People vs. Apawan

Treachery (alevosia) attends a killing when the attack on the victim is from behind, sudden, unexpected, and perpetrated without warning, thereby ensuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. The victim's lack of awareness of the impending attack and his inability to defend himself are the controlling considerations.

The appellant, Antonio Apawan y Tapi, and the victim, Edgardo Yap, were both cousins of the prosecution witnesses Ermie and Estela Escala. The appellant was a cousin on the mother's side, while the victim was a cousin on the father's side. The appellant's residence was adjacent to the Escala house, but he was unable to establish a warm relationship with the Escala sisters, who described the atmosphere as "silent" whenever he visited. In contrast, the victim was a welcome guest in the Escala household, occasionally staying overnight, particularly during moonlight nights, and at other times sleeping in his fishing boat.

On August 13, 1984, at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Ermie Escala was taking a snack with Edgardo Yap in her house in Tumaga interior, Zamboanga City. With them were her younger siblings: Agnes, 7 years old; Liza, 10 years old; Shirleta, 15 years old; and Vicente, 3 years old. They were all seated around a table in the kitchen, with Edgardo seated on a chair facing Ermie.

While they were thus seated, appellant Antonio Apawan suddenly appeared from behind. Without any warning or exchange of words, appellant attacked Edgardo with a knife, hitting him twice: the first wound was on the left lumbar region, lacerating the left kidney, and the second was on the right thigh. Edgardo stood up to run away but collapsed and fell on the kitchen floor due to the gravity of his wounds. He died as a consequence of the first wound, which the medico-legal officer who examined his body described as "fatal."

After stabbing Edgardo, appellant turned his attention to Ermie and initiated another violent assault. Ermie jumped through the window to escape. It was at this time that Ermie's sister Estela, who had just awakened from her sleep at the second floor of the house, grabbed appellant's knife. Appellant was later pacified when his mother arrived, and he was thereafter arrested by the police who responded to the crime scene.

Appellant presented a different version of the incident. He alleged that at around 3:00 p.m. of August 13, 1984, he was engaged in a conversation with his cousin Ermie Escala at the balcony of the latter's house. The victim, upon seeing appellant, went downstairs and confronted him as to why he was peeping at Ermie. Appellant retorted that he could not possibly do such a thing as Ermie was like a sister to him. The victim punched appellant on the breast and stomach, causing him to fall on the floor of the balcony. The victim, who was physically bigger, jumped at appellant, who then ran towards the kitchen. Appellant unfortunately stumbled, and the victim caught up with him and held his neck. They fought each other. Appellant then spotted a knife tucked to the body of the victim. He allegedly grabbed the knife, but it fell on the floor. They grappled for possession of the knife. Appellant got hold of it and stabbed the victim. Appellant went home, crying, and reported the incident to his mother, who called for a policeman. Appellant surrendered and turned over the fatal knife to the police officer.

The trial court gave full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly Ermie Escala, who testified that the victim was seated and unaware of the appellant's presence when the appellant stabbed him from behind. The trial court also found that the appellant did not surrender to the police after the commission of the crime, but rather it was the policeman who placed him under arrest and brought him to the METRODISCOM for investigation.

• Bias of Prosecution Witnesses: Appellant contended that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were biased, alleging that the Escala sisters had motive to testify against him as they "nursed ill-feeling" towards him because he allegedly used to peep at them whenever they were asleep, and because they claimed he killed Edgardo Yap, a cousin closer to them than appellant.
• Implausibility of Ermie's Testimony: Appellant argued that Ermie Escala's testimony that he chased her with the intention of stabbing her does not inspire belief, for if such were the case, she would have filed attempted murder charges against him and would have sustained sprains or injuries when jumping from the window.
• Improbability of Estela's Actions: Appellant contended that the declarations of the Escala sisters that Estela was able to wrest the knife from him were simply unbelievable.
• Inconsistencies in Estela's Testimony: Appellant argued that Estela's testimony was fraught with inconsistencies, specifically when she testified that she gave the knife taken from appellant to the police, yet when cross-examined, she claimed that the weapon was taken from her by appellant's mother.
• Sufficient Provocation: Appellant insisted that there was sufficient provocation on the part of the victim who called him a "peeping tom" immediately before the incident, and that this circumstance negates the attendance of treachery in the commission of the crime.

• Absence of Improper Motive: The Solicitor General observed that aside from the testimony of Estela Escala that appellant used to peep at them whenever they were asleep, there was nothing in the records to show that the Escala family resented appellant's attitude, and the alleged close relationship of the victim with the Escala sisters was not motive enough for them to testify falsely against appellant, who was also their cousin.
• Non-Filing of Attempted Murder Case: The Solicitor General argued that the fact that Ermie did not file attempted murder charges against appellant does not affect the veracity of her testimony, as the prosecution of crimes, especially those involving crimes against the state, is the concern of peace officers and government prosecutors.
• Speculative Nature of Appellant's Claims: The Solicitor General contended that the allegation that Ermie should have sustained sprains or injuries and that its absence belies her claim that she jumped off the window is speculative, as neither party questioned Ermie on this point and no evidence was presented as to the height of the window.
• Natural Reaction of Estela: The Solicitor General argued that Estela, having just awakened from sleep and not having witnessed the manner appellant treacherously assaulted the victim, naturally reacted to prevent appellant from inflicting further injury on the victim, so she wrestled with appellant and grabbed the knife from him.
• Irrelevance of Knife Possession Detail: The Solicitor General argued that whether Estela gave the knife taken from appellant directly to the police authorities or to appellant's mother will not negate the fact that it was the said knife which appellant used in killing the victim.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the trial court gravely erred in giving full faith and credence to the allegedly biased testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
• Sufficient Provocation: Whether the trial court gravely erred in not considering in favor of the accused-appellant the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party immediately preceding the act.
• Treachery: Whether the trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of Murder instead of Homicide.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: No. The trial court's assessment of the credibility of prosecution witnesses was upheld, there being no showing of improper motive on their part to testify falsely against the appellant, and the alleged inconsistencies were immaterial to the fact that appellant killed the victim with the knife.
• Sufficient Provocation: No. The victim did not commit any act of provocation or aggression during the incident, as established by the testimony of Ermie Escala, who narrated how appellant treacherously killed the victim without any exchange of words.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was present because the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected attack of the accused, who stabbed him from behind while he was seated and unaware of the appellant's presence.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: The Court applied the fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and should be accorded the highest consideration, with the only exception being when the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied certain facts which, if considered, would materially alter the result of the case. The Court found that this case did not fall within the ambit of the exception. The Court noted that appellant himself admitted his close relationship with the Escala sisters and that he knew of no reason why they should testify falsely against him. The alleged inconsistencies in Estela's testimony regarding who possessed the knife when the police arrived were deemed immaterial, as they did not negate the fact that it was the said knife which appellant used in killing the victim. The Court also rejected as speculative the appellant's claim that Ermie should have sustained injuries from jumping out the window, noting that no evidence was presented as to the height of the window.

• Sufficient Provocation: The Court found, contrary to appellant's assertion, that the victim did not commit any act of provocation or aggression during the incident. The testimony of Ermie Escala established that appellant suddenly appeared from behind and stabbed the victim without any exchange of words. When asked if she heard appellant talking to the victim, Ermie answered "No, sir." The Court thus rejected the appellant's claim that the victim had called him a "peeping tom" immediately before the incident, as this was contradicted by the prosecution's eyewitness testimony.

• Treachery: The Court held that treachery was present because the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected attack of the accused. The testimony of Ermie Escala established that the victim was seated sidewise when appellant came at his back and stabbed him, that the victim was not aware of the person of the accused before the accused stabbed him, and that the victim was still sitting down when the accused stabbed him for the second time. The Court cited the rule that there is treachery when the attack on the victim was from behind, was sudden and unexpected, and was perpetrated without warning, thus ensuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. The Court concluded that appellant purposely adopted this mode of attack to consummate the crime without any risk to himself. The Court also noted that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of appellant, consistent with the trial court's finding that appellant did not surrender to the police after the commission of the crime but was in truth placed under arrest by a policeman who brought him to the METRODISCOM for investigation.

• Treachery (Alevosia) — There is treachery when the attack on the victim is from behind, sudden and unexpected, and perpetrated without warning, thus ensuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant. The Court applied this doctrine in affirming the conviction for Murder, finding that the victim was seated and unaware of the appellant's presence when the appellant stabbed him from behind, rendering the victim unable to defend himself.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and should be accorded the highest consideration, with the only exception being when the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied certain facts which, if considered, will materially alter the result of the case. The Court applied this doctrine in upholding the trial court's credence in the prosecution witnesses, finding no improper motive on their part to testify falsely.

• Voluntary Surrender — The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated when the accused did not surrender to the police after the commission of the crime but was in truth placed under arrest by a policeman. The Court applied this doctrine in denying the mitigating circumstance, consistent with the trial court's finding that the policeman placed appellant under arrest and brought him to the METRODISCOM for investigation.

• "From the foregoing testimony, it can be clearly gleaned that treachery was present as the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected attack of the accused." — This passage states the Court's conclusion on the presence of treachery, which is the controlling basis for affirming the conviction for Murder rather than Homicide.

• "There is treachery when the attack on the victim was from behind, was sudden and unexpected, and was perpetrated without warning, thus ensuring the execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant." — This passage articulates the canonical definition of treachery applied by the Court, which is the controlling doctrine for the disposition of the case.

• "It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and should be accorded the highest consideration." — This passage states the standard of appellate review applied by the Court in upholding the trial court's assessment of witness credibility.

• People vs. Perciano, 233 SCRA 393 (1994) — Cited to support the proposition that the prosecution witnesses' testimony is worthy of full faith and credit absent any showing of improper motive to testify falsely.
• People vs. Villafuerte, 232 SCRA 225 (1994) — Cited in support of the same proposition regarding credibility of prosecution witnesses.
• People vs. Gonzales, 230 SCRA 291 (1994); People vs. Alapide, 236 SCRA 555 (1994); People vs. Timple, 237 SCRA 52 (1994) — Cited for the fundamental rule that the trial judge's conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight and highest consideration.
• People vs. Garcia, 235 SCRA 371 (1994) — Cited for the exception to the general rule on credibility of witnesses, which the Court found inapplicable to this case.
• People vs. Lualhati, 234 SCRA 325 (1994) — Cited to support the finding that treachery was present as the victim was not in a position to defend himself from the unexpected attack.
• People vs. Suitos, 220 SCRA 419 (1993) — Cited to support the conclusion that appellant purposely adopted the mode of attack to consummate the crime without risk to himself.
• People vs. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 (1993) — Cited for the definition of treachery as an attack from behind, sudden and unexpected, perpetrated without warning.
• People vs. Cordero, 217 SCRA 10 (1993) — Cited for the same definition of treachery, ensuring execution of the criminal act without risk to the assailant.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing Murder, under which the appellant was charged and convicted. The Court affirmed the conviction under this provision, finding that treachery qualified the killing to Murder.

Padilla, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concurred.