People vs. Aposaga and Monte

The positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses prevails over the inherently weak defenses of alibi and denial, especially when corroborated by circumstantial evidence of flight, and inconsistencies in testimony that pertain only to minor details do not suffice to overturn the trial court's assessment of witness credibility.

Atty. Jose Barranda, a law practitioner, lived with his common-law wife Gloria Salongcong and their combined children on a 36-hectare farm in Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato. Among the residents in the same barrio were the accused-appellants Francisco Aposaga and Constancio Monte, the latter having been recruited by the deceased to be the administrator of his farm. Also residing nearby were Sotera Salongcong (Gloria's sister), Jesus Francisco (an ousted ex-tenant), and Doroteo Estorque (father of Aposaga's common-law wife). Tensions existed due to the ouster of previous tenants and allegations that the deceased had raped his stepdaughter, Fe Cabrera.

Atty. Jose Barranda lived on his farm in Palkan, Polomolok, South Cotabato, with his common-law wife Gloria Salongcong and their children, including Gloria's children from a previous relationship: Noe and Felomena Cabrera. Constancio Monte had been recruited by Barranda to administer the farm, displacing previous tenants like Jesus Francisco. On the morning of December 13, 1965, Barranda summoned Monte to his house for a discussion, after which they had breakfast. Barranda then left for Dadiangas via a route passing near the houses of accused Francisco Aposaga and Doroteo Estorque. Gloria left a minute later via a different route.

According to the prosecution's eyewitnesses, Noe and Felomena Cabrera, Barranda was chased and attacked by three men armed with bolos and knives. Noe testified that he saw Aposaga and a certain "Calbo" hack and stab Barranda, after which Monte arrived and also hacked the victim, ultimately stabbing him in the stomach when he fell. Felomena corroborated this account, stating she saw Monte running towards Barranda and then hacking him alongside Aposaga and Calbo. The body was later buried in a dry well, and Barranda's portfolio was buried separately. The children did not immediately report the incident, allegedly due to death threats from the accused.

The crime remained undiscovered until January 20, 1966, when Pio Francisco learned from his son Jesus that Aposaga, Monte, and Calbo had killed Barranda. Pio reported the matter to the Philippine Constabulary on January 30, 1966. During the investigation, Monte and his wife gave sworn statements implicating Aposaga and Calbo, claiming they were hired by Sotera Salongcong. Barranda's body was exhumed on February 2, 1966, with the medico-legal officer finding four fatal wounds consistent with hacking and mauling. Jesus Francisco testified that he was given P200 to deliver to Aposaga and was later instructed by the trio to bury Barranda's bag.

Aposaga and Monte were charged with murder. Aposaga claimed he fled to Iloilo because his mother was sick and only learned of the murder months later. Monte retracted his sworn statements, claiming he meant Jesus Francisco, not Aposaga, and that he did not know the contents of the affidavits he signed. The defense presented Doroteo and Vicente Estorque, who testified that Aposaga was plowing with them at the time of the incident. The trial court, however, found the eyewitnesses credible and convicted the accused, imposing the death penalty.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: Appellants argued that the testimonies of the two eyewitnesses, Noe and Felomena Cabrera, were corrupt, biased, unreliable, and incompetent due to inherent improbabilities.
• Unnatural Actuations of Eyewitnesses: Appellants pointed out that Noe did not shout for help, did not tell his mother about the killing, and accompanied her in searching for the victim despite knowing he was dead. Similarly, Felomena did not secretly inform her mother, took 48 days to report the incident, and her initial report to the PC was about a wanted man, not the murder.
• Frame-up and Motive: Appellants theorized that prosecution witnesses Sotera Salongcong, Jesus Francisco, and Gloria Salongcong plotted against the deceased due to resentment over tenancy ouster and the alleged rape of Fe Cabrera, thus framing the accused who had no motive to kill the victim.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: Whether the flaws and inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's eyewitnesses are sufficient to overturn the trial court's finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Whether the positive identification of the accused by the eyewitnesses, combined with circumstantial evidence, prevails over the defenses of alibi and denial.
• Motive: Whether the lack of motive on the part of the accused and the apparent motive of the prosecution witnesses to commit the crime warrant the acquittal of the accused.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: No. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the eyewitnesses pertain only to minor details and do not destroy their credibility, and the trial court's assessment of their credibility is accorded great respect on appeal.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: Yes. The positive identification of the accused by credible eyewitnesses prevails over the inherently weak defenses of alibi and denial, which are further undermined by evidence of flight.
• Motive: No. Motive is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proved for conviction when the identity of the culprit is not in doubt, as established by positive identification.

• Credibility of Eyewitnesses: The Court found that the alleged improbabilities in the eyewitnesses' testimonies, such as not shouting for help or not reporting earlier, do not negate their presence during the killing. The inconsistencies cited by the appellants refer to minor details. The Court noted that the eyewitnesses likely discussed the incident with their mother but denied it to protect her, as "blood is thicker than water," which would implicate their mother and other relatives. The trial court observed the witnesses' deportment during cross-examination and found them credible despite their minority and the pressure of the proceedings. Appellate courts generally defer to the trial court's findings on credibility unless facts of substance were overlooked, which was not the case here. Furthermore, no motive was shown for the eyewitnesses to falsely testify against the accused.
• Sufficiency of Evidence: The defenses of alibi and denial are inherently weak, especially when faced with positive identification. Aposaga's claim of fleeing to Iloilo due to his mother's illness was uncorroborated and improbable, and his sudden departure upon the commencement of the investigation indicated a guilty conscience. The alibi witnesses, Doroteo and Vicente Estorque, were relatives of Aposaga's common-law wife, and their testimonies were inconsistent and doubtful. Moreover, the place where Aposaga allegedly was plowing was only 150 meters from the victim's house, making it physically possible for him to be at the crime scene. Monte's retraction of his sworn statements was given little weight, as the municipal judge testified that the affidavits were read to the affiants, and it was evident Monte was trying to save his co-accused who provided him a defense counsel. Monte's own testimony contained circumstantial evidence inconsistent with innocence, such as his failure to act upon hearing a threat against the deceased and his escape from jail.
• Motive: The Court ruled that motive is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proved for conviction when the identity of the culprit is established beyond reasonable doubt, as in this case through positive identification. While the prosecution witnesses Sotera, Jesus, and Gloria may have had motives to kill the deceased and may have been involved in the crime, their non-prosecution does not exonerate the principals by direct participation. The guilt of the appellants was established with moral certainty even without the testimonies of these three witnesses.

• Trial Court's Assessment of Witness Credibility — Appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial judge regarding the credibility of witnesses, who had the opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court plainly overlooked facts of substance and value that might affect the result. The Court applied this doctrine by upholding the trial court's credence to the testimonies of the two minor eyewitnesses despite noted flaws and inconsistencies.
• Alibi as a Defense — For alibi to be acceptable, it must be shown that the accused was at a place so distant that it was well-nigh impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when it was committed. The Court rejected Aposaga's alibi because the place where he claimed to be plowing was only 150 meters from the crime scene.
• Motive in Criminal Cases — Motive is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proved for purposes of conviction. It becomes essential only when there is doubt as to the identity of the culprit. The Court held that since the accused were positively identified, the lack of motive on their part and the presence of motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses did not warrant acquittal.
• Flight as Indicative of Guilt — Flight and going into hiding indicate a guilty conscience. The Court used this principle to discredit Aposaga's explanation for his sudden departure to Iloilo and Monte's escape from jail.

• "Time and time again WE have ruled that where the issue is credibility of the witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial judge, who heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless he has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the doctrine on the deference given to trial courts in assessing witness credibility.
• "motive, as distinguished from criminal intent, is not an essential element of a crime and hence, need not be proved for purposes of conviction. Motive is essential to conviction in murder cases only when there is doubt as to the Identity of the culprit" — This defines the role of motive in criminal convictions and clarifies when it becomes a necessary element for the prosecution to prove.

• People vs. Laguisma, 98 SCRA 69 (1980) — Cited to support the doctrine that appellate courts generally defer to the trial court's findings on witness credibility.
• People vs. Veloso, 92 SCRA 515 (1979) — Cited for the ruling that motive is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proved for conviction unless the identity of the culprit is in doubt.
• People vs. Tirol, L-30538 (1981) — Cited for the requirement that for an alibi to prosper, the accused must be at a place where it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at the crime scene.
• People vs. Guevarra, 94 SCRA 642 (1979) — Cited for the principle that flight and going into hiding indicate a guilty conscience.

• Revised Penal Code — The case involves the crime of murder, for which the trial court initially imposed the death penalty. The Supreme Court modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua due to the lack of necessary votes to impose the death penalty.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.