People vs. Bantillo

Positive identification by credible eyewitnesses prevails over the defense of alibi where the alibi does not demonstrate physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene, and treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstances of band and superior strength as all three refer essentially to the use of combined strength to overpower the victim.

The accused and the victim were all residents of or had connections to Barangay Batuanan, Carles, Iloilo, and were personally known to each other. Ernesto Asuncion was the first cousin of the victim's son, Ruel Temblor, and allegedly harbored a grudge against the victim for supporting a rival candidate, Romerico Asuncion, in the barangay elections. Six individuals were charged with murder, but only Bantillo and Ernesto Asuncion were apprehended and tried; the other four remained at large.

At about 7:30 in the morning of March 6, 1990, Francisco Temblor and his son Ruel walked along the seashore of Barangay Batuanan, Carles, Iloilo, heading toward a coconut lumber site about two kilometers from their residence. Ruel was approximately 30 meters ahead of his father when he heard gunfire. Turning back, he saw his father fall to the ground and witnessed six persons armed with long homemade firearms known as "pugakhang" rush and surround the fallen victim. Ruel saw Alex Bantillo shoot his father in the head, after which all six assailants fled toward the hills. Ruel then proceeded to Barangay Barangcalan to seek help from their employer, Eric Lacson, but finding him absent, returned home and informed his mother, Celedonia. Together with four male companions, Ruel went back to the crime scene to attend to his father's body until a doctor and policemen arrived. Ruel's family incurred P20,000.00 in wake and funeral expenses.

Ruel positively identified the appellants in open court, testifying that he personally knew all six perpetrators because they used to reside in the same barangay. He stated that Ernesto Asuncion was his first cousin and Larry Asuncion was Ernesto's son. He opined that Ernesto had a grudge against his father for supporting Romerico Asuncion instead of Ernesto in the barangay elections. Ruel's testimony was corroborated in its material points by Alfredo Bandojo, an independent eyewitness who had arrived by pumpboat at the tip of Batuanan to retrieve coconut lumber. Bandojo declared that he saw Ruel walking ahead of his father, heard a series of explosions, and saw the six accused emerge from the bushes and coconut trees carrying long homemade firearms. He confirmed that after the victim fell, Alex Bantillo shot him in the head before the perpetrators departed.

Dr. Judy Ann Trumpeta conducted the post-mortem examination and found fifteen gunshot wounds on the victim's body. The frontal bone and both parietal bones were exploded, exposing the brain. Powder burns on some wounds indicated that certain shots were fired at close range, probably less than three meters. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple gunshot wounds. The incident was reported to the Carles police, who investigated but failed to apprehend any suspect. Two days later, Ruel went to the police station and gave the names of the suspects, except Ernesto Asuncion. Of the six perpetrators, only Bantillo and Ernesto Asuncion were apprehended and tried.

For their defense, Bantillo denied shooting Francisco and claimed he was in Barangay Manlot digging white clay at the time of the incident. He alleged that Eric Lacson implicated him because Lacson resented his joining the Free Farmers Federation and not supporting Lacson's candidacy during the barangay elections. Ernesto Asuncion corroborated Bantillo's alibi, insisting he was in Manlot supervising the dyeing of clay starting at four o'clock in the morning. He admitted, however, that Batuanan was accessible from Manlot by pumpboat in less than an hour or one and a half hours at most. Three other defense witnesses testified: Rolando Saturnino declared that Bantillo, Ernesto Asuncion, and Larry Asuncion were working in Manlot at the time of the killing; Romerico Asuncion, the incumbent barangay captain, stated that Celedonia and Ruel told him of Francisco's death but did not name the perpetrators; and Eduardo Casibual disputed Ruel's eyewitness account, claiming that Ruel was at the victim's house when a boy informed Celedonia and Ruel of the killing. The trial court found the defense's version unworthy of credence, ruling that the denial and alibi were unavailing in light of the positive and convincing identification of the appellants.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of Ruel Temblor and Alfredo Bandojo, contending that their claim of having witnessed the killing was unbelievable and that they could not have actually seen Alex Bantillo shoot Francisco Temblor in the head.
• Motive: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in crediting Ruel's testimony that his father was killed because the victim supported Romerico Asuncion instead of Ernesto Asuncion in the barangay elections, asserting the motive was too flimsy.
• Failure to Report Perpetrators: Appellants maintained that the trial court erred in not considering that immediately after the incident, no mention was made of who killed Francisco Temblor or who the perpetrators were, and in not giving weight to Romerico Asuncion's testimony that Ruel and his mother did not name any perpetrator when they called for him.
• Ruel's Presence at the Scene: Appellants argued that the trial court erred in not giving credence to Eduardo Casibual's testimony that Ruel and his mother were at their house when somebody informed them about the death, and that Ruel should have been killed too if he was truly at the scene, as the assailants would not spare a witness.
• Alibi: Appellants insisted that the trial court erred in not giving credence to their defense of alibi and in not acquitting all the accused.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: The Solicitor General argued that Ruel's employer was in a better position to render assistance in transporting the body, while his mother would have been shocked and paralyzed by the news of her husband's death, explaining why Ruel sought his employer first.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the trial court erred in affording credence to the prosecution's evidence, particularly the testimonies of eyewitnesses Ruel Temblor and Alfredo Bandojo.
• Weight of Defense of Alibi: Whether the appellants' defense of alibi should prevail over the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing of Francisco Temblor.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of band and superior strength were properly appreciated separately from treachery.
• Damages: Whether the awards of moral, exemplary, and actual damages were proper.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: No. The trial court did not err in crediting the prosecution witnesses, whose positive identification of the appellants was direct, unobstructed, and corroborated, and who had no ill motive to falsely implicate the accused.
• Weight of Defense of Alibi: No. The alibi failed because it was not demonstrated that the appellants were so far away as to preclude physical presence at the crime scene, and it crumbled in the face of positive identification.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: Yes. Treachery attended the killing, the assailants having waited in ambush and suddenly unleashed volleys of gunfire at the unsuspecting victim.
• Aggravating Circumstances: No. The trial court erred in separately appreciating band and superior strength, as treachery absorbs both aggravating circumstances.
• Damages: Yes, with modifications. Moral damages of P30,000.00 were upheld, exemplary damages of P20,000.00 were justified despite the absence of a generic aggravating circumstance, and actual damages of P20,000.00 were awarded for funeral expenses.

• Credibility of Prosecution Evidence: The assessment of witness credibility is left largely to the trial court, which has the opportunity to observe witnesses' conduct and demeanor on the stand. Such evaluation is well-nigh conclusive unless significant circumstances were missed or omitted. Where there are conflicting versions, the trial court's findings are generally entitled to great weight. Reviewing the evidence, the Court found no reason to doubt the prosecution witnesses: Ruel and Bandojo personally knew the appellants for a long time, their view was unobstructed at a distance of only a few meters in morning daylight, and they had no ill motive to falsely implicate the accused. Bandojo's testimony alone would have sufficed to convict; taken with Ruel's, it sealed the appellants' fate. The argument that Ruel should have been killed too was dismissed as highly speculative. Between the positive testimony of a witness and the negative testimony of another, the former prevails.

• Weight of Defense of Alibi: For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the accused were somewhere else when the offense was committed; it must likewise be demonstrated that they were so far away that they could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity. Even assuming the appellants were in Manlot, this did not preclude their presence at the crime scene, which was accessible by pumpboat in one to one and a half hours, as Ernesto Asuncion himself admitted. Moreover, the alibi crumbled in the face of the positive identification of the appellants. The defense witnesses' testimonies were far from convincing: Casibual's testimony bore contradictions and appeared contrived, and Romerico Asuncion gave inconsistent accounts of where he was when informed of the killing.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Treachery: The appellants waited in ambush behind coconut trees and bushes and suddenly unleashed volleys of gunfire at the unsuspecting victim. The sudden and unexpected attack and the deliberate manner in which it was carried out was undoubtedly treacherous. The number and location of wounds, supported by medical findings of powder burns indicating close-range firing, corroborated the eyewitness accounts that after the victim fell, the assailants surrounded and shot him again.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The trial court erred in separately taking into account the aggravating circumstances of band and superior strength. Treachery absorbs both, as all three refer essentially to the use of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim and consummate the killing.

• Damages: Moral damages of P30,000.00 were upheld under Article 2219(1) of the Civil Code, which allows recovery in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, including death in its generic sense. No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary. Exemplary damages of P20,000.00 were justified despite the absence of a generic aggravating circumstance, to impress upon the public the state's abhorrence of the proliferation of firearms, given that homemade firearms were used. Actual damages of P20,000.00 were awarded for wake and funeral expenses as found by the trial court.

• Trial court's assessment of witness credibility — The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to observe witnesses on the stand and determine by their conduct and demeanor whether they are testifying truthfully. The evaluation is well-nigh conclusive on the appellate court unless significant circumstances were missed or omitted. Where there are conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court's findings are generally entitled to great weight.

• Positive identification prevails over denial and alibi — Between the positive testimony of a witness and the negative testimony of another, the former prevails. Alibi must demonstrate not only that the accused were elsewhere but that they were so far away as to preclude physical presence at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity. Alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification of the accused as perpetrators.

• Treachery absorbs band and superior strength — Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstances of band and superior strength, as all three refer essentially to the use of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim and consummate the killing. They should not be appreciated separately.

• Motive is not an element of the crime — Motive is a state of mind which others cannot discern. It is not an element of the crime and does not have to be proved. Lack of motive does not preclude conviction, as it is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all.

• No standard behavioral response to a frightful event — There is no standard behavioral response when one is confronted by a frightful event. Some may be shocked into insensibility while others react irrationally. Witnesses react to crimes in different ways, and failure to follow an expected pattern of reporting does not destroy the value of testimony.

• "The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is left largely to the trial court because of its opportunity, unavailable to the appellate court, to see the witnesses on the witness stand and determine by their conduct and demeanor whether they are testifying truthfully and objectively." — States the doctrine governing appellate review of trial court credibility findings, the central principle sustaining the conviction in this case.

• "For their alibi to prosper it is not enough to prove that the appellants were somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be demonstrated that they were so far away that they could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission." — Sets forth the two-pronged test for alibi, a frequently cited formulation in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• "Treachery absorbs both aggravating circumstances. Both refer essentially to the use of the combined strength of the assailants to overpower the victim and consummate the killing." — Articulates the rule that treachery absorbs band and superior strength, precluding their separate appreciation as aggravating circumstances.

• "Motive is a state of one's mind which others cannot discern. It is not an element of the crime, and so it does not have to be proved." — Defines the doctrine that motive need not be established for conviction, a principle routinely invoked in murder cases.

• People vs. Mangahas, G.R. No. 118777, July 28, 1999 — Cited for the doctrine that assessment of witness credibility is the domain of the trial court.
• People vs. Molas, 286 SCRA 684 (1998) — Cited for the rule that trial court findings are entitled to great weight when there are conflicting versions of prosecution and defense.
• People vs. Banguis, 291 SCRA 279 (1998) — Cited for the principle that testimony of a witness with no improper motive is worthy of belief.
• People vs. Rabutin, 272 SCRA 197 (1997) — Cited for the doctrine that motive is not an element of the crime and need not be proved.
• People vs. Cabodoc, 331 Phil 491 (1996) — Cited for the proposition that lack of motive does not preclude conviction.
• People vs. Adoviso, 309 SCRA 1 (1999) — Cited for the rule that there is no standard behavioral response to a frightful event.
• People vs. Javier, 336 Phil 177 (1997) — Cited for the two-pronged test for alibi.
• People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19 (1996) — Cited for the rule that alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification.
• People vs. Patrolla Jr., 254 SCRA 467 (1996) — Cited on the elements of treachery.
• People vs. Tambis, 311 SCRA 430 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine on moral damages in criminal offenses resulting in physical injuries including death.

• Article 14, Revised Penal Code (Treachery) — Treachery was appreciated as the qualifying circumstance, the assailants having ambushed the unsuspecting victim with a sudden and unexpected attack.
• Article 41, Revised Penal Code (Accessory Penalties) — The penalty of reclusion perpetua carried the accessory penalties provided under this article, as imposed by the trial court.
• Article 2219(1), Civil Code (Moral Damages) — Moral damages may be recovered in a criminal offense resulting in physical injuries, which in their generic sense includes death; no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary.
• Article 2230, Civil Code (Exemplary Damages) — Exemplary damages are awarded in criminal cases where one or more aggravating circumstances attended the offense; the Court justified the award here to express abhorrence of the proliferation of firearms despite the absence of a generic aggravating circumstance.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.