People vs. Bautista

Under Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code, a person who commits a felony while serving sentence by final judgment shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, without further regard to the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. The maximum penalty for murder being death, that penalty was mandatory and left the Court no discretion to consider mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin were inmates of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, each serving sentence by virtue of final judgment—Bautista for robbery. The victim, Basilio Beltran, was likewise a convicted prisoner serving final sentence in the same institution, holding the rank of Inmate Cadet (IC), tasked with delivering food rations to prisoners. The accused were members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang confined in cell 8-C of Building 8. The killing occurred within the prison compound, where inmates were segregated by gang affiliation and where Inmate Cadets performed custodial duties such as food distribution under the supervision of prison guards.

On December 13, 1970, at approximately 6:15 in the morning, a stabbing incident occurred near the door of cell 8-C at Building 8 of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal. Prison guard Armando Miranda, assigned keeper at Building 8, was opening the door of cell 8-C, where members of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang were confined. With him were Inmate Cadets Basilio Beltran and Domingo Mallari, both confined at dormitory 8-A-2, who were carrying bread and coffee rations for the breakfast of the gang members in cell 8-C. As the door was being opened, four prisoners—Rolando Castillo, George Daeng, Conrado Bautista, and Gerardo Abuhin—all armed with "matalas" (improvised deadly weapons) and an icepick, suddenly pushed the cell door and rushed out. While one of the four (Castillo) pointed his weapon at prison guard Miranda, the other three simultaneously attacked and stabbed Inmate Cadet Basilio Beltran. Castillo then joined the other three in stabbing the already prostrate victim. The attack was over in less than half a minute. The victim sustained twelve stab wounds on different parts of his body and died instantly. The other Inmate Cadet, Domingo Mallari, was able to slip away and raise the alarm.

Immediately after the incident, investigations were conducted and sworn statements were taken from the accused and eyewitnesses on the very day of the crime, December 13, 1970, except for prison guard Miranda whose statement was taken on December 15, 1970. In their sworn statements, the accused admitted killing the victim, claiming they acted preemptively because they had heard that Inmate Cadets would kill any member of the Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang every time the ICs delivered rations. Rolando Castillo and George Daeng had already been sentenced previously on pleas of guilty—Castillo on September 15, 1973, and Daeng on September 1, 1973—for the same crime. Bautista and Abuhin were arraigned on March 10, 1973, and pleaded not guilty.

At trial, Bautista initially intimated through counsel a desire to change his plea to guilty, but when cross-examined by the prosecution, he denied participating in the stabbing, claiming he was inside the bartolina that morning. He alleged that he only admitted participation because a gang leader known as Boy Coro (Alfredo Mariano) had poked him with an improvised weapon, and that his sworn statement was extracted through force and intimidation by investigator Ferrer. He could not, however, explain why he signed the statement calmly without signs of nervousness, was never treated or hospitalized for his supposed injuries, and never reported the maltreatment to Administrative Officer Exequiel A. Santos, whom he treated like a father. His alibi was that he was sleeping in his cell when the crime occurred. Two defense witnesses attempted to corroborate this alibi but contradicted each other: Antonio Juaningco testified that Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 9, while Benito Balagtas testified that Bautista was sleeping in cell no. 13.

Abuhin testified that he was lying down in his cell when he heard a commotion, stood up, took his weapon, and heard someone shouting that everybody must come out. He admitted in open court that he participated in the killing and stabbed the victim twice, although he claimed he did so because he was hit and wounded by a knife thrown from above. He declared that he gave his sworn statement voluntarily, though he later repudiated portions of it, claiming it was fabricated out of fear of gang leaders Sarmiento and Coro. He also attempted to exculpate Bautista, testifying that Bautista was not a participant, though he had not mentioned this in his original sworn statement.

The trial court based its conviction on the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses—prison guard Miranda and Inmate Cadet Mallari—corroborating the extrajudicial confessions of the accused. Both eyewitnesses positively identified all four accused as the perpetrators, with Mallari specifically stating that it was Bautista who first stabbed the victim. The four improvised deadly weapons used in the killing were all recovered and identified.

• Involuntariness of Confessions: Bautista and Abuhin maintained that their extrajudicial confessions were extracted through force, intimidation, and maltreatment by prison investigators, rendering them inadmissible.
• Denial and Alibi: Bautista argued that he was sleeping inside his cell (bartolina) at the time of the killing and had no participation in the stabbing. Abuhin claimed he only joined the attack after being hit and wounded by a knife thrown from above, and that he acted out of fear of gang leaders.
• Repudiation of Co-Accused's Statements: Abuhin contended that Bautista was not a participant in the crime and that it would be against his conscience to let Bautista suffer for something he did not commit. Castillo, after his own conviction, belatedly testified that Bautista was not involved.
• Intimidation by Gang Leaders: Both accused claimed that gang leader Boy Coro (Alfredo Mariano) and others coerced them into admitting participation, being powerful figures within the prison cell block whose orders had to be followed.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Confessions: Whether the extrajudicial confessions of the accused were voluntarily given and admissible despite claims of force and intimidation.
• Credibility of Alibi and Denial: Whether the defenses of alibi and denial raised by Bautista and Abuhin can prevail over the positive identification by eyewitnesses and the corroborated extrajudicial confessions.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether treachery was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in the commission of the murder.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether evident premeditation and obvious ungratefulness were properly appreciated as aggravating circumstances.
• Imposition of the Maximum Penalty: Whether Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code mandates the imposition of the death penalty without regard to mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Confessions: Yes. The extrajudicial confessions were admissible, the claims of force and intimidation being general in nature and belied by the circumstances surrounding their execution, including the presence of disinterested investigators and the spontaneous narrations given on the very day of the crime.
• Credibility of Alibi and Denial: No. The alibi and denial were inherently weak, unsupported by credible evidence, and directly contradicted by positive identification from two eyewitnesses and the sworn statements of co-accused who had already pleaded guilty.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Yes. Treachery was conclusively proven, the attack being sudden, concerted, and unprovoked against a victim whose hands were occupied carrying food and who was unable to defend himself.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. Evident premeditation was established by the planned nature of the attack, the secret preparation of improvised weapons, and the accused's own admission of "attacking first." Obvious ungratefulness was present because the victim was attacked while in the very act of delivering breakfast to the assailants.
• Imposition of the Maximum Penalty: Yes. Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code mandates the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the new felony when committed by a person serving sentence by final judgment, rendering the consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances unnecessary for purposes of penalty fixation.

• Voluntariness and Admissibility of Confessions: The claims of threat and intimidation were general in nature and hardly credible in light of overwhelming established facts. The Court noted five circumstances supporting voluntariness: (1) the judicial pleas of guilty of co-accused Castillo and Daeng; (2) the disinterested and truthful narrations of prison guard Miranda and Inmate Cadet Mallari, who positively identified the four accused as the perpetrators; (3) the manifestly spontaneous narrations in the sworn statements executed on the very day of the crime, when participants and witnesses had no sufficient time to fabricate evidence; (4) the absence of any indication that the disinterested investigators had motive or grudge against the accused; and (5) the fact that Bureau of Prisons officials were merely performing their duties in the regular course of official business. Bautista's claim of maltreatment was further undermined by his inability to explain why he signed his statement calmly without signs of nervousness, why he was never treated for his supposed injuries, and why he never reported the maltreatment to Administrative Officer Santos.

• Credibility of Alibi and Denial: The alibi was inherently weak and unsupported by credible evidence. Bautista's own defense witnesses contradicted each other on a material point—one placing him in cell no. 9, the other in cell no. 13. The alibi could not stand against the positive identification made by prison guard Miranda, witness Mallari, and the sworn statements of co-accused Castillo and Daeng, both of whom had pleaded guilty. The belated testimony of Castillo exculpating Bautista was given little weight, as Castillo had already been convicted and sentenced and had nothing to lose in repudiating his earlier statement. Abuhin's complete reversal on the witness stand regarding Bautista's participation was likewise not credited.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Treachery was conclusively proven. The accused, in a sudden, concerted, and unprovoked act, all armed with improvised deadly weapons, stabbed the victim to death after pushing their cell door open and throwing prison guard Miranda off guard. The victim, holding bread and coffee in both hands intended for the assailants' breakfast, was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected assault.

• Aggravating Circumstances: Evident premeditation was established by three circumstances: (1) the sudden concerted attack was necessarily planned, calculated to throw off guard the intended victim as he was delivering food; (2) all the accused were armed with improvised deadly weapons they were not supposed to possess and must have secretly prepared over time; and (3) the accused admitted in their sworn statements that they killed the victim by "attacking first" because they had heard the rival gang would liquidate them, indicating a deliberate plan to preempt the supposed attack. Obvious ungratefulness was present because the victim was attacked while in the very act of giving the assailants their breakfast, taking advantage of his helplessness when both arms were occupied carrying their food.

• Imposition of the Maximum Penalty: Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony." The maximum penalty for murder is death. The Court thus had no choice but to impose the maximum penalty without further regard to the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, or the complete absence thereof. The consideration of such circumstances is ordinarily for fixing the proper penalty within the minimum, medium, or maximum periods, but Article 160 rendered that exercise unnecessary.

• Quasi-Recidivism (Article 160, Revised Penal Code) — Any person who commits a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. The Court applied this provision to impose the death penalty on the accused, who were inmates serving final sentences at the time they committed murder. The provision operates regardless of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, as the maximum period is mandatory.

• Treachery as a Qualifying Circumstance — Treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to ensure its accomplishment without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The Court found treachery in the sudden, concerted, and unprovoked attack on a victim whose hands were occupied carrying food, rendering him unable to defend himself.

• Evident Premeditation — Requires (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to that determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. The Court inferred evident premeditation from the planned nature of the attack, the secret preparation of improvised weapons, and the accused's own admission of "attacking first" to preempt a rival gang.

• Obvious Ungratefulness (Ingratitude) — An aggravating circumstance where the offender commits the crime against a person who has done him a favor or from whom he has benefited. The Court found this present because the victim was attacked while in the very act of delivering breakfast to the assailants, who instead of being grateful, exploited his helplessness.

• Weakness of Alibi as a Defense — Alibi is inherently weak, especially when unsupported by credible evidence and when contradicted by positive identification from credible witnesses. The Court rejected the accused's alibi, noting that their own defense witnesses contradicted each other on a material point—the cell number where Bautista supposedly slept.

• "Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code succintly provides that 'any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, ..., or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony'." — This passage states the controlling legal basis for the mandatory imposition of the death penalty, constituting the ratio decidendi on the penalty issue.

• "We have no choice here other than to impose the maximum because by mandate of Article 160 of the Revised Penal Code a person convicted of a crime while serving sentence for a previous crime shall get the maximum of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony (murder), which is death, without further regard of the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, or the complete absence thereof." — This passage articulates the Court's reasoning that Article 160 eliminates judicial discretion to adjust the penalty based on mitigating or aggravating circumstances.

• "The alleged threat and intimidation used in assailing the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confessions of the four accused, being general in nature, becomes hardly credible in the face of the overwhelming established facts and circumstances." — This passage establishes the standard for evaluating claims of coercion in extrajudicial confessions: general allegations of intimidation are insufficient when contradicted by overwhelming contrary evidence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. The trial court convicted the accused under this article, as charged in the information, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance.
• Article 160, Revised Penal Code — Provides that any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony. This provision was the controlling basis for imposing the death penalty, rendering unnecessary the consideration of mitigating and aggravating circumstances for purposes of penalty fixation.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and Martin, JJ., concurred.

Teehankee, J., took no part.