People of the Philippines vs. William Page

A conspirator in robbery is liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide even if he did not personally participate in the killing, where the conspiracy to commit robbery is conclusively shown by the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused and the homicide is committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, unless it appears that he endeavored to prevent the homicide.

William Page, an eighteen-year-old third-year high school student at Arellano University in Pasay City, and Crisanto Camposano, alias Boy Sangkay, of Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal, had been friends since boyhood. Page's extrajudicial confession was taken on February 24, 1972, before the 1973 Constitution took effect, so the requisites for the taking of custodial confessions under section 20, article IV of that Constitution did not govern its admissibility.

William Page, an eighteen-year-old third-year high school student at Arellano University in Pasay City, and Crisanto Camposano, alias Boy Sangkay, of Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, Parañaque, Rizal, had been friends since boyhood. At around four o'clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1972, Camposano went to Page's house at 143 Pildira Street, near the Manila International Airport, Pasay City. From there the two proceeded to Camposano's house, where they met the latter's father drinking with a companion; the father gave Page some liquor, and the two stayed at the house until ten o'clock in the evening.

At past ten o'clock that evening, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda at the intersection of Taft Avenue and F. B. Harrison Boulevard and boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with a balisong knife and Camposano with a revolver. Page seated himself beside a male passenger near the driver on the front seat, while Camposano took a seat at the back, where two female passengers were seated. The male passenger was Randolf Scot, a thirty-year-old employee of the Hyatt Regency Hotel on his way to work; the female passengers were the sisters Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo and Cesarea Villaverde.

According to Page's confession, while the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, he and Camposano told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue going to M. Roxas Boulevard and then to turn left going to Parañaque, where they held up the driver and the three passengers and took their money and jewelry. From the jeepney's rear view mirror, Page saw Camposano dumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard in front of Casa Marcos. The two then directed the driver to proceed to the airport and left the jeepney at Pildira Street, where Page resided; Camposano gave Page a watch and a woman's ring as his share of the loot. Page admitted that he had previously been charged with theft, a case dismissed in the municipal court, and that he knew certain hoodlums whose specialty was holding up taxicabs.

Scot gave a slightly different account. He testified that when the jeepney reached the portion of Harrison Boulevard in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank, Page pressed a knife at his neck and shouted, "This is a holdup. Don't move." Page took Scot's diary book containing a one-peso bill and ordered the driver, Eduardo Dilla, to shut off the jeepney's lights, to turn left on Russel Avenue, and to proceed to Roxas Boulevard; Page and Camposano covered their faces with pieces of cloth. Camposano told the women passengers to bring out their money and not to shout "or else there will be shots," and they replied that they had already given everything to him. In front of Casa Marcos and El Presidente Hotel, one of the women jumped out of the jeepney while the other shouted; Camposano kicked her, causing her to fall out of the jeepney. Noticing that a car was following and believing it to be a police car, Camposano ordered Dilla to drive at full speed. At an isolated place called Baltao Street near the airport, the two told the driver to stop; Page robbed Scot of his other one-peso bill and divested the driver of his earnings after boxing him for making some resistance. The two malefactors then fled into a dark alley, and Scot and Dilla reported the holdup to the Parañaque police at about eleven o'clock.

Lieutenant Casiano Eugenio, the precinct commander, showed the two robbery victims a photograph of Camposano, whom Dilla and Scot identified as one of the two hoodlums. Eugenio and the two victims repaired to Camposano's residence at Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, where Dilla pointed him out, but Camposano fired shots at them and eluded pursuit in the darkness; he was later killed by Pasay City policemen while committing another crime. The next day policemen went to Page's residence near the airport to apprehend him, but he was not there; his father, in the presence of his aunt, promised to surrender him. Page was arrested in the morning of February 24, 1972 at the Jose Abad Santos High School of Arellano University, and in the afternoon of that day his statement was taken down by Patrolman C. Prepena and sworn to before the municipal judge. The woman who jumped from the jeepney was Veronica Balacapo; she was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by a good Samaritan, Manolo Daval Santos, and was already dead when she reached the hospital. Her sister Cesarea Villaverde, who was pushed out of the jeepney, was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila, and the record is not clear whether she survived. The postmortem examination of the body of Veronica Balacapo, a forty-two-year-old married woman, revealed abrasions on the left eyebrow, left shoulder, left elbow and sacral region; bilateral severe hematoma on the occipital region of the scalp; fractures on the base of the cranial fossa and the fourth and fifth ribs along the midclavicular line; and hemorrhage in the posterior cranial fossa. Death was caused by the severe and traumatic meningeal hemorrhage.

On February 15, 1972, before Page was arrested, the chief of police filed a complaint for robbery with murder in the municipal court of Parañaque against Camposano and John Doe, based on the investigation of Dilla and Scot; Page presented no evidence at the preliminary investigation. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal convicted Page. On the disputed issue of the confession, the trial court made a searching and conscientious analysis of the evidence on the alleged duress employed by the police and concluded that the confession was voluntary. On the alibi, Page testified during the trial that at the time of the holdup he was residing with his aunt at 26 Simbo Street, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Rizal, and that he was sick; his school record, however, showed that at the time of the holdup he was residing with his father at 143 Pildira Street, Pasay City, near the airport, and that on February 11, 1972, two days before the holdup, he was not absent from school.

• Repudiated Confession: Page contended that the trial court erred in relying on his repudiated extrajudicial confession, which he claimed had been extracted from him through maltreatment while he was in the custody of the police.
• Failure of Identification: Page contended that the trial court erred in convicting him although he was not identified by Randolf Scot, the prosecution's eyewitness, at the trial.
• Weak Circumstantial Evidence: Page contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of weak circumstantial evidence, his guilt not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• Absence of Participation in the Killing: In his letters to the Court, Page, not being a lawyer and not knowing the rules on conspiracy, insisted that he had nothing to do with the death of Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo.

• Voluntariness of the Extrajudicial Confession: Whether the trial court erred in relying on Page's repudiated extrajudicial confession despite his claim that it was extracted through duress.
• Identification by the Prosecution Eyewitness: Whether Page's conviction was proper notwithstanding that prosecution eyewitness Randolf Scot did not identify him during the trial.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Defense of Alibi: Whether Page's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt, or whether the prosecution's evidence was merely circumstantial and his alibi should have been credited.
• Conspiracy and Liability for Robbery with Homicide: Whether Page, as a co-conspirator of Camposano, should be held liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only.

• Voluntariness of the Extrajudicial Confession: No error. The confession was voluntary, and having been taken before the 1973 Constitution took effect, it is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of article IV were not observed.
• Identification by the Prosecution Eyewitness: No error. Scot's failure to identify Page at the trial is of no moment because Page's own confession admitted his participation in the holdup, and that confession was corroborated by the evidence on the corpus delicti.
• Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Defense of Alibi: No. The alibi was a complete fabrication belied by Page's school record, and it did not satisfy the requirement of showing that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed.
• Conspiracy and Liability for Robbery with Homicide: Page is liable for robbery with homicide. Conspiracy to commit robbery was conclusively shown by the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused, and all who took part in the robbery are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in the killing.

• Voluntariness of the Extrajudicial Confession: Patrolman Prepena, who took Page's confession, testified on its voluntariness, while Lieutenant Eugenio, the precinct commander, and Patrolmen Manolito Miranda and Jose Elquiero, the arresting officer, denied that Page was maltreated while in police custody. Page himself admitted that when he was brought before the municipal judge for the administration of the oath on his confession, he could have complained to the latter about the alleged maltreatment but did not; his aunt, Prudencia Alupit, and his own lawyer visited him in jail, and although he allegedly confided the maltreatment to them and requested them to take action against the policemen, they never complained to the proper authorities. The trial court's conclusion that the confession was voluntary, reached after a searching and conscientious analysis of the evidence on the alleged duress, was sustained. Because the confession was taken before the new Constitution took effect, it is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of article IV were not observed, following Magtoto vs. Manguera. Certain details in the confession were strong indicia of its authenticity: Page specified that his residence was at 143 Pildira Street, an address jibing with his school record; that his maternal surname is Ubina; that he met Camposano at four o'clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1972; that they went to Camposano's residence where he was given liquor by Camposano's father; that he directed the driver to follow a certain route; that Camposano was from Sorsogon; that he was acquainted with certain hoodlums; and that he had been charged with theft. These details would not have been embodied in the confession had Page not freely disclosed them to the police.

• Identification by the Prosecution Eyewitness: Scot did not point to Page at the trial as the person who sat beside him on the front seat of the jeepney and pressed an open knife at his neck; testifying nine months after the occurrence, Scot could not remember Page's face and recalled only that Page's hair was thick. Patrolman Ruben Crue Santiago, one of those who investigated Page, testified that the latter was sporting long hair and looked like a hippie at the time of the investigation, and Page's photographs taken in July 1971, about seven months before the holdup when he was booked for theft, showed that he had long hair. Scot's failure to identify Page during the trial is of no moment because the crucial fact is that Page, in his own confession, admitted his participation in the holdup, stating therein that he boarded the passenger jeepney at the Baclaran rotonda bound for Manila via Harrison, that he sat in front beside the male passenger while Camposano sat at the rear, that they held up the jeep and the passengers in front of the San Antonio Bank and directed the driver to Russel Avenue toward M. Roxas Boulevard and then to Parañaque, that they took the money and jewelry of the passengers and the driver, that he saw in the mirror Camposano dropping the two women in front of Casa Marcos on Roxas Boulevard, and that they thereafter had themselves brought to the MIA and alighted at Pildira, Pasay City. Scot's testimony and the necropsy report proved the corpus delicti, or the fact that robbery with homicide was committed, and Page's extrajudicial confession was corroborated by the evidence on the corpus delicti under section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

• Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Defense of Alibi: Once the confession is conceded to be voluntary, there can be no doubt as to Page's guilt, the confession not having been vitiated by compulsion or constraint. The alibi interposed during the trial, which counsel did not bother to discuss in his brief, appeared to be a complete fabrication: Page testified that at the time of the holdup he was residing with his aunt at 26 Simbo Street, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Rizal, and that he was sick, but his school record showed that he was then residing with his father at 143 Pildira Street, Pasay City, near the airport, and that on February 11, 1972, two days before the holdup, he was not absent from school. In any event, even if he had been a Makati resident at the time of the holdup, that would not have precluded his participation in the offense at Baclaran, Parañaque, which is not very far from Fort Bonifacio. To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was in another place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission, a requirement Page's alibi did not satisfy.

• Conspiracy and Liability for Robbery with Homicide: It was Camposano alone who directly brought about Veronica's death, and his culpability for that deed cannot be disputed whether Veronica jumped from the jeepney, as Scot testified, or was kicked and pushed out by Camposano, as stated in Page's confession. If Veronica jumped, it must have been because she was in mortal dread that Camposano would shoot her; as fear gripped her, she thought in desperation of scampering out of the moving jeepney, her head struck the pavement, it was broken, a hemorrhage ensued, and she died before medical assistance could be extended to her. The rule is that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries. The trial court's conclusion as to conspiracy was borne out by the evidence: Page and Camposano were boyhood friends; about six hours before the crime they were already together; they were at the Baclaran rotonda at around ten o'clock in the evening or shortly before the holdup; they boarded the jeepney at that place; inside the jeepney they coordinated their actions; they directed the driver to go near the airport or in the vicinity of Page's residence, a place well known to both; and they left the jeepney together and fled in the same direction. There was not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit robbery existed between them, and the fact that the two armed themselves with deadly weapons, a knife and a revolver, signified that they were determined to kill their victims in order to consummate their objective. Conspiracy may be inferred from their acts, which revealed that they had agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney, and the Court took judicial notice that such robbery had been frequently committed since the jeepney came into existence as a public conveyance. The agreement was implemented when they waited for a passenger jeepney at the Baclaran rotonda and boarded it at the same time; had they no evil intention, they could have sat together at the back, but instead Page took the front seat so that he could control the driver and at the same time extort money from him and the other passenger in front, while Camposano took a seat at the back so that he could rob the two female passengers. Their behavior inside the jeepney disclosed a synchronization of actions evincing a prior concert and plan to commit robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons, and Page should answer for all the consequences of the conspiracy, including the homicide intertwined with the robbery committed by his conspirator, the homicide having been committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Where the conspiracy to commit robbery is conclusively shown by the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused and homicide is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion, of the robbery, all of the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in the killing; generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty of the special complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide, a rule followed in Spanish jurisprudence. Page's presence in the front seat, armed with a balisong, must have emboldened Camposano to threaten Veronica Balacapo and to cause her death with impunity. The lower court, however, failed to order the accused to pay the sum of P95 as the value of the things taken by Camposano from the deceased victim.

• Conspiracy may be inferred from the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused — Conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement; it may be deduced from the acts of the accused themselves when those acts, taken together, reveal a common design and a synchronization of purpose. In this case, the Court found the conspiracy from the fact that Page and Camposano, boyhood friends who had been together some six hours before the crime, waited at the Baclaran rotonda, boarded the same passenger jeepney at the same time, deliberately seated themselves apart (Page in front to control the driver and rob the front passenger, Camposano at the rear to rob the female passengers), directed the driver toward the airport near Page's residence, and alighted and fled together in the same direction. The Court also held that their arming themselves with a knife and a revolver signified a determination to kill their victims in order to consummate their objective.

• Liability of every conspirator in robo con homicidio — Where a conspiracy to commit robbery is conclusively shown by the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused, and homicide is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion, of the robbery, all of the accused are guilty of robbery with homicide whether or not they actually participated in the killing. Generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven, all those who took part in the robbery are guilty of the special complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. The doctrine rests on the principle that a conspirator is answerable for all the consequences of the conspiracy, including acts done by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the common design. Applied to Page, the rule made him a co-principal in the robbery with homicide notwithstanding that it was Camposano alone who directly caused Veronica Balacapo's death.

• Immediate sense of danger; responsibility for injuries sustained in an attempt to escape — If a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes that person to try to escape, and in so doing the latter injures himself, the man who created such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries. The Court applied the rule to hold that even on Scot's version — that Veronica jumped from the moving jeepney — Camposano remained culpable for her death, since her desperate leap was caused by mortal dread that he would shoot her, and her head struck the pavement, causing the meningeal hemorrhage that killed her.

• Requisites of alibi — To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was in another place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. Page's claim that he was residing with his aunt in Fort Bonifacio, Makati, and was sick failed this test, both because it was belied by his school record and because, in any event, Fort Bonifacio is not very far from Baclaran, Parañaque, where the holdup took place.

• Admissibility of confessions taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution — A confession taken before the new Constitution took effect is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of article IV were not observed. The Court relied on this rule in rejecting Page's challenge to the voluntariness and admissibility of the confession taken from him on February 24, 1972.

• Corroboration of an extrajudicial confession by evidence on the corpus delicti — An extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence on the corpus delicti when the testimony of witnesses and the medical findings independently establish that the crime charged was committed. Here, Scot's testimony and the necropsy report proved the corpus delicti of robbery with homicide, and the confession was accordingly corroborated under section 3, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.

• "The rule is that where the conspirarcy to commit robbery was conclusively shown by the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused, and homicide was committed as consequence, or on the occasion, of the robbery, all of the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in the killing (People vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5; People vs. Puno, L-31594, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 659, 663)." — This is the ratio decidendi on the central issue of Page's liability: it states the canonical formulation of a conspirator's liability for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide even absent direct participation in the killing.

• "The rule is that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries (People vs. Toling, L-27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17,33)." — This passage disposes of the factual divergence between Scot's account (the victim jumped) and Page's confession (the victim was kicked and pushed out), establishing that Camposano was criminally responsible for the death either way.

• "To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was in another place for such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission (People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350, 354)." — This states the settled requisites of the defense of alibi, which the Court applied in rejecting Page's claim that he was in Fort Bonifacio, Makati at the time of the holdup.

• "Page's confession, having been taken before the new Constitution took effect, is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of article IV were not observed (Magtoto vs. Manguera, L-37201-2, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4)." — This is the controlling rule on the admissibility of confessions taken before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, and it supplied the framework for rejecting Page's claim that his confession was inadmissible.

• Magtoto vs. Manguera, L-37201-2, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that a confession taken before the 1973 Constitution took effect is admissible although the requisites of section 20, article IV were not observed; the Court applied it to uphold the admissibility of Page's confession.
• People vs. Toling, L-27097, January 17, 1975, 62 SCRA 17 — Cited for the rule that one who creates in another's mind an immediate sense of danger causing that person to attempt escape and injure himself is responsible for the resulting injuries; applied to hold Camposano (and, through the conspiracy, Page) responsible for Veronica Balacapo's death.
• People vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5 — Cited, together with People vs. Puno, for the rule that where the conspiracy to commit robbery is conclusively shown by the concurrent and coordinate acts of the accused and homicide is committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in the killing.
• People vs. Puno, L-31594, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 659 — Cited with People vs. Lingad for the same rule on the liability of all conspirators in robbery with homicide.
• U.S. vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1 — Cited for the qualification that all who took part in the robbery are guilty of the special complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
• People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350 — Cited for the requisites of alibi, which the Court applied in rejecting Page's defense.

• Article 8, Revised Penal Code — Defines conspiracy and provides that a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The Court cited it in holding that the conspiracy between Page and Camposano could be inferred from their acts, which revealed that they had agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney.
• Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Governs the corroboration of an extrajudicial confession by evidence on the corpus delicti. The Court applied it in holding that Page's confession was corroborated by Scot's testimony and the necropsy report, which independently proved that robbery with homicide had been committed.
• Section 20, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — Prescribes the requisites for custodial investigation, including the right to counsel and the requirement that a confession be in writing and signed in the presence of counsel. The Court held that because Page's confession was taken before the new Constitution took effect, it was admissible notwithstanding non-compliance with these requisites.

Barredo, Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concurred. Fernando (Chairman), J., concurred in the result. Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division, and Concepcion Jr., J., was on leave.