People vs. Abueg

Conspiracy to commit robbery with homicide may be inferred from the concerted and spontaneous acts of the assailants showing a unity of criminal purpose, even without proof of a prior agreement, and the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code may be appreciated where the offender was not shown to have been aware that the victim was behind the door being rammed.

Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro, both 19 years old at the time of the offense on November 1, 1973, were charged with robbery with homicide before the former Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District of Metro Manila (Pasig), for the death of Marciana Maraya and the taking of clothes valued at P393.00 belonging to Diosdado Maraya. The case reached the Supreme Court by way of automatic review due to the imposition of the death penalty by the trial court. At the time of the offense, both accused were minors under the Youth and Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603), which provided for suspension of sentence and confinement in a youth rehabilitation center.

On November 1, 1973, at about 10:30 in the evening, Diosdado Maraya, his mother Marciana Maraya, and his cousin Norberto Alcaraz were in their house at Biak-na-Bato, Rosario, Cavite, eating "kalamay" (rice cake) as it was All Saints' Day. Two persons — Ricardo Abueg and Deogracias San Pedro — unexpectedly entered the house. Abueg asked if he could partake of the kalamay and was told he could. While Diosdado Maraya was serving coffee, Abueg suddenly hit Norberto Alcaraz twice with a "chaco" (a two-piece club linked at the mid-section with a string, used in martial arts) on the head and on the eyebrow, causing blood to ooze. Because the tie of the chaco was disengaged, Abueg and San Pedro retreated and left.

Minutes later, Abueg and San Pedro returned. While Marciana Maraya was closing the door, Abueg speared the door with a piece of wood about one arm long and hit Marciana on the chest. Abueg struck the door again, and when it opened, he and San Pedro entered. Carrying the piece of wood, Abueg struck the plates and glasses on the table, struck Norberto Alcaraz on the forearm, and destroyed the cabinet (aparador). Abueg demanded money but was told by the wife of Diosdado Maraya that they had none since her husband was jobless. After destroying the cabinet, San Pedro took the clothes inside. Thereafter, both accused left.

The victim was brought to the Maternity Hospital in Rosario, Cavite, where she was pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Nieto Salvador, NBI medico-legal officer, conducted a postmortem examination and found that the victim suffered fractured ribs on the left chest and a complete fracture of the sternum resulting in extensive contusion of the base of the heart. The Necropsy Report stated the cause of death as "shock and traumatic" injury. A team of policemen led by Pat. Wilfredo Perrera repaired to the scene and noticed the door was punctured. The children of the victim told them their mother was speared with a piece of wood by Abueg and San Pedro. The policemen later spotted the two suspects on the road, apprehended them, and brought them before the family of the victim, who confirmed their identities. Two pieces of wood were recovered at the crime scene. At the police precinct, Pat. Joaquin Vargas, Jr. conducted an investigation, during which the witnesses identified the weapons and the clothes taken.

The defense presented a different version of the incident. According to the accused, they went inside the Maraya residence uninvited and asked to partake of the kalamay. Suddenly and for no reason at all, San Pedro hit Alcaraz with the chaco and ran away, leaving Abueg behind. Due to poor lighting (perok-perok lamps were used) and the suddenness of the attack, Alcaraz and Maraya concluded it was Abueg who struck and ganged up on him. Abueg retreated and ran out, grabbed the other portion of the chaco from San Pedro, went back, hit Alcaraz, and ran away. As they started to leave, Alcaraz and Maraya shouted invectives at them. Angered, the two took pieces of wood from a nearby fence and returned. The door was already closed, so they rammed it several times, unaware that Marciana was behind the door. A hole was created, and Marciana was pierced with a piece of wood and fell to the floor. Once inside, the two smashed the wooden cabinet, and according to Norberto Alcaraz, it was San Pedro alone who took some clothes. Both then ran out and were later arrested.

• Absence of Conspiracy: Appellant argued that conspiracy was not duly established, claiming he returned to the victim's house armed with a piece of wood only to get even with Norberto Alcaraz and Diosdado Maraya who had beaten him, and that there was no previous plan or agreement to commit robbery.
• Proper Conviction for Homicide Only: Appellant maintained that at most he should be convicted of homicide only and not robbery with homicide, since it was his co-accused San Pedro alone who took the clothes and the conspiracy to take the same was not duly established.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Appellant claimed entitlement to two mitigating circumstances: (1) that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, as the intention in ramming the door was merely to force it open and he was unaware Marciana was behind it; and (2) that he was suffering from a mental defect diminishing his will-power, as shown by a psychological report classifying him in the mentally defective group with I.Q. scores of 68, 68, and 66 on the verbal, performance, and full scale, respectively.

• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy between the two accused was duly established to hold appellant liable for robbery with homicide.
• Proper Offense: Whether appellant should be convicted only of homicide and not robbery with homicide, it being alleged that only his co-accused took the clothes.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Whether the mitigating circumstances of (1) lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong and (2) mental defect diminishing will-power should be appreciated in appellant's favor.

• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established by the concerted acts of the two accused in returning to the house armed, ramming the door, destroying the cabinet, and taking the contents, showing a continuity of criminal design even without a prior agreement.
• Proper Offense: No. Appellant remains liable for robbery with homicide because it is enough that a homicide result by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery; the established conspiracy renders him equally liable for the acts of his co-accused.
• Mitigating Circumstances: Partially yes. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong was appreciated, as it was not shown the accused were aware the victim was behind the door. The claim of mental defect was rejected, appellant having been able to narrate events clearly and a psychiatric evaluation placing him within normal limits.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be inferred from the acts of the assailants. Appellant and San Pedro went back to the house each carrying a piece of wood. With these, they struck the door, hitting Marciana Maraya inside who was closing the door. Upon gaining entrance, they destroyed the wooden cabinet for the obvious purpose of taking the things therein. Even appellant's own Statement of Facts admitted that "the two accused began smashing the wooden cabinet (aparador) with the pieces of wood they have previously used in ramming the door." The testimony of Norberto Alcaraz corroborated that both accused destroyed the cabinet and that San Pedro took the clothes, after which both left together. Appellant's claim that he had no previous knowledge that San Pedro would steal the clothes was further belied by his own testimony admitting that he demanded money from the Marayas and threatened them with death if they did not give it. The acts of the two accused in destroying the cabinet for the obvious purpose of taking the contents showed a continuity of criminal design. Although no previous agreement to commit the robbery was proven, such is not essential; it is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. The tacit and spontaneous cooperation in breaking the cabinet showed the existence of conspiracy, bolstered by appellant's failure to prevent San Pedro from stealing the clothes and running away with them.

• Proper Offense: Appellant remains liable for robbery with homicide because it is enough that a homicide result by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Even assuming that the two accused, as alleged by them, only sought to wreak vengeance on the male persons inside the house, this does not exclude the fact that they went further and proceeded to rob the family. The homicide was committed by reason of and on the occasion of the robbery, satisfying the elements of the complex crime.

• Mitigating Circumstances: The psychological examination relied upon by appellant was conducted on September 26, 1976, about three years after the crime was committed on November 1, 1973, while appellant was already detained at the New Bilibid Prison. When appellant testified on September 4, 1975, he was able to narrate clearly and accurately the incidents that took place, recalling the places he and San Pedro went before and after the incident, the name of the arresting officer, the time of arrest, and the duration of their confinement. Considering this ability to recount vividly the details of the crime and subsequent events, his assertion of mental defect failed. This was further supported by the psychiatric evaluation conducted by Dr. Romeo Y. Tating, Chief of the Neuro-Psychiatrist Service of the NBI, whose findings submitted on February 10, 1977 placed appellant within normal limits. As to lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the Court agreed that the mitigating circumstance could be appreciated. It was not satisfactorily established that in forcing entrance through the closed door with pieces of wood, the two accused were aware that Marciana Maraya was behind the door and would be hurt. Even as they sought to enter the house to retaliate or commit robbery, there was no clear showing they desired to kill Marciana. Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the criminal act is executed. As the attendant circumstances indicated that the death of Marciana was not deliberately intended, the penalty imposed by the trial court was reduced.

• Implied Conspiracy — Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be inferred from the acts of the assailants showing a unity of purpose and continuity of criminal design. It is sufficient that the malefactors acted in concert pursuant to the same objective, even without a previous agreement. In this case, the tacit and spontaneous cooperation of the two accused in breaking the cabinet and the failure of appellant to prevent San Pedro from stealing the clothes demonstrated the existence of conspiracy.

• Robbery with Homicide (Article 293 in relation to Article 294, Revised Penal Code) — Robbery with homicide is committed when homicide results by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. It is enough that the homicide is connected to the robbery, even if the original intent of the accused was vengeance against the male occupants. The accused remains liable for the complex crime notwithstanding that the original motive for re-entry was retaliation.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Lack of Intention to Commit So Grave a Wrong (Article 13, par. 3, Revised Penal Code) — This circumstance addresses the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the criminal act is executed. Where it is not shown that the accused were aware the victim was behind the door they rammed, the death was not deliberately intended, and the mitigating circumstance may be appreciated to reduce the penalty.

• "Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence; it may be inferred from acts of assailants." — This passage states the foundational principle that conspiracy may be established through circumstantial evidence of concerted acts, dispensing with the need for direct proof of a prior agreement.

• "The tacit and spontaneous cooperation and coordination by the two accused in breaking the cabinet show the existence of conspiracy." — This defines how implied conspiracy is established through coordinated acts demonstrating a shared criminal objective, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "It is enough that a homicide result by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery." — This states the controlling rule for robbery with homicide under the Revised Penal Code, establishing that the nexus between the homicide and the robbery suffices for conviction of the complex crime.

• People vs. Gardon, et al., 104 Phil. 371 — Followed for the principle that where it does not appear that the accused deliberately intended to harm their victims, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated, justifying a reduced penalty commensurate to the crime committed.

• People vs. Boyles, 11 SCRA 88 — Followed for the rule that Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code addresses the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the criminal act is executed, not the general intent behind the criminal enterprise.

• Article 293, Revised Penal Code — Defines robbery with violence or intimidation against persons, the foundational provision for the crime charged.
• Article 294, Section 1, Revised Penal Code — Prescribes the penalty for robbery with homicide, the specific paragraph under which the accused were convicted.
• Article 13, paragraph 3, Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, applied to reduce the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua.
• Section 192, Presidential Decree No. 603 — Provides for the suspension of sentence and confinement of youth offenders in a rehabilitation center, applied by the trial court since both accused were 19 years old at the time of the crime.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, and Feliciano, JJ., concurred.