People vs. Azugue

Positive identification by a credible eyewitness who has no motive to testify falsely prevails over the defense of alibi, and a conspirator who immobilizes the victim while another inflicts the fatal wound is liable for murder as if he himself dealt the fatal blow.

Buenafe Azugue, Morito Salvador, and Bertito Beturin, all residents of Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, were charged with the murder of Joebe Arrobang under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Amended Information alleged that on October 27, 1990, the three accused, conspiring and confederating with one another, attacked and stabbed Arrobang, with treachery and evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances. Only Azugue was tried; Salvador remained at large, and Beturin's status is not addressed in the decision.

Around seven o'clock in the evening of October 27, 1990, at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, Joebe Arrobang was stabbed by Morito Salvador, causing his death. Arrobang was brought to St. Anthony Hospital but did not survive. Dr. Gervacio Diaz, the attending physician, issued a death certificate. The victim's cadaver was referred to Dr. Rafael Almalbis, Jr., a City Health Officer of Roxas City, who conducted a post-mortem examination at Funeraria de Jesus. The examination revealed a through-and-through stab wound with a point of entrance at the right flank of the abdomen at the level of the umbilicus, about six centimeters above the antero-superior iliac crest, measuring three centimeters in length, traversing toward the opposite side and exiting at the lateral side measuring three-fourths of a centimeter in width, with evisceration of the small intestine. The cause of death was shock secondary to internal hemorrhage due to the stab wound of the abdomen.

The sole prosecution witness against Azugue was Porferio Delmo, a fish vendor, who testified that around four o'clock in the afternoon of October 27, 1990, while riding in a public utility jeep from Barangay Punta Cogon, the vehicle stopped because its rear tire got stuck in the mud. The victim, Joebe Arrobang, the jeepney conductor, alighted to check the cause. Thereupon, Azugue held the victim on both forearms while facing him, and immediately, co-accused Morito Salvador, coming from behind, stabbed the victim on the right hip. The victim shouted "I was stabbed," after which Azugue and Salvador fled toward Barangay Punta Cogon. Delmo did not alight from the jeep but later rode in the same vehicle that brought the victim to the hospital. He positively identified Azugue because he was only two arms-lengths away and knew both accused even before the incident.

Azugue interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that on the morning of October 27, 1990, he went to Barangay Ilas Norte, Municipality of Dao, Province of Capiz, together with his father-in-law, Wilfredo Buenavenida, to harvest palay, and returned to Barangay Cogon only on October 28, 1990. Buenavenida partially corroborated this alibi but testified that they left for Ilas Norte on October 7, 1990, and returned only on October 30, 1990 — a date inconsistent with Azugue's own testimony that he returned on October 28. Merlinda Fajartin, sister of Morito Salvador, offered a different version: she testified that around 6:30 in the evening of October 27, 1990, she heard Arrobang shouting in the street, challenging Salvador to come out, carrying a jeepney bench ready to strike; Salvador then appeared, stabbed the victim, and fled, acting alone and without any companion, and with no passenger jeepney present as claimed by the prosecution.

The trial court found Delmo's testimony credible and worthy of full faith and credit, noting that he was only two arms-lengths from the victim, positively identified Azugue, and had no dubious or evil motive to testify falsely. The trial court convicted Azugue of murder, sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to pay the victim's heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witness: Appellant contended that the evidence presented by the prosecution was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, arguing that the lone eyewitness, Porferio Delmo, never gave a statement to police authorities or the city prosecutor, was not listed as a witness in the Information or Amended Information, and first testified almost two years after the crime on October 19, 1992, despite being a neighbor of the private complainant.
• Defense of Alibi: Appellant maintained that he was in Barangay Ilas Norte, Municipality of Dao, Province of Capiz, with his father-in-law Wilfredo Buenavenida at the time of the incident, harvesting palay, and thus could not have been at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City when the crime was committed.

• Credibility of Witness: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credence to the testimony of the lone prosecution witness Porferio Delmo.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the defense of alibi interposed by the accused-appellant, which was corroborated by his father-in-law.

• Credibility of Witness: No. The trial court correctly gave credence to the eyewitness testimony of Porferio Delmo, whose straightforward and unequivocal account was worthy of belief, and whose failure to give a prior statement to police was sufficiently explained.
• Defense of Alibi: No. The defense of alibi is inherently unreliable and cannot prevail over positive identification by a prosecution witness with no motive to testify falsely, especially where the alibi's corroborating testimonies contain glaring inconsistencies.

• Credibility of Witness: The Supreme Court applied the well-settled principle that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand and is thus in the best position to weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless the trial judge plainly overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result, his assessment on credibility must be respected. Delmo gave a straightforward and unequivocal account, positively identifying Azugue as the person who held the victim's arms while Salvador stabbed the victim from behind, from a distance of only two arms-lengths. No dubious or evil motive was proved that would compel Delmo to falsely testify against Azugue. The fact that Delmo did not make a prior statement to police or the city prosecutor was of no moment; he sufficiently explained that since the other jeepney passengers had already reported the incident, there was no need for him to make his own statement. The categorical identification by a witness with no ill motive, grudge, or animosity is entitled to full faith and credit.

• Defense of Alibi: The Court reiterated that alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke, viewed with caution if not suspicion because it is inherently unreliable and easy to fabricate. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was at another place for such a period of time that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification by a prosecution witness who has no motive to testify falsely. The testimonies of Azugue and his corroborating witness Buenavenida contained glaring inconsistencies: Azugue testified he returned to Barangay Cogon on October 28, 1990, while Buenavenida stated they returned on October 30, 1990. Both testified on the same morning of November 23, 1992, with Buenavenida testifying first and Azugue hearing his testimony in toto, yet their accounts remained inconsistent, indicating fabrication. The testimony of Merlinda Fajartin, which sought to relocate the crime scene and limit the perpetrator to her brother alone, was likewise discredited as a concoction designed to acquit Azugue, a friend and co-conspirator of her brother. The Court found that Azugue's active cooperation in holding and immobilizing the victim's arms while the victim was stabbed fatally from behind by Salvador clearly showed both acted with one purpose and design to kill, establishing conspiracy. Azugue's liability as a conspirator attaches even though he did not actually stab the victim. Treachery was appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the two requisite conditions being present: the employment of means of execution that gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means.

• Trial Court's Assessment of Witness Credibility — The trial court's choice between the prosecution's and the defense's versions is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand and the manner in which they gave their testimonies, making it more competent to discern truthfulness and weigh conflicting testimonies. Unless the trial judge plainly overlooked facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result, his assessment on credibility must be respected. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the trial court's crediting of Porferio Delmo's testimony.

• Alibi as the Weakest Defense — Alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke, viewed with caution if not suspicion because it is inherently unreliable and easy to fabricate. It cannot prevail over positive identification of the accused by a prosecution witness who has no motive to testify falsely. For alibi to prosper, the accused must show that he was at such other place for such a period of time that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. The Court rejected Azugue's alibi due to inconsistencies between his and his corroborating witness's testimonies and because it could not overcome Delmo's positive identification.

• Conspiracy by Coordinated Acts — Where the accused's participation is limited to holding and immobilizing the victim's arms while a co-accused inflicts the fatal stab wound, the accused's active cooperation clearly shows both acted together with one purpose and design to kill, establishing conspiracy. The accused is then liable, by legislative and judicial fiat, as if he himself dealt the fatal blow, notwithstanding that he did not actually stab the victim.

• Treachery — Treachery is appreciated when two conditions are present: (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The Court found both conditions satisfied where the victim's arms were held and immobilized by Azugue while Salvador stabbed him from behind, rendering the victim helpless and unable to defend himself.

• "It is an oft-repeated rule that alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke, and courts have always looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it is inherently unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the doctrine on alibi as the weakest defense, explaining why courts view it with suspicion and why it cannot prevail over positive identification.

• "the mere fact that the accused-appellant 'did not actually stab the victim . . . does not negate the appellant's being part of a conspiracy to kill the latter.'" — This passage articulates the principle that a conspirator's liability attaches even without direct participation in the fatal act, provided the conspirator's coordinated conduct demonstrates a common purpose and design.

• "when the question is raised as to whether to believe the version of the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial court's choice is generally viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on the witness stand" — This passage defines the controlling doctrine on deference to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, the rationale being the trial court's firsthand observation of the witnesses.

• People vs. Layno, G.R. No. 110833, Nov. 21, 1996 — Followed for the proposition that alibi is the weakest defense and cannot prevail over positive identification, and for the rule on deference to the trial court's credibility assessment. Citing People vs. Pasiliao, 215 SCRA 163 (Oct. 26, 1992).
• People vs. Obzunar, G.R. No. 92153, Dec. 16, 1996 — Followed for the principle that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to the highest respect. Quoting People vs. Alimon, G.R. No. 87758 (June 28, 1996), and citing People vs. Vallena, 244 SCRA 685 (June 1, 1995), and People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535 (Dec. 4, 1991).
• People vs. Dinglasan, G.R. No. 101312, Jan. 28, 1997 — Followed for the principle that non-participation in the actual stabbing does not negate conspiracy liability. Citing People vs. Francisco, 249 SCRA 526 (Oct. 25, 1995).
• People vs. Crisostomo, 222 SCRA 93 (May 17, 1993) — Followed for the two-element test for treachery: (1) means of execution giving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of such means.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes the crime of murder. The trial court convicted Azugue under this article, imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances.
• Article 29, Revised Penal Code (as amended) — Governs the deduction of the period of preventive imprisonment from the term of the sentence, applied in the trial court's disposition to credit Azugue's detention period, in full if he abided by the rules as a detention prisoner, or four-fifths otherwise.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concurred.