People vs. Bañez

Insanity exempts only upon proof of complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of freedom of the will at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of execution, and schizophrenia neither exempts unless consciousness of the acts was completely lost nor mitigates unless diminished will-power at that precise time is proved.

Wilfredo C. Bañez, estranged from his wife Apolonia Reboalos, had lived for four years in his father Bernardo P. Bañez's house in Barangay San Vicente East, Urdaneta, Pangasinan, where he worked as helper in the family poultry farm. Years before the killing he had been treated for gasoline addiction, including confinement at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center beginning in 1988 and treatment at the Baguio General Hospital in 1987.

Wilfredo Bañez lived in his parents' house in Barangay San Vicente East, Urdaneta, Pangasinan. On August 14, 1994, his sisters Elvira Bañez-Bustamante and Emelinda Bañez-Antiado came to the house because their father Bernardo P. Bañez complained that Wilfredo made trouble whenever drunk and wanted to place him in another house or sleeping quarters. In the evening, Elvira and Emelinda discussed the plan with their father; after the father went to his room, Wilfredo, red in the face and appearing drunk, ran to the kitchen, took two knives, and entered his father's room, followed by Emelinda.

According to Elvira, she then heard Emelinda scream and, upon entering the room, saw Wilfredo stabbing their father while saying "Pinalalayas mo ako!" The elder Bañez fell in a sitting position at a corner. When Elvira tried to take the knives and pleaded "He is our father," Wilfredo lunged at her and stabbed her on the right hand, forearm, and buttock. Emelinda threw a piece of wood to stop him, but he turned on her saying "You are also one," causing her to flee to Elvira's house about 25 meters away as he chased her. Elvira locked herself inside her father's house until three poultry-farm helpers and the maid arrived; her request to take her father to the hospital was blocked when Wilfredo returned and threatened them. Only after Wilfredo left again was Bernardo taken to Sacred Heart Hospital in Urdaneta, where he was already dead, while Elvira was treated for her injuries.

The autopsy showed ten lunate stab wounds on the chest, abdomen, right arm through-and-through, and right thigh, with 50-75 cc. blood in the pericardial sac and a stab wound of the heart; the cause of death was cardiac tamponade due to stab wound of the heart. For the defense, which interposed insanity without presenting accused-appellant's testimony, Dr. Rico Angelo Gerona III of the National Center for Mental Health testified that Wilfredo, admitted September 3, 1994 twenty days after the crime and treated by him only from February 19, 1996, suffered from schizophrenia characterized by thought disturbance, hallucination, suspiciousness, and deterioration in work, social relations, and self-care, possibly caused by gasoline addiction or family problems. He opined Wilfredo was ill on August 14, 1994 and 99% certain of schizophrenia, yet admitted he could not be certain of insanity at the killing, that Wilfredo was apparently in good mental condition from release from Bicutan until admission in 1994, and that a schizophrenic would not remember a violent act although Wilfredo admitted the killing out of resentment over being thrown out and expressed remorse. Marina Cabael-Bañez, Wilfredo's mother, testified to his more than one-year confinement at Bicutan for gasoline addiction, treatment at Baguio General Hospital in 1987, work in the poultry farm after release, renewed gasoline sniffing after his wife left him, and post-crime confinement at Mandaluyong, while denying he was a drunkard and saying he drank only when offered. The trial court factually credited Elvira's eyewitness account, found motive in resentment over being sent away, and rejected insanity as insufficiently proven.

• Insanity as Exempting Circumstance: Accused-appellant argued that he was suffering from schizophrenia when he killed his father and therefore exempt under Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code, citing Dr. Gerona's report diagnosing psychosis classified under schizophrenia and testimony that the illness existed six years before admission and on August 14, 1994.
• Dwelling and Intoxication as Aggravating: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in appreciating dwelling and intoxication as aggravating in the commission of the crime charged.
• Death Penalty vs. Reclusion Perpetua: Accused-appellant argued that, on the assumption he was sane at the time of the killing, the death penalty should not have been imposed and reclusion perpetua should instead be imposed.

• Insanity: Whether the exempting circumstance of insanity under Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code should have been credited in favor of accused-appellant.
• Dwelling and Intoxication: Whether the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and intoxication attended the commission of the crime.
• Proper Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed or whether reclusion perpetua should be imposed assuming sanity at the time of killing.

• Insanity: No. Insanity was not proved, as neither complete deprivation of intelligence nor total deprivation of freedom of the will at or immediately before the killing was established.
• Dwelling and Intoxication: No. Dwelling does not aggravate where offender and victim shared the same house, and habitual or intentional intoxication was not proved by clear and positive evidence.
• Proper Penalty: Reclusion perpetua, not death. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, Art. 63(2) requires the lesser of the indivisible penalties for parricide under R.A. No. 7659.

• Insanity: The cognition test from People vs. Formigones, as elaborated in People vs. Rafanan, Jr., requires complete deprivation of intelligence, with volition alone never having sufficed without accompanying cognitive deprivation. Dr. Gerona's opinion was inconclusive: he treated accused-appellant only long after the crime, admitted his conclusion was presumption with a 1% possibility of sanity, conceded apparent normality from the 1988 Bicutan discharge until 1994 confinement, and acknowledged that accused-appellant remembered and admitted the killing with stated motive and remorse, inconsistent with his claim about schizophrenics. No Bicutan or Baguio records were submitted to show schizophrenia, the mother's testimony proved only gasoline addiction and check-up, and the evidence showed motive — resentment because the father wanted him transferred for drunken troublemaking — supporting emotional breakdown after, not insanity during, the act. As confession and avoidance like self-defense, insanity had to be proved beyond reasonable doubt immediately before or at execution, which was not discharged; nor was diminished will-power under Art. 13(9) proved for mitigation.
• Dwelling and Intoxication: Dwelling aggravates because of violation of the sanctity of the victim's home by trespass to commit crime, a rationale absent where accused-appellant and his father lived in the same house where the killing occurred. Intoxication under Art. 15 aggravates only if habitual or intentional to commit the crime; Elvira's testimony that accused-appellant looked drunk, reddish and smelling of liquor, and caused trouble when drunk was contradicted by his mother's denial of drunkardness and, even assuming drunkenness, the record lacked proof of habitual excessive drinking or deliberate intoxication on August 14, 1994. Every aggravating circumstance must be proved as fully as the crime itself with doubts resolved for the accused, so intoxication could be neither aggravating nor, absent proof of impaired will-power or incomprehension of wrongfulness, mitigating.
• Proper Penalty: Under R.A. No. 7659 parricide is punished with reclusion perpetua to death, and pursuant to Art. 63(2) with neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance the lesser penalty applies. Accordingly the death sentence could not stand.

• Insanity as exempting circumstance — cognition and volition tests — Insanity under Art. 12(1) requires complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., deprivation of reason and absence of discernment, or total deprivation of freedom of the will; mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Philippine caselaw relies on the cognition test, with no case exempting solely for loss of freedom of the will without complete cognitive deprivation. Applied here, later-diagnosed schizophrenia without proof of complete loss of reason at the killing did not exempt.
• Burden of proof for insanity — Insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance, like self-defense, placing on the defense the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt insanity immediately before or at the very moment of execution. Accused-appellant failed where expert testimony was presumptive and contradicted, medical records were unproduced, and motive and remembrance indicated reason.
• Schizophrenia as mitigating circumstance — Schizophrenia not completely depriving consciousness does not exempt but may mitigate under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes exercise of will-power. Mitigation was denied here for failure to prove schizophrenia or any mental illness diminishing will-power at or immediately before the crime.
• Dwelling as aggravating circumstance — Dwelling aggravates because the offender violates the sanctity of the victim's home by trespassing to commit the crime. It was not applied where father and son lived in the same house where the parricide occurred, following People vs. Morales and United States vs. Rodriguez.
• Intoxication as alternative circumstance — Under Art. 15, intoxication aggravates only when habitual or intentional in connection with the crime; it mitigates only when so severe that will-power is impaired and wrongfulness incomprehended. It was held neither aggravating nor mitigating where habitualness or intent was not clearly and positively proved and impairment was not shown, with doubts on aggravation resolved for the accused.
• Penalty for parricide with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance — Under R.A. No. 7659 parricide is punished with reclusion perpetua to death; pursuant to Art. 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code, with no aggravating or mitigating circumstance the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed.

• "The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstance may be taken into account, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least discernment: (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of November 21, 1891; 47 Jur. Crim. 413.); that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of the will." — States the canonical Spanish-derived standard for insanity adopted in People vs. Formigones and applied to reject the schizophrenia claim.
• "The defense of insanity is in the nature of confession and avoidance. Like the justifying circumstance of self-defense, the burden is on the defense to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was insane immediately before the commission of the crime or at the very moment of its execution." — Defines the burden and precise temporal focus that the defense failed to meet.
• "Every aggravating circumstance must be proven by the prosecution as fully as the crime itself and any doubt as to its existence must be resolved in favor of the accused." — States the proof standard that defeated habitual or intentional intoxication as aggravating.

• People vs. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 (1950) — Controlling source of the insanity standard requiring complete deprivation of intelligence or total deprivation of freedom of the will; followed to deny exemption.
• People vs. Rafanan, Jr., 204 SCRA 65 (1991) — Elaborated Formigones into cognition and volition tests and noted reliance on cognition; followed to require complete cognitive deprivation.
• People vs. So, 247 SCRA 708 (1995); People vs. Danao, 215 SCRA 795 (1992) — Cited for the rule that insanity must be proved beyond reasonable doubt immediately before or at execution; applied against the defense.
• People vs. Morales, 94 SCRA 191 (1979); United States vs. Rodriguez, 9 Phil. 136 (1907) — Cited to hold dwelling inapplicable where offender and victim lived in the same house.
• People vs. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566 (1990) — Cited for the rationale that dwelling aggravates because of trespass violating home sanctity.
• People vs. Maturgo, Sr., 248 SCRA 519 (1995) — Cited for requiring full proof of aggravating circumstances with doubts for the accused; applied to intoxication.
• People vs. Renejane, 158 SCRA 258 (1988); People vs. Ancheta, 148 SCRA 178 (1987) — Cited to deny mitigation for intoxication absent proof of impaired will-power or incomprehension of wrongfulness.

• Art. 12(1), Revised Penal Code — Exempts an imbecile or insane person unless acting during lucid interval; invoked but denied for failure to prove complete deprivation of reason at the killing.
• Art. 246, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 — Defines and punishes parricide, here with penalty of reclusion perpetua to death; basis for conviction and sentencing.
• Art. 13(9), Revised Penal Code — Allows mitigation for illness diminishing will-power; considered for schizophrenia but denied for lack of temporal proof of diminished will-power.
• Art. 15, Revised Penal Code — Treats intoxication as aggravating if habitual or intentional; applied to reject aggravation where neither was clearly proved.
• Art. 63(2), Revised Penal Code — Requires the lesser penalty when the crime is punished with two indivisible penalties and neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance attends; basis for imposing reclusion perpetua.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.