People vs. Archivido

Treachery cannot be appreciated where the victim was forewarned of the danger and chose to confront it rather than flee, even if the initial attack on a companion was sudden and unexpected; the victim's awareness of the peril negates the element of an unforeseen attack essential to alevosia.

Armando Archivido y Abengoza and Ruben Archivido are brothers whose parents owned an eight-hectare parcel of land in San Pascual, Basud, Camarines Norte. The lot was subdivided in 1979, with each brother receiving 2.68 hectares. In 1989, Armando demanded a bigger share, which Ruben and their mother Lydia refused, engendering a protracted dispute between the brothers. On July 2, 2009, the conflict escalated when Armando threatened to kill Ruben and Ruben's wife Lilia, an incident recorded in the barangay blotter.

Armando and Ruben Archivido are brothers whose parents owned an eight-hectare parcel of land in San Pascual, Basud, Camarines Norte. The lot was subdivided in 1979, with each brother receiving 2.68 hectares. In 1989, Armando demanded a bigger share, but Ruben and their mother Lydia refused, infuriating Armando and sparking a dispute that dragged on for years. On July 2, 2009, the conflict escalated when Armando threatened to kill Ruben and his wife Lilia, an incident recorded in the barangay blotter.

At around 10:00 a.m. on July 31, 2009, while Ruben and Lilia were on their way home after cultivating their land at San Pascual, they chanced upon Armando, who was on his way to the mountains. According to the prosecution, Armando intentionally bumped Lilia, resulting in an argument. Ruben intervened and urged both to move on; they agreed. However, immediately after Ruben and Lilia turned their backs, Armando suddenly hacked Lilia from behind. Upon hearing a thud, Ruben turned around and saw Armando hacking Lilia with his bolo. Lilia tried to retaliate but was no match for Armando and fell to the ground severely injured. Ruben rushed to his wife's aid, but while he was removing his raincoat and unloading the cassava he was carrying, Armando suddenly started hacking him, inflicting injuries on his face, shoulders, and arms. Armando then left to wash his bolo. Ruben left Lilia's side to seek help and met Edgar Ponaya, who reported the matter to the barangay and took Ruben to the Camarines Norte Provincial Hospital. Dr. Edmundo Dizon noted that Ruben had six hacking wounds causing severe bleeding that would have been fatal without immediate medical attention; Ruben was confined for 16 days. Lilia succumbed to her injuries. Dr. Jose Magana, Municipal Health Officer of Daet, conducted a post-mortem examination and noted several hacking wounds on Lilia's legs, declaring the cause of death as hemorrhagic shock.

Armando interposed self-defense. He related that he met Lilia and Ruben while on his way to the mountain and that Lilia threatened him to refrain from testifying in a case being filed against her by Glenda Sablawan. He retorted that Lilia should not tell him what to do. When he turned his back to leave, he was suddenly struck with a bolo. Ruben and Lilia moved towards him with arms raised and clutching their bolos. While he was about to draw his bolo, Ruben hit him on his right arm. Ruben tried to hack him several times, but he was able to parry the attacks and fight back. When Ruben pleaded for him to stop, he left and proceeded to the barangay hall of San Pascual to surrender, but no barangay official was present. He asked a certain Eduardo to accompany him to the Basud Police Station; on their way they met barangay tanod Morada, who brought him to the station. He had the incident recorded in the police blotter and was taken to the hospital for treatment. Dr. Antonio Dee noted that his injuries were superficial and not fatal. After discharge, he returned to the police station.

The RTC found Armando guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and frustrated murder, rejecting his plea of self-defense and his claim of voluntary surrender. The CA affirmed with modifications, appreciating treachery in both attacks, rejecting evident premeditation and self-defense, and recognizing voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.

• Self-Defense: Armando pleaded self-defense, claiming that Lilia and Ruben attacked him first by hacking the back of his head. Although the wound was later declared superficial, he honestly believed at the time that his life was in danger, prompting him to retaliate. The means he employed were reasonably necessary to parry the assault, and he did not cause any sufficient provocation, merely refusing to accede to Lilia's request not to testify against her.
• Absence of Qualifying Circumstances: Armando argued that the prosecution failed to establish treachery and evident premeditation. He contended that the prosecution's narration was unbelievable, asserting that if he truly wanted to attack without danger to himself, he would have attacked Ruben first as the stronger opponent and targeted a more delicate part of the body. Neither was the assault deliberately and consciously adopted.
• Alternative Conviction: Alternatively, Armando argued that should he be found guilty, he may only be convicted of homicide and frustrated homicide.
• Voluntary Surrender: Armando claimed entitlement to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, having gone to the barangay hall immediately after the incident and, finding no one there, proceeded to the Basud Police Station.

• Failure of Self-Defense: The OSG countered that Armando failed to prove his plea of complete and incomplete self-defense, his defense resting on his "lone and doubtful testimony" which pales in comparison to the prosecution witnesses' statements. His claim that Ruben and Lilia ganged up on him is unbelievable and belied by the physical evidence.
• Presence of Treachery and Evident Premeditation: The OSG maintained that the attack was attended with treachery and evident premeditation, Armando having hacked the spouses as soon as they turned their backs, employing means to ensure success with least harm to himself. Evident premeditation existed given the ongoing dispute and Armando's prior threat to kill them, which he fulfilled by killing Lilia and injuring Ruben.

• Treachery (Lilia): Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing of Lilia Archivido.
• Treachery (Ruben): Whether the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the attack on Ruben Archivido.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was proven.
• Self-Defense: Whether Armando's claim of self-defense, complete or incomplete, has merit.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether Armando is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalties and monetary awards imposed by the CA are proper.

• Treachery (Lilia): Yes. Treachery attended the killing of Lilia, the attack having been sudden, swift, and unexpected, launched from behind after Lilia believed the prior argument was settled, affording her no chance to resist or escape.
• Treachery (Ruben): No. Treachery was not present in the attack on Ruben, who turned around upon hearing a thud, saw Armando assaulting Lilia, and was thereby forewarned of the impending danger before he himself was attacked.
• Evident Premeditation: No. The prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, no evidence having been adduced as to when Armando determined to commit the crime or that a sufficient lapse of time allowed him to reflect on his resolution.
• Self-Defense: No. Armando failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; his claim that the spouses ganged up on him was self-serving, uncorroborated, and belied by the medical records showing he emerged practically unscathed.
• Voluntary Surrender: Yes. Armando voluntarily went to the barangay hall to surrender and, finding no one there, proceeded to the police station, offering no resistance — evincing a sincere desire to submit to the authorities.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: The CA's penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder was affirmed. For frustrated homicide, an indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum was imposed. Damages were adjusted in accordance with People vs. Jugueta.

• Treachery (Lilia): Treachery or alevosia is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms to ensure execution of the crime without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The essence is that the attack comes without warning, swift, deliberate, and unexpected, affording the victim no chance to resist. Although Armando and Lilia had a prior argument, Lilia believed the matter was settled and turned her back to leave. Armando then hacked her from behind in a swift motion. The reasons behind the squabble — Armando's refusal to accede to Lilia's request or his bumping into her — were too shallow to have warned Lilia of life-threatening peril. The deliberate swiftness diminished any risk of retaliation, and the fact that Armando suffered no injuries while Lilia died of severe blood loss further evidenced treachery. Precedents establish that a prior altercation negates treachery only insofar as it forewarned the victim; here, the squabble had ended and could not serve as a warning.

• Treachery (Ruben): Ruben's situation differed from Lilia's. After turning their backs, Ruben heard a thud, turned around, and saw Armando hacking Lilia. He was thus forewarned of the impending danger and was aware that in rushing to aid Lilia, he would be vulnerable to attack. Once a victim is forewarned of danger and chooses to meet it rather than flee, treachery cannot be appreciated, as treachery presupposes a sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack. Any doubt in assessing treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. The attack on Ruben was therefore not treacherous, and the conviction was downgraded to frustrated homicide.

• Evident Premeditation: The essence of evident premeditation is that execution of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at calm judgment. Three requisites must be proven: (i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (ii) an act manifestly indicating he clung to his determination, and (iii) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. The prosecution failed to identify when Armando decided to kill Lilia and Ruben. His prior threats and the ongoing dispute were insufficient, constituting at best mere expressions of hatred rather than evidence of a predetermined plan to kill. Mere expressions of anger do not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime unless accompanied by outward acts clearly showing such intent.

• Self-Defense: By invoking self-defense, Armando admitted the acts charged but sought justification, shifting the burden to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was unlawful aggression by the victims, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non. Armando's claim that the spouses ganged up on him was self-serving, uncorroborated, and belied by medical records: Lilia died of massive bleeding, Ruben suffered six hacking wounds causing severe blood loss, while Armando's wounds were superficial and not fatal. Even assuming the spouses initiated the attack, the assault Armando inflicted was glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize them, and his actions after the parties had peacefully parted ways were animated by an evil desire to harm rather than a legitimate impulse to defend.

• Voluntary Surrender: Voluntary surrender is a mitigating circumstance when the accused has not been actually arrested, surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and the surrender is voluntary. The essence is spontaneity and intent to submit to authorities. After the attack, Armando went to the barangay hall to surrender; finding no one there, he proceeded to the police station, meeting Tanod Morada en route and offering no resistance. He also voluntarily returned to the police station after hospital discharge. These acts evince a sincere desire to surrender.

• Proper Penalty and Damages: For murder under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. With no aggravating circumstance proven and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated, Article 63(3) of the RPC mandates the lesser penalty — reclusion perpetua. Damages of P75,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages were awarded pursuant to People vs. Jugueta. For frustrated homicide, Article 50 of the RPC prescribes the penalty next lower in degree than that for the consummated felony; homicide carries reclusion temporal under Article 249, so the penalty for frustrated homicide is prision mayor. With voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance, the maximum was taken from the minimum period of prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum was taken from prision correccional. An indeterminate sentence of four years and two months of prision correccional as minimum to eight years of prision mayor as maximum was imposed. Damages of P30,000.00 each for civil indemnity and moral damages were awarded; no exemplary damages were awarded absent any proven aggravating circumstance. All monetary awards earn 6% per annum interest from finality until full satisfaction.

• Treachery (alevosia) — Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. The essence is that the attack comes without warning, swift, deliberate, and unexpected, affording the victim no chance to resist or escape. A prior altercation negates treachery only insofar as it forewarned the victim of impending danger; where the squabble was too shallow to serve as a warning and had ended before the attack, treachery may still be appreciated. An attack against a victim whose back is turned is treacherous, signifying a conscious choice of means rather than a sudden emotional response.

• Forewarning Negates Treachery — Where the victim was forewarned of the danger and chose to confront it rather than flee, treachery cannot be appreciated. Treachery presupposes a sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack. Any doubt in assessing treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused. This principle was applied to downgrade the conviction from frustrated murder to frustrated homicide, as Ruben had turned around, witnessed the assault on Lilia, and was aware of the peril before being attacked.

• Evident Premeditation — The essence is that execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at calm judgment. Three requisites must be proven: (i) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (ii) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (iii) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow reflection. Evident premeditation cannot be presumed; mere expressions of anger or hatred do not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime unless accompanied by outward acts clearly showing such intent.

• Self-Defense — When the accused invokes self-defense, he admits the acts charged but seeks justification, and the burden shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (i) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (ii) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression, and (iii) lack of sufficient provocation on the accused's part. Unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non, requiring: (i) a physical or material attack or assault, (ii) actual or at least imminent attack, and (iii) the attack must be unlawful. The fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto prove unlawful aggression; once the aggressor is dispossessed of the weapon, subsequent acts by the accused constitute retaliation, not self-defense.

• Voluntary Surrender — A mitigating circumstance requiring: (i) the accused has not been actually arrested, (ii) the accused surrenders to a person in authority or the latter's agent, and (iii) the surrender is voluntary. The essence is spontaneity and intent to submit to authorities, either because the accused acknowledged guilt or wished to save authorities the trouble and expense of search and capture.

• Frustrated Felony — A frustrated crime exists where the perpetrator performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but the felony was not accomplished due to some cause independent of the assailant's will. In frustrated homicide, the main element is the accused's intent to take the victim's life, which must be proven clearly and convincingly. The crucial points are the means employed, the nature, location, and number of wounds, supported by independent proof that the injuries were sufficient to cause death without timely medical intervention.

• "The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the sudden blow." — This passage provides the canonical formulation of treachery relied upon by the Court in finding Armando's attack on Lilia qualified by alevosia.

• "once it appears that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and instead of fleeing from it, met it and was killed as a result, then the qualifying circumstance of treachery cannot be appreciated. Treachery presupposes a sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from frustrated murder to frustrated homicide as to the attack on Ruben, distinguishing his situation from Lilia's.

• "An intimation or expression of hatred does not necessarily imply a resolution to commit a crime and a determination to carry it out. A criminal intent cannot be presumed from hatred or ill-will, unless the expression of the latter is accompanied or thereafter followed by outward acts clearly and manifestly showing such intent." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Narit, defines why Armando's prior threats and the ongoing land dispute were insufficient to establish evident premeditation.

• "when the accused invokes self-defense, in effect, he or she admits to the commission of the acts for which he or she was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would exculpate him or her. Consequently, the burden of proving that the act was justified, shifts upon him or her." — This passage states the doctrinal basis for shifting the burden of proof to the accused upon a plea of self-defense, foundational to the Court's rejection of Armando's defense.

• People vs. Kalipayan, 824 Phil. 173 (2018) — Followed. Held that an attack against a victim whose back was turned is treacherous, signifying a conscious choice of means rather than a sudden emotional response.
• People vs. Saure, 428 Phil. 916 (2002) — Followed. Affirmed the presence of treachery despite a prior altercation, where the victim believed the matter was settled.
• People vs. PO3 Feliciano, 418 Phil. 88 (2001) — Followed. A prior verbal tussle did not eliminate treachery where the victim had no reason to believe he was in danger.
• People vs. Vallespin, 439 Phil. 816 (2002) — Followed. Clarified that a prior altercation negates treachery only insofar as it forewarned the victim about impending danger.
• People vs. Se, 469 Phil. 763 (2004) — Followed. Held that once a victim is forewarned of danger and meets it instead of fleeing, treachery cannot be appreciated.
• People vs. Casas, 755 Phil. 210 (2015) — Followed. No treachery where the victim was fully aware of the danger in intervening to assist another.
• People vs. Mantes, 420 Phil. 751 (2001) — Followed. "There is no treachery where the victim was aware of the danger to his life; when he chose to be courageous instead of cautious."
• People vs. Grabador, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018 — Followed. Enumerated the three requisites for establishing evident premeditation.
• People vs. Narit, 274 Phil. 613 (1991) — Followed. Mere expressions of anger or hatred do not evidence a predetermined plan to kill absent outward acts showing criminal intent.
• People vs. Dulin, 752 Phil. 24 (2015) — Followed. The fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto prove unlawful aggression; once dispossessed of the weapon, subsequent acts constitute retaliation.
• Velasquez, et al. vs. People, 807 Phil. 438 (2017) — Followed. Even assuming the victims were initial aggressors, the assault inflicted was glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize them.
• Serrano vs. People, 637 Phil. 319 (2010) — Followed. Characterized a frustrated crime as one where the perpetrator performed all acts of execution but the felony was not accomplished due to a cause independent of the assailant's will.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed. Provided the framework for awarding civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in murder and frustrated homicide cases.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659) — Defines and penalizes murder, prescribing reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to convict Armando of murder for the killing of Lilia, qualified by treachery.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. Used as the reference penalty for determining the imposable penalty for frustrated homicide, which is the penalty next lower in degree.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated felony. Applied to reduce the penalty for frustrated homicide to prision mayor.
• Article 63(3), Revised Penal Code — States that when the commission of the act is attended by a mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied where the law prescribes two indivisible penalties. Applied to impose reclusion perpetua rather than death for murder.
• Article 13, paragraph 7, Revised Penal Code — Recognizes voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. Applied to reduce the penalties in both criminal cases.

Leonen (Chairperson), Gesmundo, and Carandang, JJ., concurred. Zalameda, J., was on official leave.