People vs. Bastasa

A legally married person who surprises a spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another person and kills either or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter is liable under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code and must suffer the penalty of destierro, not reclusion perpetua for murder. The credit for preventive imprisonment under Article 29 extends to a sentence of destierro, because destierro, while not imprisonment, is a form of deprivation of liberty.

Dionisio Bastasa and his wife Virginia Bastasa resided at Jones Street, Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte. The deceased, Atty. Solomon Sudiacal, was a local attorney who had a business arrangement with Bastasa, having placed an order for cigarettes through him. Unknown to Bastasa, the deceased had been carrying on an illicit sexual relationship with Virginia Bastasa. On November 30, 1966, Bastasa left Dipolog for Zamboanga City on a business errand without informing his wife when he would return, creating what the Solicitor General characterized as a perfect opportunity for the deceased to visit the Bastasa residence for sexual relations.

On the evening of December 2, 1966, Atty. Solomon Sudiacal was at his drug store in Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, with his wife, Leonora Lacaya Sudiacal. After 7:00 p.m., he left the store; his wife expected him to go to Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte. Instead, the deceased proceeded to the house of the spouses Dionisio Bastasa and Virginia Bastasa at Jones Street, Dipolog, ostensibly to find out whether Dionisio had returned from Zamboanga City, as the deceased had placed an order for cigarettes through him. Virginia informed him that her husband had not yet arrived, and the deceased decided to wait, sitting on a chair in the sala while Virginia sewed at a sewing machine with her back to him.

According to the prosecution's version, while the deceased was sitting and scanning a fashion magazine in the sala, the appellant fired shots at him. Neighbors Francisco Balboza, Jr. and Blanco Carreon, who had been playing cards nearby, heard shots coming from the Bastasa house at around 9:30 p.m. Looking toward the house, they saw the deceased, fully clothed and face soaked in blood, slowly walking toward the kitchen while the appellant aimed a gun at him. The appellant then fired again, and the deceased fell on the kitchen floor. The two witnesses then saw Virginia Bastasa emerge from the bedroom; the spouses undressed the deceased and brought his naked body to the sala and then to the balcony. Four or five successive shots followed, after which the spouses left the house.

The appellant Dionisio Bastasa admitted shooting the deceased but gave a markedly different account. He testified that he had left for Zamboanga City on November 30, 1966 without informing his wife when he would return. On December 2, 1966, he arrived home at about 9:00 p.m., entering through a secret passage leading to the old balcony to avoid disturbing his sleeping family. On the center table in the sala he found a jacket and a .45 caliber pistol. Believing someone was inside the bedroom, he took the pistol, confirmed it was loaded, and climbed a ladder on the northern side of the house to observe without being seen. From the top of the ladder, he saw the deceased, naked from the waist down, lying with his wife and having sexual intercourse with her. His feet slipped, creating a noise; the deceased stood up, and Bastasa fired four shots at him. The deceased ran to the sala, picked up his jacket, and Bastasa fired three more shots. The deceased ran to the kitchen. Bastasa climbed down to pursue him, heard a crash against the plywood board serving as a provisional shutter of the new balcony, and saw the deceased fall with the board. He went up and fired two more shots. He then turned the body over and attempted to cut off the deceased's penis but desisted upon hearing an approaching jeep. He left the house, placed the pistol on the deceased's stomach, failed to find a motorcab, borrowed his uncle Dr. Destura's car, visited his cousin Gregorio Bastasa to arrange for a bond, and then proceeded to the PC Headquarters at Sicayab, Dipolog, where he surrendered and informed them he had killed a man inside his own house.

The Solicitor General found the appellant's version more credible than the prosecution's, noting that the physical evidence corroborated it: four empty bullet shells were found on the bedroom floor, consistent with Bastasa's account of firing four shots there; the deceased's T-shirt had no bullet holes despite wounds on his breast, confirming he was not wearing it when first shot; the bullet holes on the jacket did not align with the wounds on the upper body, supporting the claim that the deceased held the jacket as a shield in the sala; the fashion magazines found under a table bore bullet holes, contradicting the prosecution's claim that the deceased was reading one when first shot; and the body was found completely naked on a piece of plywood in the living room, consistent with Bastasa's account of the deceased falling through the balcony shutter. The Solicitor General further concluded that the deceased's real purpose in visiting the Bastasa residence was to engage in sexual intercourse with Virginia, taking advantage of her husband's absence. The Supreme Court agreed with these observations and conclusions.

• Misapplication of Article 247: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not applying the provisions of Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code in the imposition of the penalty, maintaining that the killing was committed under exceptional circumstances—specifically, that he had surprised the deceased in the act of sexual intercourse with his wife.

• Adoption of Appellant's Version: The Solicitor General, representing the People of the Philippines, concurred with the appellant's version of the incident, finding it more credible than the prosecution's account because it was consistent with the physical evidence. The Solicitor General recommended that the appellant be sentenced under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code to the penalty of destierro, concluding that the appellant killed the deceased while in the act of committing sexual intercourse with the appellant's wife.

• Applicability of Article 247: Whether the killing of Atty. Solomon Sudiacal by Dionisio Bastasa falls under the exceptional circumstances defined in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code, warranting the penalty of destierro instead of reclusion perpetua for murder.
• Credit for Preventive Imprisonment: Whether the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, which credits preventive imprisonment against the service of a sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, may be extended to an appellant sentenced to destierro.

• Applicability of Article 247: Yes. The killing was committed under exceptional circumstances as defined in Article 247, the physical evidence having corroborated the appellant's account that he surprised the deceased in the act of sexual intercourse with his wife and killed him immediately thereafter.
• Credit for Preventive Imprisonment: Yes. Article 29 applies when the penalty imposed consists of deprivation of liberty, and destierro, though not imprisonment, is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty; the appellant is therefore entitled to credit for his preventive imprisonment against the destierro sentence.

• Applicability of Article 247: The Court carefully examined the records and agreed with the Solicitor General's observations. The physical evidence consistently corroborated the appellant's account over the prosecution's version: the four empty bullet shells on the bedroom floor supported the claim that four shots were fired in the bedroom; the absence of bullet holes on the deceased's T-shirt despite wounds on his breast confirmed he was not wearing it when first shot; the misalignment between jacket bullet holes and body wounds substantiated the claim that the jacket was used as a shield in the sala; the bullet holes in the fashion magazines found under a table contradicted the prosecution's claim that the deceased was reading when first shot; and the naked body found on plywood in the living room verified the appellant's account of the deceased falling through the balcony shutter. The antecedent facts—particularly the ongoing illicit relations between the deceased and the appellant's wife, and the appellant's unannounced departure for Zamboanga City on November 30, 1966—established that the deceased's real purpose in visiting the Bastasa residence was to engage in sexual intercourse with Virginia. These circumstances brought the killing squarely within the first paragraph of Article 247, which imposes destierro on a legally married person who, having surprised a spouse in the act of sexual intercourse with another person, kills either or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.

• Credit for Preventive Imprisonment: The appellant had been under preventive imprisonment since December 2, 1966—nearly twelve years as of the date of decision. The penalty of destierro has a duration of six months and one day to six years. Even if credited with only four-fifths of his preventive imprisonment (nine years and six months), the appellant had more than served the full duration of destierro. The Court held that Article 29 applies whenever the penalty imposed consists of deprivation of liberty. Relying on Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasar, the Court noted that destierro means banishment or prohibition from residing within a radius of 25 kilometers from the accused's actual residence for a specified length of time. Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment—a typical example of deprivation of liberty—it is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty. Article 29 was therefore applicable, and the appellant was entitled to credit for the full period of his preventive imprisonment against the destierro sentence.

• Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code (Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted Under Exceptional Circumstances) — A legally married person who, having surprised a spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person, kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or inflicts upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. The Court applied this provision after finding that the physical evidence corroborated the appellant's account that he caught the deceased in the act of sexual intercourse with his wife and killed him immediately thereafter, displacing the trial court's murder conviction.

• Destierro as Deprivation of Liberty under Article 29 — Destierro, defined as banishment or prohibition from residing within a 25-kilometer radius of the accused's actual residence for a specified period, does not constitute imprisonment but is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty. Because Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code applies whenever the penalty imposed consists of deprivation of liberty, preventive imprisonment credit extends to a sentence of destierro. The Court so held, relying on Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasar and People vs. Abilong.

• "Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment (which is a typical example of deprivation of liberty), it is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty." — This passage establishes the ratio decidendi on the second issue, defining destierro as a form of deprivation of liberty sufficient to trigger the application of Article 29's preventive imprisonment credit.

• "We have carefully examined the records of this case and We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General as well as his conclusion that the appellant killed the deceased while in the act of committing sexual intercourse with the appellant's wife, Virginia Bastasa." — This sentence marks the Court's adoption of the Solicitor General's factual findings and legal conclusion, forming the basis for the application of Article 247.

• "Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code applies when the penalty to which the accused has been sentenced consists of deprivation of liberty." — This formulation articulates the governing rule for determining the applicability of preventive imprisonment credit, tying it to the nature of the penalty rather than the specific form of custody.

• Uy Chin Hua vs. Dinglasar, 86 Phil. 617 — Cited for the definition of destierro as banishment or prohibition from residing within a 25-kilometer radius of the accused's actual residence for a specified length of time, establishing that destierro, while not imprisonment, is a deprivation of liberty.

• People vs. Abilong, 82 Phil. 172 — Cited in support of the proposition that destierro does not constitute imprisonment but is nonetheless a deprivation of liberty, reinforcing the applicability of Article 29 to a destierro sentence.

• Article 247, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. Applied to the appellant because the Court found that he surprised the deceased in the act of sexual intercourse with his wife and killed him immediately thereafter, warranting the penalty of destierro instead of reclusion perpetua for murder.

• Article 29, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 6127) — Governs the credit of preventive imprisonment against the service of a sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty. Applied to the appellant's destierro sentence because destierro is a deprivation of liberty, entitling him to credit for nearly twelve years of preventive imprisonment—far exceeding the six-year maximum of destierro—resulting in his immediate release.

• Article 19(3), Revised Penal Code — Defines an accessory after the fact. Applied by the trial court to acquit Virginia Bastasa, who as the spouse of the principal was exempt from criminal liability as an accessory after the fact.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, and Santos, JJ., concurred.