People vs. Agapinay

Conspiracy requires an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it; where a killing occurs in the "spur of the moment," there can be no conspiracy, and each accused's liability must be considered individually. Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack by which the victim is rendered defenseless, and the manner of attack must be shown; where the evidence shows only that the accused took advantage of their superior strength to overcome an already-injured victim, the qualifying circumstance is abuse of superiority, not treachery.

The six accused-appellants, all surnamed Agapinay, were brothers except Romeo, who was Delfin's son. They were hirelings of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats, along with the victim Virgilio Paino, Amor Flores, and Eufemio Paino. The case arose from a fatal stabbing that occurred on April 13, 1981, in Gonzaga, Cagayan, after the group returned from a fishing venture. The accused were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, with the information alleging conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength.

On April 12, 1981, the Agapinays, along with Virgilio Paino, Amor Flores, and Eufemio Paino, set out on a fishing venture in the sea of Batangan, Gonzaga, Cagayan, as hirelings of Julia Rapada, an operator of fishing boats. They returned to shore the following day, April 13, 1981, unloaded their catch, and spread out their fishnet on the sand to dry. Except for Romeo Agapinay, they mended the net with thread and small knives under a portable shed.

Virgilio Paino took the shed and placed it where he, Alex, and Cirilo Agapinay were. Moments later, Romeo Agapinay appeared and confronted Virgilio, berating him for taking the shed without permission. The two exchanged words and tempers flared. Romeo lunged at Virgilio with a six-inch hunting knife, hitting his right arm. Virgilio ran away, but Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay met him and held onto his arms. Romeo approached and dealt him a second stab at the right side of his back. Virgilio managed to extricate himself and ran away again, but while he was running, Delfin, Alex, Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilo took turns stoning him. Suddenly, Amor Flores appeared and plunged a knife at Virgilio's back, causing him to collapse. Julia Rapada cried, "Kill him and we will bury him."

The prosecution also established that Cirilo and Delfin had attacked Eufemio Paino, Virgilio's brother, with their own knives, but the latter defended himself with a paddle. The former ran away, and the rest of the Agapinays likewise fled. Antonio and Eufemio Paino, brothers of Virgilio, and Artemio Siababa brought the wounded Virgilio to his house, where he supposedly executed an ante-mortem statement implicating the Agapinays and Amor Flores. He was then brought to the Don Alfonso Enrile Hospital at Gonzaga but was dead on arrival.

Police Corporal Rugino Sunico, when informed of the stabbing, went to the scene to investigate but Virgilio had already been brought home. Patrolman Sunico later took a supposed confession of Romeo Agapinay, who surrendered to him at 9:00 o'clock in the morning of April 13, 1981. Meanwhile, Cirilo and Delfin Agapinay proceeded to the police headquarters to complain that Eufemio Paino also assaulted them, but they refused to make any further statement. Dr. Silverio Salvanera's post-mortem examination showed that Virgilio suffered three wounds: a 2 cm. wound penetrating to the liver, a 2.5 cm. wound penetrating to the lungs, and a thru-and-thru wound at the medial aspect of the right arm.

The defense presented a different version of events. Cirilo Agapinay stated that the incident started when Virgilio grabbed the atal (a piece of wood used to roll boats ashore) without his permission, and that Virgilio clubbed him, causing him to lose consciousness. Delfin Agapinay testified that Virgilio confronted them and clubbed Cirilo until he passed out, and claimed that Romeo, Dante, Alex, and Fortunato were not around when the incident happened. Fortunato Agapinay contended that he was asleep aboard the boat at the time and was roused by his nephew, whereupon he saw men fighting. Alex Agapinay testified that he was repairing a lamp when he learned that Virgilio had been stabbed and that Romeo was the culprit. Romeo Agapinay alleged that Virgilio suddenly appeared "uttering bad words to his father Delfin," struck Cirilo and his father with a paddle, and that he was forced to stab Virgilio three times. The defense pictured Virgilio as having been drunk and that he came on strong without provocation.

The trial judge rejected the accused's claim of defense of relative and convicted all six accused of murder, attended by treachery. The trial court found that the Agapinays had conspired to kill Virgilio Paino and held them all "principals by participation." The court found no evident premeditation but appreciated treachery and conspiracy. It also commanded the Provincial Fiscal to indict Julia Rapada as alleged principal by inducement and Amor Flores for their crimes.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The accused-appellants assigned as errors the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses, specifically that the trial court erred in finding that Romeo stabbed the deceased twice and that Delfin, Alex, and Fortunato took turns in stoning the victim.
• Preliminary Investigation: The accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in adopting as part of the evidence the proceedings at the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Judge.
• Conspiracy: The accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding that there was conspiracy on their part when they committed the crime charged.
• Treachery: The accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by treachery.
• Penalty: The accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in sentencing them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
• New Trial: The accused-appellants argued that the trial court erred in not allowing them to present evidence to find out if the evidence to be presented constituted newly discovered evidence as a basis for a new trial. Counsel alleged that the notice of appeal was filed only as a precautionary measure because the motion for new trial had not been formally resolved, and the appeal period was about to expire.

• Prosecution's Case: The prosecution's evidence showed that Romeo stabbed Virgilio twice, that Delfin and Fortunato held the victim's arms while Romeo stabbed him, and that Delfin, Alex, Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilo took turns stoning the victim as he ran away. The prosecution also established that Amor Flores dealt the death blow.
• Defense of Relatives Rejected: The prosecution maintained that the accused's claim of defense of relative was untenable because it was not Virgilio who assaulted Cirilo and Delfin with a knife, but rather Eufemio Paino, and thus the Agapinays could not say they had been defending themselves against Virgilio.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court erred in its factual findings on the credibility of prosecution witnesses.
• Preliminary Investigation: Whether the trial court erred in adopting the proceedings at the preliminary investigation as part of the evidence.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was established to hold all six accused as co-principals in the crime of murder.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the killing so as to qualify the crime as murder.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Whether abuse of superiority qualified the killing into murder.
• Defense of Relatives: Whether the accused were entitled to the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Whether the accused were entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation.
• New Trial: Whether the trial court erred in denying the motion for new trial on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction after the appeal was perfected.

• Credibility of Witnesses: No. The errors assigned by the accused refer to credibility of witnesses, which is the domain of the trial court, and there was no controversy that the Agapinays were guilty of participating in the slay of Virgilio Paino.
• Preliminary Investigation: No. The Court did not separately address this assigned error, as it was subsumed in the general rule that credibility findings of the trial court are given great weight.
• Conspiracy: No. Conspiracy was not shown beyond reasonable doubt because the stabbing happened in the "spur of the moment," and where a tragedy is a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy to speak of; hence, the parties' liability should be considered individually.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established because the manner of attack was not shown; the fact that Delfin and Fortunato held Virgilio while Romeo stabbed him does not demonstrate treachery.
• Abuse of Superior Strength: Yes. Abuse of superiority qualified the taking of the victim's life into murder, as the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who was already injured.
• Defense of Relatives: No. Defense of relatives requires unlawful aggression, which was not present since all that Virgilio did was to address offensive language to Delfin Agapinay, and injurious words or threats do not amount to unlawful aggression.
• Mitigating Circumstance: Yes. The accused were entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation (or vindication of a grave offense or passion or obfuscation) since the deceased uttered offending words that made the Agapinays, especially Romeo, react violently.
• New Trial: No. The trial court correctly held that after the appeal was perfected, it no longer had jurisdiction to entertain any incident, and the accused's counsel faced no risk of losing the right to appeal since the time during which a motion for new trial has been pending is deducted from the appeal period.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The Court held that in a long line of cases, "credibility" is the domain of the trial court. There was no controversy that the Agapinays were guilty of participating in the slay of Virgilio Paino: (1) Romeo admitted having stabbed him; (2) thereafter, Delfin and Fortunato held him, whereupon Romeo thrust another stab; (3) as Virgilio ran away, Delfin, Alex, Fortunato, Dante, and Cirilo threw rocks at him. Although it appeared that Amor Flores dealt the death blow, the Agapinays could not deny that they had the intent to kill and performed acts to carry that out, for which they should be held accountable under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Conspiracy: The Court ruled that conspiracy means an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it, citing Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code and People vs. Saavedra. As the lower court observed, the stabbing happened in the "spur of the moment." If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy to speak of. Hence, the parties' liability should be considered individually. Only Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato should be held as principals in the crime of murder: Romeo by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1, and Delfin and Fortunato as principals by cooperation under Article 17, paragraph 3, for holding the victim by his arms and allowing Romeo to inflict the stab wound. Alex, Dante, and Cirilo should be held as simple accomplices under Article 18 for their acts of pelting the victim with rocks, since the deceased had already sustained two stab wounds and the act of hurling rocks was not indispensable to justify holding them legally liable as principals, citing People vs. Tatlonghari.

• Treachery and Abuse of Superior Strength: The Court held that treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack by which the victim is rendered hors de combat, as in an ambuscade, or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to himself, citing United States vs. Devela. The manner of attack must be shown, and there was no such showing here. The fact that Delfin and Fortunato held Virgilio while Romeo stabbed him does not demonstrate treachery; rather, what it proves is abuse of superiority. It was plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who, at that time, was already injured. Abuse of superiority qualifies the taking of the life of another into murder under Article 248, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Defense of Relatives: The Court ruled that "defense of relatives" requires the concurrence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant. Of these three requisites, "unlawful aggression" is the most essential and primary, without which any "defense" is not possible or justified. The Court was not persuaded that Virgilio had acted with unlawful aggression; the records showed that all Virgilio did was to address offensive language to Delfin. Injurious words or threats do not amount to unlawful aggression, citing United States vs. Santos. Even assuming Virgilio did strike Delfin and Romeo with a paddle, upon being stabbed in the right arm, he ran away, and self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray, citing United States vs. Dimitillo.

• Mitigating Circumstance: The Court found that the accused should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation (or vindication of a grave offense or passion or obfuscation) under Article 13, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of the Revised Penal Code, since clearly the deceased uttered offending words ("vulva of your mother, if you are talking as if you have no debts, not like me, I have no debts") that made the Agapinays, especially Romeo, react violently. While the trial court disregarded this evidence, the entire picture seemed to indicate that Virgilio did say bad words that made the Agapinays act in retaliation.

• New Trial: The Court sustained the action of the trial court judge, who held that after the appeal had been perfected, the court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain any incident. The accused's counsel ignored the fact that the time during which a motion for new trial has been pending shall be deducted from the appeal period under Rule 41, section 3 of the Rules of Court, and hence faced no risk of losing the right to appeal.

• Julia Rapada's Liability: The Court held that Julia Rapada could not be held liable as a principal by inducement. Her words, "Kill him and we will bury him," amounted but to imprudent utterances said in the excitement of the hour or in the heat of anger, and not in the nature of a command that had to be obeyed. Citing United States vs. Indanan, the inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and must be the determining cause of the crime.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy means an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it. Where a killing occurs in the "spur of the moment" as a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy, and each accused's liability must be considered individually. The Court applied this doctrine to hold only Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato as principals, while Alex, Dante, and Cirilo were held as accomplices.

• Treachery — Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack by which the victim is rendered hors de combat, as in an ambuscade, or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to himself. The manner of attack must be shown. The Court held that treachery was not established because the evidence showed only that the accused took advantage of their superior strength, not that the victim was deprived of all defenses.

• Abuse of Superior Strength — Abuse of superiority qualifies the taking of the life of another into murder under Article 248, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court applied this doctrine where the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who was already injured.

• Defense of Relatives — Defense of relatives requires the concurrence of three elements: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending the relative had no part in provoking the assailant. Unlawful aggression is the most essential and primary requisite, without which any "defense" is not possible or justified. Injurious words or threats do not amount to unlawful aggression.

• Principal by Inducement — For one to be liable as a principal by inducement, the inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime. A chance word spoken without reflection or in the heat of anger does not constitute inducement.

• "Conspiracy means, however, an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and a decision to commit it. If the tragedy was a chance stabbing, there can be no conspiracy to speak of. Hence, the parties' liability should be considered individually." — This passage states the controlling definition of conspiracy and the basis for the Court's ruling that each accused's liability must be determined individually rather than collectively.

• "Treachery depends on the suddenness of the attack, by which the victim is rendered hors d'combat, as in an ambuscade, or any manner in which the victim is deprived of all defenses, and in which the malefactor faces no risk to himself. The manner of attack must be shown. There is no such showing here." — This passage defines the qualifying circumstance of treachery and explains why it was not established in this case.

• "The fact that Delfin and Fortunato Agapinay held Virgilio Paino while Romeo stabbed him, does not demonstrate treachery. Rather, what it proves is abuse of superiority. It is indeed plain from the records that the trio of Romeo, Delfin, and Fortunato had taken advantage of their strength to overcome the victim who, at that time, was already injured." — This passage distinguishes treachery from abuse of superior strength and identifies the correct qualifying circumstance in the case.

• "A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it produce a result." — This passage, quoted from United States vs. Indanan, supports the Court's ruling that Julia Rapada's words did not constitute principal by inducement.

• United States vs. Indanan, 24 Phil. 203 (1913) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that inducement must be made directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and must be the determining cause of the crime; applied to absolve Julia Rapada of liability as principal by inducement.
• People vs. Saavedra, No. L-48738, May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 610 — Cited in support of the definition of conspiracy under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code.
• United States vs. Cueva, 23 Phil. 553 (1912) — Cited as a comparable case where the accused struck the deceased while his brother held the latter by the arm, supporting the finding that Delfin and Fortunato were principals by cooperation.
• People vs. Tatlonghari, No. L-22094, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 726 — Cited for the proposition that acts not indispensable to the commission of the crime render the actor an accomplice rather than a principal; also cited for the rule on deduction of time for pending motions for new trial.
• United States vs. Devela, 3 Phil. 625 (1904) — Cited as controlling authority for the definition of treachery.
• United States vs. Vallados, 4 Phil. 339 (1905) — Cited for the proposition that if there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to prevent or repel, supporting the ruling on defense of relatives.
• United States vs. Carrero, 9 Phil. 544 (1908) — Cited for the rule that not even incomplete self-defense can be validly invoked without unlawful aggression.
• United States vs. Santos, 17 Phil. 87 (1910) — Cited for the rule that injurious words or threats do not amount to unlawful aggression.
• United States vs. Dimitillo, 7 Phil. 475 (1907) — Cited for the rule that self-defense does not justify the unnecessary killing of an aggressor who is retreating from the fray.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining and penalizing murder; applied to qualify the killing through abuse of superior strength.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining conspiracy; applied to determine that no conspiracy existed because the stabbing happened in the "spur of the moment."
• Article 17, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining principals; applied to hold Romeo as principal by direct participation and Delfin and Fortunato as principals by cooperation.
• Article 18, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining accomplices; applied to hold Alex, Dante, and Cirilo as accomplices for their acts of pelting the victim with rocks.
• Article 11, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — The provision on defense of relatives; applied and rejected for lack of unlawful aggression.
• Article 13, paragraphs 4, 5, and 6, Revised Penal Code — The provisions on the mitigating circumstances of provocation, vindication of a grave offense, and passion or obfuscation; applied to reduce the penalties.
• Article 4, Revised Penal Code — The provision on criminal liability; applied to hold the accused accountable for the intent to kill and acts performed to carry it out.
• Rule 41, section 3, Rules of Court — The procedural rule providing that the time during which a motion for new trial has been pending shall be deducted from the appeal period; applied to reject the accused's argument that they faced risk of losing the right to appeal.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla, and Regalado, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinions were noted in the provided case text.