People vs. Balmores

A crime is not "impossible" under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code merely because the falsification is clumsy or patent; it is impossible only when the means employed are inherently inadequate or ineffective to produce the crime. The waiver of the right to counsel by an illiterate accused does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty.

The case arose under the Revised Penal Code provisions on falsification of government securities (Article 166) and complex crimes (Article 48), as applied to an attempt to defraud the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The accused was an illiterate person who, without the assistance of counsel, entered a plea of guilty to an information charging him with attempted estafa through falsification of a security. The legal backdrop includes the then-recent codification of the "impossible crime" doctrine in Article 4(2) and Article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, which made punishable acts that would have produced a crime against persons or property but failed by reason of the inherent ineffectiveness of the means employed.

On or about September 22, 1947, in the City of Manila, Rafael Balmores y Caya tore off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket, thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of the same. He then substituted and wrote in ink at the bottom on the left side of the ticket the figure or number 074000, which was a prize-winning number in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes draw held on June 29, 1947. Balmores thereafter presented the falsified ticket at the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office for the purpose of exchanging it for the corresponding cash prize of P359.55, fraudulently pretending that the ticket was genuine and that he was entitled to the amount won by said number.

The attempt was foiled when Bayani Miller, an employee of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office to whom the ticket was presented, discovered that the ticket was falsified and immediately called for a policeman, who apprehended and arrested Balmores on the spot. An information was filed by Assistant City Fiscal Lorenzo Relova charging Balmores with attempted estafa through falsification of a security.

Balmores, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the information. He was sentenced by Judge Emilio Peña to suffer not less than 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, and to pay a fine of P100 and the costs. From that sentence, he appealed to the Supreme Court. The falsified ticket itself was before the Court on appeal, and it appeared to be a 1/8 unit. Balmores was admittedly illiterate.

• Sufficiency of Facts: Appellant argued that there could be no genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket for the June 29, 1947 draw, contending that the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office issued only four 1/4 units for each ticket for that draw. He further argued that the information did not show that the true and real unidentified number of the ticket alleged to have been torn was not and could not be 074000, and that the substitution and writing in ink of the number 074000 was not falsification if the true and real number of the ticket so torn was already 074000.
• Jurisdiction: Appellant contended that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict him on a plea of guilty because, being illiterate, he was not assisted by counsel.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the facts charged in the information constitute a crime.
• Jurisdiction over Illiterate Accused: Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to convict the appellant on a plea of guilty because he was illiterate and not assisted by counsel.
• Impossible Crime: Whether the crime committed constitutes an impossible crime under paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, of the Revised Penal Code, such that the penalty should be reduced.
• Propriety of Penalty: Whether the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes. The facts charged constitute attempted estafa through falsification of a security; the altered ticket was before the Court and appeared to be a genuine 1/8 unit, and the assumption that the original number was 074000 was unsupported by the record.
• Jurisdiction over Illiterate Accused: No, the trial court did not lack jurisdiction. Illiteracy did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction; the decision expressly stated that appellant waived the right to be assisted by counsel, and no law prohibits such a waiver.
• Impossible Crime: No. The crime was not an impossible crime under Article 4(2) in relation to Article 59 of the Revised Penal Code, because the falsification, though reckless and clumsy, was not inherently incapable of producing the intended estafa had the clerk not exercised due care.
• Propriety of Penalty: Yes. The penalty imposed by the trial court is correct, being the result of applying Article 166 (falsification of securities) in its minimum period, increased to the maximum period under Article 48 for the complex crime, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction considered under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The contention that no genuine 1/8 unit ticket existed for the June 29, 1947 draw was based on an assumption not borne out by the record. The falsified ticket was before the Court and appeared to be a 1/8 unit. The Court could not take judicial notice of what was not common knowledge; if relevant, the fact should have been proved. Moreover, even if it were true that the Sweepstakes Office issued only 1/4 units, that would only strengthen the prosecution's theory that the 1/8 unit ticket presented by appellant was spurious. The assumption that the true and real number of the ticket was the winning number 074000 was likewise unsupported. The information alleged that appellant removed the true and real unidentified number and substituted 074000 in its place; there would have been no need for removal and substitution if the original number was the same as the one written in ink.

• Jurisdiction over Illiterate Accused: The second contention was based on a correct premise but a wrong conclusion. The fact that appellant was illiterate did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction. The decision expressly stated that appellant waived the right to be assisted by counsel, and the Court knew of no law against such a waiver. The waiver was valid and effective, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to accept the plea and render judgment.

• Impossible Crime: The recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, of the Revised Penal Code. The Court cited examples of impossible crimes: (1) attempting to kill another by putting in soup a substance believed to be arsenic when it is in fact common salt, and (2) attempting to murder a corpse. Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket, the Court was not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for appellant to consummate the crime of estafa through falsification if the clerk to whom it was presented had not exercised due care. The means employed were not inherently inadequate or ineffective; the crime failed due to the vigilance of the employee, not due to the inherent impossibility of the method.

• Propriety of Penalty: Article 166 penalizes the forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations and securities with reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P10,000, when the falsified document is an obligation or security of the Philippines. Because this was a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification, the penalty was imposed in its maximum period in accordance with Article 48. Taking into account the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum could not be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. The penalty imposed by the trial court was therefore correct. The Court acknowledged that the penalty was severe considering the circumstances, as the alteration of a losing sweepstakes ticket caused no harm to anyone except for the attempt to cash it, but it had no discretion to impose a lower penalty than authorized by law; the exercise of clemency was not within the Court's province.

• Impossible Crime (Article 4(2), Revised Penal Code) — An impossible crime is one where a person performs all the acts of execution which would produce a crime against persons or property, but the crime is not produced by reason of the inherent ineffectiveness of the means employed or the inadequacy of the object. The Court distinguished impossible crimes from merely clumsy or reckless attempts: the former involve means that are inherently incapable of producing the crime (e.g., using salt instead of arsenic, or attempting to kill a corpse), while the latter fail due to external intervention (e.g., the vigilance of a clerk detecting the falsification). The falsification of a sweepstakes ticket, though patent and clumsy, was not an impossible crime because the means were not inherently ineffective — the crime failed because the employee exercised due care, not because the method was intrinsically incapable of success.

• Waiver of Right to Counsel — An illiterate accused may validly waive the right to be assisted by counsel, and such waiver does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to accept a plea of guilty and render judgment. There being no law prohibiting such a waiver, the plea and conviction stand.

• Complex Crime of Attempted Estafa through Falsification (Article 48, Revised Penal Code) — Where a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or where one offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Falsification of a government security under Article 166 carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum period; as the more serious component of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification, it is imposed in its maximum period under Article 48.

• "The recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the impossible crime issue, distinguishing clumsy but viable attempts from inherently impossible crimes.

• "Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care." — This explains why the crime was not impossible: the failure was due to external vigilance, not inherent inadequacy of the means employed.

• "We realize that the penalty is too severe, considering all the circumstances of the case, but we have no discretion to impose a lower penalty than authorized by law. The exercise of clemency and not in this court." — This reflects the Court's acknowledgment of the disproportion between the offender's conduct and the severe penalty mandated by law, while recognizing the limits of judicial power to mitigate.

• Guevara, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th ed., page 15 — Cited as authority for the examples of impossible crimes (using salt instead of arsenic; attempting to murder a corpse), illustrating the doctrine that the means must be inherently ineffective for the crime to qualify as impossible.
• Decision, Supreme Court of Spain, November 26, 1879; 12 Jur. Crim., 343 — Cited alongside Guevara as historical authority on the concept of impossible crimes under Spanish criminal law, from which the Revised Penal Code provision was derived.

• Article 4(2), Revised Penal Code — Defines impossible crimes: criminal liability is incurred by any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent ineffectiveness of the means employed or the inadequacy of the object. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the falsification of the sweepstakes ticket constituted an impossible crime, concluding it did not.
• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Governs complex crimes, prescribing that the penalty for the most serious crime be imposed in its maximum period. Applied because the offense was a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of a security, requiring the penalty under Article 166 to be imposed in its maximum period.
• Article 59, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for attempted felonies. Read in relation to Article 4(2) for impossible crimes, and applied in determining the appropriate penalty for the attempted crime.
• Article 166, Revised Penal Code — Penalizes the forging or falsification of treasury or bank notes or certificates or other obligations and securities with reclusion temporal in its minimum period and a fine not to exceed P10,000 when the document is an obligation or security of the Philippines. Applied as the base penalty for the falsification component of the complex crime.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in conjunction with the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction to determine the minimum and maximum of the indeterminate sentence, resulting in a minimum of prision mayor in its maximum period (10 years and 1 day to 12 years) and a maximum of reclusion temporal.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concurred.

• Paras, J. — Dissented, arguing that the appellant committed only an impossible crime under Article 4(2) in relation to Article 59 of the Revised Penal Code. The dissent reasoned that the falsification was inherently inadequate and certain to be detected: no one would cash a ticket that had a missing portion and bore a number written in ink, and indeed the falsification was readily detected by the Sweepstakes Office employee. The dissent analogized the act to passing a counterfeit bill made from regular newsprint in ordinary handwriting. The dissent also raised doubt about the 1/8 unit ticket, noting that if the appellant had been assisted by competent counsel, the fact that tickets for the June 1947 draw consisted of only four units might have been proven. While acknowledging that the appellant waived counsel, the dissent pointed out that a miscarriage of justice may result from such circumstances and that any capital doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. The dissent voted to reverse the judgment and release the appellant immediately, noting he had been imprisoned since November 11, 1947.