People v. Navarro

A judgment of acquittal rendered in a criminal case that was never tried is void ab initio for lack of due process and does not bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The State is entitled to its day in court, and a trial court's arbitrary denial of a timely and well-founded motion for reconsideration of such an acquittal will be set aside.

On March 6, 1968, Jaime Catuday was charged in the Municipal Court of Makati, Rizal, with light threat allegedly committed against Henry Dioquino, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12846. Almost a year later, on February 3, 1969, while the light threat case was still pending, he was charged in the same court with a different offense, frustrated theft, allegedly committed against Commonwealth Foods, Inc. In two separate decisions rendered on September 10, 1969, the Municipal Court convicted him of both charges, and he appealed both decisions to the CFI of Rizal.

In the CFI, the Provincial Fiscal filed two separate informations, one for light threat (Criminal Case No. 20145) and the other for frustrated theft (Criminal Case No. 20146), both assigned to Branch XI. The theft case was first set for hearing on December 16, 1969, while the threat case was originally set for December 22, 1969. On December 16, 1969, the court ordered continuation of the trial of the theft case for January 14 and 21, 1970; on December 22, 1969, it rescheduled the threat case for January 26, 1970. On January 14, 1970, the court reset the theft case hearing of that day to January 21, 1970, and when January 21 came, it rescheduled the theft case for February 11 and 24, 1970. On January 26, 1970, the scheduled threat case hearing was rescheduled for February 11, 1970 — the first time the two cases were set for hearing on the same day.

On February 11, 1970, the theft case was set for continuation of trial and the threat case for start of trial. In two separate orders issued that day, the court directed that the threat case be rescheduled for February 24, 1970 and that the trial of the theft case be continued also on February 24, 1970. On February 24, 1970, counsel de oficio for both cases failed to appear, and for the first time the court issued a single order in the two cases, directing the arrest of counsel and requiring her to show cause why she should not be punished for contempt, and ordering that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for March 25, 1970, at 8:30 in the morning."

On March 25, 1970, trial of the theft case continued. The threat case was not tried at all on that date or at any subsequent trial; in the hearings after March 25, 1970, it was always the theft case which was heard. Sometime in December 1972, upon the retirement of Judge Flores of Branch XI, respondent Judge Pedro C. Navarro took over the two cases, with the theft case then in the rebuttal stage. On March 20, 1973, rebuttal evidence closed and, upon order of the court, the parties filed their respective "offer and submission of exhibits" and submitted the theft case for decision.

On July 20, 1973, Judge Navarro rendered one decision acquitting Catuday of both charges for lack of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, cancelling the bonds for his provisional liberty in both cases and stating that the two cases "were tried jointly." On September 6, 1973, the private prosecutor, with the conformity of the provincial fiscal, filed a motion for reconsideration insofar as Criminal Case No. 20145 was concerned; on November 10, 1973, Judge Navarro denied the motion, reiterating that there was a joint hearing of the two criminal cases. On December 13, 1973, the provincial fiscal filed a second motion for reconsideration, which was denied on February 27, 1974.

The record belied any joint trial. The transcripts of the stenographic notes showed the court itself referring to "this case (of frustrated theft) in which the accused is charged" and to "this crime of theft," and defense counsel stating that "the other case is not being tried as yet." The parties' identical "Offer and Submission of Exhibits" listed only exhibits pertaining to Criminal Case No. 20146 for frustrated theft, and the defense's "Motion for Cancellation of Hearing" and "Objection to Evidence" related exclusively to the offense of theft.

• Due Process — No Trial of the Light Threat Case: Petitioner argued that the threat case was never tried in the lower court, so the charge therein should not have been dismissed on the ground of lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt; the judgment of acquittal insofar as Criminal Case No. 20145 is concerned was rendered without due process and should be annulled, with the record remanded to the court of origin for trial.

• Joint Trial Occurred: Respondents claimed that there was a joint trial of the threat case and the theft case, and since the prosecution failed to present evidence respecting the alleged threat, the case was properly dismissed on the stated ground.

• Joint Trial: Whether there was a joint trial of the light threat and frustrated theft cases.
• Effect of Captions: Whether the inclusion of both case numbers in the captions of pleadings, subpoenas, court orders, and transcripts of stenographic notes established that the two cases were jointly tried.
• Due Process: Whether the judgment of acquittal in the light threat case, which was never tried, is void for lack of due process.

• Joint Trial: No. There was no court order for joint trial, and none was called for because the charges were different and did not arise from the same facts or form part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character.
• Effect of Captions: No. Captions are purely formal and not controlling; what is embodied in the record shows that only the theft case was tried.
• Due Process: Yes. The acquittal in the untried light threat case was rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and is null and void ab initio.

• Joint Trial: The SC laid out two distinct rules. Under Section 8, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court, "when two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly, unless the court in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant orders separate trial"; as long as that condition is fulfilled, joint trial is automatic and needs no court order. That rule is inapplicable here because there is only one defendant in the two cases. Under Section 15, Rule 119, "charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character may, in the discretion of the court, be tried jointly" — this second rule clearly requires a court order, since the court has discretion whether or not to order a joint trial. Respondents pointed to no such order, and there is none. The February 24, 1970 order does not qualify even though it is the first order covering both cases: all it says is that "the trial set for today is hereby re-set for March 25, 1970," the term "trial" is singular, and the court did not specify which trial it intended to reschedule. All that can be inferred is that the court intended a common date of hearing for the two cases, as was true of the hearings set for February 11 and February 24, 1970 — obviously a concession to defense counsel who had asked that the hearings be scheduled on the same day so she would come to court only once. Joint trial was moreover not called for: there were two different complainants (Henry Dioquino in the threat charge and Commonwealth Foods, Inc. in the theft case); the threat was supposedly made on March 5, 1968 while the theft was allegedly committed on January 31, 1969, almost a year later; and the charges are different and do not even belong to the same class of crimes, light threat being a crime against personal liberty and security and frustrated theft a crime against property. The charges therefore were not founded on the same facts nor part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character, and the court had no power to try them jointly.

• Effect of Captions: A mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect, for it is the sufficiency of the averments of the charging part that is the gist of the accusation. It is almost the universal rule that the caption of a pleading is not controlling but what is embodied therein; the office of a caption is to declare the purpose of the act, and if the matter mentioned in the caption is not contained in the body of the act, it is merely surplusage and does not affect the matters set forth in the act itself. Captions are purely formal and may be amended. Despite the captions of some portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, an examination thereof reveals that the light threat case was never tried at all: the court itself repeatedly referred to "this case (of frustrated theft) in which the accused is charged" and to "this crime of theft," and when defense counsel objected that grave coercion was immaterial "because we are trying the case of theft," the respondent Judge made no remark correcting counsel to the effect that a joint trial was being conducted. Defense counsel likewise stated on the record that "the other case is not being tried as yet." The parties' identical "Offer and Submission of Exhibits" listed only exhibits pertaining to Criminal Case No. 20146, and the defense's "Motion for Cancellation of Hearing" and "Objection to Evidence" related exclusively to the offense of theft — confirming that the theft case was the only one actually tried to the finish, the light threat case not even having reached first base.

• Due Process: The State is entitled to due process in criminal cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. The SC has always accorded this right to the prosecution and, where the right had been denied, has promptly annulled the offending court action. A purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court, and for this reason it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and therefore null and void. Such a dismissal is invalid for lack of a fundamental prerequisite, due process, and consequently will not constitute a proper basis for the claim of double jeopardy. Likewise, a trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal; such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby. "Jurisdiction" is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing, and a judgment is void for lack of due process, which is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Here, the respondent Judge, in rendering judgment of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 20145 for light threat which was never tried in his court nor in Branch XI of the CFI of Rizal, acted with abuse of discretion tantamount to excess or lack of jurisdiction — so grave and patent as to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari. For such want of jurisdiction, the judgment is null and void ab initio; it is one rendered by a court which had no power so to do, as though there had been no judgment or process, and is coram non judice.

• Joint trial of multiple defendants is automatic; joint trial of separate charges against a single accused requires a court order — Under Section 8, Rule 119, when two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant, orders separate trial; joint trial is automatic and needs no court order. Under Section 15, Rule 119, charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character, may in the discretion of the court be tried jointly — this requires a court order. The first rule was inapplicable because there was only one defendant; the second because there was no order and the charges (light threat against personal liberty and security; frustrated theft against property) were not of the same class and did not arise from the same facts.
• Caption is not controlling — A mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect, for the sufficiency of the averments of the charging part is the gist of the accusation. The caption of a pleading is not controlling but what is embodied therein; matter in the caption not contained in the body is mere surplusage, and captions are purely formal and may be amended. Applied to hold that the appearance of both case numbers in the captions of pleadings, subpoenas, orders, and transcripts did not establish a joint trial.
• State's right to due process in criminal cases — The State must be given the opportunity to present its evidence in support of the charge. A purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict and denies the prosecution its day in court; it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, null and void, and does not constitute a proper basis for double jeopardy.
• Arbitrary denial of the prosecution's motion for reconsideration — A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal; such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced.
• Void judgment for lack of due process — A judgment is void for lack of due process, which is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction; it is as though there had been no judgment or process, and is coram non judice.

• "A purely capricious dismissal of an information deprives the State of fair opportunity to prosecute and convict; it denies the prosecution its day in court. For this reason, it is a dismissal (in reality an acquittal) without due process, and, therefore, null and void." — The core due process holding: the acquittal in an untried case is no acquittal at all and cannot anchor a double jeopardy claim.
• "A trial court may not arbitrarily deny a timely and well-founded motion of the prosecution for reconsideration of an order of dismissal or acquittal and that such arbitrary refusal to reopen the case will be set aside to give the State its day in court and an opportunity to prove the offense charged against the accused and to prevent miscarriage of justice, especially when no substantial right of the accused would be prejudiced thereby." — Justifies setting aside the denial of the prosecution's two motions for reconsideration.
• "It is almost the universal rule that the caption of a pleading is not controlling but what is embodied therein." — The canonical formulation used to reject the argument that dual captions proved a joint trial.
• "Jurisdiction" is the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing." — The definitional anchor for treating the acquittal in an untried case as an act in excess or in lack of jurisdiction.

• Trimica, Inc. vs. Polaris Marketing Corp., L-29887, Oct. 28, 1974 — Controlling; a judgment is void for lack of due process, which is equivalent to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
• People vs. Gomez, 20 SCRA 298 — Relied on for the rule that a capricious dismissal of an information is void and does not bar double jeopardy.
• People vs. Surtida, L-24420, Jan. 26, 1972 — Cited alongside Gomez for the same rule on capricious dismissal.
• People vs. Hon. Catolico, L-31260, Feb. 29, 1972 — Relied on for the rule that arbitrary refusal to reopen a case after a well-founded motion for reconsideration will be set aside.
• Lagman vs. Dela Cruz, 40 SCRA 101 — Cited to justify issuance of the writ of certiorari where the abuse of discretion is grave and patent.
• Palma and Ignacio vs. O. & S., Inc., 17 SCRA 98 — Source of the definition of grave abuse of discretion as a capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment equivalent in the eyes of the law to lack of jurisdiction.
• Windsor vs. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 — Cited for the definition of jurisdiction as the right to hear and determine, not to determine without hearing.
• Galutera vs. Macalino, CA-G.R. No. 52 (L-274), Jan. 25, 1947 — Cited for the rule that the caption of a pleading is not controlling but what is embodied therein.

• Section 8, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court — When two or more defendants are jointly charged with any offense, they shall be tried jointly unless the court, in its discretion upon motion of the fiscal or any defendant, orders separate trial. Held inapplicable because there was only one defendant in the two cases.
• Section 15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court — Charges for offenses founded on the same facts, or which form or are part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character, may in the discretion of the court be tried jointly. Held to require a court order, which was absent, and to be unavailable anyway because the two charges were not founded on the same facts nor part of a series of offenses of the same or similar character.