People vs. Aragon

A marriage void ab initio does not require a judicial declaration of nullity before a subsequent marriage may be contracted, and the accused cannot be convicted of bigamy for contracting a marriage after the death of the first spouse but during the lifetime of a second spouse whose marriage to him was void ab initio. The Court applied the rule of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused, holding that in the absence of an express statutory provision requiring judicial declaration of nullity of void marriages, the accused cannot be penalized.

The accused contracted three marriages: first with Maria Gorrea in 1925, second with Maria Faicol in 1934, and third with Jesusa C. Maglasang in 1953. The prosecution arose from the third marriage, which was contracted after the death of the first wife but during the lifetime of the second wife. The case implicates Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which punishes any person who contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, and Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613), which makes a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse illegal and void from its performance.

On September 28, 1925, the accused, under the name of Proceso Rosima, contracted marriage with Maria Gorrea in the Philippine Independent Church in Cebu. While this marriage was subsisting, the accused, under the name of Proceso Aragon, contracted a canonical marriage with Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Santa Teresita Church in Iloilo City. The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were Eulogio Giroy, an employee of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Iloilo, and Emilio Tomesa, a clerk in the same office.

After the second marriage, the accused and Maria Faicol established residence in Iloilo. The accused was then a traveling salesman and commuted between Iloilo, where he maintained Maria Faicol, and Cebu, where he maintained his first wife. Maria Gorrea died in Cebu City on August 5, 1939. After her death, the accused brought Maria Faicol to Cebu City in 1940, where she worked as a teacher-nurse.

The accused and Maria Faicol did not live a happy marital life in Cebu. In 1949 and 1950, Maria Faicol suffered injuries to her eyes because of physical maltreatment at the hands of the accused. On January 22, 1953, the accused sent Maria Faicol to Iloilo, allegedly for the purpose of undergoing treatment of her eyesight. During her absence, the accused contracted a third marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang on October 3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.

The accused admitted having contracted the marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang. Although he attempted to deny his previous marriage with Maria Faicol, the trial court found this attempt futile, as the fact of the second marriage was fully established not only by the certificate of the marriage but also by the testimony of Maria Faicol and Eulogio Giroy, one of the sponsors of the wedding, and the identification of the accused made by Maria Faicol. The action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife, Maria Faicol, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into.

• Reliance on People vs. Mendoza: The appellant relied on the case of People vs. Mendoza (95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767), where the majority of the Court declared that the statutory provision of Section 29 of the Marriage Law plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.

• Judicial Declaration of Nullity Required: The trial court held that even in the absence of an express provision in Act No. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void ab initio, the defendant could not legally contract marriage with Jesusa C. Maglasang without the dissolution of his marriage to Maria Faicol, either by the death of the latter or by the judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriage, at the instance of the latter. Authorities cited were 5 Viada, 5th edition, 651; 35 American Jurisprudence, Marriage, Sec. 46, p. 212; and Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579.

• Void Marriage and Judicial Declaration: Whether a marriage void ab initio requires a judicial declaration of nullity before a subsequent marriage may be contracted without incurring criminal liability for bigamy.
• Strict Construction of Penal Laws: Whether the rule of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused applies where the Revised Penal Code contains no express provision requiring judicial declaration of nullity of void marriages.

• Void Marriage and Judicial Declaration: No. A marriage void ab initio does not require a judicial declaration of nullity before a subsequent marriage may be contracted. The Court held that Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages.
• Strict Construction of Penal Laws: Yes. The rule of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused applies. The Court held that had the rule requiring judicial declaration of nullity of void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law; in its absence, the Court is bound by the rule of strict interpretation.

• Void Marriage and Judicial Declaration: The Court acknowledged the weighty reasons of Justice Alex Reyes in his dissent in People vs. Mendoza, which argued that it is not for the spouses to judge whether a marriage was void or not, and that judgment is reserved to the courts. However, the Court found that the very fundamental principle of strict construction of penal laws in favor of the accused justifies the stand in People vs. Mendoza. The Court noted that the Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment, and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, the Court is bound by the rule of strict interpretation.
• Strict Construction of Penal Laws: The Court observed that the action was instituted upon the complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one, and the appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage could not prosper. The Court reversed the judgment appealed from and acquitted the defendant-appellant, with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for having contracted the second bigamous marriage.

• Void Marriage Requires No Judicial Declaration of Nullity — A marriage void ab initio is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the accused's second marriage with Maria Faicol, being void ab initio, did not require judicial declaration of nullity before the accused could contract a third marriage.
• Strict Construction of Penal Laws — Penal laws are strictly construed in favor of the accused. Where the Revised Penal Code contains no express provision requiring judicial declaration of nullity of void marriages, the Court cannot read such a requirement into the law. The Court applied this principle to acquit the accused, notwithstanding the dissent's view that judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.

• "The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere annullable marriages." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Mendoza, states the controlling doctrine that void marriages require no judicial declaration of nullity, and is the basis for the Court's acquittal of the accused.
• "Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation already adverted to." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the principle of strict construction of penal laws, reasoning that the absence of an express statutory provision requiring judicial declaration of nullity compels acquittal.
• "It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this marriage can not prosper." — This passage explains the factual basis for the acquittal: the third marriage was valid because the second marriage was void and the first wife had died, so the prosecution for bigamy could not prosper.

• People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 845; 50 Off. Gaz., [10] 4767 — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case, where the majority declared that a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity.
• Bickford vs. Bickford, 74 N. H. 466, 69 A. 579 — Cited by the trial court as authority for the proposition that judicial declaration of nullity is required before a subsequent marriage may be contracted. The Supreme Court did not adopt this authority.
• People vs. Jose Cotas (CA), 40 Off. Gaz. 3145 — Cited in the dissenting opinion of Justice Reyes, quoting Mr. Justice Tuason's statement that the rule requiring judicial declaration of nullity is in line with the well-known rule established in cases of adultery.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — The provision punishing with prision mayor any person who contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved. The Court interpreted this provision in light of the rule of strict construction, holding that a void marriage does not require judicial dissolution.
• Section 29, Act No. 3613 (Marriage Law) — The provision making a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of the first spouse illegal and void from its performance. The Court applied this provision to hold that the second marriage was void ab initio and required no judicial declaration of nullity.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concurred.

• Reyes, A.J., dissenting — Justice Reyes dissented, reiterating his dissent in People vs. Mendoza. He argued that Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who contracts a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, and that it is not for the spouses to judge whether a marriage was void or not; that judgment is reserved to the courts. Citing Viada, he maintained that the sanctity and importance of marriage do not permit the spouses to judge their own nullity, and the presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage until a court declares its nullity. He added that the construction placed by the majority upon the law penalizing bigamy would frustrate the legislative intent rather than give effect thereto. Padilla and Montemayor, JJ., concurred with the dissent.