People vs. Amado Daniel

The Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua or death is invoked by the Court of Appeals' certification of findings of fact and guilt without the need for the appellate court to impose the penalty itself, because the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose reclusion perpetua or death, and the phrase "shall refrain from entering judgment" in Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court means the Court of Appeals must refrain from rendering judgment altogether and forthwith certify the case for final determination by the Supreme Court.

Amado Daniel, a 22-year-old farmer, was charged with the rape of Margarita Paleng, a girl born on November 20, 1952, who was a first-year high school student at the Baguio Eastern High School and was temporarily boarding at a house in Pinsao Guisad, Baguio City. The complaint alleged that on or about September 20, 1965, the accused, armed with a sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation, had carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will in her room, with the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, had amended Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code to provide that rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, and when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, Margarita Paleng, then less than thirteen years of age, arrived in Baguio City from Tublay, Mountain Province, aboard a Dangwa bus. Because it was raining and the bus was parked several meters from the station, she waited inside. After about three minutes, the accused, Amado Daniel, approached and began molesting her by asking her name and grabbing her bag. She resisted and called the attention of the bus driver and conductor, but they appeared afraid of him. Despite the rain, she left the bus and walked about 100 meters to a jeepney parking area. The accused followed closely. When the jeepney departed, the accused rode beside her. Upon reaching Guisad, she alighted and had to walk about ten meters to her boarding house. The accused also alighted and insisted on carrying her bag, though she refused. She did not suspect he was following her with criminal intent.

When Margarita reached her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the accused dashed in and shut the door behind him. He followed her into her room, drew an eight-inch dagger, and threatened: "If you will talk, I will kill you." Stunned into silence by fear, she was unable to cry out. The accused grabbed her hair with his left hand, forced her to lie down on the bed, and placed a handkerchief in her mouth while holding the dagger to her neck with his right hand. He then unbuttoned his pants, set the dagger on the bed, and attempted to remove her underwear. Though he failed to fully remove her panty, he pried open the portion covering her private parts, guided his penis, and inserted it into her vagina. Margarita lost consciousness during the assault. When she recovered, the accused was already gone. She was 4 feet 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds, while the accused was 5 feet 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds.

The following morning, Margarita's father visited her, and she confided what had happened. She was taken to the Baguio General Hospital for examination and then to the Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health Center, where Dr. Perfecto O. Micu, the City Medico-Legal Officer, examined her on September 23, 1965. His findings included a circular-stellate hymen with healing lacerations at the 6:00, 8:00, 9:00, and 11:00 o'clock positions, contusions at the base of the hymen at the 3:00 and 9:00 o'clock regions, a tight vaginal orifice that hardly admitted two fingers, and a vaginal smear negative for spermatozoa. Dr. Micu concluded that defloration was recent, that the complainant had been a virgin before the incident, and that the number of lacerations and contusions indicated the degree of force exerted.

For his defense, the accused claimed that he and Margarita had been acquainted since 1963 and had on occasion ridden together in a bus. He testified that the sexual intercourse on September 20, 1965 was consensual and was in fact the second time he had carnal knowledge of her, the first having occurred inside a shack. He stated that he had promised to marry her but was surprised when she filed the complaint. The trial court did not credit this testimony. The accused also submitted to a lie detector test at the National Bureau of Investigation, the results of which were favorable to him, but the trial court found the test inconclusive, noting that the conditions under which it was administered were not conducive to affecting the subject emotionally.

• Credibility of the Complainant: Appellant assailed the veracity of the complainant's testimony, insinuating that the complaint was filed because he had not married the girl despite his promise to do so, and suggesting it was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay, who was Margarita's uncle.
• Failure to Seek Help: Appellant stressed that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or attract the attention of other people before reaching her boarding house — at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the marketplace, at the jeepney parking place, and in neighboring houses as close as five meters away — but made no attempt to seek help.
• Lack of Resistance: Appellant's counsel claimed that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the accused's acts, as shown by the medical findings that there were no signs of extra-genital injuries on her body and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
• Lie Detector Test: Appellant argued that he voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test at the NBI, the results of which were in his favor, indicating he was telling the truth when he denied forcing Margarita Paleng into sexual intercourse.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, certified to it by the Court of Appeals with findings of fact and of the guilt of the accused, but without the Court of Appeals imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant.
• Credibility of the Complainant: Whether the testimony of the 13-year-old complainant is sufficient to sustain a conviction for rape beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of extra-genital injuries and blood stains.
• Sufficiency of Force and Intimidation: Whether the force and intimidation employed by the accused — including the use of an eight-inch dagger and a threat to kill — were sufficient to constitute rape.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: Whether the aggravating circumstance of dwelling under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code is present when the victim was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Yes. The Supreme Court acquires jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals' certification of findings of fact and guilt, without the appellate court needing to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death, because the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose those penalties and must refrain from rendering judgment.
• Credibility of the Complainant: Yes. The straightforward and positive testimony of the complainant was credible, and no motive existed for a thirteen-year-old girl to fabricate a story that would subject her and her family to shame and humiliation.
• Sufficiency of Force and Intimidation: Yes. In rape, force need not be irresistible; it need only be sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose, and intimidation through the use of a deadly weapon and a threat to kill sufficiently established the crime.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: Yes. A bedspace in a boarding house constitutes a "dwelling" under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code, as it is not necessary that the victim own the place where she lives; the sanctity of the home is protected regardless of whether the occupant is an owner, lessee, boarder, or bed-spacer.

• Appellate Jurisdiction: Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions vest the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, and Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 makes this jurisdiction exclusive. The Court of Appeals, being without jurisdiction to impose the penalties of reclusion perpetua or death, cannot be charged with that duty. The phrase "shall refrain from entering judgment" in Section 12, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court was construed to mean "shall refrain from rendering judgment," since "entering judgment" in the procedural sense presupposes a final judgment already rendered, and it would be incongruous to enjoin the Court of Appeals from entering a judgment that does not exist. The Rule requires only that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty, it must refrain from rendering judgment and certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination as if the case had been brought before it on appeal. Based on the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, which are conclusive and binding, the Supreme Court passes upon the correctness of the legal conclusions and imposes the correct penalty. This interpretation harmonizes the Rule with the constitutional grant of exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court and avoids the absurdity of requiring the Court of Appeals to impose a penalty it has no power to impose.

• Credibility of the Complainant: The findings of fact of the trial court, sustained by the Court of Appeals after examination of the evidence, were found to be without cogent reason for discarding. A thirteen-year-old girl barely in her teens would have no motive to fabricate a story of rape, which could only bring shame and humiliation upon her and her family and make her an object of gossip. The insinuation that the complaint was filed because the appellant had not married the girl was preposterous, as Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old on the date of the incident and was not of marriageable age, making marriage a legal impossibility. The trial court did not credit the appellant's claim that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay. The argument that Margarita failed to seek help presupposed that she was aware all along that the appellant intended to rape her, but she testified that she did not suspect he was following her, and when she reached her boarding house there were no persons around. The appellant's forced entry and immediate threat with a dagger took her by surprise. Persons react differently to threatening situations, and a silent, fearful attitude is a valid response.

• Sufficiency of Force and Intimidation: The absence of extra-genital injuries and blood stains did not negate the use of force. The force employed need not be irresistible; it need only be present and sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose. The disparity in physical attributes — Margarita being 4 feet 8 inches and about 95 pounds, the accused being 5 feet 7 inches and 126 pounds — demonstrated the sufficiency of the force used. The medical findings of lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted. Rape is likewise committed through intimidation, and the accused's use of an eight-inch dagger and threat to kill the victim if she talked naturally weakened whatever resistance she could muster, enabling the consummation of the act. The lie detector test was given little weight, as such tests are not conclusive and their efficacy depends on the circumstances under which they are administered; the trial court observed that the test conditions were not conducive to affecting the subject emotionally.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Dwelling: The aggravating circumstance of dwelling under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code applies because the crime was committed in the room of the offended party, which constituted her dwelling. Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room was for all intents and purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in the Code. It is not necessary that the victim own the place where she lives; whether she is a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is her home, the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold. The correct penalty for rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is death under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended, but for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree — reclusion perpetua — was imposed.

• Sufficiency of Force in Rape — In the crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; it need only be present and sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose. All that is necessary is that the force used is sufficient for the accused to accomplish his evil design. The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. The Court applied this doctrine by noting the significant disparity in physical attributes between the accused (5 feet 7 inches, 126 pounds) and the complainant (4 feet 8 inches, 95 pounds), and by relying on the medical evidence of lacerations and contusions indicating the degree of force exerted.

• Intimidation in Rape — Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety. The Court found that the accused's use of an eight-inch dagger and his threat to kill the complainant constituted sufficient intimidation to overcome her resistance.

• Dwelling as an Aggravating Circumstance — Under Article 14(3) of the Revised Penal Code, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party who has not given provocation. A "dwelling" includes any place where a person lives — whether owned, leased, or merely occupied as a boarder or bed-spacer — as the law protects the sanctity of the home regardless of the occupant's legal title to the premises.

• Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction over Capital Cases — The Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction over criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment is constitutional in character and cannot be diminished by Congress. The Court of Appeals, lacking jurisdiction to impose reclusion perpetua or death, must refrain from rendering judgment and certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination. The phrase "shall refrain from entering judgment" in Section 12, Rule 124 means "shall refrain from rendering judgment," as "entering judgment" in procedural terms presupposes a final judgment already rendered.

• Lie Detector Tests Not Conclusive — Lie detector tests are not conclusive evidence; their efficacy depends on the time, place, and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If the conditions are not conducive to affecting the subject emotionally, the test will fail to detect deception. The trial court found that because the trial was already over and the subject was not confronted by the victim or other persons he had reason to fear, his reactions were normal and unaffected.

• "it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view." — This passage, quoting the 1905 decision in U.S. vs. Villarosa, articulates the canonical formulation of the sufficiency-of-force doctrine in rape cases and has been followed in numerous subsequent decisions.

• "Although Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and purposes a 'dwelling' as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold." — This passage defines the scope of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, establishing that legal ownership of the premises is not required and that the protection extends to all forms of lawful occupation.

• "The clause 'entering judgment' means 'rendering judgment'. Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain from rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for the crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the preliminary jurisdictional issue, construing the phrase "entering judgment" as synonymous with "rendering judgment" and grounding the interpretation in the Court of Appeals' lack of jurisdiction to impose capital penalties.

• People vs. Ramos, 79 Phil. 612 (1947) — Controlling precedent on the certification procedure from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the Court of Appeals is duty bound to make findings of fact to support its opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, and that the Supreme Court will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom. The majority in the present case relied on Ramos for the proposition that the Court of Appeals must state findings of fact but distinguished it from the further requirement that the appellate court impose the penalty.

• U.S. vs. Villarosa, 4 Phil. 434 (1905) — Followed. Established the doctrine that in rape, the force employed need not be irresistible but only sufficient to consummate the accused's purpose. The Court applied this doctrine to the facts of the present case, where the physical disparity between the accused and the complainant demonstrated the sufficiency of the force used.

• People vs. Savellano, 57 SCRA 320 — Followed. Held that the force or violence necessary in rape is a relative term depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each other. The Court cited this proposition in assessing whether the force employed was sufficient given the disparity in physical attributes.

• People vs. Equec, 70 SCRA 665 (1977) — Cited as one of the latest cases following the Villarosa doctrine on the sufficiency of force in rape.

• People vs. Garcines, 57 SCRA 653 (1974) — Cited in support of the proposition that rape is committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits against her will because of fear for her life and personal safety.

• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 — Provides that the crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, and whenever committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The Court applied this provision to impose the correct penalty, finding that the crime was rape with the use of a deadly weapon (an eight-inch dagger) and the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, which warranted the death penalty, though reclusion perpetua was imposed for lack of the necessary votes.

• Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code — Defines the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, applicable when the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party who has not given provocation. The Court held that the complainant's rented bedspace in a boarding house constituted her dwelling for purposes of this provision.

• Section 12, Rule 124, Rules of Court — Provides that whenever the Court of Appeals should be of the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, it shall refrain from entering judgment and certify the case to the Supreme Court for final determination. The Court construed "entering judgment" as meaning "rendering judgment," holding that the Court of Appeals must refrain from rendering judgment altogether and need not impose the penalty before certifying.

• Section 17, Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as amended) — Grants the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal final judgments in criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. The Court relied on this provision to establish that its appellate jurisdiction over capital cases is exclusive and that the Court of Appeals lacks jurisdiction to impose the penalties of reclusion perpetua or death.

• Article X, Section 5(2)(d), 1973 Constitution; Article VIII, Section 2(4), 1935 Constitution — Vest the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment. The Court held that this jurisdiction is constitutional in character and cannot be diminished by Congress.

• Teehankee, J. — Concurred in the majority opinion in full.
• Aquino, J. — Wrote a separate concurring opinion agreeing that "shall refrain from entering judgment" means the Court of Appeals should not decide the case. He categorized appealed criminal cases into three classes: (1) those where the lower court imposed death or reclusion perpetua, within the Supreme Court's exclusive appellate jurisdiction; (2) those where the trial court imposed reclusion temporal or a lesser penalty, falling within the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction; and (3) those where the trial court imposed a lesser penalty but the Court of Appeals concludes the imposable penalty is death or reclusion perpetua, which should be elevated to the Supreme Court for final determination. He noted that reclusion perpetua was properly imposed upon the appellant, whom he characterized as a pedophiliac.
• Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., and Santos, JJ. — Concurred in the result on the merits (the rape conviction and penalty), though they also concurred in Chief Justice Castro's dissent on the preliminary jurisdictional issue.

• Castro, C.J. — Dissented on the preliminary jurisdictional issue, arguing that the Court of Appeals must render judgment expressly imposing the penalty of death or reclusion perpetua before certifying the case to the Supreme Court. He contended that the constitutional phrase "final judgments and decrees of inferior courts" and "the penalty imposed" require that a final judgment imposing the proper penalty must first be rendered by the Court of Appeals, as it is constitutionally classified as an "inferior court" whose judgments are subject to Supreme Court review. He argued that "entering judgment" is distinct from "rendering judgment" — the former being the clerical act of recording a judgment in the book of entries of judgments after it becomes final, while the latter is the judicial act of writing and filing the decision. Under his reading, the Court of Appeals should render a decision imposing the correct penalty, refrain from entering (recording) that judgment, and then certify the case. He was joined by Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, and Fernandez, JJ.