People vs. Baldimo

A plea of guilty to a capital offense does not constitute an admission of aggravating circumstances alleged in the information where the prosecution's evidence fails to establish them, and under Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, any death penalty already imposed is automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua without need of presidential commutation.

The accused-appellant, Isidoro Baldimo, was one of five men charged with the murder of Perpetua C. Adalim, an agricultural landowner in Taft, Eastern Samar. The crime was committed on January 1, 1982, when Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death for murder. The case was tried before the Court of First Instance of Borongan, Eastern Samar. The constitutional and statutory landscape governing the death penalty shifted materially during the pendency of the case: the 1987 Constitution proscribed the death penalty unless Congress provided for it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, and Republic Act No. 7659, which reimposed the death penalty for certain heinous crimes, took effect on December 31, 1993.

On January 1, 1982, at about 6:00 p.m., Perpetua C. Adalim, an agricultural landowner, went to the house of her tenant Cresencio Lupido at Sitio Palaspas, Barangay Polangi, Taft, Eastern Samar, to look for farmers willing to work in her ricefields. She decided to spend the night at Sitio Palaspas and instructed Lupido's wife to fetch food from her house in the poblacion. While Perpetua was standing in the yard waiting, five armed men arrived and confronted her. Lupido, who witnessed the events, recognized two of the men as Roman Derilo and appellant Isidro Baldimo, both of whom frequently passed by his house. The other three men he could not name but claimed he could identify them if presented.

Roman Derilo spoke briefly with Perpetua, then without warning shot her three times with a pistol. After she fell, appellant Baldimo, standing at Derilo's right side, approached and stabbed her several times with a knife resembling a Batangas knife or a bolo known locally as "depang." A third member of the group, described as short and stout, followed in stabbing Perpetua. After the repeated stabbings, the group lingered in the yard for some time and then departed toward the mountains, all carrying long firearms. Lupido immediately went to Perpetua's house in the poblacion and informed her family of the incident. Dr. Eduardo S. Evardone conducted the postmortem examination and submitted a corresponding autopsy report corroborating the cause of death.

Of the five accused, only Baldimo was apprehended. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985, after the information was translated into the Waray dialect, he pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued, and the prosecution presented its evidence, including the eyewitness testimony of Lupido and the autopsy findings of Dr. Evardone. On August 6, 1986, after the prosecution had formally finished presenting its evidence, Baldimo, through counsel de parte, manifested his desire to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty. A re-arraignment was conducted, during which the trial court propounded a series of questions to test the voluntariness of the plea and Baldimo's comprehension of its consequences. Satisfied with his answers, the trial court convicted him of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

The trial court found that the killing was qualified by treachery, with superior strength and cuadrilla absorbed in alevosia. It further found the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation to be present, reasoning that the existence of conspiracy among the accused presupposed evident premeditation and that Baldimo's plea of guilty constituted an admission of all material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances. With no mitigating circumstance to offset the aggravating circumstance, the trial court sentenced Baldimo to death and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of the victim. The judgment was promulgated on October 12, 1986, but the records were not elevated to the Supreme Court until July 20, 1994, a delay of nearly eight years attributable to the court of origin.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty: Whether appellant's belated plea of guilty, entered after the prosecution had rested its evidence, may be treated as a mitigating circumstance analogous to a voluntary plea of guilty under paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was properly appreciated by the trial court given the insufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.
• Plea of Guilty as Admission of Aggravating Circumstances: Whether a plea of guilty to a capital offense constitutes an admission of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, such that the prosecution need not independently prove them.
• Constitutional Reduction of Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty imposed on appellant prior to the ratification of the 1987 Constitution was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua by virtue of Section 19(1), Article III thereof, and whether Republic Act No. 7659 may be applied retroactively.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty: No. A belated plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has presented its evidence cannot be considered mitigating, as it is not analogous to the spontaneous and willing admission of guilt at the first opportunity contemplated in paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
• Evident Premeditation: No. Evident premeditation was not established, the prosecution having presented no proof of the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, any act manifesting clinging to that determination, or a sufficient lapse of time for reflection.
• Plea of Guilty as Admission of Aggravating Circumstances: No. Under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, the prosecution is required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of culpability even after a plea of guilty to a capital offense; a plea of guilty cannot stand in place of the evidence required.
• Constitutional Reduction of Death Penalty: Yes. The 1987 Constitution automatically reduced the death penalty already imposed to reclusion perpetua by its own force, without need of presidential commutation, and Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be applied retroactively as it would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Plea of Guilty: A plea of guilty is mitigating under paragraph 7, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code on the rationale that an accused spontaneously and willingly admits guilt at the first opportunity as an act of repentance. Appellant pleaded not guilty at arraignment and only changed his plea after the prosecution had presented its evidence and closed its case. Allowing a belated plea to be treated as mitigating would enable an accused to speculate on the outcome of proceedings by pleading not guilty initially, then substituting it with a plea of guilty upon discovering the strength of the prosecution's case. The plea made is not "of a similar nature and analogous" to the plea contemplated in paragraph 7. The case of People vs. Coronel, relied upon by appellant, was inapplicable because the death penalty there was modified not on the basis of paragraph 10, Article 13, but because the required number of votes to affirm a death sentence was not secured.

• Evident Premeditation: To establish evident premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act. The records and transcripts of stenographic notes were barren of any proof tending to show prior reflection followed by persistence in the criminal resolution. The trial court erroneously presumed evident premeditation from the existence of conspiracy and from appellant's plea of guilty. Conspiracy and evident premeditation have completely different elements: conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree to commit the felony, while evident premeditation requires a sufficient period for meditation and reflection. Evident premeditation can only be deduced from conspiracy if, in the course of directly proving conspiracy, the elements of evident premeditation were likewise presented and proven — which was not done here. Aggravating circumstances must be proved as conclusively as the criminal act itself; mere suppositions or presumptions are insufficient.

• Plea of Guilty as Admission of Aggravating Circumstances: The old rule that a plea of guilty admits all material facts alleged in the information, including aggravating circumstances, has been modified by Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which took effect on January 1, 1985. Under the new rule, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court must (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea, (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of culpability, and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf. This rule is mandatory; failure to observe it constitutes grave abuse of discretion. The trial court's searching inquiry was also deficient because it did not explain to appellant the meaning and consequences of the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery. Technical terms such as "treachery" and "evident premeditation" are beyond the understanding not only of illiterates but even of educated non-lawyers. A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was made to explain that a plea to a capital offense attended by aggravating circumstances may result in the death penalty. Furthermore, even under the old rule, where the evidence presented by the prosecution fails to establish the aggravating circumstances, a plea of guilty cannot constitute an admission of those circumstances. The prosecution had already rested when appellant changed his plea and had full opportunity to prove all material allegations, yet it established only treachery and failed to prove evident premeditation. Notwithstanding the improvidence of the plea, remand was unnecessary because the conviction could be sustained on the evidence already on record.

• Constitutional Reduction of Death Penalty: The crime was committed in 1982, when Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code prescribed reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The 1987 Constitution, ratified on February 2, 1987, provided in Section 19(1), Article III that "any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." Appellant was sentenced to death in 1986, before the Constitution's ratification. By constitutional fiat, that sentence was automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua on February 2, 1987. The word "reduced" was deliberately chosen over "commuted" by the Constitutional Commission, on the suggestion of Commissioner Regalado, to make the effect automatic without need of presidential action. Republic Act No. 7659, which took effect on December 31, 1993 and imposed a heavier penalty for murder (reclusion perpetua to death), cannot be applied retroactively because penal laws operate prospectively unless favorable to the accused, and retroactive application would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws. The fact that the case reached the Supreme Court only in 1994 does not detract from the force of the constitutional directive, as the reduction was effected by the express words of the fundamental charter, not by the action of the courts or the President.

• Evident Premeditation — To establish evident premeditation, there must be proof of (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act and to allow conscience to overcome the resolution of the will. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was preceded by cool thought and reflection during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. Evident premeditation must be based on external acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning. The Court found that none of these elements were proved by the prosecution.

• Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense (Section 3, Rule 116) — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the trial court must (1) conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea, (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of culpability, and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so. This rule is mandatory. A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort is made to explain to the accused that a plea to a capital offense attended by an aggravating circumstance may result in the imposition of the death penalty. Technical terms such as "treachery" and "evident premeditation" must be explained to the accused in ordinary language.

• Aggravating Circumstances Must Be Proved Like the Crime Itself — Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal offense. Every qualifying or aggravating circumstance alleged to have been present must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. Mere suppositions or presumptions are insufficient. A plea of guilty cannot stand in place of the evidence required by Section 3, Rule 116.

• Conspiracy Does Not Presuppose Evident Premeditation — While conspiracy may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused, it does not automatically establish evident premeditation. The elements of conspiracy and evident premeditation are completely different: conspiracy arises on the very instant the plotters agree to commit the felony, while evident premeditation requires a sufficient period for meditation and reflection. Evident premeditation can only be deduced from conspiracy if, in the course of proving conspiracy, the elements of evident premeditation were likewise presented and proven.

• Automatic Reduction of Death Penalty Under the 1987 Constitution — Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." The word "reduced" was deliberately chosen over "commuted" to make the effect automatic without need of presidential action. The reduction is effected by the express words of the Constitution, not by the action of the courts or the President. The accused is entitled to the reduction ipso jure.

• Prospectivity of Penal Laws — Penal laws operate prospectively unless the contrary clearly appears. A penal law may have retroactive effect only when it is favorable to the accused. Republic Act No. 7659, which imposed a heavier penalty for murder, cannot be applied retroactively as it would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.

• "A plea of guilty is improvidently accepted where no effort was even made to explain to the accused that a plea of guilty to an information for a capital offense, attended by an aggravating circumstance, may result in the imposition of the death penalty." — This passage articulates a critical requirement for the valid acceptance of a plea of guilty in capital cases, reinforcing the mandatory duty of trial courts to ensure the accused fully understands the consequences of the plea, including the aggravating circumstances alleged.

• "It is an ancient but revered doctrine that qualifying and aggravating circumstance before being taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty to be imposed must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as that which establishes the commission of the act charged as the criminal offense." — This passage states the fundamental principle that aggravating and qualifying circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt with the same degree of certainty as the criminal act itself, a doctrine central to the Court's refusal to appreciate evident premeditation.

• "By February 2, 1987, that penalty had already been automatically reduced to reclusion perpetua, not by the grace of the President or of the courts, but by the mandate of the fundamental law of the land." — This passage captures the Court's holding that the 1987 Constitution's reduction of the death penalty was self-executing and automatic, requiring no presidential commutation or judicial action, a ruling of enduring significance for cases sentenced to death before the Constitution's ratification.

• "The late plea of guilty entered by herein appellant cannot be considered mitigating because the plea made is not 'of a similar nature and analogous' to the plea of guilty contemplated in paragraph 7 of Article 13." — This passage establishes that a belated plea of guilty entered after the prosecution has rested cannot be treated as a mitigating circumstance, preventing accused persons from speculating on the outcome of proceedings.

• People vs. Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 509 — Distinguished. Appellant relied on this case for the proposition that a belated plea of guilty may be treated as mitigating under paragraph 10, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court clarified that the death penalty in Coronel was modified to life imprisonment not because of paragraph 10, but because the required number of votes to affirm a death sentence was not secured.

• People vs. Camay, G.R. No. 91306, July 29, 1987, 152 SCRA 401 — Followed. The Court relied on Camay's exposition of the three mandatory requirements under Section 3, Rule 116 for pleas of guilty to capital offenses: searching inquiry, presentation of evidence by the prosecution, and opportunity for the accused to present evidence.

• People vs. Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, July 20, 1990, 187 SCRA 637 — Followed. The Court cited Dayot for the proposition that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116 is mandatory and that any judge who fails to observe its command commits grave abuse of discretion.

• U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305 (1917) — Followed. The Court quoted extensively from Jamad for the principle that a plea of guilty is insufficient to sustain a conviction if the accused does not clearly and fully understand the nature of the offense charged, the meaning of technical language used in the information, or the consequences of a heavy or capital penalty.

• People vs. Alamada, G.R. Nos. L-34594-95, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103 — Followed. The Court cited Alamada for the principle that the trial court must explain to the accused the nature of the charges, particularly allegations regarding conspiracy, treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, which are technical terms beyond the understanding of an unschooled accused.

• People vs. Rizal, G.R. Nos. L-43487-89, February 26, 1981, 103 SCRA 282 — Followed. The Court quoted Rizal for the principle that evident premeditation cannot be taken for granted from conspiracy alone where there is no proof of attendant deliberation and selection of the method, times, and means of executing the crime.

• People vs. Gungab, 64 Phil. 779 (1937) — Followed. The Court cited Gungab for the rule that when an accused who lacks instruction pleads guilty to a crime described in the information with aggravating circumstances, and his testimony fails to show the existence of such circumstances, his plea of guilty shall be understood as limited to the admission of having committed the crime, not the aggravating circumstances.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes the crime of murder. At the time of the crime in 1982, it prescribed the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The trial court convicted appellant under this provision. The Court found the penalty of death inapplicable due to the constitutional reduction and the absence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.

• Article 13, paragraphs 7 and 10, Revised Penal Code — Paragraph 7 provides as a mitigating circumstance that the offender voluntarily confessed guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Paragraph 10 provides as a mitigating circumstance any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those enumerated. The Court held that appellant's belated plea of guilty was not analogous to paragraph 7 and thus could not be mitigating under paragraph 10.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person accused. The Court invoked this provision in holding that Republic Act No. 7659, which imposed a heavier penalty, could not be applied retroactively.

• Section 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Mandates that when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The Court held this provision mandatory and found the trial court's compliance deficient.

• Section 19(1), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Provides that excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading, or inhuman punishment inflicted, and that neither shall the death penalty be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress provides for it. It further provides that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Court held this provision self-executing and automatic, requiring no presidential commutation.

• Section 22, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits the passage of ex post facto laws. The Court invoked this provision in holding that retroactive application of Republic Act No. 7659 would be unconstitutional.

• Section 10, Rule 122, Rules of Court — Requires the clerk of court to transmit to the Supreme Court the complete records of cases where the death penalty is imposed within twenty days after promulgation of judgment. The Court noted the nearly eight-year delay in transmittal and directed the Office of the Court Administrator to investigate.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Torres Jr., JJ., concurred. Hermosisima Jr., J., was on leave.