People vs. Amigo

Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua, but does not require a corresponding modification of the remaining periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; the medium and minimum periods remain unchanged.

Patricio Amigo was a vulcanizer at a shop in Davao City. The victim, Benito Ng Suy, was a Chinese businessman who operated a store on Ramon Magsaysay Avenue, Davao City. The offense was committed on December 29, 1989, after the 1987 Constitution had taken effect but before the enactment of Republic Act No. 7659, which later reimposed the death penalty for heinous crimes. During this interim period, the proper penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code — as affected by the constitutional prohibition on the death penalty — was the subject of conflicting doctrinal interpretations by the Court.

On December 29, 1989, at around 1:00 P.M., Benito Ng Suy was driving his gray Ford Fiera home to Bajada, Davao City, after spending the morning at his store on Ramon Magsaysay Avenue. With him were his daughters Jocelyn and a younger daughter, his two-year-old son seated beside him at the front, and a five-year-old boy at the back. While traversing the National Highway of Bajada, an orange Toyota Tamaraw driven by Virgilio Abogada suddenly made a left turn in front of the Regional Hospital, cutting across the Ford Fiera's path and causing a head-on collision that slightly damaged the Tamaraw's right bumper. Seated beside Virgilio in the Tamaraw was Patricio Amigo, a vulcanizer at a local shop.

Benito immediately alighted and confronted Virgilio, telling him, "You were not looking," to which Virgilio replied, "I did not see you." While the two drivers argued, Amigo alighted from the Tamaraw and advised Benito to leave, calling it a minor accident. Irritated by the interference, Benito rebuked Amigo, telling him not to meddle since he had nothing to do with the collision. Amigo sarcastically asked, "You are Chinese, is it you?" When Benito confirmed that he was Chinese, Amigo replied, "So, you are a Chinese, wait for a while," then walked away.

Benito instructed Jocelyn to call a policeman. About a minute later, Amigo returned and again asked, "You are a Chinese, is it not?" When Benito calmly answered in the affirmative, Amigo muttered, "Ah, so you are a Chinese," drew a five-inch knife from his waist, and stabbed Benito twice in the chest. Wounded and sensing his life was in peril, Benito pushed Amigo away and ran around the Tamaraw, but Amigo pursued him, overtook him, embraced him, and thrust the knife into the victim several more times, the last stab hitting Benito on the left side of his body. Jocelyn, still inside the Ford Fiera, pleaded for mercy but could not open the door. She shouted for help among the bystanders, but no one intervened. Only when Benito lay seated on the floor of the Ford Fiera did Jocelyn manage to open the door. Her younger sister then embraced their bloodied father, causing Amigo to cease his assault and flee. Jocelyn chased him but could not overtake him; she returned, loaded her father into the Tamaraw, and brought him to San Pedro Hospital.

At the emergency room, Dr. Rolando Chiu operated on Benito, who had suffered thirteen stab wounds. He was placed in the ICU for three weeks. With only a 10 to 20 percent chance of survival, Benito was airlifted to Manila and confined at the Chinese General Hospital. After three weeks there, he died of sepsis — an overwhelming infection that had circulated throughout his body. The trial court found Amigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay P93,214.70 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.

• Proper Penalty Under the 1987 Constitution: Amigo argued that because the death penalty had been abolished under Section 19(1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the penalty for murder committed without any modifying circumstances should be computed from reclusion perpetua downward, yielding reclusion temporal in its medium period — that is, 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years — pursuant to Article 64, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code.
• Excessive Penalty: Amigo claimed that reclusion perpetua was too cruel and harsh a penalty and pleaded for sympathy, urging the Court to reduce the sentence.

• Proper Penalty for Murder Under the 1987 Constitution: Whether Article III, Section 19(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, also requires a corresponding reduction of the remaining periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, such that the medium period for murder becomes reclusion temporal in its medium period rather than reclusion perpetua.
• Plea for Sympathy: Whether the Court may reduce the penalty on the ground that reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh.

• Proper Penalty for Murder Under the 1987 Constitution: No. Article III, Section 19(1) merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua; the range of the medium and minimum penalties under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code remains unchanged. With no modifying circumstances present, the applicable sentence is the medium period, which is still reclusion perpetua.
• Plea for Sympathy: No. Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy; their duty is to apply the law. The remedy lies in executive clemency or legislative amendment, not judicial reduction.

• Proper Penalty for Murder Under the 1987 Constitution: The Court adhered to the doctrine established in People vs. Muñoz (170 SCRA 107 [1989]), which reversed the earlier line of cases — People vs. Gavarra, People vs. Masangkay, People vs. Atencio, and People vs. Intino — that had divided the modified penalty for murder into three new periods. A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III shows that nothing therein expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty or requires a corresponding modification of the other periods. The provision merely states that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless Congress provides for it for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, and that if already imposed, it shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. Because the language is plain, resort to extrinsic aids such as constitutional convention records is neither necessary nor permissible. The question is not whether the framers intended to abolish the death penalty or merely to prevent its imposition, but whether they also meant to require a corresponding modification in the other periods — and no such requirement is expressed or even implied in the provision. The Court acknowledged that this interpretation may produce inequities, as a person originally subject to the death penalty and another who committed murder without any modifying circumstance would both be punishable with the same medium period. However, that is a question of wisdom, not construction, and the remedy lies with Congress, not the judiciary. Penalties are prescribed by statute and are essentially and exclusively legislative; the Court has no authority to modify their range. Accordingly, with no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the offense, the applicable sentence is the medium period of the penalty prescribed by Article 248, which remains reclusion perpetua.
• Plea for Sympathy: The Court rejected the plea for sympathy, holding that the duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding feelings of sympathy or pity for an accused. The principle of dura lex sed lex — the law is harsh, but it is the law — governs. The proper remedies for a harsh penalty are executive clemency or legislative amendment, not judicial modification.

• Interpretation of Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution — The constitutional provision merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and, if already imposed, reduces it to reclusion perpetua. It does not abolish the death penalty in the sense of restructuring the entire penalty scheme, nor does it require a corresponding reduction of the remaining periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The medium and minimum periods remain unchanged. Where no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstances attend the commission of murder, the applicable penalty is the medium period under Article 248, which is reclusion perpetua.
• Dura Lex Sed Lex — The duty of courts is to apply the law as written, disregarding feelings of sympathy or pity for an accused. Relief from a harsh penalty must be sought through executive clemency or legislative amendment, not through judicial reduction.
• Plain Meaning Rule in Constitutional Interpretation — Where the language of a constitutional provision is plain, it is neither necessary nor permissible to resort to extrinsic aids such as constitutional convention records for its interpretation.

• "Article III, Section 19(1) does not change the periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only insofar as it prohibits the imposition of the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua. The range of the medium and minimum penalties remains unchanged." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the constitutional prohibition affects only the death penalty, not the remaining periods, thereby settling the doctrinal conflict.
• "A reading of Section 19(1) of Article III will readily show that here is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty. The provision merely says that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes the Congress hereafter provides for it and, if already imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua." — This passage applies the plain meaning rule to the constitutional text, rejecting the argument that the death penalty was abolished and the remaining periods correspondingly reduced.
• "Courts are not the forum to plead for sympathy. The duty of courts is to apply the law, disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for an accused. DURA LEX SED LEX." — This passage articulates the principle that judicial sympathy cannot override statutory penalties, confining relief to the executive or legislative branches.

• People vs. Muñoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989) — Controlling precedent. The Court expressly followed this case, which had reversed the earlier doctrine dividing the modified penalty for murder into three new periods and restored the original interpretation that Article III, Section 19(1) only prohibits the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua without changing the remaining periods.
• People vs. Gavarra — Original interpretation holding that the penalty for murder after the 1987 Constitution is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, eliminating death as the original maximum. This was the starting point of the doctrinal evolution that was later modified and then restored.
• People vs. Masangkay, People vs. Atencio, and People vs. Intino — Cases that divided the modified penalty into three new periods (lower half of reclusion temporal maximum as minimum, upper half as medium, reclusion perpetua as maximum). This doctrine was expressly reversed by People vs. Muñoz and rejected in the present case.
• People vs. Parominog, 203 SCRA 673 (1991) — Followed and reiterated the Muñoz ruling.
• People vs. De la Cruz, 216 SCRA 476 (1992) — Followed and reiterated the Muñoz ruling.

• Article III, Section 19(1), 1987 Constitution — Provides that the death penalty shall not be imposed unless for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes Congress hereafter provides for it, and that if already imposed, it shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua. The Court held that this provision merely prohibits the death penalty and reduces it to reclusion perpetua, without modifying the remaining periods of the penalty for murder.
• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for murder as reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The Court held that the constitutional prohibition affects only the maximum (death), reducing it to reclusion perpetua, while the medium and minimum periods remain unchanged. With no modifying circumstances, the medium period — reclusion perpetua — applies.
• Article 64, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances are present, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. Applied to determine that the medium period of the penalty under Article 248, as modified by the Constitution, is reclusion perpetua.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concurred.