People vs. Andrade

When a motion to quash is grounded on the allegation that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the trial court is mandated by Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court to give the prosecution an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment before granting the motion to dismiss; the court may not dismiss outright nor may it consider grounds other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction.

In 2003, the Bureau of Corrections conducted a random drug test among inmates of the National Bilibid Prison. Twenty-one inmates, including the respondents, tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride ("shabu"). The Department of Justice subsequently filed informations charging them with violation of Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) for using dangerous drugs.

• The Random Drug Testing: On June 30, 2003, pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections Dionisio R. Santiago, a random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP). Thirty-eight inmates submitted urine samples for testing by the Alpha Polytechnic Laboratory. Twenty-one samples, including those of respondents Aquilino Andrade, Roman Lacap, Yong Fung Yuen, Ricky Yu, Vicente Sy, Alvin So, Romualdo Miranda, Sindao Melibas, Saturnino Liwanag, Roberto Medina, and Ramon Navarro, initially tested positive and were subsequently confirmed positive by the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division.
• The Informations: The respondents were charged under identical informations for violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165, alleging that on or about June 30, 2003, they "willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any manner introduced into the physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as 'shabu,' a dangerous drug."
• Arraignment and Motion to Quash: After respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" on June 29, 2006, they filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss (treated as a Motion to Quash under Rule 117) on August 29, 2006. They argued that Section 15 requires apprehension or arrest for drug use or coverage under Section 36 (mandatory drug testing), neither of which applied to them as they were merely subjected to a random test while serving sentences for other crimes. They further argued that even if applicable, the testing procedure violated Section 38 of RA 9165 because they were not informed of screening test results within the required timeframe to challenge them via confirmatory testing.
• RTC Order of Dismissal: The RTC granted the motion, ruling that the essential requisites for the offense were absent because respondents were not apprehended or arrested for violation of RA 9165, nor were they among those enumerated in Section 36 subject to mandatory drug testing. The RTC concluded that "finding no probable cause for the offense charged," the cases were dismissed.
• Appellate Proceedings: The CA affirmed the dismissal, noting that while the RTC erred in failing to give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the informations as required by Section 4, Rule 117, any amendment would be futile because the defects could not be cured.

• Proper Remedy and Waiver: Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the dismissal because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3(a), Rule 117 by failing to file the motion to quash before arraignment. Alternatively, petitioner maintained that the ground raised was waived by their entry of plea.
• Amendment of Information: Petitioner contended that even if the motion was properly filed, Section 4, Rule 117 mandates that the prosecution be given an opportunity to amend the information when the ground is that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. The trial court's outright dismissal deprived the State of its right to due process and its day in court.
• Scope of Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: Petitioner asserted that the trial court exceeded its authority by making a determination of probable cause after arraignment. The judicial determination of probable cause is limited to the issuance of warrants of arrest; once an information is filed and the accused arraigned, the court may not review the prosecutor's executive determination of probable cause absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion.

• Timeliness of Motion: Respondents countered that their motion to quash filed after arraignment was proper because Section 9, Rule 117 expressly excepts grounds under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 from the waiver rule. Since their motion was based on Section 3(a) (facts do not constitute an offense), it could be filed at any time.
• Substantive Defect: Respondents argued that the informations were defective because Section 15 of RA 9165 applies only to persons apprehended or arrested for drug use or those subject to mandatory drug testing under Section 36. As inmates serving sentences who were merely subjected to a random test, they did not fall within the scope of Section 15. They maintained that the defect was substantive and could not be cured by amendment.

• Authority to Determine Probable Cause: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the informations based on a determination of lack of probable cause when the motion to quash was grounded on the failure to state an offense, and whether such determination was proper after arraignment.
• Opportunity to Amend: Whether the trial and appellate courts erred in failing to give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the informations pursuant to Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
• Curability of Defect: Whether the defect alleged—that the facts charged do not constitute an offense under Section 15 of RA 9165—is curable by amendment.

• Proper Ground for Motion to Quash: The motion filed by respondents, though denominated as a "Motion to Dismiss," was in substance a Motion to Quash under Section 3(a), Rule 117 because it alleged that the facts stated in the information did not constitute an offense. Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 117, grounds under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 are not deemed waived even if the motion is filed after arraignment. Thus, the motion was not barred by the entry of plea.
• Limitation on Judicial Determination of Probable Cause: The trial court exceeded its authority when it dismissed the cases based on "lack of probable cause" rather than the specific ground raised in the motion. Section 2, Rule 117 provides that the court shall consider no ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction. The determination of probable cause by a judge is limited to ascertaining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued; it does not extend to reviewing the prosecutor's executive determination of probable cause after the information has been filed and the accused arraigned. By proceeding with arraignment, the trial court had already admitted the existence of probable cause; its duty thereafter was limited to determining whether the material averments in the information were sufficient to hold respondents for trial.
• Mandatory Opportunity to Amend: Section 4, Rule 117 mandates that if a motion to quash is based on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution must be given an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment before the motion is granted. The motion shall be granted only if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or if the information still suffers from the same defect despite amendment. Generally, the failure of allegations to constitute an offense is a defect curable by amendment. The trial court's outright dismissal without allowing amendment was reversible error.
• Prematurity of Merits Determination: The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the dismissal and in speculating that amendment would be futile. Such pronouncement was premature without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence or to amend the informations. The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to due process and its day in court. The prosecutor has the duty to lay before the court every fact and circumstance known to exist, and the court should not deprive the State of this right based on technical grounds when the defect might easily be cured.

• Executive vs. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause — There are two distinct determinations of probable cause: (1) the executive determination, made by the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to support an information; and (2) the judicial determination, made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes an independent determination solely for the purpose of issuing an arrest warrant. Once the information is filed and the accused arraigned, the trial court may no longer inquire into the existence of probable cause unless there is a showing that the executive or judicial determination was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
• Exception to Waiver of Grounds for Motion to Quash — Under Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, the failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before pleading is deemed a waiver of objections, except for grounds provided in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3. These exceptions include: (a) that the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) that the court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (g) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; and (i) that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case was dismissed without express consent.
• Mandatory Amendment Before Dismissal — Section 4, Rule 117 imposes a mandatory duty on the court to give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the information when the motion to quash is based on a defect curable by amendment, such as the failure of the facts charged to constitute an offense. The motion shall be granted only if the prosecution fails to amend, or if the defect persists after amendment. This rule is rooted in the principle that the State is entitled to due process and should not be deprived of its right to prosecute on technical grounds when the pleading defect is remediable.

• "It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made."
• "The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised by respondents..."
• "The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued."
• "Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly states that if the ground based upon is that 'the facts charged do not constitute an offense,' the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."
• "The State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest."

• People v. Castillo and Mejia, 607 Phil. 754 (2009) — Cited for the distinction between executive and judicial determinations of probable cause, and the limitation on the judge's authority to review the prosecutor's finding of probable cause.
• People v. Inting, G.R. No. 88919, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 788 — Cited for the distinction between the preliminary inquiry for issuance of a warrant of arrest (judicial function) and the preliminary investigation proper (executive function).
• People v. Talao Perez, 98 Phil. 768 (1956) — Cited for the rule that when defects in an information can be cured by amendment, the court should order amendment rather than dismissal.
• People v. Leviste, 325 Phil. 525 (1996) — Cited for the principle that the State is entitled to due process and its day in court in criminal proceedings.

• Section 15, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) — Defines the offense of use of dangerous drugs, requiring apprehension or arrest and a positive confirmatory test. The Court noted that respondents claimed they did not fall within the coverage of this provision because they were not apprehended for drug use nor subject to mandatory testing under Section 36.
• Section 4, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Mandates that the prosecution be given an opportunity to amend the information when a motion to quash is based on a defect curable by amendment, such as the failure to state an offense.
• Section 9, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that grounds for motion to quash under paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 are not waived even if the motion is filed after the accused enters a plea.
• Section 2, Rule 117, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that the court shall consider no grounds other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged.

• Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson)
• Martin S. Villarama, Jr.
• Jose Catral Mendoza (Designated Acting Member)
• Francis H. Jardeleza