People vs. Abella

Conviction for murder may rest on positive identification by witnesses familiar with the accused and on an unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence, even without eyewitnesses to the actual killing; alibi cannot prevail against positive identification, and a move to clear one’s name at a police station is not voluntary surrender. Treachery attends the killing when the victims were first seized and bound and then slain, rendering them defenseless and helpless.

The accused were ranking members or deacons of the Iglesia ni Cristo, and the victims were residents of Lakas Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila. The INC observed the panata, a seven-day religious practice preparatory to the santa cena, from 8 to 14 March 1992, with the santa cena on 15 March 1992. The prosecution’s witnesses included neighbors of the victims and Elena Bernardo, an INC member.

The five victims—Marlon Ronquillo, Joseph Ronquillo, Erwin Lojero, Andres Lojero Jr., and Felix Tamayo—lived in Lakas Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa, Manila, where the events that led to their deaths began with a basketball game on the morning of 7 March 1992. Marlon, Joseph, and an unidentified companion played three rounds against the team of Joey de los Santos at the vicinity of Dalisay and Lakas Streets. The Ronquillos won the first two rounds, but the third ended in a brawl, which the neighbors quickly pacified. Joey later returned to Dalisay Street carrying two pillboxes; Donald Ancheta saw him, took the pillboxes, and turned them over to a policeman. On 8 March 1992, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., Joey and his brother Gener threw stones at the Ronquillos’ house, attracting the attention of neighbors, who ran after the brothers, overtook and mauled them before releasing them.

Between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Wilfredo Lojero, a certain Daniel, and the victims were in front of the Ronquillos’ house in Lakas Street, trading stories while awaiting a certain Aling Flor. Josephine del Rosario was at the corner of Lakas Street on her way to a friend’s house when the victims called her and asked about her mother, a barangay kagawad at Bacood; they told her they were waiting for Aling Flor to report that Joey and Gener had thrown stones at the Ronquillos’ house. Later, Evelyn de la Cruz joined the group. The area was illuminated by a streetlight at the corner of Damayan and Dalisay Streets about ten arms-length away. Suddenly, a dirty white Ford Fiera without a plate number stopped in front of the group. There were about ten to thirteen people on board, among them Joey and Gener, who looked out of the van and pointed at the victims. All the passengers except Joey and Gener alighted; their faces were covered with black handkerchiefs, and they were armed. Someone shouted, “Pulis ito!” Another exclaimed, “Walang tatakbo!” Felix ran but stopped when shots were fired; he was hit with a gun then dragged into the van. Wilfredo managed to sneak into the Ronquillos’ house and was able to see everything. The other victims were boxed, kicked, and also hit with a gun and dragged into the van. Before the van sped away, one of the abductors warned Josephine, “Ikaw huwag kang maingay, wala kang nakita, wala kang narinig.”

At about 6:00 p.m. inside the Iglesia ni Cristo compound in Bacood, Elena Bernardo was waiting for Pastor Cesar Almedina to seek advice regarding her son-in-law’s problem. Pastor Almedina asked her to wait, and she waited until 10:00 p.m. Suddenly the guard switched off the lights inside the compound. With only the MERALCO light illuminating the compound from outside, she saw a dirty white Ford Fiera loaded with passengers enter and park in front of the pastoral house near the path leading to the basement. Joey, Gener, all the accused, and the victims were inside the van. Four of the victims were made to alight, while the fifth lay on the floor of the vehicle as though dead. The victims were brought to the basement at the back of the chapel and beneath the choir office. Elena followed. Inside the basement, the victims were continually mauled, whipped with a gun, and beaten with steel tubes, lead pipes, and other blunt instruments. One of the victims was tied with wire. Filemon Garcia arrived with a blowtorch and entered the basement. Elena heard the victims beg for mercy. Unable to endure the sight, she sat in front of the chapel and stayed for 30 minutes. Pastor Almedina arrived and told her that they would talk about her problem at another time. Afterwards, the victims were herded back to the Fiera; they seemed almost dead.

On 10 March 1992, at 8:45 a.m., the lifeless body of Felix was found floating on the Pasig River near Beata-Tawiran in Pandacan. At 12:25 p.m., Erwin’s body was retrieved from the same river at the back of the Sta. Ana market. At about the same time, the decomposing bodies of Andres, Marlon, and Joseph were fished out of the Pasig River near Lambingan Bridge. Postmortem examinations showed signs of foul play: Marlon’s hands were tied at the back with a black electric cord, and he had lacerated wounds, contusions, ligature marks, and hematoma; he died from a gunshot wound on the head. Andres’s hands were bound at the back with a plastic flat rope with four loops; his genitals were cut off, and he had ligature marks, contusions, and hematoma; the cause of death was “asphyxia by strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial, traumatic.” Joseph’s hands were hog-tied at the back using a basketball T-shirt; he had ligature marks, contusions, lacerated wounds, and fracture; he died of “asphyxia by strangulation; hemorrhage, intracranial, traumatic with skull fracture.” Erwin’s body showed abrasions and burns, cord impressions on his wrists, and a depressed fracture on his head and at the base of his skull; he died of “asphyxia by drowning with blunt head injury.” Felix had abrasions on the left cheek and tie impressions on the wrists; the cause of death was “asphyxia by drowning.”

On 13 March 1992, SPO3 Myrna Ricasa, who prepared the crime report, was part of the group that conducted a police line-up; witnesses to the abduction identified the accused from among five line-ups. Josephine identified Abella as among the passengers of the Ford Fiera, while Evelyn pointed to Granada; Roy Ronquillo and Noel Estorel, who were not presented as witnesses, identified De Guzman and Valencia, respectively. According to former accused Bienvenido Tugay, on 11 March 1992 at 11:00 p.m., Major Joe Pring arrived at the Iglesia compound in Punta, Sta. Ana, with police officers and demanded entrance; Tugay refused because there was no order from his superior allowing outsiders to enter, and an enraged Pring asked for the names of Tugay’s companions, and Tugay enumerated the names of appellants. The following day, appellants read their names in newspapers as among the perpetrators; alarmed, they consulted the INC Central Office and, accompanied by Atty. Restituto Lazaro of the Iglesia’s legal department, proceeded to see Gen. Diokno at the Western Police District Headquarters on 13 March 1992 “to clear their names.” Major Pring brought them to his office and hurriedly organized a police line-up; during the line-up, Major Pring allegedly tapped all the accused on the shoulder as a signal to the prosecution witnesses for identifying them, and the appellants were accordingly identified.

Appellants advanced alibi as their defense. They all claimed to have attended the panata at the Punta Sta. Ana chapel on 8 March 1992 from 8:00 to 10:00 p.m., save for Abella whose attendance was excused. The panata is a religious practice of the INC held for seven consecutive days as preparation for the santa cena or holy supper; in 1992, the panata was held from 8 to 14 March 1992 and the santa cena on 15 March 1992. Valencia testified that after the panata on 8 March 1992, he went home to San Juan, Metro Manila, arriving at about 11:00 p.m. Granada claimed that after attending the panata, he left the Iglesia compound with Filemon and Marilou Garcia; the three arrived at the Garcia residence in Bacood, Sta. Mesa, at 11:00 p.m., had snacks, and watched two movies on the video player; it was already past midnight when Granada went home. Granada’s testimony was corroborated by both Filemon and Marilou. Abella was a member of the PNP highway patrol group assigned to Mobile Unit No. 13 in March 1992; his tour of duty was from 2:00 to 10:00 p.m., and he had been previously granted exemption from attending the panata. Together with PO3 Ferdinand Parolina, he patrolled Roxas Boulevard from the corner of T.M. Kalaw St. to the corner of Vito Cruz St. on 8 March 1992, and Abella and Parolina parted ways at 10:15 p.m.; PO3 Parolina, who drove the mobile car, corroborated Abella’s testimony. The trial court, Judge Makasiar, found Elena’s version “impressive, as the manner of her narration was straightforward, sincere, candid, frank and terse,” and observed that she withstood searching, grueling, and consuming cross-examination by retired Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas.

• Positive Identification: Appellants contended that reliance on the testimonies of Josephine and Evelyn was misguided; Josephine’s sworn statement mentioned only Granada and omitted Abella, while Evelyn did not identify Abella, De Guzman, and Valencia during the police line-up and in her 11 March 1992 sworn statement although she pointed to all appellants in court; Granada’s recognition in a dimly lit place at night because of his gray hair was unworthy of belief.
• Credibility of Elena Bernardo: Appellants claimed that Elena’s testimony was a mere concoction with loopholes revealed on cross-examination; her insistence that all the victims were stabbed was disproved by medico-legal findings; her testimony was uncorroborated and contradicted by the ocular inspection; and she was a biased witness motivated by vindictiveness because she admittedly held a grudge against Granada.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Appellants alleged that the circumstances relied upon by the trial court were not established with certainty; the only proven circumstances were the basketball altercation, the stoning of the Ronquillos’ house, Felix’s attempt to flee, and the recovery of the victims’ bodies from the Pasig River; the testimonies on the abduction were inconsistent; nothing connected appellants to the basketball altercation or the stoning; and the link between appellants and the De los Santos brothers was tenuous.
• Alibi: Appellants asserted that their defense of alibi gained strength because they were not positively identified.
• Treachery and Superior Force: Appellants maintained that the use of superior force as a qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the information and could not elevate the killing to murder; treachery could not be considered because there were no witnesses to the actual killing.
• Voluntary Surrender: Appellants equated their move to “clear their names” with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Positive Identification: Whether the accused were positively identified as the abductors despite the alleged inconsistencies and the covering of their faces.
• Credibility of Elena Bernardo: Whether Elena Bernardo’s testimony was credible and sufficient to convict despite discrepancies, alleged bias, and conflict with physical evidence on stabbing.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Whether the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt absent eyewitnesses to the actual killing.
• Alibi: Whether the defense of alibi should be credited in light of the positive identification.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killings to murder even if superior force was not alleged in the information and despite the absence of witnesses to the actual killing.
• Voluntary Surrender: Whether the accused’s act of going to the police to “clear their names” constituted voluntary surrender.

• Positive Identification: Yes. The accused were positively identified as the abductors; Josephine recognized Granada despite his handkerchief because she had known him since childhood and knew his prematurely graying hair, and she recognized Abella because his face was uncovered; Evelyn and Wilfredo also identified Granada, and omissions in sworn statements were mere amplifications.
• Credibility of Elena Bernardo: Yes. Elena’s testimony was credible and sufficient to convict; her mistaken statement on stabbing did not invalidate her entire testimony under falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, since the believable portions were corroborated by the autopsy and other witnesses, and the trial court’s credibility finding was respected.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Yes. The circumstantial evidence formed an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the perpetrators of the crime.
• Alibi: No. Alibi was the weakest defense; appellants failed to show physical impossibility of being at the scene, and the defense could not prevail against their positive identification.
• Treachery: Yes. Treachery qualified the killings because the victims were first seized and bound and then slain, rendering them defenseless and helpless; abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery and need not be alleged.
• Voluntary Surrender: No. Going to the police merely to clear one’s name was not spontaneous and unconditional submission to the authorities, so it did not constitute voluntary surrender.

• Positive Identification: The SC held that when part of the accused’s face is not visible, positive identification is difficult, but recognition is facilitated when the witness is familiar with the accused, the identity is not sufficiently hidden due to physical appearance, or there are extraneous factors; identification becomes easy once a person has gained familiarity with another. Josephine readily recognized Granada from among the abductors who alighted from the Fiera because he was her neighbor and she had known him since childhood; despite the black handkerchief, she was familiar with his physique and physical features, particularly his prematurely graying hair, and she was in front of the victims when they were abducted. Josephine also recognized Abella because he had no cover on his face and was a “good-looking guy” who “could easily be remembered”; the omission of Abella in her sworn statement was not an inconsistency because her testimony was an amplification of her affidavit, where she said she recognized someone whose name she did not know, and she probably learned Abella’s name only after the affidavit was executed. Evelyn recognized Granada as among the abductors, having seen him on several occasions; her assertion that Granada’s face was not covered, contrary to Josephine’s testimony, did not detract from the identification because the handkerchief could have fallen off during the commotion and witnesses need not view the abduction at the same stage. Wilfredo, who was part of the victims’ group and whose brothers were among the victims, recognized Granada despite the handkerchief because Granada’s white hair and pointed nose became rooted in his consciousness when Granada got off the van, introduced himself as a policeman, and fired two warning shots; blood relatives have a definite stake in seeing the guilty person brought to court. Elena Bernardo also identified all appellants as among the passengers and as among those who mauled the victims; the SC found her testimony credible, as discussed under the credibility issue.
• Credibility of Elena Bernardo: The SC held that Elena’s testimony was sufficient to convict; she positively identified all appellants as among the passengers of the Fiera and saw them torturing the victims; she could not have been mistaken because she knew them very well as deacons of the INC; she was only four meters away when the Fiera passed, her identification was confirmed when appellants alighted and proceeded to the basement, and she followed and stayed near the door where she saw the mauling, with the place illuminated by two streetlights outside. The SC acknowledged that her testimony that some cohorts stabbed the victims was contrary to the postmortem findings, which showed no stab wounds; physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth and prevails over testimony. However, her answer on cross-examination, “Siguro po, hindi ko po alam,” showed she must have been mistaken in observation or recollection, which is understandable given the number of persons mauling the victims and the lapse of time; under falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, the maxim deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of universal application, and where the mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and not conclusively indicative of deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be admitted, especially when corroborated by other evidence. Her identification was corroborated by other prosecution witnesses, and her testimony that the victims were beaten with lead pipes and blunt instruments was corroborated by the autopsy report showing lacerated wounds, contusions, and hematoma. The trial judge found her version “impressive, as the manner of her narration was straightforward, sincere, candid, frank and terse,” and she withstood searching cross-examination by retired Supreme Court Justice Serafin Cuevas; factual findings of the trial court on credibility are accorded great weight and respect. Her testimony was a declaration against interest because it put her in danger of expulsion from the INC, and although she admitted a grudge against Granada for arresting her son-in-law in 1991, the grudge did not automatically render her testimony false, especially as it was corroborated by three other prosecution witnesses, and she had no known quarrel with the other appellants. Her delay in reporting or testifying was explained by Judge Nitafan’s initial bar and a threat on her life, and failure to report to police does not affect credibility.
• Circumstantial Evidence: The SC conceded there were no eyewitnesses to the actual killing, but the following circumstances left no shred of doubt: on the morning of 7 March 1992, Marlon and Joseph had a basketball altercation with Joey and his companions; later that day, Joey was caught bringing two pillboxes to Dalisay Street where the victims reside; between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. of 8 March 1992, Joey and Gener, both INC members, threw stones at the Ronquillos’ house and were mauled by neighbors; between 8:00 and 9:00 p.m. of the same date, after the De los Santos brothers pointed at the victims, appellants and their cohorts picked up and herded the victims into a Ford Fiera, which sped away; at about 10:00 p.m., the victims, except the one lying in the vehicle who seemed unconscious or dead, were brought to a basement in the INC compound in Punta, Sta. Ana, where they were mauled, tortured, and beaten by appellants, who were deacons of the INC, and their cohorts using steel tubes, lead pipes, guns, and other blunt instruments, after which they were loaded into the van, which sped out; and three days later, on 10 March 1992, the victims’ bodies were found floating on the Pasig River, showing signs of foul play. These circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty persons.
• Alibi: The SC held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses; appellants failed to show that it was physically impossible for them to have been present at the scene. Granada, De Guzman, and Valencia claimed to have attended the panata on 8 March 1992, but considering that at least 200 INC members attended, it was possible for them to have sneaked out unnoticed into the Ford Fiera to Lakas Street, picked up the five victims, and waited in the evening for the grounds to be deserted before bringing them inside the INC compound. Abella did not show by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to go from his post at T.M. Kalaw and Roxas Boulevard to Lakas Street, Bacood, Sta. Mesa. The defense was worthless in view of the positive identification of appellants as the culprits.
• Treachery: The SC agreed that the killing was characterized by treachery. Although treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression, when the victim was first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present. The victims’ hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found floating in the Pasig River, clearly showing that they were rendered defenseless and helpless, allowing appellants to commit the crime without risk to their persons. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength was absorbed in treachery and could not be considered as an independent aggravating circumstance; it need not be alleged in the information because treachery was adequate to elevate the killing to murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: The SC held that appellants’ move to “clear their names” could not be equated with voluntary surrender. For surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and capture. When the accused goes to a police station merely to clear his name and not to give himself up, voluntary surrender may not be appreciated. Appellants went to the Western Police District Headquarters to clear their names after reading their names in newspapers, not to surrender.

• Positive Identification Despite Face Covering — When part of the accused’s face is not visible, positive identification is difficult, but recognition is facilitated when the witness is familiar with the accused, the identity is not sufficiently hidden due to physical appearance, or there are extraneous factors; identification becomes easy once a person has gained familiarity with another. The SC applied this when Josephine recognized Granada despite his handkerchief because she had known him since childhood and knew his prematurely graying hair, and when Wilfredo recognized Granada through his white hair and pointed nose.
• Falsus in Uno, Falsus in Omnibus — The maxim deals only with the weight of evidence and is not a positive rule of universal application; when the mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and not conclusively indicative of deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be admitted, especially when corroborated by other evidence, and the maxim should not be applied where the false portions could be innocent mistakes. The SC applied this to Elena Bernardo’s mistaken testimony on stabbing, which was contradicted by postmortem findings but did not invalidate her entire testimony.
• Circumstantial Evidence — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty persons. The SC applied this to the chain from the basketball altercation and stoning to the abduction, mauling in the INC basement, and recovery of the bodies from the Pasig River.
• Alibi — Alibi is the weakest of all defenses and must show that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been present at the scene of the crime; it cannot prevail against positive identification. The SC applied this when Granada, De Guzman, and Valencia failed to show impossibility despite the panata, and Abella failed to show impossibility from his patrol post.
• Treachery — Treachery normally attends at the inception of the aggression, but when the victim is first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present because the victim is rendered defenseless and helpless; abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and need not be alleged as an independent aggravating circumstance. The SC applied this because the victims’ hands were tied at the back when their bodies were found.
• Voluntary Surrender — Voluntary surrender requires a spontaneous act showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense of his search and capture; going to a police station merely to clear one’s name is not voluntary surrender. The SC applied this to appellants’ move to clear their names.
• Physical Evidence Prevails Over Testimony — Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth and rates high in the hierarchy of trustworthy evidence; where physical evidence runs counter to the testimony of a prosecution witness, the former should prevail. The SC applied this to Elena’s testimony on stabbing, which was contradicted by postmortem findings showing no stab wounds.
• Credibility of Witnesses and Trial Court Findings — Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and respect because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood. The SC applied this when it upheld Judge Makasiar’s finding that Elena Bernardo’s narration was straightforward, sincere, candid, frank, and terse.
• Failure to Report a Crime — The failure of a witness to report to the police authorities the crime she witnessed is not a matter affecting her credibility; the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. The SC applied this to Elena Bernardo’s delay in reporting or testifying.
• Declaration Against Interest — A testimony against the accused may be considered a declaration against interest when it puts the witness in danger of expulsion from a religious sect. The trial court likened Elena Bernardo’s testimony against ranking INC members to a declaration against interest because it put her in danger of expulsion.

• “These circumstances are sufficient to establish the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. They constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the appellants, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty persons.” — The SC’s canonical formulation of the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in this case.
• “This rule, however, has its own limitations, for when the mistaken statement is consistent with good faith and is not conclusively indicative of a deliberate perversion, the believable portion of the testimony should be admitted.” — The SC’s statement of the limits of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, applied to Elena Bernardo’s mistaken testimony on stabbing.
• “It is true that treachery should normally attend at the inception of the aggression. However, when the victim was first seized and bound and then slain, treachery is present.” — The SC’s rule on treachery when the victim is bound before being killed.
• “For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either because (1) he acknowledges his guilt or (2) he wishes to save the government the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and capture.” — The SC’s statement of the requisites of voluntary surrender, which appellants’ move to clear their names did not satisfy.

• People vs. Matubis, 288 SCRA 210, 221 [1998] — Followed for the rule that identification becomes easy once a person has gained familiarity with another.
• People vs. Conde, 252 SCRA 681, 690 [1996] — Followed for the rule that there is no inconsistency when a witness states in open court details or additional facts not mentioned in the affidavit.
• People vs. Nepomuceno, 298 SCRA 450, 463 [1998] — Followed for the rule that physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth and prevails over testimony that runs counter to it.
• People vs. Ruiz, 93 SCRA 739, 763 [1979]; People vs. Bibat, 290 SCRA 27, 37-38 [1998] — Followed for the limitations on the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
• People vs. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, 212-213 [1996] — Followed for the rule that factual findings of the trial court, especially on credibility, are accorded great weight and respect.
• People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565, 591-592 [1995] — Followed for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence that forms an unbroken chain pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others.
• U.S. vs. De Leon, 1 Phil. 163, 164 [1902]; U.S. vs. Elicanal, 35 Phil. 209, 218 [1916] — Followed for the rule that treachery is present when the victim was first seized and bound and then slain.
• People vs. Lee, 204 SCRA 900, 911 [1991]; People vs. Evangelista, 256 SCRA 611, 625 [1996] — Followed for the requisites of voluntary surrender and the rule that going to a police station merely to clear one’s name is not voluntary surrender.