People vs. Alejandro

A judgment of acquittal, once promulgated, is immediately final and executory and may not be recalled, withdrawn, or modified by the trial court—even to correct an erroneous factual finding or misapprehension of evidence—without violating the accused's constitutional right against double jeopardy; the proper remedy to challenge an acquittal is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not a motion for reconsideration or mere manifestation.

Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel was charged with two counts of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, committed against AAA, a 12-year-old minor. During trial, AAA testified that on two separate occasions, Alejandro sexually assaulted her—first at the back of a school and second inside her home—after which she disclosed the incidents to her mother. Medical examination confirmed positive signs of sexual intercourse. The defense opted not to present evidence and submitted the case for decision.

• Accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel was charged with two counts of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997), involving a 12-year-old minor named AAA.
• During trial, AAA testified that accused-appellant first assaulted her at the back of a school by removing her clothes and inserting his penis into her vagina, and two months later, entered her house through a window and raped her again; on both occasions, he threatened to kill her if she disclosed the incidents.
• AAA's mother, BBB, brought her to the Municipal Health Office where Dr. CCC examined her and found deep, healed, old and superficial lacerations in her hymen, concluding that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.
• Through counsel, accused-appellant manifested in open court that he would no longer present evidence for the defense and submitted the case for decision.
• On July 26, 2011, the RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting accused-appellant after erroneously concluding that AAA had not testified, allegedly because the order reflecting her testimony dated September 3, 2008 was mistakenly attached to the records of a different criminal case (Crim. Case No. Br. 20-4979) involving the same accused but a different victim.
• On the same day of promulgation, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Roderick Cruz filed a manifestation pointing out the error, prompting the RTC to issue an Order recalling and setting aside the judgment of acquittal to "rectify the error committed and in order to prevent the miscarriage of justice."
• The RTC denied accused-appellant's Motion for Reconsideration, ruling that the initial judgment contravened the Constitution because it was not based on facts and law, rendering it invalid.
• Subsequently, the RTC rendered a Joint Decision on July 26, 2011 finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of simple rape under Article 266-A paragraph (D) of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count and to pay civil and moral damages.
• The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, holding that the initial decision failed to express clearly and distinctly the facts of the case because the records were incomplete and inaccurate, making the verdict of acquittal null and void, but modified the award of damages to include legal interest of six percent per annum from the date of finality until fully paid.

• Accused-appellant argued that the RTC gravely erred in recalling its previously promulgated decision of acquittal, asserting that a judgment of acquittal becomes immediately final and executory upon promulgation and cannot be withdrawn or modified without violating the constitutional right against double jeopardy.
• He contended that the RTC's misapprehension of facts (believing AAA did not testify) did not grant it the power to rectify such mistake after the acquittal had attained finality.
• He insisted that the prosecutor's manifestation, which catalyzed the recall of the acquittal, was effectively equivalent to a motion for reconsideration, which is not allowed in judgments of acquittal.
• He argued that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction for rape despite what he characterized as AAA's incredible testimony.

• The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintained that there was no error in the recall of the acquittal because the public prosecutor's manifestation was filed on the same day of the promulgation of the recalled decision, and it merely pointed out that AAA actually testified during the trial.
• The OSG argued that the double jeopardy clause only proscribes the filing of an appeal that would allow the prosecutor to seek a second trier of fact of the defendant's guilt after having failed with the first, and that no double jeopardy attaches where the prosecution merely manifests that the court overlooked a fact which, if not considered, would result in great injustice.
• The OSG asserted that there was no double jeopardy because there was no presentation of additional evidence to prove or strengthen the State's case, and that the recall was necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Regional Trial Court could validly recall, set aside, and modify a judgment of acquittal already promulgated upon the mere manifestation of the prosecutor pointing out an alleged error of fact (that the victim had testified when the court thought she had not), without violating the accused's right against double jeopardy.
• Substantive Issues: Whether the accused-appellant could be validly convicted of two counts of rape after the recall of the initial acquittal, and whether the exceptions to the rule on double jeopardy (deprivation of due process, mistrial, or grave abuse of discretion) apply in this case.

• Procedural: The Supreme Court held that the RTC's recall and subsequent modification of the judgment of acquittal violated the accused-appellant's constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Court ruled that a judgment of acquittal, once promulgated, is immediately final and executory, and may not be recalled, withdrawn, or modified by the trial court—even to correct an erroneous factual finding or misapprehension of evidence. The Court emphasized that the proper remedy to assail a judgment of acquittal is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, not a mere manifestation or motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutor. Since the prosecution was not denied the opportunity to present its case and the trial was not a sham, and since the recall was not based on a finding of grave abuse of discretion through a proper certiorari proceeding, the recall was invalid.
• Substantive: The Supreme Court granted the appeal, reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, and set aside the conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court. The Court acquitted accused-appellant Lino Alejandro y Pimentel and ordered his immediate release from custody unless he is being held for another lawful cause. The Court held that the exceptions to the double jeopardy rule (deprivation of due process, mistrial, or grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances) did not exist in this case because the prosecution was actually able to present their case and witnesses, and there was no showing that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the initial acquittal.

• Finality-of-Acquittal Doctrine — A judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable upon its promulgation and is immediately executory; it cannot be recalled, withdrawn, or modified by the trial court even to correct errors of fact or law, as this would violate the constitutional right against double jeopardy. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the RTC's recall of its acquittal based on a mistaken belief that the victim had not testified was invalid.
• Double Jeopardy — The constitutional protection against being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense attaches when: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction has been filed; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction has taken cognizance of the case; (3) the accused has been arraigned and pleaded; and (4) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case has been dismissed without his express consent. The Court found all elements present and held that the recall of the acquittal placed the accused in double jeopardy.
• Exceptions to Double Jeopardy — The two recognized exceptions are: (1) where there has been deprivation of due process and a finding of mistrial, or (2) where there has been grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. The Court held these exceptions did not apply because the prosecution was able to present its evidence and there was no grave abuse of discretion shown in the initial acquittal.
• Certiorari as Remedy to Assail Acquittal — The only proper remedy to challenge a judgment of acquittal is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; a mere manifestation or motion for reconsideration is insufficient and constitutes a violation of double jeopardy if granted.

• "In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable."
• "Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation."
• "The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances."
• "A judgment of acquittal may only be assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated."
• "Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is no longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial."
• "In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case."

• Argel v. Judge Pascua — Cited as controlling precedent where the Supreme Court sanctioned a judge for gross ignorance of the law for recalling a judgment of acquittal; the Court quoted extensively from this case to establish that a final decision is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error, and that a judgment of acquittal cannot be revised without violating double jeopardy.
• People v. Laguio, Jr. — Cited for the proposition that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
• People v. Hon. Asis, et al. — Cited as authority for the finality-of-acquittal doctrine.
• Chiok v. People, et al. — Cited for the enumeration of the elements necessary for double jeopardy to attach.
• Villareal v. Aliga — Cited regarding the exceptions to the double jeopardy rule and the requirement that certiorari, not ordinary appeal, is the proper remedy to assail an acquittal.

• Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes rape by sexual intercourse through force, threat, or intimidation; cited as the provision under which the accused-appellant was charged.
• Republic Act No. 8369 (Family Courts Act of 1997) — Cited in relation to the jurisdiction of the court over crimes involving minors.
• Republic Act No. 8353 — Cited as the law amending Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code regarding the definition of simple rape.
• Section 7, Rule 117 of the 1985 and 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Enumerates the requisites for double jeopardy to attach; cited to establish that all elements were present in this case.
• Rule 65 of the Rules of Court — Identified as the proper remedy (certiorari) to assail a judgment of acquittal on grounds of grave abuse of discretion, as opposed to a motion for reconsideration or manifestation.