People vs. Abejero

In robbery with homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the phrase “by reason or on occasion of the robbery” requires only a mere occasional relationship between the robbery and the homicide; it is not necessary that the homicide be committed as a means of executing the robbery, nor that the offender acted with intent to kill, and the crime exists even if death results by mere accident, provided the homicide occurs on the occasion of the robbery.

On the afternoon of December 26, 1971, Clinton C. Tan and Chua Sy boarded a calesa in Manila to go home. After the calesa passed the M. Hizon Elementary School, four men stopped it and two of them — later identified as Leopoldo Abejero and Jesus Reyes — entered. Announcing a holdup, the men, armed with knives, demanded money. Tan and Sy surrendered sixty pesos and Sy’s wallet containing a Hongkong dollar. When further demands were not met, Abejero stabbed Sy. Tan escaped. Sy died two days later from two chest wounds that lacerated his heart, liver, and diaphragm.

• The Robbery and Stabbing: At about five in the afternoon of December 26, 1971, Clinton C. Tan, 47, and Chua Sy, 49, were riding a calesa along Jose Abad Santos Street, Manila. After passing the M. Hizon Elementary School, four male persons stopped the calesa. Two of them, later identified as Leopoldo Abejero, 24, and Jesus Reyes, 18, entered the vehicle. Reyes announced a holdup. Abejero, Reyes, and a third companion, Benjamin Mallari, were armed with knives. They demanded money. Tan and Sy handed over sixty pesos to Abejero, who passed the money to Reyes; Sy also surrendered his wallet containing a Hongkong dollar. Unsatisfied, Abejero and Reyes demanded more. When the demand was not met, Abejero stabbed Sy. Tan jumped to the ground and fled, pursued by Reyes, who broke off when a jeep arrived. Sy was taken to a hospital and died two days later. The two stab wounds lacerated his heart, liver, and diaphragm.

• Investigation and Confession: From Tan’s description of the knife-wielder, Patrolman Jose de la Cruz, Jr. concluded the assailant might be Leopoldo Abejero, alias “Boy Sakay.” His hangout was placed under surveillance, and he was apprehended on January 10, 1972. After verbally admitting his participation, Abejero executed an extrajudicial confession sworn to before Fiscal Mariano Chavez. In it, he disclosed that his companions were “Susing,” “Benny Bulok,” and “Ebot”; that he stabbed Sy because the latter fought back (“lumalaban ho”); and that the four used the proceeds to buy food and beer and went to a cabaret. Annexed to the confession was a sketch, drawn by Abejero, of the knife he used, with a handwritten legend identifying it as the weapon used in the stabbing. The annex was also sworn to before Fiscal Chavez.

• Proceedings Against Co-Accused: Using the descriptions in Abejero’s confession, the police arrested Jesus Reyes (“Susing”) and Benjamin Mallari (“Benny Bulok”) on January 12, 1972. Their confessions were taken and sworn to before Fiscal Avelino Concepcion, and both pointed to Abejero as the killer of Sy.

• New Trial and Recantation: After the initial conviction, Reyes executed a statement on March 10, 1972 declaring that Abejero was not his companion in stabbing Sy; Reyes claimed he alone stabbed Sy because they bumped each other and he fell. Abejero moved for and was granted a new trial. At the new trial, however, Reyes testified that he did not know how to read; when the statement was read to him, he said he had forgotten it, claimed it was prepared by Abejero’s lawyer, and alleged he was forced to sign it. The trial court found the new trial a “fiasco” for Abejero.

• Defense of Alibi: Abejero raised alibi, claiming he was taking a bath at his residence at 1559 F. Tubera Street, Tindalo, Sta. Cruz at the time of the crime. The trial court rejected the defense, noting the residence was near the scene of the crime.

• Insufficiency of Eyewitness Testimony: Abejero contended that the testimony of Clinton C. Tan required corroboration.

• Involuntariness of Extrajudicial Confession: Abejero claimed he was maltreated before signing his confession, rendering it involuntary and inadmissible.

• Absence of Robbery with Homicide: Abejero maintained that robbery with homicide was not committed because the killing was not perpetrated in order to conceal the robbery.

• Confession as Principal Evidence: The prosecution countered that the primary evidence against Abejero was his own confession, which was corroborated by the indubitable proof of the corpus delicti and reinforced by Tan’s eyewitness testimony.

• Voluntariness of Confession: The prosecution argued that Abejero did not complain of maltreatment to Fiscal Chavez when brought to swear to his confession; he read and signed the confession twice and also signed the sketch twice, demonstrating voluntariness.

• Nature of Robbery with Homicide: The prosecution argued that Article 294 requires only that the homicide be committed on the occasion of the robbery, not as a means to execute or conceal it.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the trial court erred in admitting Abejero’s extrajudicial confession despite his claim of maltreatment.

• Elements of Robbery with Homicide: Whether the crime of robbery with homicide was properly found where the killing was not committed to conceal the robbery.

• Aggravating Circumstance: Whether the trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority.

• Admissibility of Extrajudicial Confession: The trial court’s admission of the confession was upheld. Abejero’s claim of maltreatment was insufficient to overcome the testimony of Patrolman de la Cruz that the confession was signed voluntarily. Abejero did not complain to Fiscal Chavez when he appeared before him to swear to the confession; Fiscal Chavez even required him to read it and sign it again, resulting in two signatures above and below his typed name, and he signed the sketch twice as well. A confession should not be set aside merely because the accused repudiates it at trial; the reasons and motives for repudiation must be carefully scrutinized. His failure to complain to the fiscal or to ask his counsel de oficio to report the alleged maltreatment militated against his claim of involuntariness.

• Elements of Robbery with Homicide: The crime of robbery with homicide was properly found. Article 294 punishes the taking of property with the use of violence or intimidation when “by reason or on occasion of the robbery” homicide results. This requires only a mere occasional relationship between the robbery and the homicide. It is not necessary that the homicide be committed as a means of executing the robbery, or that the offender acted with animus homicida; the crime exists even if death results by mere accident, provided the homicide occurs on the occasion of the robbery, regardless of whether the killing is anterior, contemporaneous with, or posterior to the taking.

• Aggravating Circumstance: Abuse of superiority was correctly appreciated because the four malefactors took advantage of their combined strength to overwhelm the two unarmed victims, one of whom had to flee to avoid physical injury.

• “On Occasion of the Robbery” in Article 294: The phrase “by reason or on occasion of the robbery” means that it is sufficient that between the robbery and the homicide a mere occasional relationship exists. The crime of robbery with homicide is committed even when there is no intent to kill, and even if death results by mere accident, so long as the homicide occurs on the occasion of the robbery. It is immaterial whether the death is anterior, contemporaneous with, or posterior to the taking.

• Scrutiny of Repudiated Confessions: Before setting aside an extrajudicial confession merely because the accused repudiates it at trial, the reasons and motives for the repudiation must be carefully scrutinized. The failure of the accused to complain of alleged maltreatment to the administering fiscal, and the voluntary reaffirmation of the confession before that fiscal, constitutes strong evidence of voluntariness.

• “It is not sound practice for the court to disregard the confession just because the accused repudiates it at the trial. Before setting aside a confession, the reasons and motives for its repudiation should be carefully scrutinized.”

• “No se require que el homicidio se cometa como medico de ejecucion del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencion de matar, el delito existe … incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo o con occasion del robo, siendo indiferente que la muerte sea anterior, coetanea o posterior a este.” (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Vol. II, 14th Ed., 1975, p. 872) — This passage, quoted by the Court, encapsulates the controlling interpretation of Article 294: the crime of robbery with homicide exists even without homicidal intent and even if death results by accident, as long as the homicide occurs on the occasion of the robbery.

• People vs. Dorado, L-23464, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 53: Cited for the rule that a confession should not be disregarded solely because of repudiation; the reasons and motives for repudiation must be scrutinized.

• People vs. Ijad and Muslim, 113 Phil. 348, 356; People vs. Racca, 113 Phil. 802, 812: Cited for the principle that the accused’s failure to complain of maltreatment to the fiscal or to counsel de oficio militates against the claim that the confession was involuntary.

• U.S. vs. Tampacan, 19 Phil. 185; People vs. Mabassa, 65 Phil. 568; People vs. Cruz, 103 Phil. 693, 706; People vs. Abrina, 102 Phil. 695, 706: Cited in support of the appreciation of abuse of superiority.

• Article 294, Revised Penal Code: Defines and penalizes robbery with violence or intimidation against persons when by reason or on occasion of the robbery homicide results. Applied by the Court through the settled interpretation that a mere occasional relationship between the robbery and the homicide suffices, and that no intent to kill is required.

Barredo, A.C.J., Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concurred. Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Teehankee were on leave.