People vs. Balili

An accused who knowingly accompanies malefactors to the scene of a crime and remains outside while the crime is committed, without proof of conspiracy or direct participation, is guilty as an accomplice for having supplied material and moral aid, not as a principal.

Appellant Benedicto Balili was charged together with Leonardo Amoguis (alias "Big Boy") and unidentified "John Doe" and "Ricardo Doe" defendants with the crime of robbery with homicide committed against Federico So, a Chinese resident of Tandag, Surigao. The Court of First Instance of Surigao convicted Balili as a principal and acquitted Amoguis. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal, the appellant contesting both the sufficiency of the evidence and the voluntariness of his extrajudicial confession.

On September 9, 1956, during the town fiesta of Tandag, Surigao, spouses Federico So (nicknamed "Diko" or "Dikoy") and Juliana Respicia were living in their store located on Serra Street in the sitio of Bungtud. That evening, Juliana and her children attended the coronation of the carnival queen at the town plaza carnival, while Federico remained at home. Juliana returned at about ten o'clock that evening; Federico opened the door for them, then closed and locked it, and went to sleep on his bed at the back of the store on the ground floor, while Juliana and the children retired to the upper floor. Before sleeping, Juliana placed the carnival season's ticket inside a drawer where P1,000.00 in cash was kept. All doors were secured with cross bars inside and all windows were nailed shut.

At about three o'clock the following morning, September 10, 1956, Juliana was awakened by her husband's shout for help. She took a flashlight, went downstairs with her children and their woman-storekeeper, and found Federico lying face down on the floor. She held him and asked what happened, but he could no longer answer. He had a wound on the breast near the left nipple, another on the arm, and blood on his abdomen. A club (Exhibit B) was found under his body. Federico died shortly thereafter. The doors of the store and the door leading to the kitchen on the upper floor were found open, indicating that the robbers had entered by climbing a calamungay tree near a window. The drawer had been opened and the P1,000.00 cash was gone. Municipal health officer Dr. Pedro Serra examined the body at about six o'clock that morning and found five groups of wounds, the most serious being a penetrating and perforating wound on the left breast that pierced the heart, which was fatal.

There was no eyewitness to the commission of the crime. Appellant Balili was prosecuted on the basis of his confessions, both verbal and written, and on evidence of his presence in the vicinity of the crime during or immediately after its commission. Martiniano Ajos, a rural policeman, testified that at about two o'clock that same morning, while on his way home from carnival guard duty, he passed through the street in front of the victim's house. Using a flashlight because the night was dark, he focused the light on the face of a man lurking near the front door of the victim's store. Ajos recognized the man as Balili, who ran away, preceded by two other running men whom Ajos could not identify. Hearing the commotion inside, Ajos entered the house and found Juliana wailing over her husband's body. Ajos kept his observations to himself until November 25, 1956, when he learned that Balili had already confessed; he then informed the widow and signed an affidavit the next day.

Asuncion Buenaflor, former chief of police of Tandag, testified that on the morning of September 13, 1956, Balili solicited his assistance and told him, "I do not know why I go with the robbery case in the house of Chinaman Dikoy," adding that his companions were "three moros and one 'mestizo' and Big Boy." Buenaflor advised Balili to consult a lawyer and relayed the confession that same day to the widow's uncle, Vicente Respicia, who in turn informed police officer Emilio Espinosa. Espinosa interrogated Balili on September 13, and Balili admitted his participation but refused to put it in writing. It was only on November 3, 1956 that Balili agreed to execute a written statement (Exhibit C). In that statement, Balili narrated that on September 8 a "Moro" boarding at his house asked him who the rich persons in Tandag were, and he identified the Chinese residents. The next morning at about two o'clock, the same "Moro" woke him, threatened him with a dagger, and forced him to accompany the three "Moros" to the store of Chinaman Dikoy, where "Big Boy" and a "mestizo" were already waiting. The five men planned their entry; "Big Boy" and the "mestizo" climbed the calamungay tree and used a piece of wood as a bridge to reach a second-floor window, then opened the door to the first floor to let in two of the "Moros." The third "Moro" remained outside guarding Balili. Balili heard a commotion inside; the four men emerged and entered the bodega. Finding himself alone, Balili left. He claimed that later that morning he saw the "Moros" washing bloodstained clothes in his bathroom and that one threatened to kill him and his family if he told anyone.

Balili disowned the written confession, claiming he signed it under duress. He presented an affidavit (Exhibit 6) executed on December 13, 1956, alleging maltreatment by investigating policemen. Espinosa and Pastor Cabrera, the municipal secretary, denied threatening Balili. Vicente Murillo, the Justice of the Peace before whom the affidavit was sworn, affirmed that it was voluntary and denied that Balili protested the incriminating portions. Balili claimed he signed because he was told he would be used only as a prosecution witness and that, being illiterate, he only learned of the incriminating contents when the Justice of the Peace read them to him. The Court found no reason to doubt the testimony of Ajos and Buenaflor, noting that neither had any motive to testify falsely and that Buenaflor was in fact a friend of the appellant. The Court also found no evidence of conspiracy or direct participation by Balili in the robbery and killing, but concluded that his knowing presence and accompaniment of the malefactors rendered him guilty as an accomplice.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness Ajos: Appellant assailed the credibility of Martiniano Ajos, pointing out that Ajos did not know which policeman had relieved him as carnival guard or the names of the streets he passed on his way home, suggesting his testimony was unreliable.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Appellant disowned his written confession (Exhibit C) on the ground that he did not sign it voluntarily, presenting an affidavit (Exhibit 6) claiming he had been maltreated by investigating policemen.
• Illiteracy and Misrepresentation: Appellant claimed he was illiterate and signed the affidavit only because he was given to understand he would be utilized as a prosecution witness, learning of its incriminating contents only when the Justice of the Peace read them to him.
• Duress by Malefactors: Appellant maintained that he was forced by the "Moros" to accompany them to the victim's house under threat of a dagger, and that the handwritten insertion "pinaague pag holga sa balisong" (by threatening to kill me with his dagger) in the affidavit reflected this duress.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the testimony of prosecution witnesses Ajos and Buenaflor was credible and sufficient to establish appellant's presence and involvement in the crime.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Whether appellant's written extrajudicial confession (Exhibit C) was voluntary and admissible notwithstanding his claim of duress and illiteracy.
• Degree of Participation: Whether appellant was guilty as a principal or merely as an accomplice in the robbery with homicide.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The testimony of Ajos and Buenaflor was found credible, neither witness having any motive to testify falsely, and Buenaflor being a friend of the appellant to whom appellant voluntarily confessed.
• Voluntariness of Confession: Yes. The written confession (Exhibit C) was voluntary and admissible; the claim of duress was unsubstantiated, and the Justice of the Peace affirmed its voluntariness.
• Degree of Participation: Appellant was guilty as an accomplice, not as a principal. No evidence of conspiracy or direct participation was found, but his knowing accompaniment of the malefactors constituted material and moral aid.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Appellant's attack on Ajos's credibility based on the latter's inability to name the relieving policeman or the streets he passed was given little weight. The relieving officer reported to the officer-in-charge of carnival guards, not to Ajos, and there was no reason for Ajos to note or remember street names on his route. Buenaflor's testimony was corroborated by Espinosa and was credible because Buenaflor was appellant's friend, to whom appellant voluntarily unburdened himself and whose help he sought. Neither witness had any motive to testify falsely.

• Voluntariness of Confession: Appellant's claim of duress in signing Exhibit C was rejected. Espinosa and Cabrera denied threatening him, and the Justice of the Peace affirmed the confession was voluntary and denied that appellant protested the incriminating portions. The possibility that Exhibit 6 (the later affidavit alleging maltreatment) was signed under duress did not justify a similar inference regarding the first confession. Appellant's claim that he signed Exhibit C believing he would only be a prosecution witness was unpersuasive, because if that were so, he could have insisted on deleting the incriminating portions without jeopardizing his usefulness as a witness. The narrative form of Exhibit C did not prove it was a prepared statement forced upon him. The Court further held that even if an extrajudicial confession contains exculpatory statements, the court need not believe the confession in its entirety, citing People vs. Villanueva. The handwritten insertion regarding the dagger threat was deemed an afterthought inserted to escape criminal liability, and appellant's claim of being forced by the "Moros" was discredited because there was no reason for the malefactors to force his involuntary presence, which would only increase the risk of discovery, and his nervous and remorseful demeanor when confessing to Buenaflor three days later belied innocence.

• Degree of Participation: There was no evidence that appellant conspired with the malefactors or actually participated in the commission of the crime, so he could not be held liable as a principal. However, by going with them knowing their criminal intention and staying outside the house while the others went inside to rob and kill, appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. His consciousness of guilt was confirmed by his silence for several days and by his confession to Buenaflor.

• Partial Admissibility of Confessions — Even if an extrajudicial confession contains exculpatory statements exonerating the accused from guilt, the court need not believe the confession in its entirety. The court may accept the incriminating portions while rejecting the self-serving exculpatory narrative. The Court applied this doctrine by crediting Balili's admission of presence and involvement while rejecting his claim that he was forced by the "Moros" to accompany them.

• Accomplice Liability — A person is liable as an accomplice when, with knowledge of the criminal intent of the principals, the person cooperates by supplying material or moral aid, without having participated as a principal or having conspired with the principals. The Court found that Balili's knowing accompaniment of the malefactors and his presence outside the house while the crime was committed constituted such aid, warranting accomplice liability rather than principal liability.

• "Even if the extrajudicial confession contains exculpatory statements exonerating the accused from guilt, the court need not believe the confession in its entirety." — This footnote citation articulates the doctrine of partial admissibility of confessions, allowing courts to credit incriminating portions while rejecting self-serving exculpatory statements within the same confession.

• "But in going with them, knowing their criminal intention, and in staying outside of the house with them while the others went inside the store to rob and kill, appellant effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from principal to accomplice, defining the boundary between principal and accomplice liability based on knowledge and the nature of cooperation.

• People vs. Villanueva, L-12687, July 21, 1962 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that a court need not believe an extrajudicial confession in its entirety, particularly where the confession contains exculpatory statements alongside incriminating admissions. The doctrine was applied to reject Balili's claim of duress while accepting his admission of presence and involvement.

• Revised Penal Code, Article on Accomplices — Applied to hold Balili liable as an accomplice rather than a principal, on the ground that he knowingly cooperated with the malefactors by accompanying them and remaining at the scene, supplying material and moral aid without direct participation or conspiracy. The penalty was accordingly reduced from reclusion perpetua (as a principal in robbery with homicide) to an indeterminate sentence ranging from prision mayor to reclusion temporal.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro, JJ., concurred.