People vs. Barasina

When homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, as the offense constitutes a single complex crime under P.D. 1866, and the constitutional right to counsel during custodial investigation is satisfied by the provision of a competent and independent lawyer, even if not the accused's initially preferred choice.

On July 17, 1988, Fiscal Lino Mayo of Olongapo City was shot and killed at the Victory Liner Compound in Caloocan City. The accused, Elias Barasina, was apprehended near the scene shortly thereafter in possession of a .45 caliber pistol, which was later determined to be unlicensed and the weapon used in the killing. He was charged with two separate Informations: one for illegal possession of a firearm under P.D. 1866, and another for murder.

• Nature of the Action: Two separate criminal cases for Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm were filed against the accused, Elias Barasina, for the shooting death of Fiscal Lino Mayo using an unlicensed .45 caliber pistol.
• The Shooting: On the evening of July 17, 1988, at the well-lit Victory Liner Compound, multiple eyewitnesses (Rufino Alcaraz, Felipe Hamtig, Ruel Ganiola, and Barangay Councilman Prudencio Motos) saw the accused shoot the victim in the face with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused was then seen cocking the gun, tucking it into his waist, and fleeing.
• Apprehension and Evidence: The accused was chased and apprehended by police near the LRT station. The unlicensed firearm was confiscated from him. Ballistic examination confirmed the spent shell at the scene was fired from the confiscated gun. A paraffin test on the accused was positive for gunpowder nitrates.
• Extrajudicial Confession: During custodial investigation, the accused, assisted by Atty. Abelardo Torres (provided upon the directive of the police), executed a written confession and a waiver of rights ("Paalala").
• Defense Version: The accused claimed he was merely walking when a stranger bumped him, dropped a gun, and ran. He alleged he picked up the gun to return it and fired a warning shot. He later retracted his confession, claiming it was coerced and that he was not assisted by a lawyer of his own choice.
• Lower Court Findings: The trial court found the prosecution witnesses credible and the defense version "strange and bizarre." It convicted the accused of both offenses.

• Inadmissible Confession: Petitioner (accused-appellant) argued that his extrajudicial confession was inadmissible because he was not assisted by competent and independent counsel of his own choice, as required by Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. He claimed he wanted Atty. Romeo Mendoza but was given Atty. Abelardo Torres.
• Insufficient Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt, relying on his exculpatory testimony that he merely found the gun.

• Valid Confession: Respondent (People) countered that the accused was properly assisted by a competent and independent counsel (Atty. Torres) during the investigation, and there was no showing the accused manifested a desire for a different lawyer at that time.
• Credible Eyewitness Testimony: Respondent argued that the positive, categorical, and consistent testimonies of multiple eyewitnesses positively identifying the accused as the shooter overwhelmed the accused's bare denial and incredible story.

• Constitutional Right to Counsel: Whether the extrajudicial confession is admissible, given the accused's claim that he was not assisted by counsel of his own choice.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved the accused's guilt for Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm beyond reasonable doubt.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the Court of Appeals correctly increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua for each offense.

• Constitutional Right to Counsel: The extrajudicial confession is admissible. The constitutional requirement is for "competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice." The word "preferably" does not grant an exclusive right to a specific lawyer. The accused was assisted by a lawyer, conferred with him, and did not object to his presence or request another at the time. The hiring of a different lawyer later was deemed an afterthought.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The evidence proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution's eyewitness accounts were affirmative, categorical, and corroborated by physical evidence (ballistics, paraffin test). The accused's version was inherently unbelievable and contradicted by a prosecution witness. The incomplete cross-examination of one witness (Hamtig) did not violate the accused's rights, as the opportunity for cross-examination was provided and substantial cross-examination had occurred.
• Proper Penalty: The Court of Appeals correctly modified the penalty. Pursuant to People v. Tac-an and People v. Morato, when murder is committed with an unlicensed firearm, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua under the complex crime provision of P.D. 1866. This single complex crime should be charged in one information, but since two separate informations were filed without a motion to quash, the conviction for two separate offenses stands, with the penalty for each being reclusion perpetua.

• Right to Counsel During Custodial Investigation — Under Section 12(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a person under investigation has the right to competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice. The use of "preferably" means the right is not absolute; the state's duty is to provide a competent and independent lawyer if the suspect cannot afford one or if the chosen lawyer is unavailable. The key is the effective and genuine assistance of counsel, not the identity of the lawyer.
• Complex Crime of Murder with Unlicensed Firearm — Under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866, the act of committing homicide or murder with an unlicensed firearm constitutes a single complex crime punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. The penalty is imposable for the complex crime itself, not as separate penalties for murder and illegal possession.

• "The word 'preferably' under Section 12[1], Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution does not convey the message that the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling his defense." — This clarifies that the constitutional right to counsel is not a right to a specific lawyer, but a right to effective assistance.
• "The efficacy of accused-appellant's own version that he merely picked up the gun which supposedly fell from a stranger who bumped appellant, presumably for the purpose of returning the firearm to its rightful owner had been adequately diminished by Prudencio Motos who sat on the witness stand to particularly say that nobody bumped accused-appellant near the LRT station." — Illustrates the Court's assessment of witness credibility and the rejection of the accused's inherently improbable defense.

• People vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601 (1990) — Cited as controlling precedent for the rule that the penalty for murder committed with an unlicensed firearm is reclusion perpetua.
• People vs. Morato, G.R. Nos. 95358-59, July 5, 1993 — Reiterated the doctrine from Tac-an.
• People vs. Gorospe, 129 SCRA 233 (1984) — Cited for the principle that the right to cross-examination is not absolute and may be considered terminated if it serves the ends of justice, especially when the failure to complete it is not the fault of the prosecution.

• Section 12(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides the right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of one's own choice during custodial investigation. Applied to determine the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession.
• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Defines and penalizes illegal possession of firearms. The second paragraph provides that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed (interpreted as reclusion perpetua in light of subsequent laws).

• Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Chairman)
• Justice Josue N. Bellosillo
• Justice Santiago M. Kapunan

N/A — The decision was unanimous.