People vs. Abrazaldo

Treachery cannot be appreciated where the accused and the victim were grappling face to face and shouting at each other prior to the stabbing, as the victim was not caught off guard and had opportunity to defend himself; and aggravating circumstances not alleged in the Information may not be appreciated under the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which is given retroactive effect being favorable to the accused.

Federico Abrazaldo ("Peding") was charged with the killing of Delfin Guban, a member of the barangay tanod of Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan. The incident occurred on the evening of July 15, 1995, after Abrazaldo, then intoxicated, had caused trouble at the house of his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, prompting the barangay tanod — including the victim — to respond. The case reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty.

On July 15, 1995, at about 10:00 in the evening, at Barangay Pogo, Mangaldan, Pangasinan, Federico Abrazaldo, then intoxicated, attempted to hack his uncle, Bernabe Quinto, but instead hit the post of the latter's house. The incident was reported to the barangay authorities, prompting Delfin Guban, Rosendo Fajardo, Sr., Alejandro Loceste — all members of the barangay tanod — and Cesar Manaois to rush to the scene. Upon arriving, Fajardo heard Abrazaldo shouting at his uncle, "I will kill you!" Thereafter, Abrazaldo emerged from Quinto's house with blood oozing from his forehead. The area was well lighted by a fluorescent lamp.

Guban attempted to assist Abrazaldo. For reasons that remained unclear, the two shouted at each other and grappled face to face. Abrazaldo pulled out his knife, stabbed Guban in the abdomen, and fled. When Fajardo held Guban, the latter said, "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo." The barangay tanod rushed Guban to the Gov. Teofilo Sison Memorial Hospital, where Dr. Alberto Gonzales operated on him, but Guban died after a few hours. The Medico-Legal Certificate stated the cause of death as "stab wound, epigastrium, massive hemothorax right." On July 16, 1995, Fajardo and SPO2 Roberto Fernandez recovered the knife from the house of Francisca Velasquez, Abrazaldo's aunt, in Salay, Pangasinan.

Abrazaldo presented a different version. He testified that on the evening in question he was making fans inside his house with his wife and children when Guban, who was drunk, arrived and shouted, "Get out Feding I will kill you!" When Abrazaldo went out, Guban hit him with an iron pipe. Abrazaldo ran back inside to get his two children, but Guban followed, now armed with a knife, and the two grappled for its possession. Both fell, and the knife Guban was holding accidentally hit him. Abrazaldo claimed he did not know which part of Guban's body was struck and that he took the knife to surrender it to the police. His sister, Marites Abrazaldo, however, contradicted his account: she testified that Abrazaldo sustained the wound on his forehead when he bumped an artesian well while running away from his uncle's place, and that he created trouble in their compound, attempted to kill his uncle, and killed Guban.

Gregorio Guban, the victim's father, testified that he spent a total of ₱27,000.00 for funeral and hospitalization expenses — ₱10,000.00 for burial, ₱10,000.00 for a ten-day funeral wake, ₱3,000.00 for a ninth-day novena, and ₱4,000.00 for hospitalization — but no receipts were presented to substantiate these amounts.

• Self-Defense: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating his claim of self-defense, maintaining that the victim was the unlawful aggressor who came to his house, threatened to kill him, hit him with an iron pipe, and attacked him with a knife.
• Recovery of Weapon: Accused-appellant contended that the recovery of the alleged weapon at the house of his aunt did not bolster the prosecution's case, there being insufficient evidence to prove the knife's veracity as the weapon used.
• Defense Witness Testimony: Accused-appellant asserted that the trial court erred in appreciating the testimony extracted from defense witness Marites Abrazaldo, which had no sufficient basis.
• Treachery: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that treachery attended the stabbing without sufficient basis to prove the same.
• Nighttime: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court erred in assuming that he took advantage of nighttime in committing the act.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Authorities: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in finding that the charge was aggravated by the fact that the victim was in the performance of his duty.

• Admission by Claim of Self-Defense: The Solicitor General asserted that in pleading self-defense, accused-appellant admitted killing the victim and must therefore rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's.
• Contradiction by Own Witness: The Solicitor General pointed out that accused-appellant's version was completely contradicted by the testimony of his own sister, Marites Abrazaldo.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Duty: The Solicitor General maintained that the aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 14 was clearly established because Guban, as Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order during the incident.
• Concession on Treachery: The Solicitor General agreed with accused-appellant that there was no treachery, noting that the two shouted at each other and struggled face to face before the stabbing, so the assault was not sudden.
• Concession on Nighttime: The Solicitor General likewise agreed that accused-appellant did not purposely and deliberately seek nighttime to perpetrate the crime.

• Self-Defense: Whether the accused-appellant's claim of self-defense should be appreciated given the circumstances of the case.
• Recovery of Weapon: Whether the recovery of the alleged weapon at the house of accused-appellant's aunt bolstered the prosecution's case.
• Defense Witness Testimony: Whether the testimony of defense witness Marites Abrazaldo was properly appreciated by the trial court.
• Treachery: Whether treachery attended the stabbing of the victim.
• Nighttime: Whether accused-appellant took advantage of nighttime in committing the act.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Authorities: Whether the charge was aggravated by the fact that the victim was in the performance of his duty.

• Self-Defense: No. The claim of self-defense was uncorroborated, contradicted by the accused's own sister, and internally inconsistent in simultaneously invoking accident and self-defense, rendering the testimony dubious and insufficient to discharge the burden of proof.
• Recovery of Weapon: No error found. The recovery of the knife at the house of accused-appellant's aunt, together with the eyewitness testimony identifying Abrazaldo as the stabber, sufficiently bolstered the prosecution's case.
• Defense Witness Testimony: No error found. Marites Abrazaldo's testimony, rather than supporting the defense, affirmed the prosecution's version by testifying that Abrazaldo created trouble, attempted to kill his uncle, and killed Guban.
• Treachery: No. Treachery was not established because the accused and victim were grappling and shouting at each other before the stabbing, showing the victim was not caught unprepared and the assault was not sudden.
• Nighttime: No. Nocturnity was not properly appreciated because there was no evidence that accused-appellant deliberately sought the cover of darkness; the scene was in fact illuminated by a fluorescent lamp.
• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Authorities: No. The crime was committed at the accused's compound where no public function was being held, and the barangay authorities arrived only because of the prior trouble; moreover, aggravating circumstances not alleged in the Information cannot be appreciated under the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

• Self-Defense: Where self-defense is invoked, the burden shifts to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he was not the unlawful aggressor, (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel the aggression. Abrazaldo failed to discharge this burden. His testimony that Guban came to his house, threatened him, hit him with a pipe, and attacked him with a knife was uncorroborated and directly contradicted by his own sister, who testified that Abrazaldo's forehead wound was caused by bumping an artesian well, not by a pipe. His testimony also bore the vice of internal inconsistency: he invoked both self-defense (presupposing voluntariness induced by necessity) and accident (presupposing lack of intention), which are mutually exclusive. His flight from the crime scene, failure to report the incident to authorities, and failure to surrender the knife were inconsistent with a clean conscience and indicated culpability. The principle that one who pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the prosecution's, was dispositive.

• Recovery of Weapon: The recovery of the knife from the house of Abrazaldo's aunt, combined with the eyewitness testimony of Fajardo who saw Abrazaldo pull out his knife, stab Guban, and flee, sufficiently established the accused's identity as the perpetrator. The victim's own dying declaration — "I was stabbed by Feding Abrazaldo" — further corroborated the prosecution's case.

• Defense Witness Testimony: Marites Abrazaldo's testimony did not support the defense but instead affirmed the prosecution's narrative. She testified that Abrazaldo was engaged in a drinking spree, caused trouble at his uncle's house, attempted to hack his uncle, bumped an artesian well causing his forehead wound, and killed Guban. This testimony undermined Abrazaldo's claim that Guban was the unlawful aggressor.

• Treachery: Treachery requires that the offender employ means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make. It cannot be presumed but must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Fajardo testified that Abrazaldo and Guban were "grappling with each other" and were "shouting each other" before the stabbing. In this scenario, the victim was not unprepared to defend himself, and the assault was not sudden. The element of treachery was therefore absent, and the killing could not be qualified as murder.

• Nighttime: For nocturnity to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be shown that nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime and was purposely sought by the offender. Nighttime by itself is not aggravating. No evidence was offered that Abrazaldo deliberately sought darkness; Fajardo testified that a fluorescent lamp sufficiently illuminated the scene. The aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was therefore improperly appreciated.

• Aggravating Circumstance of Public Authorities: The aggravating circumstance under paragraph 5 of Article 14 is based on greater perversity of the offender as shown by the place of commission, which must be respected. The crime was committed at Abrazaldo's compound where no public function was being held; the barangay authorities arrived only because of the prior trouble. Moreover, under Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information to be appreciated. Except for treachery, the aggravating circumstances were not alleged. Being favorable to the accused, the new procedure was given retroactive effect.

• Elements of Self-Defense — Where self-defense is invoked, the accused must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor; (2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part; and (3) he employed reasonable means to prevent and repel the aggression. On appeal, the burden becomes even more difficult as the accused must show that the court below committed reversible error in appreciating the evidence. The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but in itself is extremely doubtful. One who pleads self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution.

• Incompatibility of Self-Defense and Accident — Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness induced only by necessity. Invoking both simultaneously renders testimony dubious and shows ambivalence.

• Treachery — Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. Where the parties were grappling and shouting at each other before the stabbing, treachery is absent because the victim was not caught off guard and had opportunity to defend himself.

• Nocturnity as Aggravating Circumstance — For nighttime to be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime and that it was purposely sought by the offender. By and by itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance.

• Aggravating Circumstances Must Be Alleged — Under Section 8, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the Information, otherwise they cannot be appreciated. Being favorable to the accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive effect.

• Temperate Damages in Lieu of Actual Damages — Where the amount of actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages may be awarded. Such temperate damages, taking into account the current jurisprudence fixing the indemnity for death at ₱50,000.00, should be one-half thereof, or ₱25,000.00, making it equal to the award of exemplary damages fixed at ₱25,000.00 in cases where its award is justified.

• "Treachery cannot be presumed, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself." — This passage states the fundamental requirement that treachery must be established with the same certainty as the killing itself, and cannot be presumed from the mere fact of a fatal stabbing.

• "By and itself, nighttime is not an aggravating circumstance." — This formulation encapsulates the rule that nocturnity requires proof of deliberate seeking and facilitation, not merely the fact that the crime occurred at night.

• "where the amount of the actual damages cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove the same, but it is shown that the heirs are entitled thereto, temperate damages may be awarded. Such temperate damages, taking into account the current jurisprudence fixing the indemnity for death at ₱ 50,000.00, should be one-half thereof, or ₱25,000.00." — This passage establishes the rule for awarding temperate damages as one-half of the death indemnity where actual damages cannot be substantiated by receipts, a formulation frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence.

• "Accident presupposes lack of intention to stab the victim, while self-defense presumes voluntariness, induced only by necessity." — This passage articulates the doctrinal incompatibility between accident and self-defense as justifying and exempting circumstances, respectively, explaining why simultaneous invocation of both undermines credibility.

• People vs. Saure, G.R. No. 135848, March 12, 2002 — Cited for the established doctrine on the three elements of self-defense and the burden on the accused to prove them by clear and convincing evidence.
• People vs. Orongan, 168 SCRA 586 (1988) — Cited for the doctrine that a plea of self-defense cannot be entertained where it is uncorroborated and in itself extremely doubtful.
• People vs. Carlos, 115 Phil. 704 (1962) — Cited for the principle that accident and self-defense are incompatible defenses, the former presupposing lack of intention and the latter presupposing voluntariness induced by necessity.
• People vs. Moreno, G.R. No. 140033, January 25, 2002 — Cited for the rule that nighttime is not by itself an aggravating circumstance and must be shown to have been deliberately sought and to have facilitated the crime.
• People vs. Luayon, 260 SCRA 739 (1996); People vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 136094, April 20, 2001; People vs. Baroy, G.R. Nos. 137520-22, May 9, 2002 — Cited for the proposition that the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure requiring aggravating circumstances to be alleged in the Information may be given retroactive effect, being favorable to the accused.
• People vs. Manlansing, G.R. No. 131736, March 11, 2002 — Cited for the rule that actual damages must be substantiated by receipts and that temperate damages may be awarded in their absence.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659 — Defines and penalizes murder. The trial court convicted the accused under this provision, appreciating treachery as a qualifying circumstance; the Supreme Court reversed, finding treachery absent.
• Article 249, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide. The Supreme Court convicted the accused under this provision in the absence of any qualifying circumstance, imposing the penalty of reclusion temporal.
• Article 14, paragraphs 5 and 6, Revised Penal Code — Lists aggravating circumstances, including commission where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties (par. 5) and commission at nighttime (par. 6). Both were rejected by the Supreme Court.
• Section 8, Rule 110, 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires that aggravating circumstances be alleged in the Information. The Court applied this provision retroactively, being favorable to the accused, to bar appreciation of aggravating circumstances not alleged in the Information.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied to determine the indeterminate penalty: minimum within prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) and maximum within reclusion temporal in its medium period (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months).

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concurred. Ynares-Santiago, J., was on official leave.