People v. Hamiana

Where a rape is committed by one member of a robbery band at a location away from the robbery scene and without positive proof that the other members were aware of or abetted the act, only the rapist is liable for the complex crime of robbery in band with rape; the others are liable only for robbery in band.

Seven men — Alfonso Hamiana, Silvino Jabin, Ceferino de la Cruz, Norberto de la Cruz, Emiliano de la Cruz, Ceferino Parcon, and Anastacio Blancada — were charged in three separate criminal cases before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for a series of armed robberies committed in Hacienda Sta. Rita and surrounding areas in Bago, Negros Occidental, on April 1 and April 9, 1947. The cases were consolidated for appeal before the Supreme Court. The Revised Penal Code's provisions on robbery in band, complex crimes, aggravating circumstances, and the imposition of penalties governed the prosecution.

At about one o'clock in the morning of April 1, 1947, Vicente Piadoche was awakened by a noise while sleeping in his house in Hacienda Sta. Rita, Bago, Negros Occidental. Upon opening the door as ordered, he recognized appellants Ceferino Parcon and Norberto de la Cruz, along with their companions Alfonso Hamiana, Silvino Jabin, Anastacio Blancada, Ceferino de la Cruz, and Emiliano de la Cruz. Hamiana and Jabin each carried a bolo, while Parcon and Blancada were armed with rifles. Parcon, Norberto de la Cruz, Jabin, and Hamiana entered the house; Parcon trained his rifle at Piadoche's wife while Norberto de la Cruz took nine gantas of palay valued at ₱4.50. Ceferino de la Cruz and Emiliano de la Cruz remained below and seized chickens worth ₱8.

At about two o'clock that same morning, the appellants proceeded to the house of Fortunata Nobleza in the same vicinity. Nobleza was ordered to open the door but first hid her oldest daughter. Hamiana, armed with a rifle, and Jabin and Emiliano de la Cruz, armed with bolos, demanded palay. The appellants seized three cavanes of seedlings. Norberto de la Cruz climbed the roof and took ten chickens, which he gave to Parcon, also armed, while the others watched. Immediately thereafter, the group proceeded to the house of Porfirio Lorenzo in the same hacienda. Lorenzo, awakened by his dog's barking, saw the appellants from his window; six approached him. Parcon aimed his gun at Lorenzo and demanded palay and chickens. The appellants took palay worth ₱4.50, two chickens worth ₱4, and cassava worth ₱8, while Lorenzo was guarded by Blancada with a gun.

On the evening of April 9, 1947, at about ten o'clock, Rosita Colantro, residing at the crossing of Atipuluan, Bago, Negros Occidental, heard one of the appellants calling for "uncle." When she did not reply, the appellants hammered at the walls of her house. Colantro saw rifles aimed at her from outside her low house. The appellants demanded palay; Colantro answered she had only a few seedlings. She was ordered to go down, and with lamp in one hand and her small child in the other, she met Hamiana (her neighbor) with a bolo, Emiliano de la Cruz and Ceferino de la Cruz with rifles, and Jabin with a bolo. She attempted to flee but was caught by Blancada, who ordered her at gunpoint to put her child down. Blancada took her to a place away from the house and raped her at gunpoint. After the rape, Colantro proceeded to the house of Federico Nava, where she stayed overnight. The next morning, she found that the appellants had carried away her palay worth ₱35.

The victims positively identified the appellants, and no motive was attributed to the prosecution witnesses that could have prompted false imputations. Colantro knew Hamiana well as her neighbor and recognized Blancada by face because he worked near her house. The defense of alibi was raised by all appellants, each claiming to have been elsewhere on the dates in question, but the distances between their claimed locations and the crime scenes were relatively short and did not preclude their presence. The defense also presented Antonio Palmes, a convict serving 38 years, who admitted that he and the Bravo gang committed the robberies; the Court found this admission hardly believable given Palmes's minimal additional exposure to penalty. Counsel for the appellants pointed out discrepancies between the victims' testimonies and their affidavits regarding the number of perpetrators — six versus seven — but the victims explained that their statements mentioned seven persons and that in one instance the seventh member did not approach the window.

• Alibi: Each appellant claimed to have been at a different location on the nights of April 1 and April 9, 1947, and could not have participated in the robberies.
• Third-Party Confession: The defense presented Antonio Palmes, a convict, who admitted that he and the Bravo gang committed the robberies in question, thereby seeking to exculpate the appellants.
• Discrepancies in Affidavits: Appellants' counsel pointed out that the victims' affidavits mentioned six persons whereas seven appellants were charged, and that there were variances between the testimonies and the affidavits of Vicente Piadoche, Fortunata Nobleza, and Porfirio Lorenzo.

• Two Separate Offenses in Criminal Case No. 1255: The Solicitor General contended that two separate offenses of robbery in band were charged in Criminal Case No. 1255 because the house of Fortunata Nobleza was different and separate from that of Porfirio Lorenzo and the offenses were committed on different occasions, and that because the appellants did not object to the sufficiency of the information or the evidence, they should be convicted of two separate offenses.
• Complex Crime of Robbery in Band with Rape: The Solicitor General recommended that all appellants be convicted in Criminal Case No. 1257 of the complex crime of robbery in band with rape, there being no showing that the rape committed by Blancada was prevented by the other appellants.
• Aggravating Circumstances: The Solicitor General contended that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling were present in all three cases, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them.

• Duplicity of Information: Whether the appellants may be convicted of two separate offenses of robbery in band in Criminal Case No. 1255, where a single information charged one offense and the evidence was not explicit in segregating testimony for each offense.
• Individual Responsibility for Rape: Whether all appellants may be held liable for the complex crime of robbery in band with rape in Criminal Case No. 1257, where the rape was committed by one appellant away from the robbery site.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Whether the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling were present in the commission of the robberies.

• Duplicity of Information: No. The Court declined to convict the appellants of two separate offenses, taking the view favorable to them, as they would not have objected to an information charging only one offense or to evidence that was not explicit in segregating testimony by offense.
• Individual Responsibility for Rape: No. Only Anastacio Blancada was held liable for the complex crime of robbery in band with rape; the other appellants were not, there being no positive proof that they were aware of or abetted the rape, which was committed away from the house where the robbery occurred.
• Aggravating Circumstances: Yes. The aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling were present in all three cases, with no mitigating circumstance to offset them.

• Duplicity of Information: The Solicitor General argued that because the house of Fortunata Nobleza was different and separate from that of Porfirio Lorenzo, and the offenses were committed on different occasions, two separate offenses of robbery in band were charged in Criminal Case No. 1255. Because the appellants did not object to the sufficiency of the information or the evidence, conviction of two separate offenses was recommended. The Court declined to adopt this recommendation, reasoning that the appellants naturally would not have objected to an information charging only one offense of robbery, or to evidence that was not explicit in pointing out which testimony pertained to which offense. Convicting them of two separate offenses under these circumstances would be prejudicial.

• Individual Responsibility for Rape: The Solicitor General recommended that all appellants be convicted of the complex crime of robbery in band with rape because there was no showing that the rape was prevented by the other appellants. The Court rejected this reasoning, finding that Blancada caught Rosita Colantro while she was trying to escape and committed the rape at a place away from the house where the robbery occurred. There was no positive proof in the record that the other appellants were aware of, much less abetted, the criminal act committed by Blancada against Colantro. Absent such proof of knowledge or participation, the other appellants could not be held liable for the rape as a complex crime; only Blancada bore individual responsibility.

• Aggravating Circumstances: The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling were present in all three cases, with no mitigating circumstance to offset them. The robberies were committed at night and in the victims' dwellings, satisfying both aggravating circumstances under the Revised Penal Code.

• Individual responsibility for rape in robbery in band — Where a member of a band committing robbery also rapes a victim, the other members are not liable for the complex crime of robbery in band with rape unless there is positive proof that they were aware of or abetted the rape. In this case, because the rape was committed by Blancada at a location away from the robbery site and no evidence showed the other appellants knew of or facilitated the act, only Blancada was convicted of the complex crime.

• Favorable construction of duplicitous information to the accused — Where a single information charges one offense of robbery but the evidence arguably supports two separate offenses committed against different victims at different locations, and the accused did not object to the sufficiency of the information or the evidence, the Court will take the view favorable to the accused rather than convict of two separate offenses, particularly where the evidence was not explicit in segregating testimony by offense.

• Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification — The defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive testimony of victims who identified the appellants, especially where the distances between the appellants' claimed locations and the crime scenes are relatively short and do not preclude their presence and participation.

• "There is no positive proof in the record that the other appellants were aware of, much less abated, the criminal act committed by appellant A against the person of R." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi for limiting liability for the complex crime of robbery in band with rape to the actual perpetrator, absent proof of knowledge or complicity by the other band members.

• "The appellants naturally would not have objected to the information which charged only one offense of robbery, or to the evidence presented which was not explicit in pointing out that the testimony of a certain witness was for one offense and the testimony of another witness was for another offense charged in one or more informations." — This passage explains the Court's rationale for declining to convict the appellants of two separate robbery offenses, emphasizing the prejudice that would result from construing a single-information charge as supporting multiple convictions.

• "The defense of alibi set up by the appellants cannot prevail over the positive testimony of their victims." — This passage states the controlling principle that alibi is insufficient where victims have positively identified the accused, particularly where no ill motive is attributed to the prosecution witnesses.

• Article 70, Revised Penal Code — The dispositive portion referenced Article 70 in connection with the service of the three sentences successively, governing the maximum period of detention when multiple penalties are imposed.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, and Jugo, JJ., concurred.