People v. Natindim

Where the original intent of the malefactors was to kill the victim and the taking of property was merely an afterthought or incidental to the killing, the crimes committed are separate Murder and Robbery, not the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide; and treachery, when specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven, qualifies the killing to Murder, absorbing abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, and nighttime as aggravating circumstances.

The accused-appellants were residents of or frequent visitors to the barangays of Mambuaya and Dansolihon in Cagayan de Oro City, where the victim Pepito Gunayan and his wife Judith also resided. Pepito was a member of the Ronda Tanod (village watch) of Dansolihon. Several of the accused were neighbors or acquaintances of the Gunayan spouses, having known them from the Mambuaya area where Judith once worked and attended elementary school. The motive for the killing arose from a prior altercation during a fiesta in Dansolihon, during which Pepito had boxed accused-appellant Gerry Natindim, and from an instruction allegedly given by one Usting de la Peña to kill Pepito in retaliation for Pepito having shot Usting's daughter Judith with an air gun. The case was tried under the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty regime subsequently affected by the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty.

On July 29, 1997, at around 9:00 in the evening, Judith Gunayan and her husband Pepito Gunayan were having dinner with their two minor children at their residence in Sitio Sta. Cruz, Dansolihon, Cagayan de Oro City, when they heard hushed conversation outside and the cocking of a paleontod (homemade shotgun). Pepito stood up and looked out from their bedroom window to check the noise. A gunshot was immediately fired, hitting Pepito on the head and knocking him to the floor. Judith put out their kerosene lamp and embraced her children. Someone from outside shouted in the local dialect that they were Ronda Tanods of Mambuaya and ordered the family to come down or be massacred. Judith peeped through the window and recognized her neighbor Rolando Lopez standing beside a molave tree, counting "uno, dos." Overwhelmed by fear, she and her children went downstairs, where she was met by Dino Natindim, Marque Clarin, Fernando Piano, and Danny Piano, whom she recognized as close friends and acquaintances from Purok Uno, Mambuaya. Gerry Natindim spoke to her face and demanded to know where their money was. During the incident, Dino carried a firearm, Rogelio Natindim carried a bolo, and Jimmy Macana carried an air gun.

Arnold Araneta and Johnny Lopez entered the house, and hacking sounds were heard from inside. Rogelio and Jimmy also entered. Jimmy returned outside and handed an FM radio to Gerry, then went back inside and took Pepito's air gun, while Rogelio took a 25-inch bolo. When Rogelio, Jimmy, Arnold, and Johnny emerged, Satorane Panggayong shouted "Attack!" Satorane took the spouses' goat, Edimar Panggayong rushed to the kitchen and snatched their hen, Gerry took their fighting cock, and someone took and pulled their two pigs. The group then gathered around Judith and her children. Someone suggested killing her as well, and another agreed, but Judith pleaded for mercy, saying she had small children. Dino poked a paleontod at her head, but Maribel Sinukat intervened and shoved it away. Carlito Panggayong mashed her vagina. Gerry tied Judith's hands with a rope and warned her not to shout or they would kill her. The group then left. After a few minutes, Judith screamed for help, and neighbors Mario Fernandez, Jerry Fernandez, and Edwin Caayon responded and untied her. When she entered the house, she found Pepito slumped on the floor with gunshot and hack wounds.

The defense presented a different version of events. Nestor Labita, Gerry Natindim, and Edimar Panggayong each pleaded guilty and testified that the group had met at Kibonhog Forest, Tinagpoloan, approximately two hours before the incident to plan the killing of Pepito. Gerry testified that the motive was revenge, as Pepito had boxed him during Dansolihon's fiesta. Edimar testified that one Usting de la Peña had instructed him to kill Pepito because Pepito had shot Usting's daughter Judith with an air gun, and had given him P1,000.00 with a promise of P3,000.00 more upon completion. According to the defense's account, Edimar shot Pepito when the latter aimed a gun at them from the window. Gerry then hacked Pepito several times. Edimar and Gerry took the air gun, fighting cock, hen, and radio, though they denied taking the goat and pigs. Maribel Sinukat testified that she was forced to accompany the group because her live-in partner Satorane threatened to kill her. The remaining accused — Arnold, Danny, Johnny, Rolando, Jimmy, Marque, Fernando, Rogelio, and Dino — interposed the defenses of alibi and denial, claiming they were elsewhere at the time of the incident. The RTC found Judith's positive identification of all the accused credible and rejected the defenses of alibi and denial, noting the short distances between the accused's residences and the crime scene and the absence of corroborating witnesses. The CA affirmed these factual findings, and no facts or circumstances of weight were shown to have been overlooked or misapprehended.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Appellants argued that the qualifying circumstances for Murder were not specifically alleged in the Information, citing People vs. Alba and People vs. Gano for the proposition that circumstances must be alleged with specificity to qualify the crime; otherwise, they may only be considered as generic aggravating circumstances, with Gano clarifying that Alba should be given retroactive effect as more favorable to the accused.
• Erroneous Appreciation of Circumstances and Imposition of Death Penalty: Appellants contended that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the death penalty due to a patent erroneous appreciation of attendant circumstances.
• Reasonable Doubt as to Specific Accused: Appellants Arnold Araneta, Marque Clarin, Rolando Lopez, Johnny Lopez, Danny Piano, Rogelio Natindim, and Jimmy Macana argued that their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, maintaining their defenses of alibi and denial.
• Presumption of Innocence (Arnold): Arnold specifically argued that the prosecution failed to overcome his constitutional presumption of innocence.
• Lack of Conspiracy (Arnold): Arnold contended that there was no evidence showing he conspired to commit Murder or that evident premeditation attended the crime.
• Mitigating Circumstances (Carlito and Edimar): Carlito Panggayong and Edimar Panggayong argued that the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary surrender in their favor.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the qualifying circumstances for Murder, particularly treachery and evident premeditation, were properly alleged in the Information so as to qualify the killing to Murder.
• Imposition of Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed by the trial court and whether the attendant circumstances were correctly appreciated.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether accused-appellants Arnold Araneta, Marque Clarin, Rolando Lopez, Johnny Lopez, Danny Piano, Rogelio Natindim, and Jimmy Macana were proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Robbery.
• Presumption of Innocence and Conspiracy (Arnold): Whether the prosecution overcame Arnold Araneta's presumption of innocence and whether conspiracy was established as to him.
• Mitigating Circumstances (Carlito and Edimar): Whether the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary surrender should have been appreciated in favor of Carlito Panggayong and Edimar Panggayong.
• Nature of the Crime: Whether the crimes committed constitute separate offenses of Murder and Robbery or the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Yes, as to treachery. Treachery was specifically alleged in the Information and duly proven, qualifying the killing to Murder; evident premeditation, however, was not specifically alleged with factual averments and could only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.
• Imposition of Penalty: The death penalty was properly imposed under Article 248 of the RPC given the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, but was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole pursuant to R.A. No. 9346.
• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. Judith's positive identification of the accused prevailed over their defenses of denial and alibi, her testimony being candid, straightforward, and spontaneous, with no ill motive to falsely testify.
• Presumption of Innocence and Conspiracy (Arnold): Yes. The presumption of innocence was overcome by Judith's positive identification, and conspiracy was established from the mode and manner in which all the accused acted in concert.
• Mitigating Circumstances (Carlito and Edimar): Voluntary surrender was not appreciated because their surrender was for other cases of robbery in Talakag, not for the crimes charged; voluntary confession of guilt was appreciated for Edimar, Gerry, and Nestor, but did not reduce the penalty for Murder because the imposable penalty consists of two indivisible penalties.
• Nature of the Crime: The crimes are separate Murder and Robbery. The original intent was to kill Pepito in revenge, and the taking of property was an afterthought incidental to the killing, precluding a conviction for the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide.

• Sufficiency of the Information: The Information in Criminal Case No. 97-1258 specifically alleged that the accused, "with evident premeditation, with treachery, by taking advantage of superior strength and under cover of night," shot Pepito on the head and thereafter hacked and stabbed him. The Court found that treachery was properly pleaded and proven. The two elements of treachery — (1) the victim was not in a position to defend himself at the time of the attack, and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack — were both present: Pepito was unarmed and merely looking out the window when Edimar shot him on the head, and the subsequent hacking of Pepito while he lay helpless on the floor further demonstrated treachery. Since treachery qualified the killing to Murder, the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, and nighttime were absorbed by treachery. Nighttime could only be separately appreciated if purposely sought on different factual bases, which the prosecution failed to prove. As to evident premeditation, the Court held that mere reference to the term in the Information was insufficient because it is in the nature of a conclusion of law, not factual averments. Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court requires that the acts constituting the offense be stated in ordinary and concise language to apprise the accused of the nature of the accusation. Because the acts constituting evident premeditation were not specifically alleged, it could not qualify the killing but could be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance, the requisites thereof having been proven during trial: (1) the meeting of all accused at 3:00 p.m. on July 29, 1997 to plan the killing; (2) the act of arming themselves with paleontods and bolos; and (3) a sufficient lapse of six hours between determination and execution. The generic aggravating circumstances of cruelty, dwelling, and intoxication could not be appreciated because they were not specifically alleged in the Information, and the Court gave retroactive effect to People vs. Legaspi as favorable to the accused.

• Imposition of Penalty: Article 248 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death for Murder. Article 63 of the RPC provides that when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is an aggravating circumstance, the higher penalty shall be imposed. Since evident premeditation was appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance and treachery was sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper imposable penalty was death. However, by virtue of R.A. No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The Court rejected the argument that mitigating circumstances could reduce the penalty by one degree, holding that the reduction applies only when the sentence prescribed by law is a divisible penalty, which is not the case where the penalty consists of two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death).

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The RTC and CA's factual findings were based on Judith's positive identification of the accused and her narration of their individual acts. The trial judge's evaluation of witness credibility is accorded the highest respect, having had the unique opportunity to observe the witness's demeanor directly, more so when affirmed by the CA. The accused failed to prove that the RTC or CA overlooked, misapprehended, or misinterpreted facts of weight. Judith's testimony was candid, straightforward, and spontaneous, and she had no ill motive to falsely testify. The defenses of alibi and denial were rejected because the accused failed to show it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene, and their alibi testimonies were uncorroborated. The short distances between their residences and the crime scene further undermined their alibis.

• Presumption of Innocence and Conspiracy (Arnold): The prosecution overcame Arnold's presumption of innocence through Judith's positive identification. Conspiracy was established under Article 8 of the RPC, which provides that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The State need not prove a previous agreement because conspiracy can be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offenders perpetrated the criminal act. All fifteen accused acted in concert in killing Pepito and taking his properties, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and design. All conspirators are liable as co-principals.

• Mitigating Circumstances (Carlito and Edimar): Voluntary surrender was not appreciated because the surrender of Edimar and Carlito was for other cases of robbery committed in Talakag, not for the crimes charged. A voluntary surrender must be spontaneous and by reason of the crime for which the accused is to be prosecuted. However, the voluntary confession of guilt was appreciated for Edimar, Gerry, and Nestor. Even with one mitigating circumstance offsetting the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, leaving Edimar with one mitigating circumstance (voluntary confession) and Carlito with none, the penalty for Murder could not be reduced because it consists of two indivisible penalties. The rule that ordinary mitigating circumstances reduce the penalty by one degree applies only to divisible penalties.

• Nature of the Crime: A conviction for the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide requires that robbery be the main purpose and objective of the malefactors and the killing merely incidental. If the malefactors did not originally intend to rob, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or incident, the offender is guilty of two separate crimes — Murder or Homicide and Robbery — and not the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. In this case, the original intention was to kill Pepito to exact revenge for his earlier assault on Gerry and allegedly shooting Judith with an air gun. Edimar immediately shot Pepito when he looked out the window, showing that robbery was not intended at the outset. The taking of property — the air gun, FM radio, bolo, goat, pigs, fighting cock, and hen — followed as an afterthought after the killing. The proper penalty for Robbery was therefore under Article 294(5) of the RPC (prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period), not the penalty for Robbery with Homicide under Article 294(1). The RTC and CA erred in applying the penalty for Robbery with Homicide when the case charged separate crimes of Murder and Robbery.

• Complex Crime of Robbery with Homicide vs. Separate Crimes of Murder and Robbery — A conviction for Robbery with Homicide requires that robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactors and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. If the malefactors did not originally intend to rob, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the homicide, the offender is guilty of two separate crimes — Homicide or Murder and Robbery — and not of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide. In this case, the original intent was to kill Pepito in revenge, and the taking of property was incidental, so the crimes were separate Murder and Robbery.

• Qualifying and Aggravating Circumstances Must Be Alleged in the Information — Both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the Information or Complaint, as provided in the amended Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Otherwise, they will not be appreciated even if duly proved during trial. This doctrinal rule, as articulated in People vs. Legaspi, was given retroactive effect in this case because it was favorable to the accused and the RTC judgment was promulgated before the ruling was issued.

• Treachery Absorbs Abuse of Superior Strength, Aid of Armed Men, and Nighttime — When treachery qualifies the killing to Murder, the generic aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men, and nighttime are absorbed by and necessarily included in treachery. Nighttime may be considered a separate generic aggravating circumstance only if it was purposely sought and founded on different factual bases from those constituting treachery.

• Elements of Treachery — The two elements of treachery are: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself or herself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the victim's part.

• Requisites of Evident Premeditation — Evident premeditation is attendant when the following are proven: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that he or she clung to that determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow reflection upon the consequences of the act and to allow conscience to overcome the resolution of the will. It presupposes deliberate planning of the crime before executing it, preceded by cool thought and reflection.

• Conspiracy Inferred from Mode and Manner of Commission — Under Article 8 of the RPC, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The State need not prove a previous agreement; conspiracy can be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offenders perpetrated the criminal act. When conspirators act in concert with a community of purpose and design, all are liable as co-principals.

• Effect of Mitigating Circumstances on Indivisible Penalties — When the penalty prescribed by law consists of two indivisible penalties (e.g., reclusion perpetua to death), ordinary mitigating circumstances cannot reduce the penalty by one degree regardless of their number. The reduction by one degree applies only when the sentence prescribed by law is a divisible penalty — either a single divisible penalty or three different penalties divisible into three periods.

• Voluntary Surrender Must Be for the Crime Charged — For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the surrender must be spontaneous, with the accused voluntarily submitting to authorities with an acknowledgment of guilt and intent to save them from the trouble and expense of effecting capture. Moreover, the surrender must be by reason of the crime for which the accused is to be prosecuted; surrender for an unrelated offense does not qualify.

• Extinguishment of Criminal and Civil Liability by Death Pending Appeal — When an accused dies during the pendency of an appeal, the criminal and civil liabilities arising from the crime are extinguished pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, and the judgment of conviction is set aside as to the deceased accused.

• "If, originally, the malefactors did not comprehend Robbery, but Robbery follows the Homicide either as an afterthought or merely as an incident of the Homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, that of Homicide or Murder and Robbery, and not of the special complex crime of Robbery with Homicide." — This passage articulates the controlling distinction between the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and separate offenses of Murder and Robbery, the ratio decidendi for the Court's correction of the penalty imposed for the robbery charge.

• "Mere reference to evident premeditation is not sufficient because it is in the nature of a conclusion of law, not factual averments." — This defines the requirement that the acts constituting evident premeditation must be specifically alleged in the Information with factual averments, not merely named as a legal conclusion, in order to qualify the crime or be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.

• "The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information in order not to violate the accused's constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." — This states the constitutional basis for the rule requiring specific allegation of qualifying circumstances in the Information, ensuring the accused's right to prepare a defense.

• "Conspiracy can be deduced from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated their criminal act." — This encapsulates the doctrine that direct proof of a prior agreement is not necessary to establish conspiracy; it may be inferred from the concerted acts of the accused demonstrating a community of purpose and design.

• People vs. Alba, 425 Phil. 666 (2002) — Cited by appellants for the rule that qualifying circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the Information; otherwise, they may only be considered as generic aggravating circumstances. The Court acknowledged the rule but found treachery was in fact specifically alleged.
• People vs. Gano, 405 Phil. 573 (2001) — Cited by appellants for the proposition that Alba should be given retroactive effect as more favorable to the accused. The Court gave retroactive effect to the Legaspi rule instead, as it was more favorable.
• People vs. Legaspi, 409 Phil. 254 (2001) — Applied retroactively as the controlling doctrine requiring that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the Information to be appreciated, even if duly proved during trial. Given retroactive effect because the RTC judgment was promulgated before the ruling and the doctrine is favorable to the accused.
• People vs. Delector, 819 Phil. 310 (2017) — Followed for the rule that evident premeditation requires specific factual averments in the Information, not mere reference to the term as a conclusion of law.
• People vs. Daniela, 449 Phil. 547 (2003) — Followed for the distinction between the complex crime of Robbery with Homicide and separate crimes of Murder/Homicide and Robbery, based on whether robbery was the original purpose or an afterthought.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed for the proper amounts of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in Murder cases, and for the rule on temperate damages when actual damages proved are less than the temperate damages fixed by jurisprudence.
• People vs. Castañeda, 60 Phil. 604 (1934) — Followed for the rule that ordinary mitigating circumstances cannot reduce a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties by one degree.
• People vs. Semanada, 103 Phil. 790 (1958) — Followed for the requirement that voluntary surrender must be for the crime for which the accused is prosecuted, not for an unrelated offense.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659) — Defines and punishes Murder, prescribing reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death when committed with attendant circumstances including treachery, evident premeditation, or cruelty. Applied to qualify the killing of Pepito Gunayan to Murder based on treachery.
• Article 294, Revised Penal Code (as amended by R.A. No. 7659) — Prescribes penalties for robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Paragraph 1 imposes reclusion perpetua to death when homicide is committed by reason or on occasion of the robbery; paragraph 5 imposes prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. The Court applied paragraph 5, not paragraph 1, because the crimes were separate Murder and Robbery.
• Article 63, Revised Penal Code — Provides that when the penalty is composed of two indivisible penalties and there is an aggravating circumstance, the higher penalty shall be imposed. Applied to justify the imposition of the maximum penalty (death, reduced to reclusion perpetua by R.A. No. 9346) for Murder.
• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy as existing when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Applied to hold all accused liable as co-principals.
• Article 89(1), Revised Penal Code — Provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the offender, as to whom the penalty is not yet final. Applied to dismiss the cases against Dino Natindim, Fernando Piano, and Rolando Lopez, who died during the pendency of the appeal.
• Section 6, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Sets forth the sufficiency requirements for a complaint or information. Applied to hold that the Information complied with the requirements.
• Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110, Rules of Court (as amended) — Require that qualifying and aggravating circumstances be specifically alleged in the Information. Applied retroactively to bar appreciation of cruelty, dwelling, and intoxication, which were not specifically alleged.
• R.A. No. 9346 — Prohibits the imposition of the death penalty. Applied to reduce the penalty for Murder from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
• R.A. No. 9344 — Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act. Section 51 was applied by the CA to remand the case of Satorane Panggayong, a minor at the time of the offense, to the RTC for appropriate action.

Leonen, J. (Chairperson), Hernando, J., Inting, J., Delos Santos, J., and Rosario, J., concurred.