People vs. Bates

Self-defense is unavailable where the victim's unlawful aggression has already ceased, and the defender's continued infliction of wounds upon a helpless, prostrate victim constitutes retaliation, not self-defense. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the prosecution fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the means of attack were deliberately or consciously adopted to insure execution without risk to the offender; absent any qualifying circumstance, a killing charged as murder is reduced to homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.

Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr. were charged together with the murder of Jose Boholst in Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City. The Bates family — Marcelo, his brother Carlito Bates, and Marcelo, Jr. — resided in the same barangay as the victim. Jose Boholst was married to Concepcion Boholst, who witnessed part of the incident. The case arose from a confrontation involving Jose and Carlito over a dispute concerning coconut palm, which escalated into a fatal encounter. Marcelo Bates, Jr. remained at large throughout the proceedings.

On November 28, 1995, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, Edgar Fuentes, Simon Fuentes, and Jose Boholst left Barangay Esperanza, Ormoc City to deliver copra to a certain Fely Rodado at Barangay Green Valley. After completing the delivery at approximately 5:00 p.m., the three men headed back toward Barangay Esperanza. According to the prosecution, while they were walking along a trail leading to the house of Carlito Bates, Carlito suddenly emerged from a thick banana plantation, aiming his firearm at Jose, who was walking ahead of his companions. Jose grabbed Carlito's right hand and elbow and attempted to wrest the firearm away. During the struggle, the gun discharged, hitting Carlito, who fell to the ground. At that moment, Marcelo Bates and his son Marcelo Bates, Jr. — brother and nephew of Carlito, respectively — emerged from the plantation, each brandishing a bolo, and immediately attacked Jose, hacking him several times. Jose fell and rolled, but Marcelo and his son continued hacking him. Marcelo then turned toward Simon and Edgar and shouted "huwes de kutsilyo," prompting the two to flee.

Around 5:30 that same afternoon, Jose's wife, Concepcion Boholst, was at home preparing dinner when Violeta Fuentes informed her that Jose had been waylaid. Concepcion rushed to the scene, less than a hundred meters from their house, and saw Marcelo Bates and Marcelo, Jr. hacking Jose, who was lying face up. She pleaded with them to stop, but they ignored her. She did not see Carlito at the scene. Fearing for her own life, she returned home.

The defense presented a different account. Ponciano Sano, who had been sent by Barangay Captain Feliseo Sano to fetch a chicken from Marcelo, testified that while he and Marcelo were trying to catch a chicken, they noticed Jose, Edgar, and Simon approach the house of Carlito Bates, about twenty meters from Marcelo's house. Jose then dragged Carlito out of his house while the two argued and grappled, reportedly over a coconut palm. Marcelo ran toward them, but before he could reach them, Jose shot Carlito. Edgar and Simon fled. Upon seeing Carlito fall, Marcelo attacked Jose, but Jose fired a shot at him, which Marcelo avoided by ducking. As Jose was about to fire a second time, Marcelo hacked him on the neck, causing him to fall. Marcelo then went to aid his brother, found him already dead, returned to where Jose lay, and hacked him again. Ponciano picked up the gun and surrendered it to the barangay captain, and Marcelo likewise surrendered himself. The defense maintained that Marcelo Bates, Jr. was not present during the incident.

The trial court upheld the prosecution's version, finding Marcelo Bates guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and sentencing him to forty years of reclusion perpetua, with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated. Marcelo appealed, claiming self-defense, challenging the credibility of prosecution witnesses, contesting the appreciation of treachery, and arguing that passion and obfuscation should have been considered as a mitigating circumstance.

• Self-Defense: Appellant maintained that he acted in self-defense when he hacked Jose Boholst, claiming Jose had shot and killed his brother Carlito and was about to shoot him a second time, justifying his use of a bolo to repel the aggression.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant argued that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Edgar Fuentes and Concepcion Boholst were incredible and inconsistent, pointing to the absence of gunpowder burns on Carlito's wound as contradicting Edgar's account of a grapple over the gun, and contending that Concepcion should have seen Carlito's body if she truly witnessed the hacking.
• Treachery: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution having failed to prove its attendance in the commission of the crime.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Appellant argued that passion and obfuscation should have been appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in his favor, on the assumption that he did not act in self-defense, given that he was infuriated upon seeing his brother shot by Jose.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility should be respected, that the absence of gunpowder burns was not conclusive and was contradicted by appellant's own testimony confirming the grapple between Jose and Carlito, and that Concepcion's failure to notice Carlito's body was natural given the shocking sight of her husband being hacked to death.
• Inconsistencies as Minor: The prosecution maintained that any inconsistencies between the testimonies of Edgar and Concepcion were minor and did not touch upon the central fact of the crime, as both consistently and positively identified appellant and his son as the perpetrators.
• Non-Presentation of Other Witnesses: The prosecution argued that the non-presentation of Violeta Fuentes, Simon Fuentes, and Junior Comesyon was not fatal, as their testimonies would merely have been corroborative.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant established self-defense to exculpate him from criminal liability for the killing of Jose Boholst.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite alleged inconsistencies.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was sufficiently proven to sustain the conviction for Murder.
• Passion and Obfuscation: Whether the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation should have been appreciated in favor of appellant.
• Duration of Reclusion Perpetua: Whether the trial court erred in specifying the duration of reclusion perpetua at forty years.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established because unlawful aggression on the part of the victim had already ceased when appellant returned to and repeatedly hacked the helpless, prostrate victim, constituting retaliation rather than self-defense.
• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court's credibility findings were upheld, the alleged inconsistencies being minor and not touching upon the central fact of the crime, and the prosecution witnesses having positively identified the perpetrators.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, the prosecution having failed to show that the means of attack were deliberately or consciously adopted to insure execution without risk to the offenders; the conviction was accordingly reduced from Murder to Homicide.
• Passion and Obfuscation: No. Passion and obfuscation were not appreciated because appellant's second hacking of the victim, after discovering his brother was dead, was actuated by a spirit of revenge rather than lawful sentiments.
• Duration of Reclusion Perpetua: Yes, the trial court erred. Reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty and should be imposed without specifying its duration, notwithstanding Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659.

• Self-Defense: Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, self-defense requires unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. When an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. Appellant testified that he initially inflicted a single hack wound on Jose's neck, causing him to fall, then went to aid his brother Carlito, found him dead, and returned to where Jose lay — still alive but hardly moving — and hacked him repeatedly. At that point, Jose could not have mounted any defense or aggression. Unlawful aggression had ceased. It is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no further right to kill or wound the former aggressor; continued infliction of wounds constitutes retaliation, not self-defense. Because the aggression had ceased when appellant repeatedly hacked Jose, self-defense — whether complete or incomplete — was ruled out.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The issue of credibility is best addressed to the trial court, which has the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses' deportment on the stand. Absent any substantial reason justifying reversal, appellate courts are generally bound by the trial court's findings. Appellant argued that the absence of gunpowder burns on Carlito's wound belied Edgar's testimony about the grapple over the gun, but the physician's finding was neither certain nor conclusive, and was contradicted by appellant's own testimony confirming that Jose and Carlito were arguing and grappling. Appellant also challenged Concepcion's credibility for not seeing Carlito's body, but it was natural for her to be oblivious of other persons at the scene given the frightening sight of her husband being hacked to death; different people react differently to startling experiences. The inconsistencies between Edgar and Concepcion were minor — they witnessed the crime at different stages, and Edgar had already left when Concepcion arrived — and did not detract from their consistent, positive identification of appellant and his son as the killers. Discrepancies on minor details do not impair credibility. The non-presentation of other witnesses was not fatal, as the prosecution has discretion to choose its witnesses and need not present corroborative witnesses whose testimony would merely be cumulative.

• Treachery: Under Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. Two conditions must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Treachery must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself, beyond reasonable doubt, and cannot rest on mere conjecture. The only evidence was Edgar's testimony that appellant and his son emerged from the banana plantation and attacked Jose. Nothing indicated that they purposely remained hidden awaiting an opportune time to attack with impunity. A sudden attack is not treachery where it was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was triggered by sudden infuriation due to the victim's provocative act, or where the meeting was purely accidental. Because no qualifying circumstance was proven, the killing was homicide under Article 249, not murder under Article 248.

• Passion and Obfuscation: Passion or obfuscation, to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, must arise from lawful sentiments and not from a spirit of lawlessness or revenge. A distinction was drawn between the first hack — inflicted immediately upon seeing Jose shoot Carlito, which could have supported passion and obfuscation had appellant refrained from further acts — and the second hacking, committed after appellant discovered his brother was dead and returned to the prostrate, helpless victim. The latter was a clear case of acting out of anger in the spirit of revenge, disqualifying the circumstance.

• Duration of Reclusion Perpetua: While Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659 amended Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code by fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty in the absence of clear legislative intent to alter its original classification. The trial court therefore erred in imposing "forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua"; the penalty should simply be imposed without specifying its duration. This point was mooted by the reduction of the conviction to homicide, but the Court reiterated the rule for the guidance of the bench and bar.

• Cessation of Unlawful Aggression Negates Self-Defense — When unlawful aggression on the part of the victim has ceased, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor. Continued infliction of wounds upon a helpless, prostrate victim constitutes retaliation, not self-defense. Applied in this case where appellant returned to the fallen victim and hacked him repeatedly after the victim was already lying helpless on the ground.

• Burden Shifts to Accused Invoking Self-Defense — When an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused, who must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense and must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution.

• Two Requisites of Treachery — Treachery requires: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. Both must concur, and treachery must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, not by conjecture.

• Sudden Attack Not Necessarily Treacherous — A sudden attack, whether frontal or from behind, does not constitute treachery where it was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was triggered by sudden infuriation due to the victim's provocative act, or where the meeting was purely accidental.

• Reclusion Perpetua as an Indivisible Penalty — Notwithstanding Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659 fixing the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty and should be imposed without specifying its duration.

• Minor Inconsistencies Do Not Impair Credibility — Discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility.

• Prosecution's Discretion in Choice of Witnesses — The prosecution is imbued with discretion to choose whom to present as witnesses and need not present each and every witness; non-presentation of corroborative witnesses does not constitute suppression of evidence and is not fatal to the prosecution's cause.

• "At that moment, unlawful aggression on the part of Jose had ceased. It is a settled rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no longer any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for rejecting self-defense, distinguishing retaliation from lawful defense based on the cessation of unlawful aggression.

• "[C]ircumstances which qualify criminal responsibility, such as treachery, cannot rest on mere conjecture, no matter how reasonable or probable such conjecture may be. They must be based on facts of unquestionable existence. Such circumstances must be proved as indubitably as the crime itself. Treachery as a qualifying circumstance should be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt." — This formulation states the standard of proof required for treachery, explaining why the murder conviction could not stand.

• "reclusion perpetua remains to be an indivisible penalty in the absence of a clear legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. Hence, in applicable cases such as the present case, 'reclusion perpetua' should simply be imposed without specifying its duration." — This passage reiterates the doctrinal rule on the indivisible nature of reclusion perpetua despite the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 7659.

• People vs. Albao, G.R. No. 125332, March 3, 2000 — Followed for the rule that a sudden attack is not treachery where it was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was triggered by sudden infuriation due to the victim's provocative act or where the meeting was purely accidental.
• People vs. Magaro, G.R. No. 113021, July 2, 1998 — Followed for the rule that treachery cannot be appreciated where the aggressor did not consciously adopt the mode of attack to facilitate the killing without risk to himself.
• People vs. Cotas, G.R. No. 132043, May 31, 2000 — Followed for the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender has no right to kill or wound the former aggressor; otherwise, retaliation is committed.
• People vs. Lucas, G.R. Nos. 108172-73, May 25, 1994 — Followed for the rule that reclusion perpetua remains an indivisible penalty despite the amendment to Article 27 by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659.
• People vs. Mamac, G.R. No. 130332, May 31, 2000 — Followed for the proposition that different people react differently to startling or frightful experiences, supporting the credibility of Concepcion Boholst despite her failure to notice Carlito's body.
• People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 129019, August 16, 2000 — Followed for the rule that minor inconsistencies in witness testimonies not touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair credibility.

• Article 11, Revised Penal Code — Defines the justifying circumstance of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Applied to evaluate and reject appellant's claim of self-defense.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery (alevosia) as an aggravating circumstance. Applied to test whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present; found insufficiently proven.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Murder. The conviction under this article was modified because treachery was not established.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Homicide with reclusion temporal. Applied as the correct basis for conviction after treachery was not proven.
• Article 27, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 7659 — Fixes the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years. Cited to clarify that reclusion perpetua remains indivisible and should be imposed without specifying duration.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the proper indeterminate penalty for homicide, with the minimum taken from prision mayor and the maximum from the minimum period of reclusion temporal, given the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender unoffset by any aggravating circumstance.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred.