People vs. Barcimo, Jr.

Positive identification of an accused by credible eyewitnesses, even under artificial illumination such as a kerosene lamp, prevails over the defenses of alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving absent clear and convincing substantiation.

Thelma Subosa, a mother of fourteen children by her deceased husband Primo Subosa, later cohabited with her common-law husband Warlito Huesca in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New Lucena, Iloilo. Warlito Huesca died, and the victim was killed in the early morning of June 14, 1993, the day after Warlito's burial. Claudio Barcimo, Jr. was a friend of the deceased Warlito Huesca and was known to the victim's children.

Thelma Subosa was the mother of fourteen children with her deceased husband, Primo Subosa. She subsequently cohabited with her common-law husband, Warlito Huesca, and lived with some of her children in Brgy. Janipa-an, Oeste, New Lucena, Iloilo. Warlito Huesca also died, and was buried on June 13, 1993.

In the early morning of June 14, 1993, the victim and her children — Ellyn, Roselyn, Evelyn, Manilyn, Leopoldo, and Lilibeth — together with Milagros Huesca, Warlito's younger sister, were awakened by the forcible opening of the door of their house. Four men entered and declared a "hold up." The victim pleaded not to be harmed, but accused Ronnie Abolidor tied her mouth with a handkerchief to silence her. Thereafter, appellant Claudio Barcimo, Jr., also known as "Noc-noc," shot the victim several times, causing her instantaneous death. Ellyn and Roselyn, who slept on the same mat as their mother, identified Barcimo and Abolidor, aided by a kerosene lamp placed approximately five to six inches from the victim's head. They knew Abolidor as a longtime neighbor and Barcimo as a friend of their deceased stepfather. Francisco Comoda was later identified at the police station. Roselyn further testified that on June 12, 1993, during the burial of their stepfather, the victim told her that it was Barcimo who had killed Warlito Huesca.

For his part, Barcimo denied participation in the killing. He claimed he was a good friend of Warlito Huesca and could not have committed the crime. He asserted that on June 13, 1993, at around 4:00 p.m., he was with Brgy. Capt. Buñol at a celebration at the house of Brgy. Capt. Gerardo Paniza in Brgy. Dawis, where he had dinner and watched a mahjong game. He stated that he slept on a sofa near the mahjong table at around 10:00 p.m., that the game lasted until 4:00 a.m. the following day, and that he and Capt. Buñol returned to New Lucena at about 6:00 a.m. on June 14, 1993. He further stated that he left for Manila the next day for treatment of tuberculosis. He surrendered to the authorities more than one year after the incident, at which time a warrant of arrest was already pending against him.

The trial court found the collective testimonies of Ellyn and Roselyn to be direct, straightforward, and delivered without hesitancy, crediting their natural naiveté and inexperience as making them reliable witnesses free from bias or prejudice. The court convicted all three accused of murder qualified by treachery.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant contended that his identification by Ellyn and Roselyn was doubtful because, when asked whether they knew the assailants, they replied in the negative. He further argued that the testimony of the witnesses' aunt, corroborated by the barangay captain of the place where the incident occurred, showed that the prosecution witnesses had not identified the killers.
• Treachery: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that treachery was attendant in the commission of the crime.
• Nighttime: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in holding that nighttime was attendant in the commission of the crime.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating his voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• Alibi and Denial: Appellant asserted that he could not have committed the killing because the victim's common-law husband, Warlito Huesca, was his good friend, and that at the time of the incident he was at Brgy. Dawis with Brgy. Capt. Buñol watching a mahjong game.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Identification: Whether the prosecution witnesses' identification of the appellant as one of the assailants was credible and sufficient to sustain a conviction.
• Treachery: Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery was properly appreciated.
• Nighttime: Whether nighttime was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated in favor of the appellant.
• Damages: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, actual damages, moral damages, and exemplary damages were properly determined.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Identification: Yes. The positive identification by Ellyn and Roselyn was categorical, consistent, and made under sufficient illumination from a kerosene lamp, and thus prevailed over alibi and denial.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery was present because the victim had just awakened and was lying down with a handkerchief tied over her mouth, rendering her unable to defend herself.
• Nighttime: N/A. The decision did not separately rule on nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, the appellant's assignment of error on this point having been subsumed into the discussion of witness credibility and illumination.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. The requisites of voluntary surrender were not satisfied, as the surrender was made more than one year after the incident, with a pending warrant of arrest, and for the purpose of disclaiming responsibility rather than acknowledging guilt or saving the authorities trouble.
• Damages: The civil indemnity was reduced to P50,000.00; actual damages were increased to P19,000.00 based on the accused's admission; exemplary damages were fixed at P25,000.00; and moral damages were deleted for lack of proof.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Identification: Findings of fact and assessments of witness credibility by the trial court are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, on appeal, owing to the trial court's unique advantage in observing the demeanor and conduct of witnesses. No showing existed that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied any material fact. The trial court found Ellyn and Roselyn's testimonies to be direct, straightforward, and free from bias. Although the incident occurred at nighttime, a kerosene lamp placed five to six inches from the victim's head provided sufficient illumination for identification. In People vs. Prieto, illumination from kerosene lamps was ruled sufficient in proper situations. Moreover, Roselyn was familiar with Barcimo's voice as a friend of her stepfather, and voice recognition is an acceptable means of identification where the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely. The witnesses' failure to immediately report the perpetrators' identities was excused by fear, and the delay was not unreasonable since they named the appellant and Abolidor when investigated later that same day. Positive identification, when categorical, consistent, and free from ill motive, prevails over alibi and denial, which are negative and self-serving absent clear and convincing evidence.

• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. It is settled that treachery is present when the victim, when killed, was sleeping or had just awakened, as the victim is then in no position to mount any defense. Here, the victim had just been awakened by the forcible opening of the door and was lying down on the mat with a handkerchief tied around her mouth when shot, rendering her entirely defenseless.

• Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance requires three requisites: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary, meaning spontaneous and showing intent to submit unconditionally, either from acknowledgment of guilt or desire to save the authorities trouble and expense. In People vs. Viernes, going to the police station to clear one's name does not show intent to surrender unconditionally. Barcimo surrendered more than one year after the incident, with a pending warrant of arrest, and for the purpose of disclaiming responsibility — showing neither repentance nor acknowledgment of guilt nor intent to save the government trouble.

• Damages: Civil indemnity was reduced from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Actual damages were increased from P16,000.00 to P19,000.00 because, while receipts ordinarily support claims for actual damages, the amount of P19,000.00 was admitted by the appellant, and an admitted amount should be granted. Moral damages were deleted because the prosecution failed to present proof thereof, and in murder and homicide cases, moral damages must be substantiated by evidence. Exemplary damages were awarded at P25,000.00 under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, since treachery, which qualified the killing to murder, is understood as an aggravating circumstance in the broad or generic sense for purposes of civil liability.

• Trial court's findings on witness credibility — Findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of testimonies, and its assessment of probative weight are accorded high respect, if not conclusive effect, on appeal, because of the trial court's unique advantage in observing the demeanor and conduct of witnesses, unless the trial court overlooked, misconstrued, or misinterpreted cogent facts of substance that might affect the result. The Court found no such oversight here.

• Sufficiency of artificial illumination for identification — Illumination provided by kerosene lamps, wicklamps, flashlights, moonlight, or starlight may, in proper situations, be considered sufficient illumination for purposes of identifying perpetrators, making attacks on witness credibility based solely on the ground of inadequate lighting unmeritorious.

• Voice recognition as a means of identification — The voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years. Once familiarity is gained, identification becomes easy even from a considerable distance.

• Positive identification prevails over alibi and denial — Categorical and consistent positive identification, not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses, prevails over alibi and denial, which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.

• Treachery when victim is sleeping or just awakened — Treachery is present when the victim, at the time of killing, was sleeping or had just awakened, because in such cases the victim is in no position to put up any form of defense.

• Requisites of voluntary surrender — To benefit an accused, voluntary surrender requires: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary, i.e., spontaneous and showing intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities, either because of acknowledgment of guilt or desire to save them the trouble and expense of search and capture. Going to the police station merely to clear one's name does not constitute voluntary surrender.

• Exemplary damages for qualifying circumstances — Under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The term "aggravating circumstances" is understood in its broad or generic sense, so that a qualifying circumstance such as treachery warrants an award of exemplary damages.

• "It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on why the appellant's alibi and denial were rejected in favor of the prosecution witnesses' positive identification.

• "It is settled that there is treachery if the victim, when killed, was sleeping or had just awakened, because in such cases the victim was in no position to put up any form of defense." — This formulation of the treachery doctrine as applied to sleeping or newly awakened victims is frequently cited in subsequent murder jurisprudence.

• "A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Voluntary surrender presupposes repentance." — This passage defines the essential nature of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance and explains why the appellant's delayed, disclaimer-motivated surrender did not qualify.

• People vs. Prieto, G.R. No. 141259, July 18, 2003 — Cited for the proposition that illumination from kerosene lamps, wicklamps, flashlights, moonlight, or starlight may be considered sufficient for identification purposes.
• People vs. Tuppal, G.R. Nos. 137982-85, January 13, 2003 — Cited for the rule that voice recognition is an acceptable means of identification where the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely.
• People vs. Lawa, G.R. Nos. 126147 & 143925-26, January 28, 2003 — Cited for the principle that there is no rule requiring a witness to immediately name the suspect, and that fear may stifle witnesses from reporting.
• People vs. Aliben, G.R. No. 140404, February 27, 2003 — Cited for the doctrine that positive identification prevails over alibi and denial.
• People vs. Fernandez, G.R. No. 134762, July 23, 2002 — Cited for the rule that treachery is present when the victim was sleeping or had just awakened.
• Luces vs. People, G.R. No. 149492, January 20, 2003 — Cited for the requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Viernes, G.R. Nos. 136733-35, December 13, 2001 — Cited for the proposition that going to the police station to clear one's name does not show intent to surrender unconditionally.
• People vs. Delada, G.R. No. 137406, March 26, 2003 — Cited for the reduction of civil indemnity in murder cases to P50,000.00.
• People vs. Caballero, G.R. Nos. 149028-30, April 2, 2003 — Cited for the requirement that moral damages in murder and homicide cases must be substantiated by evidence.
• People vs. Pidoy, G.R. No. 146696, July 3, 2003 — Cited for the award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00 where a qualifying circumstance such as treachery is present.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction and the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Governs the imposition of the lesser penalty when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances are present. The Court relied on this provision to sustain the imposition of reclusion perpetua.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The Court applied this provision to award exemplary damages of P25,000.00, holding that treachery as a qualifying circumstance falls within the broad or generic sense of "aggravating circumstances" for purposes of civil liability.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.