People vs. Asuncion

Illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives under P.D. 1866 is not absorbed by the crime of subversion under R.A. 1700 and may be prosecuted independently of it, because subversion is committed by mere affiliation or membership in a subversive organization and does not require force and violence as an element, unlike rebellion to which the absorption doctrine of People vs. Hernandez is confined.

R.A. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Act, outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other similar associations and penalizes affiliation with or membership in a subversive organization, while P.D. 1866 penalizes the illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, with a higher penalty where the possession is qualified by subversion. The absorption doctrine had been developed in the rebellion cases, where the SC held in People vs. Hernandez that common crimes may not be separately prosecuted because force and violence are already necessary ingredients of rebellion. The question here was whether that doctrine extends by analogy to subversion, a political offense of a different character.

Sometime in February 1988, elements of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines apprehended private respondents Paterna Ruiz, Noli Narca, Fr. Nick Ruiz, Lydia Narca, Rodolfo Corteza and Tomas Dominado in separate operations. Various ammunitions, firearms and explosives were found in their possession, and subsequent searches in their respective hide-outs resulted in the confiscation of several subversive materials, including documents showing that they are ranking members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, or are mere members.

On February 10, 1988, an information for subversion under R.A. 1700 was filed against them before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40, alleging that on or about February 1 and 2, 1988 in Quezon City, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another by overt acts with the common objective to overthrow the duly constituted government, they did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affiliate themselves with, become and remain members of the Communist Party of the Philippines/National Democratic Front and/or its successor or of any subversive association.

Two days later, on February 12, 1988, six separate informations for violation of P.D. 1866 were filed against the same respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, each substantially identical in language and alleging that on or about February 1 and 2, 1988, without any authority of law, the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his or her possession and control one cal .45 pistol, armalite rifle, hand grenade, fragmentation grenade, or M-14 rifle, without first securing any license or permit from the proper authority, and that said firearm is being used in support and furtherance of the crime of subversion or rebellion.

Private respondents then moved to quash the P.D. 1866 informations, arguing that the filing of two separate informations for each accused violated the rule on double jeopardy and that, there being only a single criminal intent, the offense of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives should be absorbed in the charge of violation of R.A. 1700 following the doctrine in People vs. Hernandez. Respondent Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion granted the motion in his Resolution dated May 4, 1988, holding that the possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives charged against the accused is a constitutive ingredient of subversion and hence absorbed by the same and cannot be punished separately, since deadly weapons are needed and necessary to generate the kind of force and violence to accomplish the purpose of subversion. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied on June 8, 1988, prompting the petition.

• Absorption: The People raised, in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the issue of whether the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives punishable under P.D. 1866 is absorbed by the crime of subversion, i.e., membership in a subversive organization punishable under R.A. 1700, and assailed the RTC Resolution quashing the informations as void ab initio together with the order denying reconsideration.

• Absorption: Private respondents argued that, there being only a single criminal intent, the offense of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives should be absorbed in the charge of violation of R.A. 1700, following the doctrine in People vs. Hernandez.
• Double Jeopardy: Private respondents argued that the filing of two separate informations for each of the accused violates the rule on double jeopardy.
• Subversion as a Political Offense: Private respondents did not dispute that rebellion is distinct from subversion, but sought to adopt existing jurisprudence on rebellion by analogy on the theory that both crimes are political offenses intended to destabilize and overthrow the government with the use of force, violence or other illegal means.
• Misolas vs. Panga: Private respondents contended that the SC in Misolas vs. Panga impliedly ruled that where an accused is simultaneously charged with violation of P.D. 1866 and subversion, the doctrine of absorption of common crimes as applied in rebellion would find application.

• Absorption of Illegal Possession by Subversion: Whether the crime of illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives punishable under P.D. 1866 is absorbed by the crime of subversion, i.e., membership in a subversive organization punishable under R.A. 1700.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether the filing of separate informations for violation of P.D. 1866 and R.A. 1700 constitutes double jeopardy.

• Absorption of Illegal Possession by Subversion: No. Subversion is a crime distinct from rebellion, committed by mere affiliation or membership in a subversive organization, and does not require force and violence as an element; P.D. 1866 may therefore be prosecuted independently of R.A. 1700.
• Double Jeopardy: No. Double jeopardy requires a prior conviction or acquittal, or a dismissal or termination without the accused's express consent, by a competent court upon a valid complaint and after plea; no such prior proceeding existed here.

• Absorption of Illegal Possession by Subversion: The trial court applied People vs. Hernandez by analogy, but Hernandez, Enrile vs. Amin and Enrile vs. Salazar all resolved the issue in the setting of rebellion, where force and violence are already necessary ingredients of the crime. Private respondents themselves conceded that rebellion is distinct from subversion; they merely asked that the rebellion doctrine be carried over on the theory that both are political offenses using force and violence. The SC rejected the premise. In People vs. Liwanag the SC categorically distinguished the two: rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, while the Anti-Subversion Act punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein, mere membership being sufficient, with the taking up of arms by a member merely raising the penalty. Buscayno vs. Military Commissions added that subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security, whereas rebellion is a crime against public order. The first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700 describes the CPP as an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means — a recognition that subversive acts need not involve force and violence at all, since one may be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials. The passage in Misolas vs. Panga invoked by the respondents was mere obiter; what the SC upheld there was the validity of the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866, recognizing that the legislature had provided two distinct offenses — illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion under P.D. 1866, and subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government under R.A. 1700 — and that the same act may be penalized under two different statutes with different penalties without warranting invalidation of the law.
• Double Jeopardy: Since the SC resolved that P.D. 1866 can be prosecuted independently of R.A. 1700, there can be no double jeopardy. Double jeopardy can be invoked only if one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, in which case they cannot be subject to separate prosecutions. Article III, Section 21 of the Constitution and Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court require, under a long line of cases, that the accused had previously been convicted or acquitted, or placed in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that the former case against him for the same offense had been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the accused had pleaded to the charge. None of these circumstances obtained. People vs. Elkanish, relied upon by the trial court, is not in point.

• Absorption of Crimes — A common crime is absorbed by a political offense, and cannot be separately prosecuted, where the common crime is a necessary means of committing the political offense or is inherent in it. The doctrine was developed in rebellion, where force and violence are necessary ingredients; the SC refused to extend it to subversion, holding that because subversion is consummated by mere membership and may be committed without force or violence, illegal possession of firearms is not absorbed.
• Subversion vs. Rebellion — Rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; subversion under R.A. 1700 is committed by affiliation or membership in a subversive organization, mere membership being sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member merely raises the penalty. Subversion, like treason, is a crime against national security; rebellion is a crime against public order.
• Two Distinct Offenses Under P.D. 1866 and R.A. 1700 — The legislature provided two separate offenses: (a) illegal possession of firearms qualified by subversion under the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866, and (b) subversion qualified by the taking up of arms against the Government under R.A. 1700. That the same act may be penalized under two different statutes with different penalties, even if highly advantageous to the prosecution and onerous to the accused, does not invalidate the law.
• Requisites of Double Jeopardy — The accused must have been previously (a) convicted, or (b) acquitted, or (c) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, the former case must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance, and after he had pleaded to the charge. Absent a prior proceeding, separate prosecutions under P.D. 1866 and R.A. 1700 raise no jeopardy.

• "Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, as it is more commonly called, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No. 1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein." — Quoting People vs. Liwanag, this is the doctrinal core of the decision: the distinction that defeats the analogy to the rebellion absorption cases.
• "In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient and the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender." — The operative test distinguishing the two political offenses, which explains why force and violence cannot be treated as an ingredient of subversion.
• "This is a recognition that subversive acts do not only constitute force and violence (contra to the arguments of private respondents), but may partake of other forms as well. One may in fact be guilty of subversion by authoring subversive materials, where force and violence is neither necessary or indispensable." — Drawn from the first Whereas clause of R.A. 1700, this passage demolishes the respondents' premise that subversion necessarily entails force and violence.
• "Since We have resolved that P.D. 1866 can be prosecuted independently of R.A. 1700, there can be no double jeopardy. Double jeopardy can be invoked only if one offense is inseparable from another and proceeds from the same act, in which case, they cannot be subject to separate prosecutions." — The entirety of the SC's double jeopardy holding, tied directly to the absorption ruling.

• People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) — The absorption doctrine invoked by the trial court and the respondents; distinguished and confined to rebellion, where force and violence are necessary ingredients.
• People vs. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976) — Controlling precedent; categorically distinguished subversion from rebellion and supplied the definition the SC adopted.
• Buscayno vs. Military Commissions, 109 SCRA 273 (1981) — Followed; classified subversion as a crime against national security and rebellion as a crime against public order.
• Misolas vs. Panga, 181 SCRA 648 (1990) — The passage relied on by the respondents declared mere obiter; the SC there upheld the third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866 as a distinct offense.
• Enrile vs. Amin, 189 SCRA 573 (1990) — Distinguished; a rebellion case resolving the non-complexing of rebellion with common crimes.
• Enrile vs. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 (1990) — Distinguished; likewise a rebellion case.
• People vs. Elkanish, 90 Phil. 53 (1951) — Held not in point on the double jeopardy question raised by the trial court.

• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 (third paragraph) — Penalizes illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, with a higher penalty where committed in furtherance of subversion; treated as a distinct offense that may be prosecuted independently of R.A. 1700.
• Republic Act No. 1700 (Anti-Subversion Act), including its first Whereas clause — Outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations and punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization; its Whereas clause, describing the CPP as a conspiracy to overthrow the Government "not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means," was used to show that force and violence is not an element of subversion.
• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, and that conviction or acquittal under a law or an ordinance bars another prosecution for the same act; applied to hold that no jeopardy attached absent a prior conviction, acquittal, or valid termination.
• Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court — Bars a second prosecution for the offense charged, or an attempt or frustration thereof, or an offense necessarily included therein, only after a prior conviction, acquittal, or dismissal without the accused's express consent by a competent court upon a valid complaint and after plea; applied to defeat the double jeopardy claim.
• Article 134, Revised Penal Code — Defines rebellion as rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government; cited to contrast rebellion with subversion.

• Justice Regalado (Concurring in the result) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.

• Justice Cruz (Dissenting) — Separate opinion; its text is not included. The dissent states only that it is for the reasons stated in his dissent in Baylosis vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 98136, October 3, 1991.
• Justice Gutierrez (Dissenting) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.