People vs. Baula

A warrantless search and seizure is illegal where the police act on mere suspicion and the accused are not under lawful arrest at the time of the seizure; evidence obtained from such an illegal search is inadmissible in evidence. Additionally, the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is received with caution on appeal where the judge who heard the witnesses did not write the decision, and testimonial evidence must be credible in itself, conforming to human knowledge, observation, and experience, to be believed.

The accused-appellants were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, of Lingayen, Pangasinan, for the killing of Patrocinia Caburao on December 13, 1995. The Information alleged that the accused, conspiring and mutually helping one another, armed with a bolo (tabas), and with abuse of superior strength, treachery, and evident premeditation, attacked and stabbed the victim. The constitutional backdrop involves Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution protecting the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and Section 3(2), Article III rendering evidence obtained in violation thereof inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

On December 13, 1995, at around eight o'clock in the evening, Jupiter Caburao decided to follow his mother, Patrocinia Caburao, who had earlier left their house at Barangay Siwasiw West, Sual, Pangasinan, to settle her obligations at a store about one-and-a-half kilometers away, owned by Brigida Tumamang. While traversing the road toward the store, Jupiter noticed a commotion near the creek about ten meters away. He focused his flashlight toward the direction of the commotion and saw accused-appellants Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos in the act of hacking a person lying on the ground, while Robert Baula and Ruben Baula stood as lookouts. The assault lasted about four minutes. The accused-appellants fled but not before threatening Jupiter with death if he divulged the incident. Jupiter went near the lifeless body, which turned out to be his own mother, whose head and face sustained four hacking wounds, two of which damaged her brain tissues. Jupiter rushed home and brought his niece and nephew to a neighbor's house for safety. For fear of reprisal and believing the police could solve the killing on their own, Jupiter did not reveal the carnage to his relatives or the police.

About two o'clock in the morning of December 14, 1995, police authorities led by SPO4 Fermin Mirande went to the locus criminis and took pictures of the victim's body. Investigation revealed that before the victim was killed, she had been to Brigida Tumamang's store; that the accused-appellants were also at the store having a drinking spree; that the victim left the store between seven and eight o'clock in the evening; and that fifteen minutes later, the accused-appellants also left. SPO4 Mirande and several policemen repaired to the respective houses of the accused-appellants. The policemen asked Ruben Baula and Crisanto Baula for the clothing they wore on the night of the murder. Ruben Baula gave his bloodstained pair of short pants, and Crisanto Baula turned over his bloodstained polo shirt. The policemen next went to the hut of Danilo Dacucos, where they found hanging on the wall a bloodstained bolo. These items, together with the victim's dried blood samples, were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation, Dagupan City Branch Office, for forensic examination. The results disclosed that the bloodstains found in the bolo, on the polo shirt, and on the pair of short pants had the same type "O" blood as that of the victim.

The defense presented a different version. Wilson Radovan, the barangay captain, testified that on the night of the incident, he and other barangay officials heard a woman's cry for help and saw Teofila Uson, who told them that she and Patrocinia Caburao were being pelted with stones, but it was too dark to identify the attacker. When the group proceeded to the place of the incident, they saw the lifeless body of Patrocinia Caburao beside the road near the creek, and Radovan did not notice any other person there. Ruben Baula testified that on the morning of December 13, 1995, he, his co-accused, and other companions were harvesting palay until 4:55 in the afternoon, after which Crisanto Baula invited the group to eat merienda at Brigida Tumamang's canteen. He noticed three other persons partaking of drinks at the store. At twilight, they left the store and proceeded to their respective residences, leaving behind the three persons who continued drinking. At about three o'clock in the morning of December 14, 1995, policemen and barangay officials arrived and asked if he knew who killed Patrocinia Caburao. Ruben and Robert Baula both vehemently denied that the police ever took any clothing from them. Crisanto Baula and Danilo Dacucos corroborated the testimony of their co-accused in its material points.

The trial court convicted all accused-appellants, finding Jupiter's explanation for his delay in reporting the killing not without valid reasons, given that he was threatened and felt the authorities could solve the crime without his revelation.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: The prosecution presented Jupiter Caburao's eyewitness testimony identifying the accused-appellants as the perpetrators, arguing that his delay in reporting was satisfactorily explained by the threat on his life and his belief that the police could solve the crime on their own.
• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: The prosecution maintained that the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt, and short pants were admissible, with the polo shirt and short pants allegedly voluntarily given by the accused, and the forensic results showing the bloodstains matched the victim's type "O" blood.

• Credibility of Eyewitness: Accused-appellants contended that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the belated eyewitness account of Jupiter Caburao, arguing that his testimony was inherently improbable and contrary to human nature.
• Illegal Search and Seizure: Accused-appellants argued that the bolo, polo shirt, and short pants taken by the policemen were seized without a valid warrant, in violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, and were therefore inadmissible in evidence.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: Whether the trial court erred in giving full credence to the belated eyewitness account of Jupiter Caburao ascribing authorship of the crime to the accused-appellants.
• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: Whether the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt, and short pants taken by the policemen from the accused-appellants without a search warrant were admissible in evidence.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: No. The belated eyewitness testimony of Jupiter Caburao was highly suspect and not credible in itself, being repugnant to human knowledge, observation, and experience, particularly because his response to witnessing his own mother's murder was far from the natural reaction expected of a son.
• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: No. The bloodstained bolo, polo shirt, and short pants were obtained through an illegal warrantless search and seizure, the police having acted on mere suspicion without a lawful arrest, and were thus inadmissible under Section 3(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

• Credibility of Eyewitness Testimony: The Court acknowledged the general rule that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to great respect on appeal, but noted that this rule does not apply where one judge hears the testimony and another judge pens the decision. Here, Judge Antonio M. Belen heard the testimony, but Judge Emilio V. Angeles wrote the decision solely on the basis of the records, so the credibility assessment was received with caution. The Court found Jupiter's belated revelation highly suspect. His claim that he did not immediately report the matter, relying on a supposition that the crime could be solved without his disclosure, was flimsy. Unlike previous cases, Jupiter was not an innocent bystander but the son of the victim; the raging passion and anger of a son who has just lost a mother in such a brutal manner would have impelled him to immediately report the crime even with an alleged threat upon his life. The Court also found significant flaws in Jupiter's testimony: he recognized all the accused as barangaymates but failed to recognize the victim because he was distant; he remembered the number of times the accused hacked the victim but could not tell which part of the body was struck; he insisted he approached the victim after the accused fled but answered in the negative when asked whether he went close to the place of the incident; and he kept silent when asked why he waited four minutes before focusing his flashlight. The Court found it unlikely that after Jupiter focused his flashlight on them, the accused would continue hacking the victim, and that the two lookouts would do nothing about the presence of a witness. The most common response of persons committing a crime would be to flee upon being discovered, especially when the witness happened to be the son of their victim. Testimonial evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, which by common experience and observation could lead to the inference of at least its probability under the circumstances.

• Admissibility of Seized Evidence: The Court held that the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt, and short pants were taken sans any search warrant from the accused-appellants at a time when the police started to question them about the killing. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution protects the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and Section 3(2) renders evidence obtained in violation thereof inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The Court recognized that warrantless searches and seizures are valid under certain circumstances, such as a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, seizure of evidence in "plain view," search of a moving vehicle, consented search, or customs search. However, the situation in this case could hardly come within any of the established exceptions. In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself must be effected under circumstances enumerated by law, such as when an offense has in fact just been committed and the peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Here, the accused-appellants were not being arrested at the time the articles were taken but were just being questioned by police officers conducting the investigation. The investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime. SPO4 Mirande's testimony revealed that the police acted on mere suspicion that the accused could be responsible for the crime only because they were at the store where the victim was last seen. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause, which signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search. The Court also found less than credible the prosecution's stance that the polo shirt and short pants were voluntarily given, as an alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, which cannot prevail against constitutionally protected rights.

• Doctrine of Judicial Deference to Trial Court Credibility Findings — The assessment made by the trial court on the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent strong justifications, because the trial court has the opportunity to observe the expression of witnesses at the stand, including their demeanor under questioning. However, this rule does not apply where one judge hears the testimony of the witnesses and another judge pens the decision, for in such a case, the thesis for the rule is not extant. The Court applied this exception because Judge Belen heard the testimony but Judge Angeles wrote the decision solely on the basis of the records.

• Doctrine of Inherent Credibility of Testimonial Evidence — Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself, which, by common experience and observation, could lead to the inference of at least its probability under the circumstances. Testimony that conforms to human knowledge, observation, and experience is often deemed reliable, and that which is repugnant to such standards belongs to the miraculous and outside of judicial cognizance. The Court applied this doctrine in finding Jupiter's response to the events far from the natural reaction of a son who had just witnessed the grisly murder of his own mother.

• Doctrine on Warrantless Searches and Seizures — The proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures is not absolute, and a warrantless search and seizure of property is valid under certain circumstances: (a) a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court; (b) seizure of evidence in "plain view," whose elements are: (i) a prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (ii) the evidence is inadvertently discovered by the police having the right to be where they are; (iii) the evidence is immediately apparent; and (iv) "plain view" justifies the seizure without further search; (c) search of a moving vehicle; (d) consented search; or (e) customs search. In a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest itself must be effected under the circumstances enumerated by law, such as when an offense has in fact just been committed and the peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause, which signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged.

• "The Court finds that Jupiter's response to the events is far from the natural reaction of a son who has just witnessed the grisly murder of his own mother. What he has said to have done is simply not in accord with human nature." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the inherent credibility doctrine, finding the eyewitness's belated revelation and conduct contrary to human experience, which was central to the acquittal.

• "Testimonial evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself which, by common experience and observation, could lead to the inference of at least its probability under the circumstances." — This is the canonical formulation of the inherent credibility requirement for testimonial evidence, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Mere suspicion cannot satisfy the requirement of probable cause which signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he can be charged." — This passage defines probable cause in the context of warrantless searches and seizures, holding that the police's actions based on mere suspicion were constitutionally infirm.

• "An alleged consent to a warrantless search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. This presumption, by itself, cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution itself abhors." — This passage rejects the prosecution's claim of voluntary surrender of evidence, emphasizing that the presumption of regularity cannot override constitutional protections.

• People vs. Capilitan, 182 SCRA 313 — Followed; cited for the rule that the trial court's credibility findings are not entitled to deference where the judge who heard the evidence is not the judge who decided the case, the Court having acquitted the accused therein on that basis.
• People vs. Villapana, 161 SCRA 72 — Followed; quoted with approval for the same proposition that the Court should exercise utmost care in evaluating evidence where the judge who heard the evidence is not the judge who decided the case.
• People vs. Escalante, 238 SCRA 554 — Followed; cited for the proposition that testimony repugnant to human knowledge, observation, and experience belongs to the miraculous and outside of judicial cognizance.
• Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 — Followed; cited for the rule that evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
• People vs. Aruta, 288 SCRA 626 — Followed; cited for the proposition that between the State and the people stands the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest.
• People vs. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72 — Followed; cited for the definition of probable cause and the rule that an illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by that search.
• Tambasen vs. People, 246 SCRA 184 — Followed; cited for the proposition that zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of arbitrary methods that the Constitution abhors.
• Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 269 SCRA 402 — Followed; cited in the enumeration of recognized exceptions to the warrantless search and seizure prohibition.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Applied to hold the warrantless seizure of the bolo, polo shirt, and short pants unconstitutional.
• Section 3(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Applied to exclude the bloodstained bolo, polo shirt, and short pants from evidence.
• Section 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court — Recognized as the basis for a lawful warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. Applied to find that the search in this case was not incidental to a lawful arrest because the accused were not being arrested at the time.
• Section 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Enumerates the circumstances for a warrantless arrest, including when an offense has in fact just been committed and the peace officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. Applied to find that the investigating officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed the crime.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing murder, under which the accused-appellants were charged and convicted, and from which they were acquitted.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code — Cited by the trial court in relation to the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Melo (Chairman), Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.