People v. Sandiganbayan

The dismissal of a criminal case upon the accused's own motion will still bar a subsequent prosecution under the doctrine of double jeopardy when the dismissal is grounded on the violation of the accused's right to speedy disposition of cases.

Respondents Alejandro E. Gamos (former Mayor of Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon), Rosalyn G. Gile (Municipal Accountant), and Virginia E. Laco (Municipal Treasurer) faced two separate complaints for alleged illegal cash advances made from 2004 to 2007, charging violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) for Luzon by Sangguniang Bayan Members Jocelyn B. Gallanosa and Joselito G. Robillos, based on Commission on Audit (COA) audit observation memoranda and a special audit report. The preliminary investigation spanned multiple years, during which the OMB initially recommended dismissal of the complaints without prejudice pending COA review, then reversed itself upon learning that COA had denied respondents' request for review, and ultimately found probable cause to indict respondents for malversation of public funds.

Two separate complaints were filed against former Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon Mayor Alejandro E. Gamos, Municipal Accountant Rosalyn G. Gile, and Municipal Treasurer Virginia E. Laco, arising from alleged illegal cash advances made from 2004 to 2007. The First Complaint was filed on February 18, 2008 before the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon by Sangguniang Bayan Members Jocelyn B. Gallanosa and Joselito G. Robillos, alleging that Gamos, in conspiracy with Gile and Laco, made illegal cash advances totaling ₱6,380,725.84 in 2004 and 2006, as per COA Audit Observation Memorandum Nos. 2007-01 to 2007-06 dated September 18, 2007. The respondents filed their counter-affidavits on May 12, 2008, praying for dismissal on grounds that the complaints were malicious, baseless, and premature. Gallanosa and Robillos filed a Reply on June 26, 2008, and Gamos and Gile submitted a Joint Rejoinder-Affidavit on July 14, 2008. On August 20, 2009, Gallanosa filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion for Preventive Suspension.

On December 3, 2009, Gallanosa, having become elected mayor, filed a Second Complaint against the same respondents, alleging illegal cash advances totaling ₱2,226,500 made from January to May 2007, based on COA's Report on the Special Audit/Investigation on Selected Transactions of the Municipality of Sta. Magdalena, Sorsogon. Respondents sought extensions and filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss on May 7, 2010. On October 7, 2010, respondents filed an Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to Admit a letter to the COA Chairman dated June 21, 2010, requesting review of the audit reports on which the complaints were based.

In a Consolidated Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the OMB investigating officer recommended dismissal of both complaints without prejudice, finding it premature to determine criminal and administrative liabilities because the COA audit reports were not yet final. Due to the resignations of Deputy OMB for Luzon Mark E. Jalandoni on April 7, 2011 and OMB Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez on May 6, 2011, the Consolidated Resolution was approved only on May 17, 2011 by Acting OMB Orlando C. Casimiro. Gallanosa and Robillos moved for reconsideration on June 26, 2011. On January 9, 2012, the OMB received their Verified Position Paper, which attached COA Chairman's Letter dated September 8, 2010 effectively denying respondents' request for review of the audit reports. It was only on June 13, 2013 that the OMB resolved the motion for reconsideration, granting it and finding probable cause to indict respondents for malversation of public funds. The Order was approved by the OMB on February 20, 2015, and two Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan on March 30, 2015.

Gamos repeatedly failed to appear for arraignment despite notice, prompting the Sandiganbayan to issue a Resolution dated May 19, 2016 directing him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 22, 2016, Gamos and Gile filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of capricious and vexatious delay in the OMB's conduct of the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan, in its February 1, 2017 Resolution, dismissed the cases, finding that seven years had elapsed from the filing of the First Complaint in 2008 until the filing of the Informations, and that the OMB's delays were not satisfactorily explained. The graft court found that while the accused may have contributed to delay through their motions for extension, it took the OMB two years to act upon the complaints, and another two years before the investigating officer resolved the motion for reconsideration. In its April 16, 2018 Decision, the Supreme Court initially reversed the Sandiganbayan, finding no undue delay because of constant exchanges of pleadings from both parties, and ruling that no double jeopardy attached because respondents had allegedly not yet been arraigned and the dismissal was at their instance. However, respondents moved for reconsideration, attaching a Certificate of Arraignment dated January 27, 2016 proving they had already been arraigned, and reiterating that their right to speedy disposition was violated by the OMB's undue delay.

• No Undue Delay: Petitioner maintained that there was no undue delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation, as the constant exchanges of pleadings filed by both parties from the filing of the First Complaint and after the filing of the Second Complaint showed continuous developments in the proceedings, and any delay was attributable to the constant filing of motions and responsive pleadings from both parties.
• No Double Jeopardy: Petitioner asserted that respondents were not yet arraigned due to their refusal to appear for arraignment, and that the dismissal of the criminal cases was at respondents' own instance, so double jeopardy would not attach to the reinstatement of the criminal cases.

• Violation of Right to Speedy Disposition: Respondents insisted that their right to speedy disposition of cases was violated due to undue delay in the preliminary investigation before the OMB, pointing to unexplained institutional delays at multiple stages spanning approximately seven years.
• Violation of Right Against Double Jeopardy: Respondents argued that their right against double jeopardy was violated with the reinstatement of the criminal cases, clarifying that they had already been arraigned as evidenced by a Certificate of Arraignment dated January 27, 2016, contrary to petitioner's assertion, and that the dismissal was grounded on the violation of their right to speedy disposition, which is an exception to the general rule that dismissal upon the accused's motion does not trigger double jeopardy.

• Undue Delay in Preliminary Investigation: Whether there was undue delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation before the OMB, violating respondents' right to a speedy disposition of cases.
• Double Jeopardy: Whether respondents' right against double jeopardy was violated by the reinstatement of the criminal cases.

• Undue Delay in Preliminary Investigation: Yes. The Sandiganbayan correctly found undue delay in the OMB's conduct of the preliminary investigation, with multiple unexplained institutional delays at various stages that violated respondents' constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.
• Double Jeopardy: Yes. Double jeopardy attaches because the dismissal of the criminal cases, though sought by respondents, was grounded on the violation of their right to speedy disposition of cases, which is an exception to the general rule that dismissal upon the accused's own motion does not bar subsequent prosecution.

• Undue Delay in Preliminary Investigation: A wholistic view of the entire preliminary investigation disclosed several shortcomings on the part of the OMB resulting in undue delays not satisfactorily explained by the prosecution. First, it took the investigating officer two years and eight months from the filing of the First Complaint on February 18, 2008 to issue the Consolidated Resolution on October 19, 2010, only to find that it was premature to determine criminal and administrative liabilities because COA was still reviewing its findings. Second, seven months elapsed before the Acting OMB approved the Consolidated Resolution, the sole justification being the resignations of the Deputy OMB for Luzon and the OMB—reasons the Court found irrelevant and unreasonable, since an acting officer could act upon such matters. Third, the OMB's erroneous dismissal was itself unduly prolonged, given that as early as September 8, 2010, COA had already denied respondents' request for review; had the investigating officer exercised prudence, the dismissal would not have been issued. It was only after learning of COA's denial (received January 9, 2012) that the OMB began determining probable cause, and even then it took another one year and five months to resolve the motion for reconsideration on June 13, 2013. Fourth, after the Order finding probable cause was issued on June 13, 2013, it took the OMB one year and eight months to approve it (February 20, 2015) and another month to file the Informations (March 30, 2015). The belated filing of respondents' motion for reconsideration could not justify this delay, as it was filed beyond the five-day reglementary period under Section 7(a), Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, and Section 7(b) of the same Rule expressly provides that the filing of a motion for reconsideration shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in court. These unexplained and unreasonable institutional delays cannot impinge on citizens' fundamental rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution.

• Double Jeopardy: Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and (4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her consent. The first and second elements were undisputed. The third element was satisfied upon clarification that respondents had already been arraigned, as evidenced by a Certificate of Arraignment dated January 27, 2016, contrary to petitioner's misleading assertion. The fourth element was crucial: the criminal cases were dismissed at respondents' own instance, and the general rule is that dismissal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions—insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial or disposition of case. Because the dismissal was due to the violation of respondents' right to speedy disposition of cases, the exception applied, and reinstatement of the charges would place respondents twice in jeopardy.

• Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases — The Constitution guarantees all persons the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. Institutional delays that are unexplained and unreasonable cannot impinge on this fundamental right. In evaluating whether this right was violated, courts must take a wholistic view of the entire proceedings rather than examining isolated gaps in the sequence of events, and the prosecution bears the burden of satisfactorily explaining delays.

• Double Jeopardy — Elements — Double jeopardy attaches when the following elements concur: (1) the accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance to sustain conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and (4) he/she is convicted or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without his/her consent.

• Double Jeopardy — Exception to the Consent Rule — The general rule is that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy. This rule admits of two exceptions: (a) insufficiency of evidence, and (b) denial of the right to speedy trial or disposition of case. Where the dismissal is grounded on violation of the right to speedy disposition, double jeopardy attaches even though the accused themselves moved for dismissal.

• "These unexplained and unreasonable institutional delays cannot impinge on the citizens' fundamental rights. No less than our Constitution guarantees all persons the right to speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the first issue, establishing that institutional delays by the Ombudsman, when unexplained and unreasonable, violate the constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases.

• "[T]he dismissal thereof was due to the violation of their right to speedy disposition, which would thus put them in double jeopardy should the charges against them be revived." — This passage states the Court's conclusion on the second issue, applying the exception to the general rule that dismissal upon the accused's own motion does not trigger double jeopardy.

• "If an acting officer may act upon such important matters, we find the resignation of the said officers irrelevant and unreasonable to justify the delay in the proceedings to the prejudice of respondents' paramount right to a speedy disposition of case." — This passage defines the standard for evaluating justifications for delay: the resignation of key officials does not excuse institutional inaction where an acting officer possesses the authority to act.

• David vs. Marquez, G.R. No. 209859, June 5, 2017 — Cited as the source of the four-element test for double jeopardy, which the Court applied to determine whether the dismissal of the criminal cases barred subsequent prosecution.

• Condrada vs. People, 446 Phil. 635 (2003) — Cited for the general rule that the dismissal of a criminal case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will not place the accused in double jeopardy.

• Tan vs. People, 604 Phil. 68 (2009) — Cited for the two exceptions to the general rule on consent-based dismissal: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial or disposition of case.

• Article III, Section 16, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to speedy disposition of cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The Court applied this provision to find that the OMB's unexplained institutional delays violated respondents' constitutional right.

• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution — Protects all persons from being twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The Court applied this provision in conjunction with Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court to determine that double jeopardy attached.

• Section 7, Rule 117, Rules of Court — Defines former conviction or acquittal and double jeopardy, enumerating the conditions under which dismissal of a case bars another prosecution. The Court applied the four-element test derived from this provision.

• Section 7(a) and (b), Rule II, Administrative Order No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the OMB) — Provides that only one motion for reconsideration shall be allowed, filed within five days from notice, and that the filing of a motion for reconsideration shall not bar the filing of the corresponding information in court. The Court applied these provisions to find that respondents' belated motion for reconsideration should not have stalled the OMB's duty to promptly file the Informations, and that the OMB had no justifiable reason to delay filing after finding probable cause.

Peralta, Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and Carandang, JJ., concur.