People vs. Agguihao

The special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1613 need not be alleged in the information to be appreciated in imposing the maximum penalty, because, like a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it does not change the character of the offense charged but only guides the court in imposing the proper penalty.

The accused-appellant Damiano Agguihao was charged with arson before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, of Lagawe, Ifugao, for allegedly setting fire to the inhabited house and dwelling owned by Antonio Eheng. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 706. The accused was the Administrative Officer of the Tinoc District Hospital of the Department of Health (DOH), while the private complainants were the Eheng spouses, former residents of Lona, Lagawe, Ifugao. The burning was allegedly motivated by a land dispute between the accused and the Eheng family, with the accused claiming ownership over the land occupied by the Ehengs' house.

Spouses Betty Eheng and Antonio Eheng were former residents of Lona, Lagawe, Ifugao, where they owned a typical native house measuring approximately six meters by ten meters, with sawali walls, a cogon roof with some G.I. sheets, and a hardwood floor. At the back of their house was a pigpen. On August 28, 1988, the house was burned down.

On the morning of that day, Carolyn Eheng, the ten-year-old daughter of Antonio and Betty, was in the premises of their house playing and eating pomelo when accused Damiano Agguihao arrived. The accused asked her the whereabouts of her parents, and she told him that her mother went to the "kaingin" while her father was out selling "ice-buko." The accused then told her: "When your father and mother arrive home, tell them that they will leave this house because I will destroy it." He ordered her to fetch her younger sister who was inside the house, and she obeyed. Thereafter, the accused got hold of a hammer and "gas," went to the pigpen, smashed its roof, and set it on fire using cogon grass he had gathered. He then hit the roof of their house with a piece of wood until it collapsed, gathered some of the fallen roof's cogon grass, scattered it at the foot of the house's post, and set it on fire. Carolyn could only stare as she saw the post of their house turn to ember. Helpless, she proceeded to the house of her aunt Lourdes Rasote in Lagawe proper, some fifty meters away, and recounted the incident to her at about noontime.

Betty Eheng left their "kaingin" in the afternoon of August 28, 1988. On her way home, she noticed smoke emitting from their house. As she went nearer, she saw the burning pigpen and the accused Damiano Agguihao, who was gathering cogon grass which he placed beside the post of their house. From a 4 x 4 bottle on his hand, he poured something on the cogon and put it on fire, after which he left. Betty tried to save their properties, hurriedly extinguishing the flame on the post of their house, but the pigpen had already been razed down. She found her children in the house of her sister-in-law, Lourdes Rasote, and they decided to stay there temporarily for the whole afternoon.

Antonio Eheng had no inkling of the burning of their house. At around five o'clock in the afternoon, he was walking near the town hall of Lagawe when policeman Bonifacio Bogbog advised him not to proceed to their house, informing him that his sister had reported that Agguihao had gone to their house, requested the children to go out, burned the house, and destroyed the pigpen. He went to his sister's house where he met his crying children, who pleaded: "Daddy, let us not go home to Lona because Agguihao came and let the children go out of the house, and destroyed the pigpen and burned the house." Later in the evening, Antonio asked his wife Betty to retrieve the blankets from their house. As she was approaching their house, she saw a man moving in its premises. The man lighted a match, and their house went into flame. The flare illuminated the face of the man, whom she recognized as accused Agguihao. The accused retreated when he saw that the house was already on fire. Betty rushed back to her sister-in-law's house, trembling, and narrated what she saw. For their own safety, they did not report to the authorities that same evening.

The following morning, August 29, 1988, Antonio and Betty Eheng reported the incident to the authorities, and their sworn statements were taken by Patrolman Clemencio Kimayong and Corporal Gregorio Dangayo, Jr. Carolyn gave her sworn statement the following day. Betty and Antonio Eheng further testified that the accused burned their house because he was claiming the land occupied by their house, allegedly insisting that he bought it from a certain Agnes Gawi. The spouses claimed that the land is owned by Antonio's grandmother and that the burned house was built a long time ago by their ancestors. Considering its age, the spouses valued their house at thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00).

The defense was anchored on alibi. Accused Damiano Agguihao, Administrative Officer of the Tinoc District Hospital of the DOH, claimed that from August 28, 1988 until September 1, 1988, he was on official business at the DOH-Regional Health Office No. 2 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan. In support of his alibi, he submitted the Visitors' Logbook of said regional health office, which showed the handwritten data "8/28/88 Damiano Aguihao 2:00 P.M. / 8:00 A.M." He also submitted an unnumbered Special Order dated August 19, 1988, issued by German A. Mabbayad, OIC-Chief of Hospital, directing him to travel to the RHO No. 2 in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, as well as an Itinerary of Travel dated September 7, 1988, and a Certificate of Appearance dated August 31, 1988, signed by Records Officer Basilio Molina. His story was corroborated by defense witnesses Domingo Bat-tong, the security guard on duty at the RHO, who claimed he saw the accused in the dormitory from August 28 until August 30, 1988, and Dr. German Mabbayad, who testified that he issued the Special Order.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in convicting him by relying heavily on and assessing as fully credible the testimonies of Antonio Eheng, Betty Eheng, and Carolyn Eheng, despite their apparent and evident close relationship as husband, wife, and daughter, and notwithstanding that their testimonies were allegedly loaded with substantial contradictions and inconsistencies.
• Defense of Alibi: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court failed to appreciate and consider in his favor the well-established and documented defense of alibi, which was supported by documentary evidence, and that defense witnesses Dr. German Mabbayad and Domingo Bat-tong were unbiased witnesses.
• Penalty Imposition: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua despite the absence of clear proof of the attendance of a special aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime charged, urging that the special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred was erroneously considered as it was not alleged in the information.

• Positive Identification: The prosecution maintained that the accused was positively identified by two witnesses as the arsonist — ten-year-old Carolyn Eheng, who saw him place cogon on the post of their house and set it on fire, and Betty Eheng, who saw the accused set to flame what remained of their house in the evening of August 28, 1988.
• Motive and Implausibility of Defense Theory: The Solicitor General observed that "it is highly unnatural and illogical for the Eheng family to have put their own house on fire since proof of their actual occupancy would be obliterated (and) thereby weaken their claim on their land," countering the defense's insinuation that the Ehengs had a hand in the arson.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, who were closely related to each other, despite alleged contradictions and inconsistencies.
• Defense of Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the accused-appellant's defense of alibi, which was allegedly supported by documentary evidence.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating the special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, and in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua, despite the circumstance not being alleged in the information.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The trial court did not err in crediting the prosecution witnesses, as family relationship does not by itself render a witness' testimony inadmissible or devoid of probative value, and the alleged inconsistency between Carolyn's and Betty's testimonies regarding the time of the burning was not a material contradiction.
• Defense of Alibi: No. The defense of alibi was properly rejected, as the documentary evidence presented was not fool-proof, the visitors' logbook was doubtful given that August 28, 1988 was a Sunday when government offices do not transact official business, and the defense witnesses' testimonies were not credible.
• Special Aggravating Circumstance: Yes. The special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred, albeit not alleged in the information, may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the penalty, as it does not change the character of the offense charged but only guides the court in imposing the proper penalty.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court found no reason to depart from the settled rule that great respect is accorded to the credibility of witnesses as weighed by the trial courts, for they are in a better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The Court noted that it is far-fetched for Carolyn to fabricate the story against the accused, as her testimony was replete with minute details of the burning incident, and it would be difficult for her to concoct these details considering her tender age and her lack of knowledge of the misunderstanding between her parents and the accused. The alleged inconsistency between Carolyn's and Betty's testimonies regarding the time the pigpen was burned deserved scant consideration: Carolyn testified the burning took place in the morning, while Betty, who left the kaingin in the afternoon, was unable to see who actually burned the pigpen. Thus, Betty's testimony did not contradict her daughter's testimony. The Court also found the defense's insinuation that the Ehengs had a hand in the arson untenable, as it was unbelievable that the Ehengs would burn their own house for the flimsy reasons surmised by the accused, and the records showed that it was the accused who nurtured a grudge against the Ehengs over the land dispute.

• Defense of Alibi: The Court held that the documentary evidence presented by the accused to prove his defense of alibi would not exculpate him. The visitors' logbook showed that at around two o'clock in the afternoon of August 28, 1988, the accused was at the Regional Health Office No. 2 of Cagayan, Tuguegarao, "to follow-up official matters." However, August 28, 1988 was a Sunday, and the Court took judicial notice that government offices do not transact official business on Sundays, seriously doubting the truthfulness of the accused's allegation. Moreover, the visitors' logbook did not reflect an accurate list of visitors, as there were no visitors registered between June 21, 1988 and August 28, 1988, which was inexplicable for a people-oriented Department of Health regional office. The security guard Bat-tong, who testified he saw the accused in the regional office from August 28 until September 1, 1988, failed to explain the absence of entries for that period, and his demeanor as a witness did not reflect sincerity, as the trial court observed he was evasive, nervous, and blushing. The special travel order issued in the accused's favor was mere proof that he was authorized to travel to Tuguegarao, not that he in fact went there, as Dr. Mabbayad admitted he did not ascertain if the accused indeed went to Tuguegarao. The Itinerary of Travel was self-serving, as Dr. Mabbayad testified it was prepared by the accused himself.

• Special Aggravating Circumstance: The Court held that the accused's contention that the special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred was erroneously considered because it was not alleged in the information was incorrect. Citing People vs. Arbolante, the Court stated that the elements of the crime of arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 simply include: (1) that there is intentional burning; and (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The prosecution established the fact of intentional burning of an inhabited house. The special aggravating circumstance of spite, albeit not alleged in the information, may be proved during the trial, in the same manner that a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code may be proved during trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the penalty. The reason for applying the same rule is that the special aggravating circumstance under PD 1613, just like the generic aggravating circumstance, does not change the character of the offense charged; it only guides the court in imposing the proper penalty. The Court distinguished People vs. Gadiano, relied upon by the accused, which referred to qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery that change the nature of the offense and therefore must be alleged in the information. The Court also noted that during the trial, the accused did not object when the spouses Eheng testified on the motive behind the burning of their house, and the defense counsel even propounded questions pointing to Agnes Gawi as the alleged owner of the land in dispute. Consequently, the trial court did not err in appreciating the special aggravating circumstance of spite or hatred, and the maximum penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.

• Special aggravating circumstances under P.D. No. 1613 need not be alleged in the information — A special aggravating circumstance under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1613, just like a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, does not change the character of the offense charged; it only guides the court in imposing the proper penalty. Therefore, it may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the penalty even if not alleged in the information. This is distinguished from qualifying circumstances, which change the nature of the offense and must be alleged in the information to be considered against the accused.

• Elements of arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 — The elements of the crime of arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 are: (1) that there is intentional burning; and (2) that what is intentionally burned is an inhabited house or dwelling. The prosecution must establish both elements beyond reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of witnesses and family relationship — Family relationship does not by itself render a witness' testimony inadmissible or devoid of probative value. The Court accords great respect to the credibility of witnesses as weighed by the trial courts, for they are in a better position to decide the question, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.

• Alibi as a weak defense — Alibi is a weak defense that cannot prevail against positive identification by credible prosecution witnesses. Documentary evidence supporting alibi must be fool-proof to exculpate the accused; otherwise, it will not overcome the prosecution's positive identification.

• "The special aggravating circumstance of spite, albeit not alleged in the information, may be proved during the trial, in the same manner that 'a generic aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code may be proved during trial over the objection of the defense and may be appreciated in imposing the penalty.'" — This passage articulates the Court's core ruling on the third issue, establishing that special aggravating circumstances under P.D. No. 1613 need not be alleged in the information to be appreciated in sentencing.

• "The reason for applying the same rule is obvious: the special aggravating circumstance under PD 1613, just like the generic aggravating circumstance, does not change the character of the offense charged. It only guides the court in imposing the proper penalty." — This excerpt provides the ratio decidendi for why the special aggravating circumstance may be proved during trial, distinguishing it from qualifying circumstances that alter the nature of the offense.

• "It is far fetched for Carolyn to fabricate the story against accused Agguihao as her testimony is replete with minute of the burning incident. It is difficult for her to concoct these details considering her tender age and her lack of knowledge of the misunderstanding between her parents and Agguihao." — This passage supports the Court's ruling on the credibility of the prosecution's child witness, explaining why her detailed testimony was believable despite her age and lack of knowledge of the land dispute.

• "We share the observation made by the Solicitor General that 'it is highly unnatural and illogical for the Eheng family to have put their own house on fire since proof of their actual occupancy would be obliterated (and) thereby weaken their claim on their land.'" — This excerpt addresses the defense's theory that the Ehengs themselves burned their house, finding it untenable given the natural and logical implications of destroying proof of their occupancy.

• People vs. Arbolante, G.R. No. 96713, October 17, 1991, 203 SCRA 85 — Cited as controlling authority for the elements of the crime of arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613, which the Court applied in determining that the prosecution established intentional burning of an inhabited house.
• People vs. Gadiano, G.R. L-31818, July 30, 1982, 115 SCRA 559 — Distinguished by the Court; this case referred to qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, which change the nature of the offense and therefore must be alleged in the information, unlike the special aggravating circumstance in the case at bar.
• People vs. Magallanes, G.R. No. 89036, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 109 — Cited for the settled rule that the Court accords great respect to the credibility of witnesses as weighed by the trial courts, who are in a better position to decide the question having seen and heard the witnesses themselves.
• People vs. Hasiron, G.R. No. 100797, October 15, 1992, 214 SCRA 586 — Cited for the rule that family relationship does not by itself render a witness' testimony inadmissible or devoid of probative value.

• Section 3(2), Presidential Decree No. 1613 — Provides that the penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any inhabited house or dwelling. The Court applied this provision in affirming the conviction of the accused for burning the Ehengs' inhabited house.
• Section 4(3), Presidential Decree No. 1613 — Provides that the penalty in case of arson shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is motivated by spite or hatred towards the owner or occupant of the property burned. The Court held that this special aggravating circumstance, although not alleged in the information, may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the maximum penalty.
• Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Referenced by the Court to illustrate that, like a generic aggravating circumstance under this provision, the special aggravating circumstance under P.D. No. 1613 may be proved during trial and appreciated in imposing the penalty, as it does not change the character of the offense charged.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, and Nocon, JJ., concurred.