People of the Philippines vs. XXX

Statements made by a rape victim to a relative hours after the incident, while she remains under the continuing distress produced by the occurrence, are admissible as part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court even though not simultaneous with the crime; spontaneity is measured by the Manhuyod factors, and a three-day interval coupled with intervening events removes the statement from the exception.

XXX is the father of AAA, the complainant in four Informations for rape and one for attempted rape. The Informations alleged that he took advantage of his ascendancy and influence as her father and employed force, violence, and intimidation in the acts charged. The confidentiality of the victim's identity and of information that could establish it is protected by Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No. 9262, and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, under which the parties are designated by pseudonyms.

XXX, the father of AAA, then sixteen years old and the eldest of three children, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Bais City, Branch 45, under five separate Informations: attempted rape on July 18, 1999; rape on April 8, 2001; and three counts of rape on April 15, 2001 at about 7:00 p.m., 9:00 p.m., and 12:00 midnight. Each Information alleged that he took advantage of his ascendancy and influence as AAA's father and employed force, violence, and intimidation against her will. Upon arraignment, XXX pleaded not guilty to all the charges.

In her direct testimony, AAA recounted that on the evening of July 18, 1999, her mother was in Dumaguete City selling mats, and she slept with her two younger brothers and her father. She was later awakened to find that she no longer had her short pants and panty, that her father was beside and behind her, and that his penis was directed at her anus. She managed to keep her legs together, and her father failed to insert his organ into her vagina. She was fourteen years old at the time. Her father warned her not to tell her mother, otherwise he would kill her.

AAA further testified that April 8, 2001 was her birthday and that she had prepared to be alone in their house for the night, her father and mother having gone with her younger brothers to her grandmother's house in Campuan, a neighboring barangay. Her father suddenly arrived at about 5:00 in the afternoon, immediately held her, and took off her short pants and panty. Despite her struggle, he laid her down on the floor of their house and succeeded in inserting his penis into her sexual organ. She felt pain, as this was her first sexual intercourse, and he threatened her with death if she told her mother.

As to the events of April 15, 2001, AAA testified that in the afternoon she was in the house of her aunt DDD when her father arrived and told her to go home with him, saying that her mother was crying because she had left home without permission. When they arrived at their house, however, her mother was not there. Her father held and hugged her, took off her short pants and panty, laid her down, and inserted his sexual organ into hers. After the abuse she wanted to leave, but her father locked the door. At about 9:00 in the evening of the same day, he again took off her shorts and panty and forcibly inserted his sexual organ; and at about 12:00 midnight he again took off her short pants and panty, laid on top of her, and forcibly inserted his penis. She tried to free herself but he held her tightly. She cried and was unable to sleep the whole night because of the pain in her sex organ. Without waiting for her mother and brothers to arrive, she left their house in the morning of April 16, 2001 and went to DDD.

AAA died on January 4, 2003 before she could be subjected to cross-examination. At the hearing on January 20, 2003, the public prosecutor informed the court of her death, and on May 15, 2003 a social worker of the Department of Social Welfare and Development presented her Death Certificate. Upon motion of the defense, her direct testimony was ordered expunged from the records on the ground that she had not been cross-examined. Notwithstanding the expunction, the prosecution presented Gelmie Calug, EEE, Lovella Opada, and Vicente Tiengo, and sought to adduce evidence of res gestae through the testimonies of Calug and EEE.

EEE, AAA's aunt and the sister of her mother, testified that at noontime on April 16, 2001, AAA arrived at her house and she noticed that AAA was sad and crying. Upon inquiry, AAA told her that she had been raped by her father on April 8 and three times hours earlier on April 15, 2001, specifying 7:00 in the evening, 9:00 in the evening, and 12:00 midnight; that she could not shout or free herself because her mouth had been covered. During the few days of AAA's stay at her house, EEE often saw her crying. A few days later, AAA went to the house of Pedro de los Santos to work as a house helper; de los Santos helped her institute the rape cases, and EEE and de los Santos accompanied her to report the incident to the police.

Calug testified that on April 18, 2001, AAA reported for work for the first time as a house helper in the house of Pedro de los Santos. He noticed that she was sad and lonely and often saw her crying. She confided her problems to him and revealed that she had been raped by her own father on April 8 and 15 of that year. He noticed that she had also told their employer of what had befallen her. After eight months she left the de los Santos household, and he did not know her whereabouts thereafter, learning only from a radio broadcast that she was dead.

The RTC found that AAA's utterances to EEE and Calug, though not made immediately or simultaneously with the rape incidents, were so connected with the incidents as to make the act or declaration and the main fact inseparable, and were generated by an excited feeling extending without break or letdown from the moment of the event they illustrated; it also found that the statements were made under circumstances precluding a deliberate design or an opportunity to contrive anything contrary to the actual events. The RTC did not appreciate the special qualifying circumstance of filiation, the baptismal records having been rejected as not public records and therefore insufficient to establish the filial relationship. It rejected XXX's defense for being a simple denial and his alibi for being laden with confusion and uncertainty, he being the lone witness for the defense. The CA affirmed these findings in toto.

• Res Gestae and Hearsay: XXX argued that the RTC erred in considering the testimonies of Calug and EEE as res gestae, maintaining that the statements were purely hearsay because they were offered in court only after two years from the date of the alleged incidents.
• Absence of the Victim's Testimony: XXX argued that he could not be convicted based mainly on the testimonies of Calug and EEE, which he claimed were purely hearsay, and that without AAA's testimony identifying him as the perpetrator of all the acts complained of, he could no longer be found guilty under the crimes charged.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether XXX's guilt for the three (3) counts of Rape was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The appeal lacks merit; the prosecution's evidence, principally the res gestae statements made to EEE and the medico-legal findings consistent with the facts described, established carnal knowledge through force beyond reasonable doubt, and the accused's alibi and denial failed to overcome that evidence.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The conviction stands on the admissible res gestae statements and the corroborating medical evidence, the accused's defenses having failed.
• Propriety of proceeding with trial despite AAA's death: In criminal cases the offended party is the State, and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused; the death of AAA therefore did not extinguish the criminal liability of XXX, and the trial rightfully ensued with the rest of the evidence for the prosecution.
• Exclusion of AAA's direct testimony: Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution guarantees the accused the right to meet the witnesses face to face, echoed in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court. The right to cross-examine is essential to test the credibility and truthfulness of the testimony offered and affords the accused an opportunity to demonstrate substantial inconsistencies that could create reasonable doubt. The RTC was therefore correct in excluding AAA's direct testimony from the records notwithstanding its incriminating contents.
• Res gestae framework: Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible because it is not given under oath or solemn affirmation and has not undergone the benefit of cross-examination. Section 42, Rule 130 admits an exception for statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof. The requisites are: (i) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (ii) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (iii) that the statements concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. The ratio of the exception is that a statement made under external circumstances of physical or mental shock, while reflective faculties are stilled, is a spontaneous and sincere response to actual sensations and perceptions; the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself.
• Admissibility of the statements to EEE: EEE's testimony placed AAA's utterances only several hours from the time the disputed incidents took place on April 15, 2001, at 7:00 p.m., 9:00 p.m., and 12:00 midnight; AAA arrived at EEE's house at noontime on April 16, 2001, sad and crying, and revealed that she had been raped by her father. At the time of the utterance, the effect of the occurrence on her mind still continued, and her demeanor showed that she was still suffering as a result of the violation of her person and honor by her father. Following the standard in People vs. Manhuyod, Jr., the utterances, though not contemporaneous with the act described, remained so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the main fact particularly inseparable. Nothing in the records showed an intervening event between the rape incidents and the revelation to EEE that would indicate a restoration of her mental balance; she was in fact still under distress when she arrived at EEE's home. The revelation, made about twelve hours after the rape, was voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction it illustrates and explains, and under circumstances excluding the idea of design or deliberation.
• Inadmissibility of the statements to Calug: Calug's testimony consisted of statements given by AAA on April 18, 2001, or three days after the April 15, 2001 incidents. Although the accounts of EEE and Calug were similar as regards AAA's utterances, the records disclosed that AAA helped in the household chores for several days in EEE's home and subsequently looked for a job elsewhere, eventually working as a house helper for Pedro de los Santos, where she met Calug. These circumstances, coupled with the fact that the statements to Calug were made three days after the April 15, 2001 incidents, showed a significant break in the connection between the rape incidents and the time the statements were made. The utterances to Calug were therefore far too removed from the event described as to form part of the res gestae. This did not, however, affect the conviction, because the critical element of carnal knowledge through force was sufficiently established by the clear and straightforward testimony of EEE together with the medico-legal findings consistent with the facts described.
• Deference to factual findings: In the absence of facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court. No cogent reason existed to reverse the RTC's appreciation of the evidence, which the CA had affirmed in toto.
• Failure of alibi and denial: For the defense of alibi to overcome a prima facie finding of guilt, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the approximate time of its commission; the defense must be supported by strong evidence of innocence independent of the accused's self-serving statements. XXX simply claimed that he was elsewhere, in Palawan, at the time the alleged rapes occurred, but his testimony was replete with uncertainties, as he could not even remember the date when he was allegedly working on a fishing boat in Palawan, and he failed to produce any other witness to corroborate his testimony despite having the opportunity to do so.
• Sufficiency of the quantum of proof: Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, that produces absolute certainty; only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The prosecution's evidence met this standard.
• Modification of damages: The award of damages was modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence, as enunciated in People vs. Jugueta.

• Res gestae — Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, as well as statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it legal significance, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. The exception rests on the experience that under external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may still the reflective faculties and remove their control, so that the utterance is a spontaneous and sincere response to actual sensations and perceptions rather than a product of reason and reflection. The Court applied the exception to admit AAA's statements to EEE, made about twelve hours after the last rape while she remained under continuing distress.
• Requisites of res gestae — Three requisites must concur: (i) the principal act, the res gestae, must be a startling occurrence; (ii) the statements must have been made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (iii) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. The Court found all three satisfied as to the utterances made to EEE and all three wanting as to those made to Calug.
• Spontaneity test (Manhuyod factors) — In determining whether statements offered as part of the res gestae satisfy the requirement of spontaneity, the following factors are considered: (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. No fixed interval of time governs admissibility; the statements need not be contemporaneous with the primary fact but must be so connected with it as to make the act or declaration and the main fact particularly inseparable, or be generated by an excited feeling extending without break or letdown from the moment of the event they illustrate. What the law distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought.
• Right to cross-examination and confrontation — Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution guarantees the accused the right to meet the witnesses face to face, a guarantee echoed in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court. The right is essential to test the credibility and truthfulness of the testimony offered and to afford the accused an opportunity to demonstrate substantial inconsistencies that could create reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Where the witness dies before cross-examination, the direct testimony must be excluded from the records notwithstanding its incriminating contents.
• Death of the private complainant does not extinguish criminal liability — In criminal cases, the offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused. The death of the complainant therefore does not extinguish the criminal liability of the accused, and the trial may proceed on the remaining evidence for the prosecution.
• Alibi — For the defense of alibi to overcome a prima facie finding of guilt, the accused must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at the approximate time of its commission. The defense must be supported by strong evidence of innocence independent of the accused's self-serving statements.
• Proof beyond reasonable doubt — Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, that produces absolute certainty; only moral certainty is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

• "Res gestae means the 'things done.' It 'refers to those exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.'" — The Court's canonical formulation of the res gestae exception, drawn from People vs. Estibal citing People vs. Sanchez, and the definition against which the admissibility of AAA's out-of-court statements was measured.
• "In a manner of speaking, the spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the declarant speaking for himself." — States the theoretical justification for the exception, explaining why a spontaneous utterance made under the stress of nervous excitement is treated as trustworthy despite the absence of oath and cross-examination.
• "The rule is that the statements, to be admissible, should have been made before there had been time or opportunity to devise or contrive anything contrary to the real facts that occurred. What the law altogether distrusts is not afterspeech but afterthought." — Articulates the second requisite of res gestae and the rationale for measuring spontaneity by the absence of opportunity for deliberation; the Court used this standard to distinguish the statements to EEE from those to Calug.
• "In this light, the Court finds that the utterances made to Calug are far too removed from the event described as to form part of the res gestae." — The Court's conclusion excluding the three-day-late statements from the res gestae exception, illustrating that a significant break in connection between the incident and the declaration defeats spontaneity.

• People vs. Estibal, 748 Phil. 850 (2014) — Cited as the source of the Court's exposition of the ratio behind the res gestae exception and of the definition of res gestae; the Court adopted its formulation in full.
• People vs. Sanchez, 287 Phil. 1003 (1992) — Cited in Estibal and relied upon by the RTC for the standard that declarations must be voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction they illustrate or explain, and under circumstances necessarily excluding the ideas of design or deliberation.
• People vs. Manhuyod, Jr., 352 Phil. 866 (1988) — Controlling precedent laying down the five factors for determining whether statements offered as part of the res gestae satisfy the requirement of spontaneity; the Court expressly applied these factors to AAA's utterances.
• People vs. Lacson, 459 Phil. 330 (2003) — Cited for the proposition that in criminal cases the offended party is the State and the role of the private complainant is limited to the determination of the civil liability of the accused.
• People vs. Rivera, 414 Phil. 430 (2001) — Cited for the right of an accused to cross-examine a witness as essential to testing the credibility and truthfulness of the testimony offered.
• Miro vs. Vda. de Erederos, 721 Phil. 772 (2013) — Cited for the rule that a witness may testify only on facts derived from his own perception and not on what he has merely learned or heard from others.
• Country Bankers Insurance Corp. vs. Lianga Bay & Community Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 425 Phil. 511 (2002) — Cited for the reasons hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible: serious concerns on trustworthiness and reliability, absence of oath or solemn affirmation, and lack of cross-examination.
• People vs. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017 — Cited for the rule that appellate courts will not overturn the factual findings of the trial court absent facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect the result of the case.
• People vs. Alvarez, 461 Phil. 188 (2003) — Cited for the requisites of alibi: the accused must prove not only that he was elsewhere when the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the crime scene or in its immediate vicinity at the approximate time of its commission.
• People vs. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806 (2016) — Cited as the basis for modifying the award of damages to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.

• Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused the right to meet the witnesses face to face; applied to justify the exclusion of AAA's direct testimony, which had not been subjected to cross-examination.
• Section 1(f), Rule 115, Rules of Court — Echoes the constitutional right of the accused to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; cited alongside the constitutional provision as the basis for excluding AAA's untested testimony.
• Section 42, Rule 130, Rules of Court — The res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, admitting statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, and statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue and giving it legal significance; the provision under which AAA's statements to EEE were admitted and those to Calug were rejected.
• Article 266-A, Paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, as amended — Defines rape; the provision under which XXX was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended — The provision cited in the Informations as the basis of the rape charges.
• Article 5 and Article 51, Revised Penal Code — Cited in the Information for Attempted Rape in relation to Article 266-A, defining the stages of execution of the felony.
• Rule 133, Section 2, Rules of Court — Defines proof beyond reasonable doubt as not requiring absolute certainty but only moral certainty, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
• Section 13(c), Rule 124, Rules of Court — The mode of appeal invoked in bringing the case from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
• Republic Act No. 7610, Republic Act No. 9262, and Section 40 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC — Cited in the footnote for the withholding of the victim's identity and of information that could establish or compromise it, and for the use of fictitious names in the decision.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, A. Reyes, Jr., and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.