People of the Philippines vs. Wilson Salvador y Gagarin

Carnal knowledge of a woman against her will through force, threat, or intimidation constitutes rape, and intimidation is established where the accused, the victim’s uncle, poked a knife at her neck and threatened to kill her; the victim’s delay in reporting and the accused’s unsubstantiated sweetheart defense do not negate the crime.

Myra S. Aucena is the niece of accused-appellant Wilson Salvador y Gagarin, being the daughter of his older sister Lydia Salvador. After Myra’s mother died in 1979, she was raised by her paternal grandparents in Manaoag, Pangasinan until she finished secondary education; her maternal uncles Maximo, Wenceslao, and Nestor Salvador later offered to send her to college, and it was agreed that she would stay with her maternal grandmother Priscila Salvador in Salinungan East, San Mateo, Isabela. At the time of the acts charged, rape was punished under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

Myra S. Aucena is the niece of accused Wilson Salvador y Gagarin, being the daughter of his older sister Lydia Salvador. Myra was two years old when her mother died in 1979, and she was raised by her paternal grandparents in Manaoag, Pangasinan until she finished her secondary education. After graduation from high school, her maternal uncles Maximo, Wenceslao, and Nestor Salvador offered to send her to college, and it was agreed that she would stay with her maternal grandmother Priscila Salvador at Salinungan East, San Mateo, Isabela to facilitate her studies. She transferred there around March 1995. Priscila’s house had two stories; Priscila slept on the ground floor, while accused Wilson, Priscila’s son and Myra’s uncle, slept on the second floor. The second floor had only one room but was divided into two sleeping quarters by a collapsible divider. Myra used to sleep with her grandmother, but in August 1995, Priscila, who was then sick, advised Myra to sleep upstairs to avoid being contaminated by her illness. Accused Wilson slept on a bed at one side while Myra slept on the bamboo floor at the other side of the divider.

In the early evening of August 30, 1995, Myra was awakened by a heavy weight on top of her. She recognized the person as accused Wilson, her uncle. She froze because the accused was poking a knife at her right neck and at the same time telling her “saan ka nga agriyao ta no agriyao ka patayin ka” (Don’t shout or else I will kill you). Accused kissed all parts of her body while she was still dressed. Thereafter, still holding the knife with his left hand, accused removed her shirt, short pants, panty, and bra with his right hand. He mashed her breasts, forcibly separated her two legs, and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. Having been seized with fear, she was not able to do anything but cry after the accused was done with his act. This abuse was repeated on several occasions for over a year during her stay with her grandmother and the accused.

Myra stopped living in the house of her grandmother when another uncle, Nestor Salvador, took her and brought her to his house in Calamagui, Ilagan, Isabela on January 19, 1997. On February 24, 1997, her father, Sisenando Aucena, fetched her from Nestor’s house because his younger son, Luther John, suspected that something was wrong with her. While there, Sisenando noticed her pregnancy. Myra thus had to reveal the ordeal she underwent in the hands of the accused. She gave birth to Cherry May on June 20, 1997 as a result of the forced coitus.

Sisenando Aucena testified as to the efforts of Dolores Ramones, Panting Manuel, Sangguniang member Pulig, Sangguniang member Fermin, Nestor Salvador, Santiago Manguba, Maura Salvador, Angelito Manguba, and Kagawad Dominador Bonalos, relatives of the accused, to seek a compromise agreement or settlement of the case. They first offered to give the land supposed to be inherited by Sisenando’s children. They also offered to give the land that was supposed to be inherited by Wilson Salvador. However, the relatives did not comply with their promise, so the settlement did not materialize. Accused-appellant denied the rape charge and alleged that it was Myra who seduced him and that what occurred was consented sexual intercourse as they shared a romantic relationship. He claimed that it was Myra who first came to his bed to sleep with him in July 1995; he scolded her, but eventually they developed mutual love for each other and thus had numerous consented sexual acts. He also denied knowledge of the offer of compromise of his relatives and allegedly did not authorize them to enter into any settlement with Sisenando.

The trial court found that the victim looked upon the accused as her father.

• Force and Intimidation: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him because no force was employed; the victim did not offer any resistance, never shouted for help, and did not create any commotion that could have aroused her grandmother, so what happened was the product of two persons freely and voluntarily consenting to each other’s advances.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Accused-appellant maintained that the trial court erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Delay in Reporting: Accused-appellant contended that the delay of two years in reporting the acts charged rendered the truth of the charge doubtful.
• Consensual Relationship / Sweetheart Theory: Accused-appellant claimed that Myra seduced him and that what occurred was consented sexual intercourse as they shared a romantic relationship; he alleged that Myra first came to his bed in July 1995, that he scolded her, but that they eventually developed mutual love and had numerous consented sexual acts.
• Compromise Offer: Accused-appellant denied knowledge of the offer of compromise by his relatives and allegedly did not authorize them to enter into any settlement with Sisenando.

• Effect of Subsequent Consent: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that even if the trial court acquitted the accused of the subsequent acts of sexual intercourse on the ground that these were already consensual, the ensuing voluntary relationship does not cure the force and intimidation employed in the initial act constituting one charge for rape.

• Force and Intimidation: Whether the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant of rape despite the alleged absence of force, where the victim did not shout or resist and the accused claimed consent.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the prosecution established accused-appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Delay in Reporting: Whether the victim’s delay of about two years in reporting the rape rendered her charge doubtful.
• Sweetheart Defense: Whether accused-appellant’s claim of a consensual romantic relationship entitled him to acquittal.
• Effect of Acquittal on Subsequent Acts: Whether the acquittal for subsequent acts of sexual intercourse on the ground of consent negates liability for the first act of rape.
• Compromise Offer: Whether the offer of settlement by accused-appellant’s relatives may be received as an implied admission of guilt.
• Damages: Whether the award of P200,000.00 civil indemnity was proper and whether moral and exemplary damages should be awarded.

• Force and Intimidation: No. Force and intimidation were established; the victim was cowed by a knife poked at her neck and a threat to kill, and the uncle-niece relationship bolstered intimidation.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Yes. The prosecution proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the appeal has no merit.
• Delay in Reporting: No. Delay in reporting rape in the face of threats of physical violence cannot be taken against the victim; her silence was explained by fear.
• Sweetheart Defense: No. The affirmative defense of consensual intercourse required convincing proof, and accused presented no evidence such as love letters, gifts, or pictures to substantiate the alleged romantic relationship.
• Effect of Acquittal on Subsequent Acts: No. Each act of rape is separate and distinct; even if subsequent acts were consensual, the first sexual encounter by force constitutes one charge of rape.
• Compromise Offer: Yes. An offer of compromise in criminal cases, except quasi-offenses or those allowed by law, may be received as an implied admission of guilt; rape is not a quasi-offense.
• Damages: Partly. Civil indemnity is mandatory upon finding of rape, but the P200,000.00 award was excessive and reduced to P50,000.00; moral damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 were also awarded.

• Force and Intimidation: Under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape may be committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent. The victim testified that she resisted by boxing the accused, but he still succeeded. She was cowed into submission because the accused poked a knife at her right neck and warned her, “saan ka nga agriyao ta no agriyao ka patayin ka,” translated as “Don’t shout or else I will kill you.” The fact that the accused is the uncle of the victim bolstered the presence of intimidation, and the trial court found that the victim looked upon the accused as her father. For a young lass from the province, this circumstance was sufficient to shut her up and give in to the whims of the accused. The claim that no force was employed therefore fails.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The evidence clearly showed that the accused forced Myra to have sexual intercourse. The victim’s testimony, the knife threat, and the surrounding circumstances established the prosecution’s case beyond reasonable doubt. The appeal was thus without merit.

• Delay in Reporting: The silence of the victim for a period of time does not necessarily indicate a baseless and fabricated charge. Delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of threats of physical violence cannot be taken against the victim. Rape victims prefer to suffer in private than reveal their ordeal to the public and suffer humiliation while risking the rapist’s making good the threat to hurt them. Myra explained that she did not report because she was afraid of the accused’s threat to kill her and her brother, made after having sexual intercourse with her. The delay therefore did not render her charge doubtful.

• Sweetheart Defense: The defense of consensual intercourse merits no consideration. The accused has the burden of establishing by convincing proof his affirmative defense of an alleged romantic relationship. The “sweetheart theory” hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like, to show that he and the private complainant were sweethearts. In this case, the accused was unable to present even an iota of proof to substantiate his claim. His cross-examination showed that he did not court Myra, that they exchanged no gifts or love letters, and that they had no momentous remembrances as sweethearts. The defense therefore failed.

• Effect of Acquittal on Subsequent Acts: Even if the trial court acquitted the accused of the subsequent acts of sexual intercourse on the ground that these were already consensual, the ensuing voluntary relationship does not cure the force and intimidation which appellant employed in the initial act constituting one charge for rape. Each act of rape is considered separate and distinct from one another. Thus, even if the subsequent acts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant were considered consensual, this did not negate the fact that their first sexual encounter, due to force, constituted a ground for one charge of rape.

• Compromise Offer: The offer of settlement made by the relatives of the accused to Myra’s father further militated against the innocence of the accused. An offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Rape is not a quasi-offense. Sisenando testified that the relatives of the accused made two offers to settle with the knowledge of the accused: first, the land supposed to be inherited by Sisenando’s children, and second, the land supposed to be inherited by Wilson Salvador. This testimony was taken as an implied admission of the guilt of the accused.

• Damages: Upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto becomes mandatory. The trial court’s award of P200,000.00 was excessive, and consonant with decided cases, the civil indemnity was reduced to P50,000.00. Moral damages of P50,000.00 were also granted without need of proof, and exemplary damages of P25,000.00 were awarded to discourage abuse of young girls, especially by their relatives.

• Force, Threat, or Intimidation in Rape — Under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation; the gravamen is carnal knowledge against her will or without her consent. Intimidation is present where the accused pokes a knife at the victim’s neck and threatens to kill her. The victim need not shout or offer prolonged resistance if fear overcomes her, and the accused’s relationship as her uncle, especially where she looks upon him as a father, bolsters the presence of intimidation.

• Delay in Reporting Rape — Delay in reporting rape in the face of threats of physical violence cannot be taken against the victim. The silence of the victim for a period of time does not necessarily indicate a baseless and fabricated charge, because rape victims prefer to suffer in private than reveal their ordeal to the public and risk the rapist’s making good the threat to hurt them. In this case, the victim’s silence was explained by her fear of the accused’s threat to kill her and her brother.

• Sweetheart Theory / Affirmative Defense of Consent — The accused bears the burden of establishing by convincing proof the affirmative defense of an alleged romantic relationship. The sweetheart theory hardly deserves any attention when the accused does not present evidence such as love letters, gifts, pictures, and the like to show that he and the private complainant were sweethearts. A bare claim of a consensual relationship is insufficient.

• Each Act of Rape Is Separate and Distinct — Each act of rape is considered separate and distinct from one another. Even if subsequent acts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the complainant were considered consensual, the ensuing voluntary relationship does not cure the force and intimidation employed in the initial act. The first sexual encounter by force constitutes a ground for one charge of rape.

• Offer of Compromise as Implied Admission of Guilt — Under Section 27, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, an offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. Rape is not a quasi-offense. Thus, the relatives’ offers to settle the case, made with the knowledge of the accused, were admissible as an implied admission of guilt.

• Civil Indemnity, Moral and Exemplary Damages in Rape — Upon the finding of the fact of rape, the award of civil indemnity ex delicto is mandatory. Moral damages may be awarded without need of proof, and exemplary damages may be granted to discourage abuse of young girls, especially by their relatives. The amounts may be reduced if the trial court’s award is excessive.

• “The gravamen of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent.” — This defines the core of the crime of rape under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and frames the Court’s analysis of force, threat, or intimidation.
• “The silence of the victim for a period of time does not necessarily indicate a baseless and fabricated charge.” — This rejects the accused’s argument that the two-year delay in reporting rendered the charge doubtful and states the rule on delayed reporting in rape cases.
• “The “sweetheart theory” hardly deserves any attention when an accused does not present any evidence, such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like to show that indeed, he and the private complainant were sweethearts.” — This states the evidentiary standard for the affirmative defense of consensual romantic relationship and explains why the accused’s defense failed.
• “Well-entrenched is the principle that each act of rape is considered separate and distinct from one another.” — This supports the holding that the acquittal for subsequent acts of sexual intercourse on the ground of consent did not negate liability for the first forcible act of rape.

• People vs. Ponsica, G.R. Nos. 137661-63, July 4, 2002 — Cited for the gravamen of rape as carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her consent; the Court also noted its citation of People vs. Cariño, 362 SCRA 292 (2001).
• People vs. Villanueva, G.R. Nos. 146464-67, November 15, 2002 — Cited for the rule that delay in reporting rape in the face of threats of physical violence cannot be taken against the victim; the Court also cited People vs. Ardon, 354 SCRA 609 (2001) and People vs. Alvero, 329 SCRA 737 (2001).
• People vs. De Leon, 332 SCRA 37 (2000) — Cited on the same delay-in-reporting principle.
• People vs. Cepeda, 324 SCRA 290 (2000) and People vs. Barcelona, 325 SCRA 168 (2000) — Cited to support that the accused bears the burden of establishing by convincing proof the affirmative defense of consensual intercourse.
• People vs. Palma, 308 SCRA 466 (1999) — Cited for the rule that the sweetheart theory hardly deserves attention absent evidence such as love letters, gifts, and pictures.
• People vs. Esguerra, 256 SCRA 657 (1996) — Cited for the principle that each act of rape is separate and distinct.
• People vs. Ferrer, G.R. No. 139695, August 26, 2002 — Cited for mandatory civil indemnity ex delicto upon finding of rape.
• People vs. Sitao, G.R. No. 146790, August 22, 2002 — Cited for the award of moral damages without need of proof.
• People vs. Ylanan, G.R. No. 131812, August 22, 2002 — Cited for exemplary damages to discourage abuse of young girls, especially by their relatives.

• Article 335, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — At the time the acts were committed, rape was punished under this provision and could be committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman through force, threat, or intimidation. The Court applied this provision to the August 30, 1995 act.
• Section 27, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court — An offer of compromise by the accused in criminal cases, except quasi-offenses or those allowed by law to be compromised, may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. The Court applied this provision to the relatives’ settlement offers, since rape is not a quasi-offense.

Justices Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales concurred.