People of the Philippines vs. Willy Marquez

The exact date of the commission of rape need not be alleged in the information, the time of commission not being an essential element of the crime; and the death penalty for the rape of a child below seven years old cannot be imposed absent independent evidence, such as a birth certificate, proving the victim's age.

The case reached the Court on automatic review of a conviction rendered under Republic Act No. 7659, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offenses, which authorized the imposition of the death penalty for qualified rape, including rape of a child below seven years old. The accused, Willy Marquez, was charged with three counts of rape against Maria Cristina Agustin, a five-year-old child, in Criminal Cases Nos. 1536-G, 1537-G, and 1538-G.

The accused, Willy Marquez, was charged in three separate informations, all dated February 17, 1998, with three counts of rape committed against Maria Cristina Agustin, a five-year-old girl, in Barangay Bacayao, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. Each information alleged that the offense was committed "on or about the month of October 1997," with lewd design, taking advantage of superior strength, and by means of force and intimidation.

According to the prosecution, sometime in October 1997, the accused forcibly dragged Maria Cristina from her house in Bacayao to a banana plantation at the back of the house, undressed her, spat on her vagina, and had sexual intercourse with her. After the rape, he warned the victim not to tell anyone what he had done. On two other occasions also in October 1997, the accused again dragged Maria Cristina to the banana plantation and raped her in the same manner.

It was only on January 8, 1998 that Maria Cristina confided in detail to her mother what the accused had done to her. Upon the advice of the police, she was brought by her parents to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital for medical examination. Dr. Cora Lacurom, who examined her, found an old healed hymenal laceration at the 6:00 o'clock position, which could have been inflicted through forced sexual intercourse committed in or about October 1997.

Denying any involvement in the offenses, the accused testified that during the daytime for the whole month of October 1997 he was at his place of work hauling palay hay for Honofre Arenas at Barangay Bacayao, Guimba, Nueva Ecija. He claimed that he worked from Monday to Sunday from 6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., with a break from 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m., and that his work included pasturing cows and cleaning their wastes. During break time, he would hang out at the workshop (talyer) of his employer's brother-in-law in front of his workplace, and after dismissal from work he would proceed to the same workshop to learn.

When called to the witness stand at six years of age, Maria Cristina testified clearly that the accused brought her to the banana plantation on three occasions in October 1997, each time removing her clothes and his own, spitting on her private part, and inserting his penis into her vagina, which caused her pain, and each time warning her not to tell anyone. She stated that she finally told her mother after the third incident. The trial court found the victim's testimony clear and credible, and the accused's alibi insufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the complainant.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: Accused-appellant contended that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to state in the three informations the precise dates of the commission of the alleged rapes, insisting that the informations suffered from "constitutional and procedural infirmities" because the date and time of the offenses were indefinite and did not give him an opportunity to prepare for his defense.
• Indefiniteness of the Phrase "On or About the Month of October 1997": Accused-appellant specifically alluded to the phrase "on or about the month of October, 1997" as the dates of commission alleged in the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 1536-G, 1537-G, and 1538-G, arguing that such allegation was insufficient.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: Whether the failure of the three informations to state the precise dates of the commission of the rapes rendered them defective and deprived the accused of the opportunity to prepare his defense.
• Propriety of the Death Penalty: Whether the death penalty was properly imposed for each count of rape where the prosecution failed to present independent proof of the victim's age.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: No. The exact date of the commission of rape is not an essential element of the crime; the information need only allege the approximate time of commission under Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court, and the accused's failure to move for a bill of particulars or to quash the informations waived any objection on that ground.
• Propriety of the Death Penalty: No. The qualifying circumstance of the victim's minority must be both alleged and proved with independent evidence, such as a birth certificate; absent such proof, the penalty must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

• Sufficiency of the Informations: The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars under Rule 116, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, which the accused may file at or before arraignment. The records showed that the accused did not ask for a bill of particulars, and the failure to move for specification or to quash the information on any of the grounds provided in the Rules deprived him of the right to object to evidence lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charged a definite crime. It was too late for the accused to raise the issue for the first time on appeal, since objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made at that stage. On the merits, the exact date of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code; the gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under the circumstances enumerated therein, namely, (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Rule 110, Section 11, as long as the information alleges that the offense was committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed," the information is sufficient. When the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, the time need not be proven as alleged, and the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action. The Court had previously held that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constituted sufficient compliance with Rule 110, Section 11. In any event, even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during trial, and any objection based on that ground was deemed waived as a result of the accused's failure to object before arraignment.

• Propriety of the Death Penalty: The trial court meted out the death penalty pursuant to Section 11 [7] of Republic Act No. 7659, which was in force at the time of the commission of the crime and which provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the attendant circumstances, including when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old. That circumstance qualifies the crime of rape and must therefore be both alleged in the information and proved with competent and convincing evidence. Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree of penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. Recent rulings relative to the rape of minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused; a duly certified certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some other official document or record such as a school record, has been recognized as competent evidence. While the informations sufficiently alleged the minority of Maria Cristina, the prosecution did not present proof to substantiate the age of the victim, such as her birth certificate. This became crucial considering that the prosecution had to establish with moral certainty that the victim was below seven years old at the time of the rape to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Accordingly, the penalty imposed on the accused was reduced to reclusion perpetua. As to damages, while the trial court awarded moral damages, it did not award any indemnity ex delicto. A civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically given to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of rape, and consistent with present case law treating the imposition of civil indemnity as mandatory upon a finding of rape, the accused should likewise be ordered to pay P50,000.00 for each count of rape. This civil indemnity is distinct from and awarded in addition to moral damages, the two being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. The accused should likewise be made to pay exemplary damages, which, in line with prevailing jurisprudence, is pegged at P25,000.00 for each count of rape.

• Time of commission of rape is not an essential element — The gravamen of rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Because time is not an element, an information alleging that the offense was committed "at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed" is sufficient, and the time need not be proven as alleged. The Court applied this rule in sustaining the informations' allegation that the rapes were committed "on or about the month of October 1997."
• Remedy for an indefinite information — motion for a bill of particulars — Under Rule 116, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the accused may, at or before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. Failure to move for specification or to quash the information deprives the accused of the right to object to evidence lawfully introduced and admitted under an information of more or less general terms but which sufficiently charges a definite crime. The Court held that the accused's failure to avail of this remedy, and his raising of the objection for the first time on appeal, barred the challenge.
• Waiver of objections to the information — Objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Even if the information failed to allege with certainty the time of the commission of the rapes, the defect, if any, was cured by the evidence presented during trial, and any objection based on that ground was deemed waived.
• Alibi — For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the accused was and the place where the crime transpired, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Alibi is almost always flawed not only by its inherent weakness but also by its implausibility; it is easily susceptible of concoction and viewed invariably with suspicion, and may be considered with favor only when established by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence. Where no one corroborates the alibi, the defense becomes all the weaker. The Court rejected the accused's alibi because he himself admitted that his workplace was only 250 meters from the victim's house, and his claim that the road was muddy was belied by his own admission that it did not rain during October 1997 because it was the height of the El Niño phenomenon.
• Denial as a defense — Plain denial, a negative and self-serving evidence, cannot stand against the positive identification and categorical testimony made by a victim of rape. A mere denial is seldom given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of a witness who creditably testifies on affirmative matters.
• Credibility of a child-complainant in rape — In a prosecution for rape, the complainant's credibility becomes the single most important issue. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credit, as the willingness of the complainant to face police investigation and to undergo the trouble and humiliation of a public trial is eloquent testimony of the truth of her complaint. It is most improbable for a five-year-old girl of tender years, so innocent and so guileless, to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.
• Proof of age for the imposition of the death penalty in qualified rape — When the law specifies certain circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree of penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. To justify the imposition of death for the rape of a minor, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. A duly certified certificate of live birth accurately showing the complainant's age, or some other official document or record such as a school record, has been recognized as competent evidence. Absent such proof, the death penalty cannot be imposed.
• Civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages in rape — A civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically given to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of rape, and its imposition is mandatory upon a finding of rape. This civil indemnity is distinct from and awarded in addition to moral damages, the two being based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Exemplary damages may likewise be awarded to curb the disturbing trend of crimes against children, pegged at P25,000.00 for each count of rape in line with prevailing jurisprudence.

• "It is settled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element thereof, as this crime is defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e. (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the sufficiency of the informations, establishing that the exact date of commission need not be alleged because time is not an essential element of rape.
• "The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars." — This passage defines the procedural remedy the accused should have availed of, and grounds the Court's holding that the objection was waived when raised for the first time on appeal.
• "Jurisprudence dictates that when the law specifies certain circumstances that will qualify an offense and thus attach to it a greater degree of penalty, such circumstances must be both alleged and proven in order to justify the imposition of the graver penalty. Recent rulings of the Court relative to the rape of minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of death, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on proof of age for the imposition of the death penalty in qualified rape, which was the basis for reducing the penalty to reclusion perpetua.
• "For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime." — This passage states the canonical two-part requirement for the defense of alibi, which the Court applied in rejecting the accused's defense.

• People vs. Gianan y Molina, G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000 — Cited as the source of the rule that the time of the commission of rape is not an element thereof under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, and that the gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal knowledge under the enumerated circumstances.
• People vs. Bugayong, 299 SCRA 528 [1998] — Cited for the rule that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the offense, the time need not be proven as alleged, and the complaint will be sustained if the proof shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before the commencement of the action.
• Rocaberte vs. People, 193 SCRA 152 [1991] — Cited for the rule that the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of commission with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars, and that the accused's failure to avail of such remedy precludes objection on appeal.
• People vs. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463 [1997] — Cited for the rule that objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal, and that the remedy was to move for the quashal of the information on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form.
• People vs. Tabanggay, G.R. No. 130504, June 29, 2000 — Cited for the rule that in order to justify the imposition of death in the rape of a minor, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the victim, such as a duly certified certificate of live birth or some other official document or record.
• People vs. Pili, 289 SCRA 118 [1998] — Cited for the rule that a civil indemnity of P50,000.00 is automatically given to the offended party without need of further evidence other than the fact of rape.
• People vs. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 [1994] — Cited for the rule that alibi is almost always flawed by its inherent weakness and implausibility, is easily susceptible of concoction, and may be considered with favor only when established by positive, clear, and satisfactory evidence.
• People vs. Altabano, G.R. No. 121344, October 29, 1999, 317 SCRA 708 — Cited for the rule that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time the crime was committed but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime.

• Rule 116, Section 10, Rules of Court (now Rule 116, Section 9, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure) — Provides that the accused may, at or before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial, and that the motion shall specify the alleged defects and details desired. The Court applied this provision in holding that the accused's failure to move for a bill of particulars precluded him from objecting to the indefiniteness of the dates alleged in the informations.
• Rule 110, Section 11, Rules of Court — Provides that it is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense was committed as the information or complaint will permit. The Court applied this provision in sustaining the informations' allegation that the rapes were committed "on or about the month of October 1997."
• Rule 110, Section 6, Rules of Court — Provides that the information need only state the approximate time of the commission of the offense. The Court cited this provision in holding that the informations sufficiently complied with the rules on the allegation of time.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code — Defines the crime of rape and enumerates the circumstances under which carnal knowledge constitutes the offense: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. The Court relied on this provision in holding that the time of commission is not an element of the crime.
• Republic Act No. 7659, Section 11 [7] — Provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the attendant circumstances, including when the victim is a religious or a child below seven years old. The Court held that this qualifying circumstance must be both alleged in the information and proved with competent and convincing evidence, and that absent independent proof of the victim's age, the death penalty could not be imposed.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.