People vs. Aleman

A deaf-mute is not disqualified from being a witness; he is competent to testify provided he can perceive, can make known his perceptions to others through a qualified interpreter, understands the sanctity of an oath, and comprehends the facts about which he testifies. Positive identification of the accused in open court is controlling, and failure to identify the accused in a police line-up does not undermine the prosecution's case.

Edwin Aleman was charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of Ramon Jaime Birosel, a 55-year-old real estate broker, on February 10, 2003, in Quezon City. The prosecution's case depended almost entirely on the eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar, a 14-year-old deaf-mute who testified through a licensed sign language interpreter. The victim was survived by his widow, Maria Filomena Birosel, who incurred ₱477,054.30 in funeral expenses and testified to the value of the items taken from the victim. The crime is penalized under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.

On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 in the evening, Mark Almodovar, then a 14-year-old deaf-mute, left his house to play basketball at a court some distance away. After playing with five other children and taking a break for soft drinks at around 8:00 p.m., he walked to a shrubbery near five parked cars to urinate. While there, he observed a heavyset man talking on a cellular phone walking toward a parked car. Two men wearing black bonnets that covered their entire faces followed the man. When the man entered his car, the two pursuers separated: one positioned himself at the driver's side door armed with a knife, while the other stood at the opposite side armed with a gun. Mark watched as the man with the knife knocked twice on the half-opened car window and immediately began stabbing the victim repeatedly on various parts of his body, while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the victim's ring, watch, wallet, and cellular phone, the two men walked away.

Mark followed the two men at a distance of eight to ten meters for approximately nine minutes until they reached a place he described as far, where he saw them bury the knife and cover it with soil. He continued following them for about thirty minutes to a place he described as near, where one of the men removed his bonnet and his bloodstained white t-shirt, throwing both into running water. Under the illumination of a nearby light bulb, Mark recognized the face of the man who had wielded the knife — later identified as accused-appellant Edwin Aleman. The two men then boarded a motorcycle driven by the gunman and departed at about 10:00 p.m. Mark walked home, arriving at approximately 11:00 p.m. The following morning, he returned to the scene, found police and bystanders gathered, and gave a statement to authorities. The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, died of hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax, including three penetrating wounds that pierced the upper lobe of the left lung and perforated the heart, as well as stab wounds to the right eye, stomach, and left forearm.

Aleman, 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay Botocan, Project 2, Quezon City, interposed denial and alibi. He testified that on the evening of February 10, 2003, he was at a billiards hall a 15-minute walk from his residence, playing against a certain Ruben from approximately 7:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m. His sister, Hilda Aleman, arrived to fetch him for dinner, and they returned home together. The following day, after learning that police were looking for him, he voluntarily presented himself at Camp Karingal. On February 13, 2003, he was placed in a police line-up twice; defense witnesses SPO1 Leonardo Pasco and barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos testified that Mark shook his head both times, failing to identify Aleman. However, records showed that Mark identified Aleman in a police line-up on February 18, 2003, and, more importantly, positively identified him in open court during his testimony. Aleman's alibi was corroborated by Filomena Fungo, Ruben's grandmother, who saw Aleman and Ruben playing when she visited the billiards hall twice that night, and by Hilda, who confirmed she fetched Aleman at around 10:00 p.m.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found Mark's testimony credible, noting his lack of ill motive, his ability to communicate through a qualified interpreter, and the corroboration provided by the medico-legal findings. The defense of alibi was rejected as inherently weak and implausible, particularly given the proximity of the billiards hall to the crime scene.

• Competency of Deaf-Mute Witness: Accused-appellant argued that Mark, being a deaf-mute without formal education in sign language, was unqualified to testify, citing his inability to give responsive answers to certain questions such as why he preferred a farther basketball court over a nearer one.
• Lack of Corroboration: Accused-appellant asserted that Mark's testimony was uncorroborated by his alleged playmates or by the "chubby girl" he mentioned, weakening its probative value.
• Suspect Bias: Accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money, new clothes, and shoes from the private complainant before testifying, rendering his testimony highly suspicious.
• Failure of Line-Up Identification: Accused-appellant highlighted Mark's failure to identify him in a police line-up on February 13, 2003, arguing that this rendered Mark's subsequent in-court identification doubtful.

• Competency of Deaf-Mute Witness: Whether a deaf-mute who testifies through a qualified sign language interpreter is competent to be a witness.
• Sufficiency of Eyewitness Testimony: Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a single deaf-mute eyewitness, with minor inconsistencies, is sufficient to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Effect of Non-Identification in Police Line-Up: Whether failure to identify the accused in a police line-up negates positive identification made in open court.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: Whether the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages are proper.

• Competency of Deaf-Mute Witness: Yes. A deaf-mute is competent to testify provided he can perceive, can communicate his perceptions to others through a qualified interpreter, understands the sanctity of an oath, and comprehends the facts about which he testifies.
• Sufficiency of Eyewitness Testimony: Yes. The positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to secure conviction, and minor inconsistencies due to the difficulty of eliciting testimony from a deaf-mute do not detract from credibility where material details are consistent and corroborated by physical evidence.
• Effect of Non-Identification in Police Line-Up: No, non-identification in a police line-up does not negate in-court identification. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to proper identification; what matters is positive identification of the accused in open court.
• Proper Penalty and Damages: Yes. Reclusion perpetua is proper under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, read with Article 63, no aggravating or mitigating circumstance having attended the crime. Civil indemnity was increased to ₱75,000.00, moral damages of ₱50,000.00 and actual damages of ₱477,054.30 were sustained, and 6% per annum legal interest was imposed on all monetary awards from the date of finality until fully paid.

• Competency of Deaf-Mute Witness: Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses." A deaf-mute may not hear or speak, but his other senses — particularly sight — remain functional and allow him to observe his environment. While oral communication is impossible, a deaf-mute may communicate through writing, signs, symbols, and sketches. In this case, Mark testified with the assistance of Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who had been teaching at the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990 and held a degree in special education. Both the trial and appellate courts found that Mark understood the sanctity of an oath, comprehended the facts he testified on, and could communicate his ideas through Catinguil. The manner of examining a deaf-mute is within the trial court's discretion and will not be reviewed on appeal absent a showing of injury to the complaining party. No such injury was shown. The Court cited People vs. Tuangco, which established the three requisites for deaf-mute competency: (1) ability to understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) ability to comprehend facts to be testified on; and (3) ability to communicate ideas through a qualified interpreter — all of which Mark satisfied.

• Sufficiency of Eyewitness Testimony: Mark's testimony, though elicited through an interpreter, was found credible by both the trial and appellate courts. He communicated a coherent account of the events of February 10, 2003 — the victim boarding his car, the respective positions of the two assailants, the knocking on the window, the repeated stabbing, the taking of personal properties, the flight from the scene, and the revelation of Aleman's face when the bonnet was removed under a light bulb near running water. The Court of Appeals observed that despite intense cross-examination, Mark responded with consistency on material details indicative of firsthand knowledge. The minor inconsistencies cited by the defense were attributable to the inherent difficulty of eliciting testimony from a deaf-mute and concerned immaterial details that did not detract from credibility. Furthermore, Mark's testimony was corroborated by the medico-legal findings that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax — physical evidence whose evidentiary weight far exceeds that of testimonial corroboration. The settled rule that the positive and credible testimony of a single witness suffices for conviction was applied. No improper motive was imputed to Mark; the unanimous finding of the trial and appellate courts on the absence of ill motive, being a question of fact, was respected.

• Effect of Non-Identification in Police Line-Up: The defense's reliance on Mark's failure to identify Aleman in the February 13, 2003 line-up was rejected. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to proper identification. What the law requires is positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator in open court, which Mark accomplished. Moreover, the records showed that Mark did identify Aleman in a police line-up on February 18, 2003, in addition to his in-court identification. The Court cited People vs. Guillermo for the proposition that non-identification in a line-up is of no moment where positive identification is made in open court.

• Proper Penalty and Damages: The crime was properly classified as the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, when the law prescribes two indivisible penalties and the crime is unattended by any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. No modifying circumstance was found; thus, reclusion perpetua was proper. Civil indemnity was increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00, consistent with current jurisprudence on murder cases, on the rationale that robbery with homicide involves a greater degree of criminal propensity than homicide alone. Moral damages of ₱50,000.00 were sustained per recent jurisprudence. Actual damages of ₱477,054.30 were fully supported by evidence, as were the reimbursements for the two cellular phones (₱3,500.00 each) and the necklace (₱20,000.00). In conformity with current policy, legal interest at 6% per annum was imposed on all monetary awards — civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages — from the date of finality of the Decision until fully paid.

• Competency of Deaf-Mute Witnesses — A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. Under Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. A deaf-mute is competent where he (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts he is going to testify on; and (3) can communicate his ideas through a qualified interpreter. The manner of examination is within the trial court's discretion and will not be reviewed on appeal absent a showing of injury to the complaining party. In this case, all three requisites were satisfied through the assistance of a licensed sign language interpreter.

• Positive Identification in Open Court — There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to proper identification. What matters is the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime by the witness in open court. Failure to identify the accused in a police line-up does not negate the probative value of a subsequent in-court identification.

• Sufficiency of Single-Witness Testimony — The positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to secure the conviction of an accused. Corroboration by additional witnesses is not required where the lone witness is credible and his testimony is consistent on material details and supported by physical evidence.

• Conclusiveness of Trial Court's Factual Findings — The factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the Supreme Court in the absence of any clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied facts of weight and substance that would alter the result. The assessment of witness credibility by the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, deserves the highest respect.

• Imposition of Legal Interest on Damages — In conformity with current policy, legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on all monetary awards for damages — civil indemnity, moral damages, and actual damages — from the date of finality of the decision until fully paid.

• "A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a qualified interpreter." — This passage, quoting People vs. Tuangco, articulates the canonical three-pronged test for the competency of deaf-mute witnesses and is the controlling formulation applied in this case.

• "There is no law stating that a police line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the witness in open court." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the issue of line-up identification, establishing that in-court positive identification prevails over non-identification in a police line-up.

• "The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be a witness. The rule is that 'all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.'" — This passage applies Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to the specific facts, anchoring the competency ruling in the statutory text.

• People vs. Tuangco, 399 Phil. 147 (2000) — Controlling precedent on the competency of deaf-mute witnesses, providing the three-part test applied in this case: (1) ability to understand the sanctity of an oath; (2) ability to comprehend facts testified on; and (3) ability to communicate through a qualified interpreter. Followed.
• People vs. Sabado, 398 Phil. 1107 (2000) — Cited for the doctrine that the positive and credible testimony of a single witness is sufficient to secure conviction. Followed.
• People vs. Guillermo, 461 Phil. 543 (2003) — Cited for the proposition that non-identification in a police line-up is of no moment where positive identification is made in open court. Followed.
• People vs. Paracale, 442 Phil. 32 (2002) — Cited for the requirement of positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Followed.
• People vs. Malicdem, G.R. No. 184601, Nov. 12, 2012, 685 SCRA 193 — Cited for the current amount of civil indemnity (₱75,000.00) in murder cases, applied by analogy to robbery with homicide. Followed.
• People vs. Laurio, G.R. No. 182523, Sept. 13, 2012, 680 SCRA 560 — Cited for the propriety of ₱50,000.00 moral damages and for the imposition of 6% per annum legal interest on all monetary awards from date of finality. Followed.
• People vs. Uy, G.R. No. 174660, May 30, 2011, 649 SCRA 236 — Cited for the application of Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code in imposing the lesser penalty when no aggravating circumstance attends the crime. Followed.
• Navarrete vs. People, 542 Phil. 496 (2007) — Cited for the doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on the Supreme Court absent clear error. Followed.

• Section 20, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that "all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses." Applied to establish the competency of Mark Almodovar, a deaf-mute, to testify through a qualified sign language interpreter.
• Article 294(1), Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, prescribing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Applied to classify the crime and determine the applicable penalty range.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties and the crime is not attended by any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. Applied to justify the imposition of reclusion perpetua, no modifying circumstance having been proven.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred. No separate concurring opinions were written.