People vs. Almendras

Absent proof of any qualifying circumstance as clear as the killing itself, an admitted killing constitutes homicide only, not murder, even upon a plea of guilty to a capital offense. Guilt and the precise degree of culpability must still be proved by the prosecution, aggravating circumstances must be established with the same quantum as the crime, and a guilty plea does not admit circumstances alleged in the information.

Alfredo Almendras was the nephew of Leoncio Almendras, whose common-law wife was Criselda Manidlangan, mother of seven children. Diana Manidlangan, aged nine, was the victim's daughter, while Genady Manidlangan was the victim's brother and subsequent custodian of four of her children. No business or contractual relation connected the parties; the context was familial, with appellant later alleging a dispute over the alleged disturbance of his late father's tomb by his uncle.

At about 1:00 in the morning of June 4, 1996 in Samal, Davao, nine-year-old Diana Manidlangan accompanied her mother Criselda Manidlangan, 31, to the toilet outside their house. According to Diana, three or four men took Criselda from the toilet under bright moonlight. Diana identified two as Alex Opsimar, who smelled of Tanduay, and appellant Alfredo Almendras, recognized the face of another whose name she did not know, and saw two men drag Criselda to the road seven to ten meters from the house while appellant stood by a coconut tree. As she was dragged, Criselda shouted "Hindi ako sasama sa iyo" and told Diana "Diana, katulog na," which Diana obeyed without telling her sleeping siblings and without hearing further cries.

When Diana awoke the next day, Elena, her stepfather's niece, told her that her mother was dead. Diana went near the coconut tree where appellant had stood and found her mother lying on her back with wounds on the neck and on the head just above the ear. A policeman asked Dr. Ma. Connie Perez of Samal District Hospital to conduct a post-mortem examination because the Municipal Health Officer was on leave, but the family refused to bring the remains to the hospital and the Sanitary Inspector, Eduardo Pareñas, conducted the examination instead. Dr. Perez merely translated his sketch into medical terms and signed the description for the Municipal Health Officer, while Municipal Health Officer Dr. Lilibeth Villanueva merely reviewed the entries without seeing the body; the resulting report described 17 wounds. Genady Manidlangan, the victim's brother, took custody of four of the victim's seven children and claimed expenses for their support.

For his part, appellant testified that on June 1, 1996 he discovered in the cemetery that his uncle Leoncio Almendras, younger brother of his late father, had without permission opened his father's tomb, set aside the bones on the ground, and replaced them with the remains of Leoncio's wife. Appellant asked Leoncio to return the bones and Leoncio promised to do so. At 4:00 in the morning of June 4, 1996, appellant went to Leoncio's house to confront him again, but Leoncio immediately boxed him on the face causing him to fall. When someone advanced toward him with a piece of wood about three inches long and one-and-a-half inches in diameter, appellant, thinking it was his uncle, stood up and stabbed the approaching person several times, only realizing as the person fell that he had hit Leoncio's common-law wife Criselda. Thereafter appellant ran to his cornfield in Tibal-og, later went to their bukid in Malabog, Davao City, and on July 24, 1996 confessed to his brother Arnulfo Almendras in San Pablo, Fatima, Paquibato District, who accompanied him to surrender to SPO1 Juan Penaso at PNP Headquarters in Malabog, recorded as Entry Nos. 225 to 227, page 39, dated July 24, 1996 and Entry No. 228, page 39, dated July 25, 1996 of Police Precinct No. 7 Daily Records of Events.

The trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder attended by nighttime, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, appreciating voluntary surrender but holding it offset, and rejecting self-defense, plea of guilty, and passion and obfuscation.

• Treachery and Evident Premeditation: Appellant faulted the trial court for appreciating the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation and for consequently convicting him of murder.
• Other Aggravating Circumstances: Appellant questioned the trial court's findings on the presence of the other aggravating circumstances relied upon to impose the death penalty.

• Proper Crime: The Solicitor General agreed with appellant that treachery and evident premeditation were not established and recommended that appellant be convicted of homicide only.

• Self-Defense: Whether appellant's admission of the killing coupled with a claim of mistaken retaliation against his uncle established self-defense.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Evident Premeditation: Whether evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
• Nocturnity, Cruelty and Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether nighttime, cruelty, and abuse of superior strength attended the killing as generic aggravating circumstances.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether plea of guilty, passion and obfuscation, and voluntary surrender mitigated liability.
• Proper Offense and Penalty: Whether appellant is liable for murder punishable by death or for homicide punishable by reclusion temporal under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Self-Defense: No. Self-defense was not established, appellant having relied solely on his own testimony without clear and convincing proof of unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity, and lack of sufficient provocation.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven as indubitably as the killing, there being no showing of means deliberately adopted to deny the victim opportunity to defend or retaliate.
• Evident Premeditation: No. None of its requisites — time of determination, outward act showing adherence, and sufficient reflection interval — was shown by clear and positive evidence.
• Nocturnity, Cruelty and Abuse of Superior Strength: No. Nighttime was not shown to have been specially sought, taken advantage of, or to have facilitated impunity; cruelty lacked proof of deliberate inhuman intensification of suffering; and superior strength lacked proof of deliberate excessive force, with the 17-wound report being hearsay.
• Mitigating Circumstances: No. The belated guilty plea after two prosecution witnesses, the uncorroborated passion claim, and the non-spontaneous surrender after more than one-and-a-half months of flight do not mitigate.
• Proper Offense and Penalty: Appellant is liable for homicide only, punishable by reclusion temporal with no modifying circumstances, imposed in its medium period as maximum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• Self-Defense: When the accused pleads self-defense and owns up to the killing, the burden of evidence shifts to him to show by clear and convincing evidence, on the strength of his own evidence, the requisites of (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of means to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation. Appellant offered nothing beyond his testimony that his uncle boxed him and that he mistakenly stabbed Criselda approaching with wood, which was insufficient to overcome the burden and was rejected as tenuous.
• Treachery: Treachery requires (1) employment of means affording the victim no opportunity to defend or retaliate and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption thereof, proven as indubitably as the killing and never by presumption. The record contained nothing suggesting such means or conscious adoption, the eyewitness account showing only dragging and standing by a tree without detail of execution negating defense.
• Evident Premeditation: The requisites are (a) time when determination was made, (b) act manifestly indicating adherence to determination, and (c) sufficient lapse for reflection, with premeditation plain, notorious, and shown by outward acts, not mere inference. No evidence of planning, preparation, or when any plot was conceived was presented, so the circumstance could not be appreciated.
• Nocturnity, Cruelty and Abuse of Superior Strength: Nighttime alone does not aggravate; it must have been specially sought, taken advantage of, or facilitating the crime and impunity, none of which was shown beyond the hour of occurrence. A guilty plea to a capital offense does not admit alleged circumstances, the court being required by Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to require proof of guilt and precise culpability. Cruelty requires showing that suffering was deliberately and inhumanly prolonged for pleasure, not merely wounds exceeding necessity, and here Exhibits A to C on 17 wounds were hearsay because the Sanitary Inspector who examined the body never testified while Drs. Perez and Villanueva admitted they never saw or examined the remains. Abuse of superior strength requires clear proof of deliberate use of excessive force out of proportion to defense, which the prosecution failed to prove with the same quantum as the crime and could not supply from the weakness of the defense.
• Mitigating Circumstances: A plea of guilty mitigates only if made at the first opportunity before presentation of prosecution evidence as repentance; appellant pleaded only after two witnesses testified. Passion or obfuscation requires (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce such condition and (2) temporal proximity allowing no recovery of equanimity; even assuming desecration of ancestral remains could produce impulse, appellant offered only his testimony that his uncle removed the bones. Voluntary surrender requires spontaneity showing acknowledgment of guilt and saving trouble and expense of search; flight immediately after killing followed by surrender more than one-and-a-half months later was not spontaneous.
• Proper Offense and Penalty: With no qualifying circumstance, liability is for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable by reclusion temporal of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. With no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty is imposed in its medium period of 15 years, 6 months and 20 days to 16 years, 5 months and 9 days under Article 64(1), which becomes the maximum under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, with the minimum within prision mayor of 6 years and 1 day to 12 years.

• Self-defense; burden of evidence — While the prosecution bears the onus probandi of guilt, one who admits the killing and pleads self-defense bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence, on the strength of his own evidence, the requisites of (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of means to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation. Applied to reject appellant's uncorroborated claim of mistaken retaliation against his uncle.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when means, methods or forms directly and specially insuring execution without risk from defense are employed, requiring (1) means affording the victim no opportunity to defend or retaliate and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption thereof, proven as indubitably as the killing and never by presumption. Applied to rule out murder where no such means or adoption was shown.
• Evident premeditation — The requisites are (a) time of determination, (b) outward act showing adherence thereto, and (c) sufficient interval for reflection, with intent plain, notorious, and proved by outward acts rather than inference. Applied to reject the circumstance for absence of planning, preparation, or conception time.
• Nocturnity — Nighttime aggravates only when specially sought, taken advantage of, or facilitating commission and impunity; the hour alone is insufficient. Applied to disregard nighttime despite a 1:00 a.m. killing.
• Plea of guilty to capital offense; proof of circumstances — Under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, upon a guilty plea to a capital offense the court must inquire into voluntariness and comprehension and require the prosecution to prove guilt and precise culpability; a plea does not admit alleged aggravating or qualifying circumstances. Applied in People vs. Almendras to require independent proof of treachery, premeditation, and other aggravators.
• Cruelty — Cruelty requires proof that the offender deliberately and inhumanly intensified suffering for pleasure, causing unnecessary physical and moral pain; wounds exceeding necessity alone do not suffice. Applied to reject cruelty despite 17 reported wounds, which were in any event hearsay.
• Hearsay; post-mortem report — Findings of a non-testifying examiner identified only through witnesses who never examined the body have no probative value. Applied to disregard Exhibits A to C prepared by the Sanitary Inspector who never testified.
• Abuse of superior strength — The circumstance requires clear proof of deliberate intent to use excessive force out of proportion to available defense, proved as strictly as the crime. Applied to reject the finding based merely on appellant's sex, knife, and multiple stabbings.
• Plea of guilty as mitigating circumstance — The plea must be voluntary confession before the court prior to prosecution evidence at the first opportunity showing repentance; a plea after arraignment and trial has begun does not mitigate. Applied to deny mitigation where guilt was pleaded only after two witnesses testified.
• Passion and obfuscation — The elements are (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and (2) proximity such that the offender had no time to recover equanimity. Applied to deny mitigation where alleged tomb desecration rested solely on appellant's testimony.
• Voluntary surrender — Surrender must be spontaneous, acknowledging guilt and saving authorities trouble and expense of search and capture; flight and prolonged hiding negate spontaneity. Applied to deny mitigation where appellant fled and surrendered after more than one-and-a-half months.

• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — States the canonical definition of treachery and anchors the two-element test applied to reject murder.
• "By and of itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance." — States the controlling limitation on nocturnity, requiring special seeking, advantage-taking, or facilitation of impunity.
• "Trial courts should not assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances alleged in the information as they are required to demand that the prosecution should prove the exact liability of the accused." — States the Rule 116 duty upon guilty plea to a capital offense, preventing automatic appreciation of alleged qualifiers and aggravators.
• "To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilty must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused." — States the timeliness rule for the mitigating circumstance of guilty plea, applied to deny mitigation for a belated plea.

• People vs. Sayat, 223 SCRA 285 [1993] — Cited for the rule that the prosecution bears the onus probandi of guilt.
• People vs. Gutua, 254 SCRA 37 [1996] — Cited for the shift of burden to the accused claiming self-defense to prove it by clear and convincing evidence on his own evidence.
• People vs. Bernal, 254 SCRA 659 [1996]; People vs. Gregorio, 255 SCRA 380 [1996]; People vs. Santillana, 308 SCRA 104 (1999) — Cited for the three requisites of self-defense and for the spontaneity standard of voluntary surrender.
• People vs. Ocumen, 319 SCRA 539 (1999); People vs. Marcelino, 316 SCRA 104 (1999); People vs. Silvestre, 307 SCRA 68 (1999) — Cited for the two elements of treachery and the requirement of proof as indubitable as the killing.
• People vs. Padama, Jr., 316 SCRA 152 (1999); People vs. Altabano, 317 SCRA 708 (1999); People vs. Tan, 314 SCRA 413 (1999); People vs. Mantung, 310 SCRA 819 (1999) — Cited for the requisites of evident premeditation and the need for clear, positive proof of outward acts.
• People vs. Bermas, 309 SCRA 741 (1999); People vs. Monsayac, 307 SCRA 560 (1999) — Cited for when nighttime becomes aggravating.
• People vs. Derilo, 271 SCRA 633 (1997) — Cited for the duty not to assume admission of circumstances from a guilty plea and to require proof of exact liability.
• People vs. Alban, 245 SCRA 549 (1995) — Cited to reject cruelty absent deliberate inhuman intensification of suffering.
• People vs. Agsunod, Jr., 306 SCRA 612 (1999) — Cited for the deliberate-intent requirement of abuse of superior strength.
• People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (1998) — Cited to deny mitigation to a guilty plea made after trial began.
• Salonga vs. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 (1985) — Cited to disregard the hearsay post-mortem exhibits.

• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes homicide with reclusion temporal; applied as the proper offense absent qualifying circumstances, yielding 12 years and 1 day to 20 years.
• Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code — Requires imposition in the medium period when there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance; applied to fix the maximum within 15 years, 6 months and 20 days to 16 years, 5 months and 9 days.
• Section 3, Rule 116, Rules of Court — Requires searching inquiry into a capital guilty plea and proof by the prosecution of guilt and precise culpability, with the accused allowed to present evidence; applied to hold that appellant's plea did not admit treachery, premeditation, or other aggravators.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Requires an indeterminate sentence with a maximum within the prescribed penalty's medium period and a minimum within the next lower penalty; applied to impose 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 16 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez and Carpio, JJ., concur. Puno and Buena, JJ., were on official leave.