People vs. Astudillo

Conspiracy may be inferred from concerted acts showing a common design or concurrence of wills to kill, and treachery qualifies the killing when the accused restrain the victim so that another can stab him without opportunity to defend or retaliate; an accused who files a motion for reconsideration waives double jeopardy and opens the entire evidence for review, but a qualifying circumstance not alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated against him.

The Astudillo brothers were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for the death of Silvestre Aquino, Jr. The case reached the SC on appeal from the RTC of Bangued, Abra, Branch 2. The procedural dispute also concerns Rule 121, Section 1 and Rule 120, Section 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on motions for reconsideration and modification of judgments of conviction.

On November 12, 1995, around 7:00 p.m., brothers Clarence, Crisanto, and Hilario Astudillo went to the house of Alberto Damian, who was celebrating the eve of his birthday. Clarence greeted Alberto and asked the victim, Silvestre Aquino, Jr., who was one of the visitors, to go with him. Silvestre acceded, and the two walked toward Floras' Store, where they were later joined by Crisanto and Hilario. While at the store, Crisanto and Silvestre had an argument. At around that time, prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata, 12 and 11 years of age, respectively, were selling balut in front of Floras' Store. They saw Clarence stab Silvestre with a bolo while Crisanto and Hilario held him by the wrists. Clarence delivered several stab blows at the back and on the chest of the victim until the latter fell to the ground. Thereafter, the three appellants fled on board a tricycle. Silvestre was rushed to the Municipal Health Office of Bangued, Abra, where he was pronounced dead on arrival. The Autopsy Report prepared by Dr. Milagros Cardenas-Burgos revealed that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and 1 abrasion, with the cause of death stated as cardiac tamponade, secondary to stab wound.

According to the defense, on the same date at around 7:00 p.m., Clarence passed by the house of Alberto Damian where Silvestre and several others were playing cards. Silvestre offered Clarence a glass of gin, which he declined. Silvestre got embarrassed and cursed him, so Clarence decided to leave the house. However, Silvestre followed him in front of Floras' Store and pushed him twice, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Silvestre struck him on the head and arm with an empty one-liter softdrink bottle. Hilario arrived and tried to pacify Silvestre, but the latter attacked him. As he retreated, Hilario saw a knife which he then swung at the victim. Silvestre was hit but continued to attack him. Left with no choice, Hilario stabbed Silvestre 2 or 3 times. When the latter collapsed to the ground, Hilario rushed to the succor of his elder brother, Clarence. Meanwhile, Clarence suffered from shock and remained seated on the ground while their other brother, Crisanto, stood on the roadside and called for help.

The appellants left the scene on board a tricycle and proceeded to the house of Clarence's in-laws. On the same night, they surrendered to the Philippine National Police stationed at Bangued, Abra. The prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony and the defense's account thus diverged on who initiated the aggression and how the stabbing occurred. The RTC credited the prosecution eyewitnesses and rejected the appellants' self-defense theory.

• Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC committed reversible error in not acquitting them on the ground of reasonable doubt.
• Murder Conviction: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC erred in convicting them of Murder.
• Second Decision: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC committed reversible error and acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the second decision dated July 10, 1998.
• Conviction of All Accused: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC erred in convicting all the accused.
• Conspiracy and Uniform Penalty: Accused-appellants argued that the RTC erred in ruling that they were guilty of conspiracy and in sentencing them to a uniform penalty.
• Witness Credibility: Accused-appellants pointed to inconsistencies between the prosecution witnesses' testimony and their affidavits, specifically Eduardo Bata's failure to state in his sworn statement that Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, and Manny Bareng's alleged unfamiliarity with the Ilocano words "bagsol" and "binagsol" in his sworn statement.
• Self-Defense: Accused-appellants invoked self-defense, claiming that Silvestre attacked Clarence and Hilario and that Hilario stabbed Silvestre only after being attacked.
• Qualifying Circumstance: Accused-appellants contended that abuse of superior strength, not having been alleged in the Information, could not be appreciated against them, and that treachery could not be appreciated in the amended decision because it was not raised in their motion for reconsideration.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the RTC erred in giving full faith and credit to the prosecution eyewitnesses despite the alleged inconsistencies between their testimony and their affidavits.
• Self-Defense: Whether the accused-appellants established the elements of self-defense to justify the killing.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established among the three accused.
• Modification of Judgment: Whether the RTC validly amended its decision to appreciate treachery instead of abuse of superior strength after the accused filed a motion for reconsideration.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Use of Motor Vehicle: Whether the use of a motor vehicle was properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether voluntary surrender was properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
• Penalty: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.
• Civil Liability: Whether the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, temperate damages, and exemplary damages were proper.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The RTC's assessment of witness credibility is entitled to deference absent overlooked material facts; the alleged inconsistencies were inconsequential, and affidavits are generally inferior to open-court testimony.
• Self-Defense: No. Even if the victim initially attacked Clarence, any unlawful aggression ceased when Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim, and the 15 stab wounds negated self-defense.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy may be inferred from the accused's concerted acts of holding the victim's wrists while another stabbed him, showing a common design to kill.
• Modification of Judgment: Yes. The accused's motion for reconsideration waived double jeopardy and opened the entire evidence for review; treachery was alleged in the Information, and the qualifying-circumstance issue was raised in their alternative prayer.
• Treachery: Yes. The accused restrained the victim to enable Clarence to stab him without giving him a chance to defend himself or retaliate, and the means were deliberately adopted.
• Use of Motor Vehicle: No. The prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately used to facilitate the crime or escape; its use was merely incidental.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. The accused surrendered spontaneously and unconditionally on the same night upon learning that the authorities were looking for them.
• Penalty: Yes. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code required the minimum period, reclusion perpetua.
• Civil Liability: Modified. Civil indemnity and moral damages are affirmed; actual damages are replaced by temperate damages because they were not fully substantiated; exemplary damages are justified by treachery, but moral and exemplary damages must be separately determined.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellate courts will not disturb the RTC's assessment of witness credibility unless a material fact or circumstance of weight and substance was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. The RTC judge had the front-line opportunity to personally evaluate the witnesses' demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying. The SC reviewed the records and found no such material circumstance or palpable error. The prosecution eyewitnesses Manuel Bareng and Eduardo Bata gave positive and straightforward testimony that the appellants ganged up on the defenseless victim, and no ill-motive was shown to falsely testify against them. Their testimony was therefore entitled to full faith and credit. The alleged inconsistencies between their testimony and affidavits were inconsequential: Eduardo Bata's omission in his sworn statement that Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, and Manny Bareng's alleged unfamiliarity with the Ilocano words "bagsol" and "binagsol" in his sworn statement. An affidavit, taken ex-parte, is often incomplete and generally inferior to open-court testimony; it is usually prepared by another using his own language, so omissions and misunderstandings are not infrequent. The witnesses' direct and categorical declarations remained consistent even under cross-examination.

• Self-Defense: When an accused invokes self-defense, he admits authorship of the crime and bears the burden to prove all elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. Even assuming the deceased initially attacked Clarence, the defense still failed because the evidence showed that Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim by the wrists. At that point, any unlawful aggression or danger to the appellants' lives ceased, so it was no longer necessary for Clarence to repeatedly stab the victim. Their act could no longer be interpreted as self-preservation but as a perverse desire to kill. The number of wounds also negated self-defense: it defied reason for the victim to sustain 15 wounds on different parts of his body if the appellants were only defending themselves. The physical evidence of the wounds was a mute manifestation of truth and ranked high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence.

• Conspiracy: Direct proof of an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not necessary. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills and a common intent or design to commit a crime. Here, the appellants' collective and individual acts of holding the victim's wrists and delivering several stab blows demonstrated a common design to kill. Crisanto and Hilario restrained the victim while Clarence stabbed him, and the three fled together on a tricycle. These concerted acts showed a concurrence of wills and a common intent to kill, sufficient to establish conspiracy.

• Modification of Judgment: Under Rule 121, Section 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction may be filed by the accused, or initiated by the RTC with the consent of the accused. Under Rule 120, Section 7, a judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only upon motion of the accused before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. These provisions protect the accused from having to defend himself anew from more serious offenses or penalties that the prosecution or the RTC may have overlooked. Once judgment has been validly promulgated, any reconsideration or amendment to correct a manifest substantial error can be made only with the consent or upon the instance of the accused. However, the protection against double jeopardy may be waived. When the accused himself files or consents to a motion for reconsideration or modification, double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the accused waived his right not to be placed therein by filing such motion. The motion gives the RTC an opportunity to rectify its errors or reevaluate its assessment of facts and conclusions of law and make them conformable with the statute in the new judgment. It also affords the RTC a chance to correct its own mistakes and avoid unnecessary appeals. A motion for reconsideration or modification filed by or with consent of the accused renders the entire evidence open for review of the RTC without further proceedings, such as the taking of additional proof. The appellants filed a timely motion for reconsideration asking the RTC to acquit or, in the alternative, convict them of the lesser offense of homicide. They thereby waived double jeopardy and effectively placed the evidence taken at trial open for review. The issue of the qualifying circumstance was also squarely raised in their alternative prayer for conviction for the lesser offense of homicide in view of the erroneous appreciation of abuse of superior strength, which was not alleged in the Information. Hence, the RTC was not only empowered but also under obligation to rectify its mistake in appreciating abuse of superior strength instead of treachery. It was precluded from considering a qualifying circumstance if the complaint or information did not allege such facts. Treachery was alleged in the Information, so the amendment to appreciate treachery was valid.

• Treachery: Even before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000, qualifying circumstances were required to be specified in the complaint or information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated against the accused. In order that treachery may be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. Here, treachery qualified the killing to murder because the appellants deliberately restrained the victim so as to enable one of them to successfully deliver the stab blows without giving the latter a chance to defend himself or to retaliate. The means were deliberately adopted.

• Use of Motor Vehicle: The RTC erred in appreciating the generic aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle. The prosecution failed to show that the tricycle was deliberately used by the appellants to facilitate the commission of the crime or that the crime could not have been committed without it. The use of a motor vehicle is not aggravating where its use was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. The evidence did not establish that the tricycle was used for such purpose.

• Voluntary Surrender: To benefit an accused, voluntary surrender requires: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture. Here, the appellants voluntarily surrendered to the authorities on the same night of the incident when they learned that the authorities were looking for them. Though they did not give a statement regarding the stabbing incident, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should nonetheless be considered in their favor. What mattered was that they spontaneously, voluntarily, and unconditionally placed themselves at the disposal of the authorities. This act of respect for the law indicated a moral disposition favorable to their reform.

• Penalty: Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. With no generic aggravating circumstance and one generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty imposable on the appellants, in accordance with Article 63(3) of the Revised Penal Code, should be the minimum period, which is reclusion perpetua.

• Civil Liability: The award of moral and exemplary damages cannot be lumped together because these damages are different in nature and require separate determination. Moral damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the felonious act. The widow of the deceased testified that her husband's death brought grief and emotional suffering to their family, so the heirs are entitled to moral damages of P50,000.00 pursuant to current jurisprudence. Exemplary damages are warranted when the commission of the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. In People vs. Catubig, the SC explained that the term "aggravating circumstances" in the Civil Code is understood in its broad or generic sense; the commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying. Unlike criminal liability, which is basically a State concern, the award of damages is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. The ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. Relative to the civil aspect, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the Civil Code. The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery justified the award of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. As for actual damages, the amount actually expended in connection with the death of the victim must be substantiated with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party. The records showed that the P65,288.50 awarded by the RTC as actual damages was not fully substantiated by receipts. However, as the heirs actually incurred funeral expenses, they are entitled to temperate damages. In People vs. Abrazaldo, the SC ruled that where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of absence or lack of receipts to prove the amount claimed, temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be awarded. Finally, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is affirmed. In murder, the grant of civil indemnity fixed by jurisprudence at P50,000.00 requires no proof other than the fact of death as a result of the crime and proof of the accused's responsibility therefor.

• Trial court deference on witness credibility — Appellate courts generally do not disturb the RTC judge's assessment of witness credibility because the judge had the front-line opportunity to evaluate demeanor, conduct, and behavior while testifying; the assessment stands absent a clear showing that a material fact or circumstance of weight and substance was overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied. The SC applied this to uphold the prosecution eyewitnesses' testimony.
• Affidavit vs. open-court testimony — An affidavit is taken ex-parte, is often incomplete, and is generally regarded as inferior to the witness's testimony in open court; inconsistencies between the two do not necessarily discredit the witness. The SC applied this to disregard the alleged omissions and unfamiliarity with Ilocano terms.
• Self-defense — When an accused invokes self-defense, he admits authorship of the crime and bears the burden to prove: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. The SC found the defense failed because any aggression ceased when the victim was restrained and the 15 wounds negated self-defense.
• Conspiracy inferred from acts — Direct proof of an agreement to commit a felony is not necessary; conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused showing a concurrence of wills and a common intent or design to commit a crime. The SC inferred conspiracy from the holding of the victim's wrists while another stabbed him.
• Qualifying circumstances must be alleged — Qualifying circumstances must be specified in the complaint or information; otherwise they cannot be appreciated against the accused. The SC noted that abuse of superior strength was not alleged, while treachery was alleged in the Information.
• Treachery — Treachery requires: (1) employment of means, method, or manner of execution that ensures the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts by the victim, leaving the victim no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender. The SC found both requisites from the restraint of the victim and the deliberate stabbing.
• Waiver of double jeopardy by motion for reconsideration — A motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction filed by the accused, or with his consent, waives double jeopardy and opens the entire evidence for review by the RTC without further proceedings. The SC applied this to allow the RTC to correct its judgment from abuse of superior strength to treachery.
• Use of motor vehicle as aggravating circumstance — The use of a motor vehicle is not aggravating where it was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to make the offender's escape easier and apprehension difficult. The SC removed this aggravating circumstance.
• Voluntary surrender — Voluntary surrender requires: (1) the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary, meaning spontaneous and showing an intent to submit unconditionally to the authorities. The SC credited the surrender on the same night of the incident.
• Temperate damages in lieu of unsubstantiated actual damages — Where actual damages cannot be determined because of absence or lack of receipts to prove the amount claimed, temperate damages of P25,000.00 should be awarded. The SC applied this to replace the RTC's unsubstantiated actual damages.
• Exemplary damages and aggravating circumstances — Exemplary damages are warranted when the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, because the aggravating circumstance exacerbates the offense as to both the public and the private victim. The SC awarded P25,000.00 exemplary damages due to treachery.

• "Conspiracy, as in the instant case, can be inferred from the acts of the three appellants which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills and a common intent or design to commit a crime." — The SC used this formulation to establish conspiracy from the accused's concerted acts of restraining the victim and stabbing him.
• "In order that treachery may be considered, the following requisites must concur: (1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given to the latter to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender." — This is the SC's canonical statement of the treachery requisites, applied to the restraint of the victim.
• "The use of motor vehicle is not aggravating where the use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult." — The SC used this rule to reject the RTC's appreciation of use of motor vehicle as an aggravating circumstance.
• "A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt, or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture." — The SC applied this definition to credit the accused's surrender on the same night of the incident.

• People vs. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 133799, 5 February 2002 — Followed for the rule that conspiracy may be inferred from acts showing a concurrence of wills and common design.
• People vs. Viernes, G.R. No. 136733-35, 13 December 2001 — Followed on the effect of a motion for reconsideration filed by the accused and the waiver of double jeopardy.
• People vs. Yabut, 370 Phil. 612, 620 (1999) — Followed for the rule that an affidavit is generally inferior to open-court testimony and inconsistencies between them do not necessarily discredit the witness.
• People vs. Obzunar, 333 Phil. 395, 416 (1996) — Followed for the burden on the accused invoking self-defense and the elements of self-defense.
• People vs. Tampon, 327 Phil. 729, 741 (1996) — Followed for the rule that the number of wounds may negate self-defense.
• People vs. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, 23 August 2001, 363 SCRA 621 — Followed for the award of exemplary damages where an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, attends the offense.
• People vs. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, 7 February 2003 — Followed for the award of temperate damages where actual damages are not substantiated by receipts.
• People vs. Whisenhunt, G.R. No. 123819, 14 November 2001, 368 SCRA 586, 610 — Followed for the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in murder, requiring proof of death and responsibility.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder; the SC applied it because the killing was qualified by treachery, and imposed reclusion perpetua.
• Article 14(16), Revised Penal Code — Treats treachery as an aggravating circumstance; the SC applied its requisites and held that treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Article 63(3), Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty when there is no aggravating circumstance and one mitigating circumstance; the SC applied it to impose the minimum period, reclusion perpetua.
• Rule 121, Section 1, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Allows a motion for reconsideration of a judgment of conviction by the accused or by the RTC with the accused's consent; the SC used it to uphold the RTC's power to review the judgment after the accused's motion.
• Rule 120, Section 7, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Allows modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction upon motion of the accused before finality or perfection of appeal; the SC applied it to the amended decision.
• Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Require the complaint or information to specify qualifying and aggravating circumstances; the SC noted that qualifying circumstances must be alleged, and that abuse of superior strength was not alleged while treachery was.
• Article 2217, Civil Code — Defines moral damages; the SC awarded P50,000.00 moral damages for the widow's grief and emotional suffering.
• Article 2230, Civil Code — Authorizes exemplary damages when the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance; the SC awarded P25,000.00 exemplary damages because of treachery.