People v. Elizalde

Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the offense is punished as the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and all conspirators are equally liable therefor.

Accused-appellants Christopher Elizalde y Sumagdon and Allan Placente y Busio, together with several co-accused, were charged with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The victim, Letty Tan y Co, was the wife of Antonio Tan, who operated a concrete products store along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Sucat, Parañaque City. The case involves the abduction of Letty at gunpoint by a group of armed men, the subsequent demand for ₱20,000,000.00 in ransom, and her death by gunshot wounds during an armed encounter between the kidnappers and police operatives in Tarlac City.

On June 3, 2005, an Information was filed charging accused-appellants Christopher Elizalde y Sumagdon and Allan Placente y Busio, together with co-accused Arcel Lucban y Lindero, Allan Dela Peña, Alden Diaz, and alias Erwin, with the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The charge arose from the abduction of Letty Tan y Co on June 17, 2003, at approximately 6:30 in the evening, along Dr. A. Santos St., Sucat Road, Parañaque City. Only Elizalde, Placente, and Dela Peña were arrested; the rest remained at-large. Upon arraignment, all three pleaded not guilty.

According to the prosecution, Antonio Tan was closing their concrete products store, Nysan Concrete Products, along Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Sucat, Parañaque City, at around 6:30 p.m. on June 17, 2003, when Letty went inside their vehicle parked on the right side of the road facing their store. A red Toyota Lite Ace van with plate number ULK 341 arrived, and about seven armed men alighted. Three of them, including Placente, pointed their guns at Antonio and told him not to move, while two others, including Elizalde, dragged Letty into the van. The kidnappers then sped away. Antonio immediately called his children and his brother, Nick. In a series of telephone calls to the store's phone, the kidnappers told the family not to report the matter to the authorities and to be ready with ₱20,000,000.00 the following day. The family nevertheless contacted the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER) unit of the PNP, which met them at the Mandarin Oriental Hotel at around 9:00 p.m. that same day. Through Antonio's cellular phone, the family bargained with the kidnappers, who replied that they would not see Letty again without the ransom.

At noon the following day, June 18, 2003, the PACER team informed Antonio and his family about a shootout in Tarlac where three persons were killed. The family proceeded to the Tarlac Provincial Hall, where they saw Letty's lifeless body with a gunshot below her chin. Antonio identified the other bodies as those of the kidnappers and later learned that the others, including appellants, had escaped. P/Insp. Joselito Nelmida, stationed at the Intelligence Unit of the PNCO Tarlac City for sixteen years, testified that on the morning of June 18, 2003, he received information that a stolen red Toyota Lite Ace van would be passing through their area. He and his team tailed the van after it passed through their control point. Upon seeing the police cars, the van's passengers alighted and fired at the officers. A shootout ensued, during which a colorless jeepney passed by and likewise fired at the police. Nelmida was shot in the buttocks by Elizalde, who was riding the jeepney. After the shootout, the jeepney passengers dumped the vehicle near a bridge along Sitio Barbon, Tarlac, where Nelmida saw Letty's lifeless body. Nelmida's testimony was corroborated by Mario Ramos, a bystander who was walking towards Sitio Barbon to go fishing at around noon on June 18, 2003. Ramos saw the colorless jeepney crisscrossing along the road, heard three gunshots from inside it, and observed four armed persons alight and head towards the irrigation area, with Elizalde being the last to alight. When the jeepney door opened, Ramos saw the dead body of a fat, fair-skinned Chinese woman with a bullet hole in her head.

Sometime in April 2004, Antonio saw a news report on television showing a picture of a wounded person involved in a shooting incident in Navotas. He instantly recognized the person as Elizalde and called a PACER agent. Together with the PACER team, he went to V. Luna Hospital where Elizalde was confined and identified him as one of the men who dragged his wife into the red van. When Placente was arrested in 2007, Antonio identified him as one of the armed persons who poked a gun at him while the others dragged his wife, through cartographic sketches that the PACER team had drawn at the time of the incident. Antonio also identified Placente from several photos of suspects in PACER's gallery. According to Antonio, he easily recognized the appellants because none of them were wearing masks at the time of the incident.

For their part, appellants denied the charges and interposed alibi. Elizalde claimed he was in Blumentritt, Manila, selling boiled peanuts from a pushcart from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. on the day of the kidnapping, and went straight home afterwards for fear of getting lost, being in Manila for the first time. He further narrated that on April 1, 2004, a cousin visited him and promised to help him find a job; they boarded a small red vehicle with three other persons, and after an hour, he heard gunshots and was hit in the chest. He lost consciousness and woke up at V. Luna Hospital. He claimed that police officers forced Nilo Avelina to point at him as a co-kidnapper in a Quezon City case, and later forced him to admit involvement in that case. He was convicted by the Quezon City RTC for kidnapping, and by the Tarlac RTC for Frustrated Murder, though he was subsequently acquitted on appeal of the latter. Placente, for his part, testified that he came to Manila in 1982 from Samar, and on the day and time of the kidnapping, he was driving a neighbor's tricycle on his way to the market in Pasig City. He claimed he did not go anywhere other than his daily route, parked the tricycle in front of his neighbor's house, and returned the key as he normally did. He later went back to Samar in 2005 with his pregnant wife and son, working as a laborer and farmer until he was arrested on May 9, 2007. The defense also presented Nilo Avelina, who corroborated Elizalde's claim that Avelina was forced by police to point at Elizalde in the Quezon City case.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt, giving credence to the prosecution witnesses' positive, categorical, and straightforward testimonies and the inherent weakness of the appellants' defenses of denial and alibi. The trial court found that the prosecution established all elements of kidnapping for ransom and that conspiracy was present, shown by Placente's act of poking a gun at Antonio while Elizalde and their cohorts dragged Letty into the van. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision but reduced the moral damages to ₱100,000.00, ruling that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility deserved great weight and that the alleged inconsistencies in Antonio's testimony referred to minor details that strengthened rather than weakened his credibility.

• Credibility of Positive Identification: Appellants argued that Antonio's positive identification of Elizalde should not be given weight because Antonio only recognized Elizalde on television in April 2004, or ten months after the incident, and no cartographic sketch of Elizalde was made the day after the incident. They contended that this lapse of time would affect Antonio's memory and that the identification at the hospital was marked by suggestiveness, as Antonio was already informed beforehand that Elizalde was involved in the kidnapping.
• Inconsistencies in Testimony: Appellants raised inconsistencies in Antonio's testimonies as to the time his family left Mandarin Hotel, the number of PACER people who met them there, the exact number of his wife's abductors, and other factual circumstances that cast doubt on his credibility.
• Weakness of Prosecution Evidence: Appellants asserted that while alibi is a weak defense, the prosecution cannot profit therefrom but must rely on the strength of its own evidence.
• Violation of Constitutional Rights: Appellants contended that there was no showing they were informed of their constitutional rights at the time of their arrest, rendering the entire proceedings a nullity.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt by giving full weight and credence to the prosecution's evidence.
• Positive Identification: Whether Antonio Tan's identification of the appellants, particularly Elizalde, ten months after the incident was reliable and free from suggestiveness.
• Alibi and Denial: Whether the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial suffice to overcome the positive identification by prosecution witnesses.
• Conspiracy: Whether conspiracy was sufficiently established to hold both appellants equally liable for the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
• Constitutional Rights at Arrest: Whether the alleged failure to inform the appellants of their constitutional rights at the time of their arrest rendered the entire proceedings a nullity.

• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The trial court's assessment of witness credibility is conclusive and binding absent any showing of arbitrariness or oversight, and the Court found no cogent reason to overturn the lower courts' findings.
• Positive Identification: Yes. Antonio identified Elizalde from cartographic sketches the day after the incident and again recognized him on television in April 2004 before going to the hospital; the identification was not suggestive, as it was Antonio who first recognized Elizalde and contacted PACER.
• Alibi and Denial: No. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses that must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused, and appellants failed to corroborate their alibis with any credible witness.
• Conspiracy: Yes. Conspiracy was established from the concerted acts of the appellants and their cohorts — Placente and companions pointing guns at Antonio while Elizalde and companions dragged Letty into the van — demonstrating a community of criminal design.
• Constitutional Rights at Arrest: No. Even assuming the police failed to inform the appellants of their constitutional rights, the same is immaterial because no admission or confession was elicited from them; their guilt was established by the strength of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies.

• Credibility of Witnesses: The question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine, and its assessment is conclusive, binding, and entitled to great weight unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless some fact or circumstance of weight has been overlooked. After a careful review of the records, the Court found no cogent reason to overturn the lower courts' ruling. The prosecution witnesses testified in a categorical and straightforward manner, positively identifying the appellants as part of the group who kidnapped the victim. Antonio unmistakably narrated in detail the series of events from the moment he saw the appellants alight from their red van, split into two groups — one pointing guns at him and the other dragging his wife — up to the time they sped away. His testimony was corroborated by P/Insp. Nelmida, who was personally engaged in the shootout and was shot by Elizalde, and by Mario Ramos, who saw the appellants alight from the jeepney where the victim's lifeless body was found. No ill motive was shown on the part of the prosecution witnesses.

• Positive Identification: Contrary to appellants' claim that no cartographic sketch of Elizalde was made after the incident, the CA held that Antonio actually identified Elizalde from four cartographic sketches based on his descriptions the day after the incident. Thereafter, Antonio again recognized Elizalde on television in April 2004, prompting him to immediately call PACER agents. The identification at the hospital was not suggestive because it was Antonio who first recognized Elizalde on television and contacted PACER, not the other way around. The alleged inconsistencies in Antonio's testimony were inconsequential, referring only to minor details that actually strengthened his credibility by erasing any suspicion of being rehearsed. What prevails is the consistency of the testimonies in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the appellants.

• Alibi and Denial: Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses that must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. Appellants presented self-serving statements that Elizalde was selling peanuts and Placente was driving a neighbor's tricycle, without attempting to corroborate the same with any supporting evidence. As the RTC noted, Elizalde's cousin or Placente's neighbor could have been presented to substantiate their stories, but the defense failed to do so. Avelina's testimony regarding the Quezon City case had no bearing on the instant case, as it involved an entirely different proceeding.

• Conspiracy: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. Direct proof is not essential; conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests. The community of criminal design was evident: while Placente and companions pointed their guns at Antonio, Elizalde and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into the van. Thereafter, they demanded ₱20,000,000.00 in ransom, which never materialized due to a shootout that led to the victim's death. Having each taken part in the accomplishment of their common criminal design, the appellants are equally liable.

• Constitutional Rights at Arrest: Even assuming the police failed to inform the appellants of their constitutional rights at the time of their arrest, such failure is immaterial because no admission or confession was elicited from them. Their guilt was established by the strength of the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, not by any extrajudicial admission.

• Credibility of Witnesses — The assessment of the credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine and is conclusive, binding, and entitled to great weight, unless shown to be tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been considered. The Court found no cogent reason to overturn the lower courts' assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility.

• Alibi and Denial as Defenses — Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. Positive testimony prevails over negative testimony. For alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that they were at some other place at the time the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis. The appellants failed to corroborate their alibis with any credible witness.

• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations. Direct proof is not essential; conspiracy can be presumed from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests.

• Special Complex Crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide — Under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime. This amendment effectively eliminated the distinction between cases where the killing was purposely sought and those where it was merely an afterthought.

• Inconsistencies on Minor Details — Inconsistencies in a witness's testimony referring to minor details are inconsequential and actually serve to strengthen rather than weaken credibility, as they erase suspicion of being rehearsed. What prevails is the consistency of the testimonies in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused.

• "Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Mercado, articulates the controlling rule on the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide and is the ratio decidendi for affirming the conviction under Article 267.

• "Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the doctrine of conspiracy and its effect on individual liability, applied here to hold both appellants equally liable for the acts of their group.

• "Well settled is the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused. It is only axiomatic that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony." — This passage defines the standard for evaluating alibi and denial against positive identification, a frequently cited principle in Philippine criminal jurisprudence.

• People vs. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, July 23, 2014 — Cited for the doctrine that the trial court's assessment of witness credibility is conclusive, binding, and entitled to great weight absent arbitrariness or oversight, and for the definition and elements of conspiracy.
• People vs. Torres, G.R. No. 189850, September 22, 2014 — Cited for the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses that must yield to positive identification, and that positive testimony prevails over negative testimony.
• People vs. Montanir, 662 Phil. 535 (2011) — Cited for the principle that inconsistencies on minor details strengthen rather than weaken a witness's credibility by erasing suspicion of rehearsed testimony.
• People vs. Mercado, 400 Phil. 37 (2000) — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that kidnapping where the victim is killed in the course of detention constitutes the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
• People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016 — Cited as the basis for the modification of the amounts of damages awarded in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.

• Article 267, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Defines and penalizes kidnapping and serious illegal detention. The last paragraph provides that when the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. The Court applied this provision to convict the appellants of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide, the penalty for which should have been death but was reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole by virtue of Republic Act No. 9346.
• Republic Act No. 9346 — An Act prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines. The Court applied this law to reduce the imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concurred.