People vs. Abungan

The death of an accused pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguishes his criminal liability and his civil liability arising solely from the delict (civil liability ex delicto); consequently, the criminal case, not merely the appeal, must be dismissed. Where the civil liability may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict—such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts—the claim survives and may be pursued in a separate civil action against the estate of the accused.

Pedro Abungan was charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code for the August 4, 1992 shooting death of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in Barangay Capulaan, Villasis, Pangasinan. The Information alleged that Abungan, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr. (both at large), conspired and, armed with long firearms, attacked the victim with treachery, evident premeditation, and superior strength. The case was tried before the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50.

Pedro Abungan was charged with murder for the August 4, 1992 shooting of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in Barangay Capulaan, Villasis, Pangasinan. The Information alleged that Abungan, Randy Pascua, and Ernesto Ragonton Jr., all at large except Abungan, conspired and, armed with long firearms, attacked the victim with treachery, evident premeditation, and superior strength, inflicting wounds that caused his death. Abungan pleaded not guilty on April 30, 1993, with the assistance of counsel.

After trial on the merits, the Regional Trial Court of Villasis, Pangasinan, Branch 50, rendered its Decision on August 24, 1998, finding Abungan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The trial court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties and ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the amount of P50,000 plus costs.

Abungan filed a Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998, and was committed to the New Bilibid Prison on January 9, 1999. He filed his Appellant's Brief on October 26, 1999, and the Office of the Solicitor General submitted the Appellee's Brief on February 4, 2000. The case was deemed submitted for resolution on June 5, 2000, when the Court received Abungan's Manifestation that he would not file a reply brief.

On August 7, 2000, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital, attaching his Death Certificate. The Court then considered the effect of appellant's death on the pending appeal and on the criminal case itself.

N/A — The decision does not recount arguments advanced by the appellant beyond the filing of his appeal and briefs; the sole issue considered was the effect of his death.

N/A — The decision does not recount arguments advanced by the appellee beyond the submission of its brief; the sole issue considered was the effect of appellant's death.

• Effect of Death Pending Appeal: Whether the death of appellant Pedro Abungan during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his criminal liability and his civil liability arising from the delict, and whether the criminal case against him should be dismissed.

• Effect of Death Pending Appeal: Yes. The death of appellant on July 19, 2000, during the pendency of his appeal and before finality of judgment, extinguished his criminal liability and his civil liability ex delicto under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The criminal case, not merely the appeal, was dismissed, and the lower court's Decision was set aside.

• Effect of Death Pending Appeal: Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. Applying the doctrine in People vs. Bayotas, the Court held that death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely on the offense committed—civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. Because Abungan died during the pendency of the appeal and before the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the crime was likewise extinguished. The Court noted, however, that civil liability may survive if predicated on a source of obligation other than delict—such as law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts under Article 1157 of the Civil Code—in which case a separate civil action may be filed against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The Court further held that the logical consequence of the extinguishment of criminal and civil liabilities was the dismissal of the criminal case itself, not merely the appeal. The Court observed that the disposition in Bayotas dismissing the appeal "might have resulted from an oversight," since dismissing the appeal effectively affirmed the trial court's Decision, which was contrary to the discussion in the body of that Decision. Accordingly, the criminal case against Abungan was dismissed and the appealed Decision was set aside.

• Extinguishment of criminal liability by death of the accused — Under Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. The Court applied this provision to hold that death pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability, since the appeal had not yet resulted in final judgment.

• Extinguishment of civil liability ex delicto by death of the accused — Death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates not only criminal liability but also civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed—civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. The Court applied this principle to extinguish the P50,000 indemnity ordered by the trial court, as Abungan died before finality of the judgment.

• Survival of civil liability based on other sources of obligation — Where the civil liability may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict—law, contracts, quasi-contracts, or quasi-delicts, as enumerated in Article 1157 of the Civil Code—the claim survives the death of the accused. Recovery may be pursued only by filing a separate civil action against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The statute of limitations on such civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with Article 1155 of the Civil Code.

• Proper disposition upon death of accused pending appeal — The death of the accused pending appeal results in the dismissal of the criminal case itself, not merely the appeal. Dismissing only the appeal would effectively affirm the trial court's Decision, which is contrary to the extinguishment of criminal and civil liabilities. The lower court's Decision becomes ineffectual.

• "The death of the appellant pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not the appeal, should be dismissed." — This opening statement states the core ruling of the Resolution and the proper disposition upon the death of an accused pending appeal.

• "1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, 'the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.'" — This quotation from People vs. Bayotas is the canonical formulation of the doctrine on extinguishment of criminal and civil liability by death pending appeal.

• "While we agree with the doctrinal ruling in Bayotas, we believe that the disposition therein dismissing the appeal might have resulted from an oversight. In doing so, the Court was effectively affirming the trial court's Decision, which had found Bayotas criminally and civilly liable. Such disposition is clearly contrary to the discussion in the body of the Bayotas Decision quoted earlier in this Resolution that his death extinguished his criminal as well as civil liabilities based on delict. Indeed, the only logical consequence of the extinguishment of his criminal and civil liabilities was the dismissal of the case itself, not of the appeal." — This passage clarifies the proper disposition upon death of the accused pending appeal and explains the Court's departure from the dispositional portion of Bayotas while adhering to its doctrinal ruling.

• People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994 — Controlling precedent. The Court applied the four pronouncements in Bayotas regarding the effect of death of the accused pending appeal on criminal and civil liability, while clarifying that the proper disposition is dismissal of the criminal case, not merely the appeal.

• Villegas vs. Court of Appeals, 271 SCRA 148, April 11, 1997 — Cited as a case applying the Bayotas doctrine on extinguishment of liability by death of the accused.

• People vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500, April 24, 1998 — Cited as a case applying the Bayotas doctrine.

• People vs. Romero, 306 SCRA 90, April 21, 1999 — Cited as a case applying the Bayotas doctrine.

• People vs. Enoja, G.R. No. 102596, December 17, 1999 — Cited as a case applying the Bayotas doctrine.

• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to personal penalties; as to pecuniary penalties, liability is extinguished only when death occurs before final judgment. The Court applied this provision to extinguish Abungan's criminal liability and the P50,000 indemnity, since he died before finality of judgment.

• Article 1157, Civil Code — Enumerates the sources of obligations: law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts, and quasi-delicts. The Court cited this provision to explain that civil liability may survive the death of the accused if predicated on a source other than delict.

• Article 1155, Civil Code — Provides for the interruption of the statute of limitations on civil liability during the pendency of the criminal case. The Court cited this provision to assure that the private offended party's right to file a separate civil action is not forfeited by prescription.

• Section 1, Rule 111, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs the institution of a separate civil action against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused where civil liability survives based on a source of obligation other than delict.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred.

N/A — No dissenting opinion was noted in the text.