People v. Mercado

A dying declaration made by a victim suffering from second and third degree burns affecting 74% of her total body surface area is admissible as evidence of the highest order, the severity of the wounds reasonably presuming consciousness of impending death, and where a single act of burning a house results in the death of two persons, the crime is a complex crime of Double Murder under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, warranting a single penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga and Evelyn Santos were live-in partners residing at Block 6 Lot 2, Belmont Pare Subdivision, Purok 4, Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Accused-appellant Patrick John Mercado y Anticla was Alicia's nephew, enrolled at the nearby STI College in Sta. Maria, and resided in the same household. The case required application of the rules on dying declarations and res gestae as exceptions to the hearsay rule, the qualifying circumstance of use of fire under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and the concept of complex crimes under Article 48 of the same Code.

Alicia Mercado-Lusuriaga and Evelyn Santos were live-in partners who shared a house at Block 6 Lot 2, Belmont Pare Subdivision, Purok 4, Caypombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Patrick John Mercado y Anticla, Alicia's nephew, was enrolled at the nearby STI College and lived in the same household. Around 11:00 PM of October 14, 2007, Mercado was already inside the house, having come home from school.

At approximately 2:00 AM of October 15, 2007, the house was reported to be on fire. While the house was burning, Evelyn and Mercado were observed on the terrace, apparently trying to find a way to escape the blaze. With the help of neighbors, both were brought out of the burning house. Evelyn appeared weak and unable to walk, badly burnt, with blood oozing from the right side of her head. As soon as she was carried to safety, Evelyn promptly accused Mercado as the person responsible for attacking her and Alicia and for setting the house on fire. Multiple witnesses heard her utterances to this effect. One witness heard Evelyn say: "ilayo ninyo sa akin yang si Patrick [Mercado] dahil siya ang pumalo sa aking ulo at nagsunog ng bahay." Another heard: "Kuya, wag mo akong iwan papatayin ako ng pamangkin ko," and "ilayo nyo sa akin si Patrick [Mercado] dahil yan ang papatay sa amin." Still another witness heard: "Ilayo nyo sa akin yan batang yan. Yan ang papatay sa akin. Yan ang sumunog sa amin. Yan ang pumalo sa ulo namin." While on board the ambulance en route to the hospital, Evelyn continued to name Mercado as the culprit, saying: "Te, si Patrick [Mercado] ang may gawa," "Si Patrick [Mercado] sinunog kami," and "Si Patrick ang pumalo sa akin. Si Patrick [Mercado] ang sumunog sa amin, pati sa bahay." Despite medical attention, Evelyn succumbed to her injuries and died on November 2, 2007 at the UST Hospital. She had suffered second and third degree burns affecting 74% of the total surface area of her body. Alicia also perished in the incident.

Mercado vehemently denied the charges. He testified that on October 15, 2007, he was inside his room on the first floor reviewing for his quarterly final examination and preparing a school project when the fire broke out between 2:00 to 2:30 AM. He heard the terrace door on the second floor being opened, which he thought was either Alicia or Evelyn collecting laundry. He then heard noises and a commotion, prompting him to rush upstairs where a fire had suddenly ignited and he saw a man coming out from the terrace. He went down and summoned help from two women. When he rushed back, he saw Evelyn about to jump from the terrace and pulled her back while shouting for help. A ladder was provided by neighbors, and he positioned himself at the ladder while assisting Evelyn down. After Evelyn was boarded into a van en route to a hospital, Mercado stayed in a nearby house watching their house being engulfed by fire. While watching, a person approached and handcuffed him. A defense witness, Dan Dacallos, a neighbor, testified that he saw an unidentified bloodied man coming out of the house while it was on fire and saw Mercado throwing water on the burning house from the terrace. Dacallos did not report the bloodied man to the authorities because of his minority and his parents' reluctance to get involved.

An Information was filed against Mercado charging him with the murders of Alicia and Evelyn, alleging that he was armed with a baseball bat and, with evident premeditation, treachery, and abuse of superior strength, attacked and hit the victims with the bat, poured gasoline into their bodies, and lit them, causing third degree burns which directly caused their instantaneous death and the burning of the victims' house. Mercado was arraigned on November 22, 2007 and pleaded not guilty.

• Reasonable Doubt: Mercado argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, pointing to the non-presentation of the baseball bat allegedly used and the failure to prove the presence of gasoline as amounting to reasonable doubt requiring acquittal.
• Sufficiency of the Information: Mercado asserted that the qualifying circumstance of use of fire was not alleged in the Information, which only recited treachery, abuse of superior strength, and evident premeditation, and therefore the courts erred in appreciating use of fire to qualify the crime to Murder.
• Voluntary Surrender: Mercado argued that because he did not resist when arrested by the barangay tanod shortly after Evelyn was brought to the hospital, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should have been appreciated in his favor.
• Credibility of Defense Witness: Mercado maintained that the testimony of Dan Dacallos, who saw a bloodied man coming out of the house while it was on fire, should be believed over the prosecution witnesses' accounts of Evelyn's dying declarations.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the CA erred in convicting Mercado despite the prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Use of Fire: Whether the CA erred in upholding the RTC's appreciation of the qualifying circumstance of use of fire.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender: Whether the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. Mercado's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt through the admissible dying declarations of Evelyn and, alternatively, her statements as part of the res gestae, which constituted evidence of the highest order sufficient to overcome his defense of denial.
• Qualifying Circumstance of Use of Fire: No. The Information sufficiently alleged the use of fire by narrating that Mercado poured gasoline into the victims' bodies and lighted them, causing third degree burns which directly caused their instantaneous death, thereby apprising him of the charge regardless of whether "use of fire" was explicitly designated as a qualifying circumstance.
• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender: No. The mere failure to resist arrest does not constitute voluntary surrender, which requires spontaneity and a deliberate, unconditional intent to submit oneself to the authorities.

• Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The prosecution's evidence, though largely hearsay in character, was admissible under the exceptions to the hearsay rule. Evelyn's statements qualified as dying declarations under Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as all four requisites were satisfied: (a) the declarations concerned the cause and surrounding circumstances of Evelyn's death; (b) at the time they were made, Evelyn was under consciousness of impending death, as reasonably presumed from the severity of her wounds — second and third degree burns affecting 74% of her total body surface area, blood oozing from her forehead, and difficulty breathing — applying the principle from People vs. Umapas that the declarant's belief in the imminence of death can be shown by the nature and severity of her wounds; (c) Evelyn was competent as a witness, the presumption of competence being sustained in the absence of evidence to the contrary; and (d) the declarations were offered in a criminal case for murder in which the declarant was the victim. Even assuming the statements did not qualify as dying declarations, they were nevertheless admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130, as they were made spontaneously immediately after the startling occurrence of the fire, before Evelyn had time to contrive or devise, and concerned the occurrence and its immediately attending circumstances. The defense of denial, inherently the weakest of all defenses, crumbled in the face of the positive identification by Evelyn through her dying declarations. The failure to present the baseball bat or prove the presence of gasoline was immaterial, as the testimonies recounting Evelyn's declarations were more than sufficient to establish guilt. The testimony of defense witness Dacallos regarding a bloodied man failed to overcome the probative value of the dying declarations.

• Qualifying Circumstance of Use of Fire: The test of sufficiency of an Information is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him and enables the court to render judgment properly. Qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded to avoid violating the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. However, the Information need not explicitly designate the circumstance as "qualifying" or "aggravating"; it is sufficient that the circumstance is recited therein. The Information alleged that Mercado "pour[ed] gasoline into their bodies and light them thereby causing upon them third degree burns which directly caused their instantaneous death and the burning of [the] victim's house." One cannot be accused of causing third degree burns without necessarily using fire. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is committed when a person is killed by means of fire. The crime was therefore correctly qualified to Murder.

• Mitigating Circumstance of Voluntary Surrender: For voluntary surrender to mitigate an offense, three elements must concur: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary, meaning spontaneous and deliberate, with an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities. Mercado did not actually surrender. He stayed in a nearby house watching the fire and was simply handcuffed by someone who approached him, to which he offered no resistance. The mere fact that he did not resist arrest cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. Had he not been arrested, he would not have surrendered himself to the authorities. There was no spontaneity or conscious effort to surrender.

• Dying Declarations — A dying declaration is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule because it is evidence of the highest order, entitled to utmost credence, since no person aware of impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Four requisites must concur: (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under consciousness of an impending death; (c) the declarant is competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim. The declarant's belief in the imminence of death need not be presaged by personal feelings; the test is whether the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending, which can be shown by the declarant's own statements or from circumstantial evidence such as the nature and severity of her wounds.

• Res Gestae — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances thereof, are admissible as part of the res gestae. Three requisites must concur: (1) the principal act is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances. The test of admissibility is whether the declaration is so intimately interwoven with the principal fact or event that it is regarded as part of the transaction itself, and whether it clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

• Complex Crimes (Compound Crime) — When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. The underlying philosophy follows the pro reo principle, favoring the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed, because an accused who commits two crimes with a single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity. The single act of burning a house resulting in the death of two persons constitutes the complex crime of Double Murder, warranting a single penalty of reclusion perpetua.

• Sufficiency of Information — An Information is sufficient as long as the qualifying circumstance is recited therein, regardless of whether it is designated as aggravating or qualifying, or whether written separately or lumped together with general averments. The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense and preclude surprises during trial.

• Voluntary Surrender — For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, three elements must be present: (a) the offender has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary, i.e., spontaneous and deliberate, with an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities. Mere failure to resist arrest does not constitute voluntary surrender.

• "A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value of the denial is negligible." — This passage, quoted by the Court from the CA's decision, articulates the principle that denial is inherently weak and cannot prevail over positive identification supported by competent evidence.

• "It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible." — This formulation, drawn from People vs. Umapas, defines the controlling test for the consciousness of impending death requisite, emphasizing that it is the declarant's subjective belief rather than the objective proximity of death that governs admissibility.

• "The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Gaffud, Jr., states the rationale for the single-penalty rule in complex crimes and was applied to restore the penalty to a single reclusion perpetua.

• "It escapes the mind of the Court how one could be accused of 'causing x x x third degree burns' without necessarily saying that he or she used fire in the process." — This statement resolves the issue of whether the qualifying circumstance of use of fire was sufficiently alleged, holding that the factual narrative in the Information adequately apprised the accused of the charge.

• People vs. Umapas, 807 Phil. 975 (2017) — Controlling authority on the requisites of a dying declaration, particularly the second requisite on consciousness of impending death. The Court applied its reasoning that the severity of a declarant's burns can reasonably presume consciousness of impending death, and that the declarant's belief in the imminence of death can be shown by the nature and severity of her wounds.

• People vs. Gaffud, Jr., 587 Phil. 521 (2008) — Controlling authority on the complex crime of Double Murder committed through a single act of burning. The Court applied its rationale — that a single act of burning a house resulting in two deaths constitutes the complex crime of Double Murder warranting a single penalty — to reverse the CA's imposition of two separate penalties.

• People vs. Saul, 423 Phil. 924 (2001) — Cited for the elements of voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. The Court applied its formulation to reject Mercado's claim, holding that mere failure to resist arrest does not satisfy the requirement of spontaneous and deliberate surrender.

• People vs. Nartea, 74 Phil. 8 (1942) — Cited for the definition and scope of res gestae. The Court applied its principle that whether a declaration is part of the res gestae depends on whether the declaration was the facts talking through the party or the party talking about the facts.

• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Followed for the adjustment of damages awards in murder cases, resulting in the modification of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages to P100,000.00 each, plus P50,000.00 as temperate damages, for each victim.

• Section 37, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Defines dying declarations as admissible exceptions to the hearsay rule. Applied to admit Evelyn's statements identifying Mercado as her assailant, all four requisites being satisfied.

• Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Defines statements admissible as part of the res gestae. Applied as an alternative basis for admitting Evelyn's statements, which were made spontaneously immediately after the startling occurrence of the fire.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines Murder and enumerates its qualifying circumstances, including killing "by means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion" among others. Applied to qualify the killing to Murder through the use of fire.

• Article 48, Revised Penal Code — Provides the penalty for complex crimes: when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period. Applied to impose a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of Double Murder.

• Section 3, Republic Act No. 9346 — Provides that persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua shall not be eligible for parole. Applied to bar Mercado's eligibility for parole.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concurred.