People vs. Agliday

A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence, and malice negates the exempting circumstance of accident.

Ricardo Agliday and his wife Conchita quarreled over his drinking habit on the evening of February 25, 1999. Their 19-year-old son, Richard, intervened to pacify his father. Angered by the intervention, Agliday retrieved his unlicensed shotgun from the bedroom and shot Richard in the left buttock. Richard was rushed to three hospitals but died of hypovolemic shock. Agliday surrendered to the barangay captain shortly after the incident.

• The Quarrel and Shooting: On February 25, 1999, at around 8:00 PM, Conchita and Ricardo Agliday were quarreling over the latter's drinking habit. Their son, Richard, intervened to pacify them. Angered, Agliday retrieved his unlicensed shotgun from the bedroom and shot Richard. Conchita and another son, Rey, witnessed the shooting. Rey testified he was about four meters away and saw his father shoot his brother after the latter intervened in the quarrel.
• The Victim's Death: Richard was taken to Sto. Niño Hospital, then San Carlos General Hospital, and finally to the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City, where he expired. Dr. Rod Alden Tamondong testified that the cause of death was cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to hypovolemic shock from a gunshot wound to the left buttock.
• The Defense's Version: Agliday claimed he was cleaning his homemade shotgun in preparation for a night patrol when the gun accidentally went off, hitting Richard who was going up the stairs with Conchita.
• The Surrender: After the incident, Agliday went to Barangay Captain Jose Matabang, Jr. and voluntarily surrendered, bringing the homemade shotgun with him.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses—his wife and son—over the corroborating testimonies of disinterested witnesses, the barangay captain and a police officer. He maintained he had no motive to kill his son, who had a bright future.
• Exempting Circumstance of Accident: Petitioner maintained that the shooting was accidental, occurring while he was cleaning his shotgun for a patrol, thereby warranting acquittal under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Reckless Imprudence: Petitioner contended that he was merely negligent and should be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide rather than parricide.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Respondent countered that the trial court correctly gave credence to the eyewitness testimonies of Conchita and Rey, whose relationship to the appellant made it unlikely they would testify falsely against him.
• Rejection of Accident Defense: Respondent argued that the defense of accidental shooting was a fabricated attempt to exculpate the appellant, contradicted by the positive eyewitness accounts of his wife and son.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the prosecution witnesses over the defense's witnesses.
• Exempting Circumstance of Accident: Whether the accused is entitled to acquittal under the exempting circumstance of accident under Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code.
• Reckless Imprudence vs. Parricide: Whether the accused should be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide instead of parricide.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The trial court's factual findings were affirmed, appellate courts generally not disturbing such findings unless clearly unsupported by evidence. The disinterested witnesses' testimonies were either based on what the appellant told them (Matabang) or contradicted by the witness's own in-court explanation of shock (Opina/Conchita). Affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimonies given in open court.
• Exempting Circumstance of Accident: The exempting circumstance of accident was not established. The elements of accident under Art. 12(4) require that the person be performing a lawful act with due care; firing a shotgun at another is not a lawful act. Furthermore, the act of cocking and firing the shotgun demonstrated criminal intent, which is antithetical to accident.
• Reckless Imprudence vs. Parricide: The conviction for parricide was proper. Reckless imprudence requires the absence of malice, but the appellant's external acts—getting the gun and shooting his son—proved malice or criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence.

• Exempting Circumstance of Accident (Art. 12(4), RPC) — Criminal liability does not arise when a person, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it. The exemption is based on the lack of criminal intent. For the exemption to apply, the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident; and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the defense, as the act of firing a shotgun at a person is unlawful and lacks due care.
• Reckless Imprudence vs. Intentional Felony — Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution. Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence; once malice is proven, recklessness disappears. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence. The Court applied this principle to reject the downgrade to reckless imprudence, as the intentional shooting of the victim demonstrated malice.

• "Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proven, recklessness disappears." — Defines the nature of reckless imprudence and its incompatibility with intentional crimes.
• "A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless imprudence." — Establishes the rule that a felonious intent precludes a conviction for mere negligence.

• People v. Belbes, G.R. No. 124670, June 21, 2000 — Followed. The Court cited this case to support the ruling that where a shooting is intentional, reckless imprudence cannot lie, just as the policeman in Belbes who intentionally shot a student could not be characterized as merely reckless.
• People v. Nepomuceno Jr., 298 SCRA 450 (1998) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that for an accident to become an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful.
• People v. Llaguno, 185 SCRA 124 (1998) — Followed. Cited for the established rule that appellate courts will normally not disturb the trial court's factual findings on the credibility of witnesses.

• Article 12(4), Revised Penal Code — Exempting circumstance of accident. The Court required the concurrence of four elements for its application: (1) performing a lawful act; (2) with due care; (3) causing injury by mere accident; (4) without fault or intention of causing it. The provision was held inapplicable because the act of shooting a person is unlawful and was done with intent, not due care.

Melo, Vitug, and Gutierrez, JJ.