People vs. Anderson y Jeffrey

Death of the accused before final judgment totally extinguishes criminal liability as well as civil liability based solely on the offense, requiring dismissal of the criminal case. Had timely notice of the supervening death been given, affirmance of the conviction would not have issued.

Paul Anderson y Jeffrey was the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 04-7543, 04-7618, and 04-7619 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 207. On appeal, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision dated March 27, 2015 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 06518 finding Anderson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two separate counts of Rape through Sexual Assault and Acts of Lasciviousness.

Anderson elevated the case to the Supreme Court. Through a Resolution dated April 26, 2017, the conviction was affirmed after exhaustive review, with the appeal dismissed for failure to sufficiently prove reversible error warranting the exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The damages awarded, including the additional six percent legal interest per annum on all damages and costs, were likewise affirmed in toto.

Thereafter, Anderson's counsel filed a Manifestation and Undertaking with Motion to Dismiss dated July 26, 2017, informing the Court that Anderson had already died on April 21, 2007, as evinced by his Certificate of Death. This meant Anderson had passed away during the pendency of the criminal case, since the case was resolved by the Court only through the Resolution dated April 26, 2017.

• Extinguishment by Death Before Final Judgment: Whether the death of the accused-appellant prior to final conviction extinguishes his criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, warranting the setting aside of the affirmance and dismissal of the criminal cases.
• Survival of Civil Liability on Other Sources: Whether civil liability in connection with the accused's acts may nevertheless survive and be pursued through a separate civil action if predicated on a source of obligation other than delict.

• Extinguishment by Death Before Final Judgment: Yes. Death before final judgment totally extinguishes criminal liability under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, together with civil liability ex delicto which is grounded on the criminal action.
• Survival of Civil Liability on Other Sources: Yes. The claim for civil liability survives if predicated on a source other than delict under Article 1157 of the Civil Code, enforceable only by separate civil action against the executor/administrator or estate subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.

• Extinguishment by Death Before Final Judgment: Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties when death occurs before final judgment. The civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is likewise ipso facto extinguished because it is grounded on the criminal action, there being no longer a defendant to stand as the accused upon death pending appeal. Applied here, Anderson died on April 21, 2007, long before the April 26, 2017 Resolution became final; had the Court been timely informed, the conviction would not have been affirmed. Accordingly, the prior Resolution had to be set aside and Criminal Case Nos. 04-7543, 04-7618, and 04-7619 dismissed.
• Survival of Civil Liability on Other Sources: As clarified in People vs. Culas, death pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability as well as civil liability based solely thereon, meaning civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. However, civil liability survives if it may also be predicated on another source of obligation under Article 1157 of the Civil Code, namely law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts. Where it survives, recovery may be pursued only by filing a separate civil action, enforceable against the executor/administrator or the estate depending on the source, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Prescription is not forfeited where the civil action was instituted together with the criminal action, because the statute of limitations is deemed interrupted during pendency of the criminal case conformably with Article 1155 of the Civil Code.

• Extinguishment of criminal liability by death before final judgment — Criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties only when death occurs before final judgment. The rule was applied to set aside the affirmance and dismiss the criminal cases because Anderson died during pendency and before final conviction.
• Extinguishment of civil liability ex delicto upon death pending appeal — Death of the accused pending appeal terminates criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, that is, civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. The rationale is that the civil action for recovery ex delicto is grounded on the criminal action, which is deemed extinguished as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused.
• Survival of civil liability based on sources other than delict — A claim for civil liability survives the accused's death if it may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict under Article 1157 of the Civil Code, such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts. In this case, the victim was left to file a separate civil action against the executor/administrator or estate as warranted by law and procedural rules, with prescription deemed interrupted during pendency of the criminal case under Article 1155 of the Civil Code.

• "Criminal liability is totally extinguished: 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;" — States the controlling statutory basis under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code for dismissing the case upon death before final judgment.
• "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e. civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." — Defines the precise scope of extinguishment, distinguishing liability based solely on the offense from liability with another legal source.
• "Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended." — Prescribes the exclusive procedural vehicle for enforcing any surviving civil liability against the estate.

• People vs. Culas, 810 Phil. 205 (2017) — Followed as controlling authority summarizing the effects of death pending appeal on criminal and civil liability, including survival of civil liability based on non-delictual sources and the requirement of a separate civil action.
• People vs. Layag, 797 Phil. 386, 390-391 (2016) — Cited through People vs. Culas in support of the summarized rules on extinguishment and survival of civil liability.

• Article 89 (1), Revised Penal Code — Provides for total extinguishment of criminal liability by death of the convict as to personal penalties, and as to pecuniary penalties when death occurs before final judgment; applied to dismiss the criminal cases upon Anderson's death before final conviction.
• Article 1157, Civil Code — Enumerates sources of obligation other than delict — law, contracts, quasi-contracts, and quasi-delicts — upon which surviving civil liability may be predicated; applied to preserve a possible separate civil action against the estate.
• Article 1155, Civil Code — Provides for interruption of the prescriptive period; applied to assure that limitations on civil liability instituted with the criminal action are deemed interrupted during pendency of the criminal case.
• Section 1, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended — Governs institution of the civil action arising from the offense; applied to require that any surviving civil liability be enforced only through a separate civil action.

Hernando, J., Zalameda, J., Rosario, J., and Marquez, J., concur. No separate concurring opinions with additional reasoning appear in the text.