People vs. Acuram

Treachery cannot be appreciated where the shooting was a rash and impetuous response to provocation rather than a deliberate act of the will; absent proof of conscious adoption of a mode of attack to facilitate killing without risk to the accused, the crime is homicide, not murder.

Orlando Acuram was a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to the 421st PNP Company based at San Martin, Villanueva, Misamis Oriental, and a former member of the Philippine Constabulary. He was issued an armalite rifle by his command, which he carried on the date of the incident. The victim, Rolando Manabat, was a civilian who, together with companions, had gone to the market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish and was waiting for a ride on the national highway when the shooting occurred. The case was tried under Criminal Case No. 91-1161 before the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 22, with the Information charging murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

On June 29, 1991, at around seven o'clock in the evening, Rolando Manabat, Oscar Manabat, Bartolome Nabe, and Peterson Valendres, after the day's work, proceeded to the market in El Salvador, Misamis Oriental, to buy fish. Finding no fish available, they decided to head home and went to the national highway, standing at the right side facing east toward Cagayan de Oro City to wait for a ride. They flagged down an approaching passenger jeepney, which swerved dangerously towards them. Rolando Manabat shouted at the jeep, "Pesteng yawa-a kamo, Manligis man kamo" (You devils, why did you try to run over us?). A passenger inside the jeepney shouted back, "Noano man diay, isog mo?" (Why? Are you brave?). Immediately thereafter, two gunshots rang out, accompanied by sparks from the front right side of the jeepney. Rolando shouted, "Agay. I was shot." The vehicle did not stop but sped toward Cagayan de Oro City.

Wounded on the right knee, Rolando was brought by his companions to the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center. They were later informed that he needed blood transfusion, and at around 11:25 P.M. they transferred him to the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital in the same city. Upon arrival, Dr. Ismael Naypa, Jr. examined the victim and found his blood pressure at forty over zero (40/0), with the right leg heavily bandaged. The doctor decided to operate once the victim's blood pressure stabilized. At about 5:00 A.M. the following day, the victim underwent surgery, but he died at around 11:00 A.M. Dr. Naypa testified that the cause of death was massive loss of blood due to a gunshot wound, the wound having transected the major part of the leg. He clarified that the victim sustained only one gunshot wound, which entered at the front of the right knee and exited at the back, causing two wounds.

Police investigation revealed that appellant Orlando Acuram, a policeman assigned to the 421st PNP Company, was among the passengers of the jeepney, seated at the front right side, and was the only passenger carrying a firearm. Effective July 1, 1991, he was restricted to camp upon orders of his commanding officer, Major Rodolfo De La Piedra, pending investigation. He was later surrendered by his commanding officer to the custody of the court on the basis of a warrant of arrest issued by MCTC Judge Evelyn Nery. During trial, appellant admitted being aboard the jeepney with a gun but denied firing it, claiming it was impossible because he was sandwiched between the driver and the latter's father-in-law, and that his rifle was locked, wrapped in his jacket, with its barrel pointed toward the driver. The trial court found the defense's version weak, self-serving, and unreliable, and convicted appellant of murder qualified by treachery.

• Voluntary Surrender: Appellant argued that the trial court erred in concluding that he took flight or escaped after the incident and in failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, since he reported for duty the day after the incident and was restricted to camp by his commanding officer.
• Treachery: Appellant contended that the trial court erred in declaring the killing qualified by treachery, the shooting having been an instantaneous response to the victim's cursing rather than a deliberately adopted mode of attack.
• Identification and Weapon Testing: Appellant asserted that he was not properly and conclusively identified as the perpetrator and that the alleged weapon was not positively tested, no paraffin or ballistic tests having been conducted on him or the firearm.
• Efficient Intervening Cause: Appellant maintained that the delay in giving proper medical attention to the victim constituted an efficient intervening cause that was the proximate cause of death, thereby exempting him from criminal responsibility.

• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the trial court erred in concluding that appellant took flight and in failing to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
• Treachery: Whether the killing was qualified by treachery.
• Identification by Circumstantial Evidence: Whether appellant was properly identified as the perpetrator despite the absence of direct eyewitness identification and positive weapon testing.
• Efficient Intervening Cause: Whether the delay in medical treatment constituted an efficient intervening cause that broke the causal connection between the shooting and the victim's death.

• Voluntary Surrender: No. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was not appreciated, appellant having been surrendered by his commanding officer rather than spontaneously presenting himself to the investigating authorities.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not proven because the shooting was a spur-of-the-moment response to the victim's cursing, not a consciously adopted mode of attack.
• Identification by Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence sufficiently established appellant's identity as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt, notwithstanding the absence of direct eyewitness identification and ballistic or paraffin tests.
• Efficient Intervening Cause: No. The delay in medical treatment did not constitute an efficient intervening cause; the proximate cause of death was the gunshot wound inflicted by appellant.

• Voluntary Surrender: The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble of his search and capture. Here, appellant did not present himself to the investigating authorities despite learning he was a suspect. Instead, his commanding officer surrendered him to the custody of the court pursuant to a warrant of arrest. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within camp without submitting to investigating authorities is not tantamount to voluntary surrender as contemplated by law. The trial court correctly declined to appreciate this mitigating circumstance.

• Treachery: For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The victim had shouted damning curses at the driver and passengers of the jeepney, and the shooting was an instantaneous response to the cursing. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will. Absent this qualifying circumstance, the crime is homicide, not murder.

• Identification by Circumstantial Evidence: While prosecution witnesses did not positively identify appellant as the one who fired the gun, conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided that: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution established an unbroken chain of circumstances: appellant was a trained law enforcement officer skilled in firearms; he was issued an armalite rifle which he carried during the incident; he was the only person with a rifle inside the jeepney; he was seated at the extreme front-right side where sparks from the gunbursts were seen and heard; empty shells of an armalite rifle were recovered at the scene; and he did not present himself to authorities until after a warrant was issued and he was arrested. The absence of paraffin and ballistic tests was not conclusive, as even negative paraffin findings do not definitively show that a person did not fire a gun.

• Efficient Intervening Cause: Appellant introduced no proof that the attending doctors were negligent. Dr. Naypa testified that the attending doctor at the Cagayan de Oro Medical Center applied bandages to prevent hemorrhage, and the victim was immediately given blood transfusion at the Northern Mindanao Regional Hospital. The perceived delay in medical treatment did not break the causal connection between the wrongful act and the injuries sustained. The proximate cause of death was the shooting. It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all consequences of his criminal act, including death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The rule is founded on the policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act.

• Treachery as a qualifying circumstance — For treachery to qualify a killing as murder, there must be proof that the accused consciously adopted a mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated where the shooting was a rash and impetuous response to provocation rather than a deliberate act of the will. In this case, the shooting was an instantaneous response to the victim's cursing, so treachery was not established and the crime was homicide, not murder.

• Voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance — The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save them the trouble and expense of his search and capture. Being restrained by one's superiors to stay within camp, and being surrendered by a commanding officer to the custody of the court pursuant to a warrant of arrest, is not tantamount to voluntary surrender.

• Conviction based on circumstantial evidence — Conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence may be of similar weight and probative value as direct evidence; no greater degree of certainty is required for circumstantial than for direct evidence.

• Proximate cause and efficient intervening cause — The proximate cause of death is the wrongful act of the accused; a perceived delay in medical treatment does not break the causal connection between the wrongful act and the resulting death, and does not constitute an efficient intervening cause. The rule is founded on the practical policy of closing to the wrongdoer a convenient avenue of escape from the just consequences of his wrongful act.

• "Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused shot the victim as a result of a rash and impetuous impulse rather than from a deliberate act of the will." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for downgrading the conviction from murder to homicide, distinguishing impulsive violence from treacherous killing.

• "The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture." — This defines the canonical formulation of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance and explains why surrender effected through a commanding officer's restraint does not qualify.

• "It is settled that anyone inflicting injuries is responsible for all the consequences of his criminal act such as death that supervenes in consequence of the injuries. The fact that the injured did not receive proper medical attendance would not affect appellant's criminal responsibility." — This states the doctrine on proximate cause, foreclosing the defense of efficient intervening cause based on alleged medical negligence.

• "No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct. In either case, what is required is that there be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was committed and that the accused committed the crime." — This establishes the evidentiary standard for circumstantial evidence, equating its probative value with that of direct evidence.

• People vs. Ramos, 296 SCRA 559 (1998) — Cited for the definition and requisites of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
• People vs. Quitlong, 292 SCRA 360 (1998) — Cited for the requirement that treachery must involve conscious adoption of a mode of attack to facilitate killing without risk to the accused.
• People vs. Navarro, 295 SCRA 139 (1998) — Cited for the principle that treachery cannot be appreciated where the shooting results from a rash and impetuous impulse rather than a deliberate act of the will.
• People vs. Bermas, G.R. Nos. 76416 and 94312, July 5, 1999 — Cited for the proposition that direct evidence is not the only basis for conviction; circumstantial evidence may suffice.
• People vs. Mangat, G.R. No. 131618, July 6, 1999 — Cited for the principle that no greater degree of certainty is required for circumstantial evidence than for direct evidence.
• People vs. Fuertes, 229 SCRA 289 (1994) — Cited in support of the conclusion that the unbroken chain of circumstances established guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• People vs. Oliano, 287 SCRA 158 (1998) — Cited for the principle that negative paraffin test findings do not conclusively show that a person did not fire a gun.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defined the crime of murder, under which the appellant was originally charged and convicted by the trial court; the Supreme Court found the qualifying circumstance of treachery absent and accordingly downgraded the conviction.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of homicide and prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal; applied as the proper offense once treachery was not proven.
• Section 4, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Sets forth the requisites for conviction based on circumstantial evidence: more than one circumstance, proven facts from which inferences are derived, and a combination producing conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to fix the imposable penalty within the range of prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum.

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concurred.