People vs. Batas

Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated where the interval between the determination to commit the crime and its execution is merely thirty minutes, as such a period is insufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act. Self-defense fails where the accused fail to prove unlawful aggression by the victims, particularly where the accused sustained no injuries and the victims suffered numerous wounds, and where the accused did not surrender to authorities whose office was in close proximity to the crime scene.

Estanislao Batas and Julius Montanez were charged with Murder and Frustrated Murder for the stabbing of cousins Aniceto Hernandez and Petronio Rosales on August 20, 1984, in Barangay Taysan, San Jose, Batangas. Batas was a resident of San Jose, Batangas, while Montanez, though from Nueva Ecija, worked as a poultry boy in San Jose and was known to Rosales from the local cockpit. Both informations alleged that Batas was a recidivist, having been convicted by final judgment on August 26, 1969 for Murder in Criminal Case No. 2519 by the Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 4 (now RTC Batangas, Branch 12, Lipa City).

On the evening of August 20, 1984, at around 9:00 o'clock, Petronio Rosales and his first cousin Aniceto Hernandez arrived at the Toyet Restaurant in Barangay Taysan, San Jose, Batangas, to drink beer. Also inside the restaurant were Estanislao Batas and Julius Montanez, occupying a separate table about one meter away. Rosales knew Batas as a fellow resident of San Jose and Montanez as a poultry worker he often saw at the cockpit. While conversing, Rosales told Hernandez about his life in Saudi Arabia and remarked that in Saudi "there is no tough guy" (walang barako).

Upon hearing this, Batas and Montanez stood up, approached Rosales and Hernandez, and asked whether they were the ones referred to as "barako." Rosales answered that they were not. After the exchange, Batas and Montanez returned to their table, finished their drinks, and left the restaurant. Rosales and Hernandez stayed for another fifteen to twenty minutes before leaving shortly before 10:00 o'clock that evening. They walked together abreast toward the poblacion, Rosales on the north side and Hernandez on the south, not far from each other on the road.

As they neared the bridge, they saw two figures about six meters away walking toward them. Rosales recognized the two as Montanez and Batas only when they met at a distance of three meters. Without any word exchanged, Batas and Montanez jointly and immediately stabbed Hernandez. When Rosales was unable to aid his cousin, the two turned on him, ganged up on him, and stabbed him — Montanez inflicting wounds on his left and right breast, and Batas wounding his left forearm. Rosales ran toward the municipal building, some fifty to one hundred twenty meters away, shouting for help. He recognized his assailants because the area was illuminated by an electric post near the bridge.

Rodolfo Carandang, a tricycle driver parked in front of the municipal building, saw Rosales running and covered with blood, shouting "pulis, pulis, tulungan ninyo ako." Rosales told those nearby that he and Hernandez had been stabbed by Batas and Montanez. Carandang boarded his tricycle and found Hernandez lying prostrate near the road; with the help of spectators, he placed Hernandez in the tricycle and later transferred him to a jeep that brought him to the hospital. Carandang had earlier passed by the bridge on his way back from Palanca and had seen Batas and Montanez there, walking westward.

Dr. Isidro Marquez, the Municipal Health Officer, conducted a post mortem examination on Hernandez on August 21, 1984, and found twenty-one wounds, of which wounds No. 4 and No. 5 were the most fatal. Except for wounds No. 1 (lacerated) and No. 2 (abrasion), which could have been caused by a blunt instrument or by falling, the rest — including the fatal wounds — were caused by a sharp-edged and sharp-pointed instrument. The nature and appearance of the wounds indicated that at least two persons using two kinds of weapons had inflicted them. The accused admitted the stabbing but claimed self-defense, testifying that the victims were the unlawful aggressors. The trial court found this claim inherently improbable and in conflict with the accused's own testimonies, noting the absence of any injuries on the accused and the number, location, and seriousness of the wounds on the victims.

• Sufficiency of Evidence for Murder: The accused argued that the prosecution evidence was not clear, adequate, and convincing to establish beyond reasonable doubt that they committed the crime of murder, with evident premeditation as a qualifying circumstance, treachery and recidivism as aggravating circumstances, and conspiracy between them.
• Sufficiency of Evidence for Frustrated Murder: The accused likewise contended that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to prove frustrated murder with intent to kill, treachery as a qualifying circumstance, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance, and conspiracy.
• Self-Defense: The accused claimed self-defense, maintaining that the victims were the unlawful aggressors.

• Self-Defense: Whether the accused successfully proved self-defense to justify the killing of Hernandez and the wounding of Rosales.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy existed between the two accused in the commission of the crimes.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the commission of the offenses.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation was properly appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
• Proper Characterization of the Crimes: Whether the crimes are properly classified as murder and frustrated murder with the appreciated circumstances.

• Self-Defense: No. The claim of self-defense was rejected for failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, the absence of injuries on the accused, the number and severity of the victims' wounds, and the accused's failure to surrender to nearby authorities.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established from the concerted acts of the accused — their being together when provoked, remaining together when they met the victims, and jointly and immediately stabbing Hernandez before turning on Rosales.
• Treachery: Yes. The sudden and unexpected attack on unarmed and defenseless victims without any warning constituted treachery, as the accused adopted means to ensure commission of the offenses without risk to themselves.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The approximately thirty-minute interval between the provocation at the restaurant and the stabbing was insufficient time for the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act, failing the requisites of evident premeditation.
• Proper Characterization of the Crimes: Yes. The crimes remain murder and frustrated murder, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance and recidivism as a generic aggravating circumstance, with no mitigating circumstance to offset the same.

• Self-Defense: The requisites of self-defense under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused testified that the victims were the unlawful aggressors, but their testimonies were inherently improbable and conflicted with each other. No injuries were sustained by the accused, which would be expected if the victims had indeed been the aggressors. Hernandez alone sustained twenty-one wounds, and Rosales sustained three — the location, number, and seriousness of these wounds belied self-defense. Furthermore, the accused did not surrender themselves or their weapons to the police, whose office was only a few meters from the crime scene, further negating the claim. Citing Ebajan vs. Court of Appeals, a person who admits wounding or killing his adversary must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of the justifying circumstance; the accused failed to do so.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances showing a concurrence of minds. The prosecution evidence clearly indicated that the acts and behavior of the accused revealed their common purpose to assault and inflict harm upon the deceased, and that there was a concerted execution of that purpose. Both accused were together when provoked at the restaurant, remained together when they met the victims near the bridge, and without any word jointly and immediately stabbed Hernandez before turning against Rosales and simultaneously attacking him. The trial court also observed that the twenty-one wounds on Hernandez — thirteen stab wounds and eight hack wounds — could only have been inflicted by at least two persons with two kinds of weapons, contradicting the accused's claim that each acted independently.

• Treachery: Treachery exists when the accused adopt means and methods to insure the commission of the offenses without risk to themselves from any defense their unwary victims might make. The victims were totally unprepared for the sudden attack and were without weapons to resist it. The assault and stabbing were done in a sudden manner on unarmed and defenseless victims, satisfying the elements of treachery.

• Evident Premeditation: Evident premeditation requires proof of: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to that determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act. The trial court appreciated evident premeditation because the anger started at the restaurant and more than half an hour elapsed before the criminal acts were performed. However, following People vs. Garachico, evident premeditation requires not only a prior decision to commit the crime but that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation, or reflection. A lapse of approximately thirty minutes — the victims having stayed at the restaurant fifteen to twenty minutes after the accused left before encountering them — was insufficient time for the accused to reflect upon the consequences of their act. Evident premeditation was therefore deleted.

• Proper Characterization of the Crimes: With evident premeditation deleted, treachery remained as the qualifying circumstance for both murder and frustrated murder. Recidivism was properly appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, as alleged in the informations and proven by Batas's prior final conviction for murder on August 26, 1969. No mitigating circumstance was present to offset recidivism. The crimes were thus properly classified as murder and frustrated murder, and the appealed decision was affirmed.

• Self-Defense — Unlawful Aggression as Indispensable Requisite — Self-defense requires proof of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable requisite; without it, there can be no self-defense. The burden of proof shifts to the accused upon admission of the killing or wounding, who must present clear and convincing evidence of the justifying circumstance. The absence of injuries on the accused, the number and severity of the victim's wounds, and failure to surrender to nearby authorities all negate self-defense.

• Conspiracy Inferred from Concerted Acts — Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence; it may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances demonstrating a concurrence of minds. Where the accused are together when provoked, remain together when they encounter the victims, and jointly and immediately attack without any word, their acts reveal a common purpose and a concerted execution thereof.

• Treachery — Sudden Attack on Unarmed Victims — Treachery exists when the accused adopt means and methods to insure the commission of the offense without risk to themselves from any defense the unwary victims might make. A sudden and unexpected attack on unarmed and defenseless victims constitutes treachery.

• Evident Premeditation — Requisites and Insufficient Time for Reflection — Evident premeditation requires: (1) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that they clung to that determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act. An interval of approximately thirty minutes between provocation and execution is insufficient to warrant a finding of evident premeditation, as the decision must be the result of meditation, calculation, or reflection, or persistent attempt.

• "A person who seeks justification for his act must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of the necessary justice circumstance for having admitted wounding or killing his adversary, and he is criminally liable unless he is able to satisfy the court that he acted in legitimate, self-defense." — This passage, quoting Ebajan vs. Court of Appeals, articulates the burden placed on an accused who admits the killing but invokes self-defense, establishing that the burden of proof shifts to the defense.

• "To authorize the finding of evident premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused had made a decision to commit the crime prior to the moment of its execution but that this decision was the result of meditation, calculation or reflection or persistent attempt." — This passage, quoting People vs. Garachico, sets forth the standard for evident premeditation and was applied to hold that a thirty-minute interval was insufficient for reflection.

• "The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly indicates that the acts and behavior of the accused reveal their common purpose to assault and inflict harm upon the deceased and that there was a concerted execution of that common purpose." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for upholding the finding of conspiracy based on circumstantial evidence of concerted action.

• Ebajan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 77930-31, February 9, 1989 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that a person who admits wounding or killing his adversary must prove by clear and convincing evidence the presence of the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

• People vs. Bacho, G.R. No. 66645, March 29, 1989 — Followed. Cited for the principle that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts and behavior of the accused revealing a common purpose and concerted execution.

• Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84423, January 31, 1989 — Followed. Cited for the principle that conspiracy may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances, even without direct evidence of concurrence of minds.

• People vs. Gimongala, G.R. Nos. 62968-69, February 27, 1989 — Followed. Cited for the definition of treachery as the adoption of means and methods to insure commission of the offense without risk to the accused from any defense the victims might make.

• People vs. Almario, G.R. No. 69374, March 16, 1989 — Followed. Cited for the three requisites of evident premeditation: time of determination, act indicating clinging to determination, and sufficient lapse of time for reflection.

• People vs. Garachico, 133 SCRA 131 — Applied as controlling. Cited for the requirement that evident premeditation must result from meditation, calculation, or reflection, and that a thirty-minute interval is insufficient time for such reflection.

• Article 11, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines the justifying circumstance of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Applied to reject the accused's claim of self-defense for failure to prove unlawful aggression.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.