People vs. Acosta

Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification where the accused fails to prove physical impossibility of presence at the crime scene, and treachery qualifies killing to murder where the victim, attacked suddenly from behind while defenseless, could offer no defense. The stabbing of a victim urinating with his back turned, without warning or opportunity to repel the assault, was thus held to be murder attended by treachery.

Benny Acosta and his son Renny Boy Acosta were co-accused in a charge of murder for the fatal stabbing of Norton Baguio in Guihulngan, Negros Oriental. Renny Boy Acosta was a minor at the time of the offense, having been born on September 5, 1975. No other business, contractual, or statutory relationship between the parties is detailed beyond their presence at a town fiesta dance where the fatal encounter occurred.

At about 9 o'clock in the evening of March 13, 1993, Norton Baguio, together with Hansel Cañete, Leonardo Cabunalis and Joy Boganutan, attended a dance in celebration of the town fiesta at Sitio Tuway, Barangay P. Zamora, Guihulngan, Negros Oriental, held in an open space lighted by two petromax lamps installed opposite each other. At about past 12 o'clock midnight of March 14, 1993, the four decided to go home. Somewhere on the way, Baguio stopped to urinate at the back of a store while his companions waited for him.

According to the prosecution, as Baguio was thus urinating, Benny Acosta suddenly attacked and stabbed him from behind. When Baguio fell down and rolled facing downward, Renny Boy Acosta rushed toward the victim and took his turn in stabbing him. Baguio was helped by his companions and, although he died shortly thereafter, was able to point to Benny Acosta as his assailant. Postmortem examination by Dr. Fe L. Mercado showed two stab wounds on the left back — one at the level of the posterior axillary line and tip of the scapula, 1 inch by 1/2 inch by 5 1/2 inches deep directed to the midline, and one on the left lumbar area, 1 1/2 inches by 1/2 inch by 6 inches deep directed anteriorly and L-shaped — causing death by internal hemorrhage, possibly inflicted by a sharp pointed instrument such as a hunting knife while the victim was standing.

Benny Acosta, for his part, testified that from 5 o'clock in the afternoon of March 13, 1993 until around 1 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 1993, he was out at sea fishing, afterward sold his catch at the house of Romulo Perez, watched a betamax film, went home and rested, learning of his implication only when awakened by policemen in the morning of March 14, 1993. He admitted on cross-examination that his house was near the seashore and the dance hall was only a 10-minute walk from the seashore, with music audible therefrom, but denied presence at the dance hall and ownership of the knife and scabbard. Renny Boy Acosta testified, corroborated by Joel Sayon, that on the way home about midnight he went to buy cigarettes, Norton Baguio armed with an ice pick was about to strike him, Sayon shouted a warning and was hit, Baguio then turned on Renny Boy who parried the blow, drew his hunting knife and stabbed the victim twice, then ran home and surrendered a hunting knife on March 15, 1993.

The events precipitated the filing of the murder information on April 14, 1993. The trial court factually found that eyewitnesses Cañete and Boganutan were only about five strides or six meters from the victim in a well-lighted place and saw both accused stab Baguio from behind; that Benny Acosta was in the dance hall despite his alibi; that Renny Boy Acosta admitted stabbing the victim even after the latter had fallen; and that the victim sustained no stomach wound as Renny Boy claimed but two wounds on the back.

• Eyewitness Credibility and Identification: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in crediting Boganutan and Cañete because their testimonies were weak, improbable, inconsistent and uncertain, particularly on whether accused-appellant passed by their group before attacking, on distance and lighting with the victim allegedly in a dark place while witnesses were seated in a lighted place, and on unreliable identification.
• Number of Assailants and Weapon: Petitioner maintained that there was only one assailant based on Dr. Mercado's testimony that the two wounds could have been caused by only one instrument.
• Alibi: Petitioner argued that his alibi of being out at sea fishing should have been appreciated.
• Self-Defense and Defense of Stranger of Co-Accused: Petitioner argued that the trial court erred in not giving weight and credence to the self-defense and defense of stranger professed by Renny Boy Acosta, who allegedly acted alone against Norton's ice-pick attack.

• Eyewitness Credibility: Whether the alleged inconsistency on a collateral matter, distance, lighting, and medical testimony on the weapon undermined the positive identification of accused-appellant by the two prosecution eyewitnesses.
• Alibi: Whether accused-appellant's alibi of being out at sea fishing at the time of the stabbing should have been appreciated to acquit him.
• Non-Appealing Co-Accused and Self-Defense: Whether the plea of self-defense and defense of stranger of co-accused Renny Boy Acosta, who did not appeal, could be reviewed and could benefit accused-appellant.
• Treachery and Damages: Whether treachery attended the killing to qualify it as murder and whether civil indemnity, actual damages, and moral damages were properly awardable.

• Eyewitness Credibility: No. The positive identification stood, variations on collateral matters not impairing credibility and distance, lighting and medical testimony being consistent with two assailants.
• Alibi: No. Alibi failed, accused-appellant not having shown physical impossibility of presence where the dance hall was a mere 10-minute walk from the seashore.
• Non-Appealing Co-Accused and Self-Defense: No. The judgment against Renny Boy Acosta, who did not appeal, was final under Rule 122, Sec. 11(a), and in any event self-defense and defense of stranger were not proved, unlawful aggression having ceased and physical evidence contradicting the claim.
• Treachery and Damages: Yes. Treachery qualified the killing as murder, P50,000.00 civil indemnity was correct, actual damages were properly denied for lack of receipts, and P50,000.00 moral damages was additionally due.

• Eyewitness Credibility: Both Cañete and Boganutan testified that accused-appellant was in the dance hall and stabbed the victim from behind; whether he passed by their group beforehand concerned a mere collateral matter which strengthens rather than negates credibility. Variations on collateral or incidental matters do not impair testimony on prominent facts nor preclude positive identification. Claims of distance and darkness were pure conjecture against categorical testimony that witnesses were only five strides or about six meters away in a well-lighted place. Dr. Mercado's statement that it was difficult to determine but possible that the same kind of weapon caused both wounds referred to the kind of weapon, not to the number of assailants or weapons.
• Alibi: For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only presence elsewhere but also physical impossibility of being at the scene, measured by distance and facility of access. Accused-appellant admitted the dance hall was only a 10-minute walk from the seashore near his house, and defense witness SPO4 Perez placed his return past midnight to around 1:00 a.m., leaving ample opportunity to have come from the dance hall. Alibi is denied credence where there was even the least chance to be present at the crime scene.
• Non-Appealing Co-Accused and Self-Defense: Only Benny Acosta appealed; inclusion of Renny Boy Acosta as appellant was error perpetuated by the Office of the Solicitor General. Under Rule 122, Sec. 11(a), an appeal by one of several accused does not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as favorable and applicable, and one who did not appeal has no right to relief as the judgment is final as to him. Even if reviewed, self-defense failed: the burden shifts to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence (a) unlawful aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of means, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation. Renny Boy admitted stabbing the victim again after Baguio had already fallen and no longer tried to thrust with the 12-inch ice pick, so initial aggression, if any, had ceased and Renny Boy became the aggressor. Physical evidence contradicted him, showing no stomach wound but two back wounds. Defense of stranger likewise failed for lack of its requisites, including absence of revenge, resentment or evil motive, where Renny Boy admitted habitually bringing a hunting knife because the victim was known as a tough trouble-maker, betraying animosity.
• Treachery and Damages: Treachery exists when means are employed tending directly and specially to insure execution without risk from defense the victim might take. Baguio, urinating with his back toward assailants, was suddenly and unexpectedly stabbed twice and could not repel the attack or defend himself. P50,000.00 civil indemnity accorded with recent rulings. Actual damages for wake and burial were denied because Adelia Patricio presented no receipts, as required by Art. 2199 of the Civil Code to prove loss with reasonable certainty. P50,000.00 moral damages was additionally granted to compensate injuries to feelings.

• Credibility — variations on collateral matters — Variations in declarations of witnesses on collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of testimony on prominent facts nor per se preclude establishment of the crime and positive identification. Applied to reject the alleged inconsistency on whether accused-appellant passed by the witnesses' group before the attack.
• Alibi — physical impossibility — For alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove presence elsewhere; the accused must also show physical impossibility of being at the scene, determined by distance and facility of access, and alibi is rejected where there was even the least chance to be present. Applied because the dance hall was a 10-minute walk from the seashore where accused-appellant claimed to be fishing.
• Appeal in criminal cases — effect on non-appealing co-accused — Under Rule 122, Sec. 11(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an appeal by one or more of several accused does not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment is favorable and applicable to them; one who did not appeal cannot seek relief as the judgment is final as to him. Applied to hold Renny Boy Acosta's conviction final, reviewable only to the extent favorable and applicable.
• Self-defense — burden and requisites — One pleading self-defense admits the killing and bears the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of means to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the defender. Applied to reject Renny Boy Acosta's plea where aggression had ceased when the victim fell and further stabbing followed.
• Cessation of unlawful aggression — When unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the defender has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor. Applied where Renny Boy admitted the fallen victim no longer tried to thrust the ice pick yet stabbed him again.
• Defense of stranger — requisites — Requires (1) unlawful aggression, (2) reasonable necessity of means to prevent or repel it, and (3) absence of inducement by revenge, resentment or other evil motive on the part of the defender. Applied to reject the claim where Renny Boy betrayed animosity by habitually carrying a hunting knife against the victim as a known trouble-maker.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods or forms tending directly and specially to insure execution without risk from defense the offended party might take. Applied where the victim urinating with back turned was suddenly stabbed twice from behind without opportunity to defend.
• Damages in murder — civil indemnity, actual and moral damages — Civil indemnity of P50,000.00 follows conviction for death; actual damages for wake and burial require proof of actual loss with reasonable certainty by competent proof such as receipts under Art. 2199 of the Civil Code; moral damages of P50,000.00 compensate injuries to feelings of heirs. Applied to affirm civil indemnity, deny actual damages for lack of receipts, and award moral damages.

• "Variations in the declarations of witnesses in respect of collateral or incidental matters do not impair the weight of their testimonies, taken in their entirety, to the prominent facts, nor per se preclude the establishment of the crime and the positive identification of the malefactor." — States the rule sustaining eyewitness credibility despite inconsistency on whether accused-appellant passed by the group before the attack.
• "For alibi to prosper, however, it is not enough for the accused to prove that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed, but he must also show that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission." — Defines the two-fold requirement for alibi that accused-appellant failed to meet.
• "When the unlawful aggression has ceased to exist, the one making the defense has no right to kill or injure the former aggressor." — States the ground for rejecting self-defense where the victim had fallen and no longer attempted to thrust.
• "Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might take." — Provides the canonical formulation for qualifying the back-stabbing of the defenseless urinating victim as murder.

• People vs. Mahinay, 304 SCRA 767 (1999) — Cited to support that variations on collateral matters do not impair eyewitness credibility and positive identification.
• People vs. Lachica, 316 SCRA 443 (1999) — Cited for the rule that alibi requires proof of physical impossibility in addition to presence elsewhere.
• People vs. De Labajan, 317 SCRA 566 (1999) — Cited to define physical impossibility by distance and facility of access.
• People vs. Santiago, 319 SCRA 644 (1999); People vs. Bitoon, Sr., 309 SCRA 209 (1999) — Cited for the rule that alibi is rejected where there was even the least chance to be present at the scene.
• U.S. vs. Candelaria, 2 Phil. 104, 106 (1903) — Cited for the rule that an accused who did not appeal has no right to seek relief as judgment is final as to him.
• People vs. Cañete, 287 SCRA 490 (1998); People vs. Bitoon, Sr., 309 SCRA 217 (1999) — Cited for the burden to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Ganzagan, Jr., 247 SCRA 764 (1995); People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil. 366 (1947); People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998) — Cited to hold that aggression ceasing when victim fell made the defender the aggressor with no right to kill.
• People vs. Tobias, 267 SCRA 229 (1997) — Cited for the requisites of defense of stranger.
• People vs. Gungon, 287 SCRA 618 (1998) — Cited to define treachery as insuring execution without risk from defense.
• People vs. Borreros, 306 SCRA 680 (1999); People vs. Samolde, 336 SCRA 632 (2000) — Cited to sustain P50,000.00 civil indemnity and to require competent proof for actual damages.
• People vs. Cantos, Sr., 305 SCRA 786 (1999); People vs. Sullano, 331 SCRA 649 (2000) — Cited to support the additional award of P50,000.00 moral damages.

• Section 11(a), Rule 122, Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that appeal by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as judgment is favorable and applicable; applied to treat Renny Boy Acosta's conviction as final and not reviewable for accused-appellant's benefit.
• Article 2199, Civil Code — Requires proof of actual damages by competent proof of pecuniary loss; applied to deny actual damages for embalming, coffin, wake and burial where the aunt who paid presented no receipts.

Bellosillo, J., Quisumbing, J., De Leon, Jr., J., concur. Buena, J., on official leave.