People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Peralta

Positive identification by eyewitnesses who are shown to have no ill motive to testify prevails over alibi, which can succeed only if the accused proves that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the locus delicti at the time of the crime. Conspiracy and the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation may be established through the testimonies of witnesses to the planning and the execution of the crime, and the power to determine who may be placed in the Witness Protection Program and granted immunity from prosecution belongs to the Department of Justice under Republic Act No. 6981, not to the courts under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

Wilfredo Peralta, alias "Willie," a resident of Barangay Barsolingan, Gerona, Tarlac and a former resident of Barangay Aguso, Tarlac, was charged with the murder of Chief PNP Inspector Arthur Rivera, a police officer and resident of Aguso whose family Peralta knew. Peralta was a compadre of his co-accused, Severo Espinosa, Jr., alias "Jun Berong." Two of the witnesses whose testimonies figured in the prosecution were placed by the Department of Justice under the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, Republic Act No. 6981, which vests in that department the power to determine who may qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution.

Wilfredo Peralta, also known as "Willie," resided in Barangay Barsolingan, Gerona, Tarlac, having moved there in August 1990 from Barangay Aguso, Tarlac, where his parents remained until the family house was sold to the Riveras in 1992. He was a compadre of Severo Espinosa, Jr., alias "Jun Berong," the live-in partner of Myrna Borromeo from December 1990 to July 1994, and a frequent visitor at their house in Barangay Tibag, Tarlac. The victim, Chief PNP Inspector Arthur Rivera, lived in Aguso, Tarlac with his wife Myrna and their four children, Ferdinand, Francisco, Imee, and Mayavi; the family earned about Sixty Thousand Pesos a month from buying and selling slightly used cars, and the victim received a monthly salary of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Four Pesos as chief inspector.

Around the third week of March 1993, while serving Espinosa, Peralta and two others in a drinking session, Myrna Borromeo heard Peralta say that Major Rivera was already scheduled to be killed. Danilo Castañeda, a self-confessed gun for hire and a resident of Barangay Barsolingan, testified that Peralta, Aser Agosto, Ben Galo, and Espinosa often met at his house and talked about the killing of Major Rivera around March 1993, in the presence of Bong Pasuquin, Conrad Domingo, Anding Pineda, Jess Ilonga, and Boy Peralta; that a certain Nelson Torres, a minister of the Iglesia ni Cristo, gave them assignments whom to kill; that the group planned the killing at the house of their neighbor Carlos Rocha because Peralta was angry at Rivera for driving them out of Barangay Aguso; and that in the second week of March, Peralta, John Pasuquin, Conrad Domingo, Alvin Pineda and Jess Ilonga obtained two M-16 Armalite rifles and one M-1 from a Recto Salvador of Barangay Aguso. Carlos Rocha testified that in the last week of January 1993, Peralta went to his house with Agosto, Domingo, Salvador, Carding Pineda, a certain Gary from Dau, Jessie Longa and Bong Pasuquin to plan the killing of Benjamin Rivera, the barangay chairman of Aguso and father of the victim, so that Salvador could become barangay chairman; that the group later decided to kill Major Rivera instead, reasoning that if Benjamin were killed first Major Rivera would investigate the crime, whereas killing Major Rivera would leave no one to investigate it; that four meetings were held in his house, the last about two weeks before the killing; that after the killing the group returned and asked him to keep three armalites and one M-14, retrieving the firearms from time to time until the PACC searched the houses in the barangay; and that when the group suspected he might report the matter to the police, they sprayed his house with bullets.

On April 2, 1993, at about four o'clock in the afternoon, Francisco Rivera, then thirteen years old, and his brother Ferdinand went with their father to the town proper of Tarlac to get a bicycle, accompanied by their helper Tano Basa. Riding the victim's Ford Cortina, they arrived at about 4:20 p.m., and the boys rode the bicycle alternately while the other stayed in the car with their father and Basa. They passed through Kingburger, Matatalaib, and Crisca Resort until they reached the sub-station going to Villa Soliman, where the car stopped and the victim decided to proceed to Tabane. Upon reaching Tabane, the car parked along the shoulder of the road in front of the house of Apong Capitulo with the victim still at the driver's seat. Soon after, Francisco saw a man alight from a stainless owner jeep and shoot at his father; a light green Sarao-type passenger jeep without any plate number followed, and when it stopped, shots from an armalite rifle were fired from it. Francisco, who was at least ten meters from his father's car when the two jeeps arrived, saw the gunman from the stainless jeep board it and speed away, but could not identify that jeep, its driver, or its gunman; he did, however, take a look at the man who shot his father from the passenger jeepney and identified him as Peralta, whom he had seen before and had also seen that same day around noon outside their gate on board a motorcycle with another man. On cross-examination, his sworn statement of June 9, 1993 was shown to him, and he admitted that he had hidden in the grass because he was frightened and confused; on redirect, he described the grass as only about eight inches to two feet tall.

In the same afternoon, Conrado Capitulo and his wife were at the balcony of their house entertaining visitors when he noticed a car parked in front of their house about ten meters away and saw a boy alight and go to its rear portion. He went inside to get softdrinks for his visitors and heard about three successive shots. Returning to the balcony, he saw a Sarao jeepney parked in front of his gate on the right side of the road with its engine on and five passengers aboard, two on each side plus the driver; one occupant seated at the right side of the rear portion aimed an M-16 armalite at the car parked in front of his house. He went near his gate because one of his grandchildren was there and shouted "dapa, dapa, dapa"; the gunfire stopped briefly, the gunman looked at him, and then continued firing successively until he ran out of bullets, so that all in all there were three initial shots followed by the armalite shots before the jeepney sped away. Capitulo hurried to the street to see the jeepney's plate number, flagged down an L-300 van bound for Baguio and asked its driver to chase the Sarao jeepney and get its plate number, and called a tricycle bound for Manila and asked its driver to report the incident to the police sub-station at Salapungan. He then approached the car and saw the driver with his face on the steering wheel, whom he recognized as Major Rivera, his left hand on the steering wheel and blood oozing from his forehead and below the nape; the windshield was broken, the rear glass and the body of the car were riddled with bullets, there was a hole at the doorknob beside the driver, and the rear tire was flat. Invited to Camp Crame, Capitulo identified Peralta in a line-up as the one who shot an armalite from the passenger jeepney. Castañeda, for his part, testified that on April 2, 1993 the group assembled at Midway, the crossing going to Baguio, Makabulos and Mata Talahib Maliwalu; that one of the vehicles used was a San Francisco passenger jeepney owned by the father of Bong Pasuquin, with yellow and green stripes and a panel where the routes were written in black, parked in front of a Shell Gasoline station along the highway; that Pasuquin ordered him to park the other vehicle facing Makabulos while they waited for Major Rivera and then asked him to be a lookout; that upon seeing Major Rivera's car, Pasuquin told their companions "Parating na si Major" and to follow behind; that Major Rivera turned left at the Midway intersection and stopped at the City Trans Bus Station, formerly known as Pantrans, going to Baguio, after which Pasuquin followed the car and the witness followed about one post away; that at the boulevard Major Rivera stopped from time to time to assist his son who was riding a bicycle, then moved forward, stopping at Crisca Resort and at Villa Suliman, and afterwards went to Barangay Aguso and stopped in front of the house of Barangay Kagawad Capitulo; and that Pasuquin drove his jeep forward, overtaking the victim's car, and started firing at it, followed by Aser Agosto, Willie Peralta, Conrad Domingo, Carding Pineda, Jessie Longa, Boy Peralta and Recto Salvador, after which the group went to the house of John Pasuquin and talked about the killing.

Myrna Borromeo further testified that on April 2, 1993 she noticed that Espinosa and their stainless owner jeep were not at their house; that later in the evening she heard that Major Rivera had been killed; and that a week after the death, Peralta went to their house and she heard him tell Espinosa that they needed to hide the vehicle while it was still hot ("mainit pa"), after which Espinosa hid the vehicle at the back of their house. On cross-examination she admitted that Espinosa used to beat her up, which the defense claimed was her motive for implicating him, and on redirect she admitted that on July 22, 1994 she filed a complaint before the police stating that if given the chance to tell the truth she would report that "they used (Berong's) vehicle in killing Major Rivera." Myrna Rivera, the widow, testified that at around five o'clock in the afternoon of April 2, 1993, while on a tricycle on her way to Aguso, Tarlac, she saw many people and several policemen along the highway, and upon seeing her husband's car she ran toward it and found him at the driver's seat full of blood with a big hole on his forehead. The family incurred Twenty Five Thousand Pesos for the casket and funeral service, Seventy Seven Thousand Two Hundred Fifteen Pesos for food during the wake, and Eighty Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos for burial expenses; before his death the victim and his wife earned Sixty Thousand Pesos a month from their business, and as chief inspector the victim received a monthly pay of Seven Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty Four Pesos. Dr. Saturnino Ferrer, the Municipal Health Officer of Tarlac who conducted the post-mortem examination, testified that the cause of death was a gunshot wound and prepared post-mortem findings marked as Exhibit "B."

The defense presented only Peralta, who testified that on April 2, 1993 he was at the chapel of the Iglesia ni Cristo in Barangay Barsolingan from 4:30 in the afternoon until eight o'clock in the evening inviting friends, and that at around six o'clock a woman arrived saying there was an accident at Barangay Aguso; that he came to know the details of the incident only two or three weeks later, and when he learned that Major Rivera had been killed he asked around what the possible reason could be since he knew the victim to be a good man. He denied killing Major Rivera and denied knowing anything about his death, any suspect, or any investigation. He recounted that he was arrested by the PACC after a search of his house yielded ammunitions and was brought to Camp Crame for illegal possession of firearms, and that a case concerning the death of Major Rivera was later filed against him; that Michael Rocha approached him and said several cases would be filed against him and it would be best for him to turn state witness; that Arman Rivera, brother of the victim, also offered him state witness status several times and told him that if he helped them he would be released, helping meaning testifying against Recto Salvador, Atty. Millo and Thelmo Estanola; and that Mrs. Rivera, the mother of the victim, told him he should cooperate and help because she knew he had nothing to do with the case. He said he could not turn state witness against Recto Salvador and the others since he was not sure they were the ones who committed the crime. On cross-examination he admitted that he had stayed in Barangay Aguso before transferring to Barangay Barsolingan in August 1990, that in 1992 they sold the house to the Riveras, and that it would take ten minutes from Sitio Tabane in Barangay Aguso to Barsolingan by vehicle; he also admitted that he and Major Rivera talked very often since he would go to the Rivera house with friends practically every evening and was welcomed there, and that on May 10, 1995, on their way to the hearing in Tarlac, he escaped and was recaptured almost one year later, on January 12, 1996. In rebuttal, Myrna Rivera denied that Peralta always attended the hearings at Tarlac, particularly the May 10, 1995 hearing when he escaped, and presented a letter from the Office of the Custodian of Records in Camp Crame in support of her claim, while Francisco Rivera testified that, contrary to the accused's claim, the latter did not frequent their house in Tarlac.

The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Conrado Capitulo and Francisco Rivera, found that the killing of Major Rivera was attended with evident premeditation and treachery, and held that conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt, concluding that only Wilfredo Peralta was brought to justice and proved guilty of the crime.

• Flawed and Contradictory Testimonies: Appellant argued that the lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses notwithstanding serious flaws, contradictions, and incoherence as to the identity and participation of the accused in the killing of Major Arthur Rivera.
• Absence of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Appellant maintained that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the clear absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the conviction having no sufficient basis because the prosecution failed to establish his guilt clearly.
• Fabricated Identification: Appellant contended that his identification by Francisco Rivera was fabricated and concocted to suit the theory that he was among the group that shot and killed Major Rivera; that the prosecution failed to present evidence corroborating Francisco's testimony; and that it failed to present the testimony of Francisco's elder brother Ferdinand and of Tano Basa, who were also present when the incident occurred.
• Conrado Capitulo's Testimony: Appellant pointed out that there was no direct statement as to the identity of the accused in both the direct and cross-examination of Conrado Capitulo.
• State Witnesses and the Witness Protection Program: Appellant questioned the presentation of two State witnesses who were placed under the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice, arguing that the provisions of Section 9, Rule 119 constitute the applicable law and not the Witness Protection Program; that Danilo Castañeda and Noel Reyes should have been indicted together with him; and that the presence of this error is a ground for his acquittal.

• Positive Identification: The Solicitor General countered that, contrary to appellant's contention, the prosecution was able to establish his identity as one of the assailants, and that the testimonies of Francisco Rivera, Conrado Capitulo, Danilo Castañeda and Carlos Rocha were clear, positive and consistent in pointing to the accused-appellant as one of those who killed Major Rivera.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt and Elements of Murder: Respondent argued that the guilt of the accused-appellant was proved beyond reasonable doubt and that all the elements of murder were present and proved in the case.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Identification: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses notwithstanding the alleged serious flaws, contradictions, and incoherence as to the identity and participation of the accused in the killing of Major Arthur Rivera.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Whether the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
• State Witnesses and the Witness Protection Program: Whether the Department of Justice erred in placing the State witnesses under the Witness Protection Program instead of applying Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, and whether the failure to indict them together with the accused is a ground for acquittal.
• Damages: Whether the awards of actual damages, moral damages, civil indemnity, and loss of earning capacity were proper.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Identification: No. The trial court's assessment of credibility is generally binding on appeal absent a showing that it overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded significant facts, and both Conrado Capitulo and Francisco Rivera positively identified the accused without any ill motive being imputed to them.
• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: No. Guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt; alibi cannot prevail over positive identification unless the accused shows that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti, and treachery, evident premeditation, and conspiracy were all proved.
• State Witnesses and the Witness Protection Program: No. The power to determine who may be placed in the Witness Protection Program and granted immunity from prosecution lies with the Department of Justice under Republic Act No. 6981, not with the courts under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.
• Damages: Partly. Civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos and loss of earning capacity of One Million Ninety Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighteen and Forty Five Centavos are proper, but moral damages must be reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos and actual damages to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos, the only expense supported by a receipt.

• Credibility of Witnesses and Identification: The Court applied the settled doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts, which, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct, and attitude at trial and are thereby better placed to discriminate between truth and falsehood; appellate courts will not disturb the credence accorded by the trial court unless it is clearly shown that the latter had overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance. Review of the records showed no such error. Conrado Capitulo, who saw the gunman up close, was categorical and frank in his testimony and identified Peralta as the man who shot Major Rivera; the defense failed to impute any ill motive on him that would discredit his positive identification, and absent any reason or motive for a prosecution witness to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists and his testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. Francisco Rivera, the victim's son, likewise identified Peralta as the man who shot his father from the passenger jeepney, and it would be very unnatural for a son determined to vindicate his father's death to falsely accuse anyone other than the real culprit. The attempt to discredit Francisco failed because, although he admitted hiding among the grass, the grass was only at most two feet tall and he was thirteen years old at the time. The Court further held that discrepancies between an affidavit and the testimony of a witness in open court do not necessarily impair the credibility of the testimony, since affidavits are usually taken ex parte and are often incomplete for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.

• Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt: The only defense offered was Peralta's claim that he was at the Iglesia ni Cristo chapel in his barangay when the crime happened on April 2, 1993. Between alibi and positive identification, the Court has given weight in favor of identification especially when it is categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness to impute so grave a wrong on the accused. Alibi is inherently weak and generally not given much credence by the courts due to the facility with which it can be concocted; for this defense to prosper it is not enough to show that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed — he must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. By the accused's own admission he was only one barangay away from the scene, which was only ten minutes away by vehicle, and he failed to present any witness who would support his claim that he was at the chapel during that period. The trial court therefore correctly found him guilty of murder. On the qualifying circumstances, evident premeditation requires proof of (a) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination, and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow him time to reflect upon the consequences of his act, all of which must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself. These elements were shown by the testimonies of Myrna Borromeo, Danilo Castañeda and Carlos Rocha, who narrated how several men, including the accused, planned on several occasions the ambush-slay of Rivera; the group met several times to plan the killing, held on to the plan, and finally executed it on April 2, 1993. Treachery was likewise proved, being present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended party might make; here the victim was caught defenseless and manifestly overpowered when he was gunned down by the accused and his co-conspirators while he was in the driver's seat of his car, and this circumstance absorbs the other circumstances alleged in the Information, namely, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity. Conspiracy was also proven beyond reasonable doubt, existing where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it; it can be proven by evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. The testimonies of Francisco Rivera and Conrado Capitulo as to the manner of the execution of the crime clearly showed unity of intent and purpose, the group having utilized two vehicles that followed the victim and, upon getting the opportunity, those with firearms shot at him before speeding away, while the testimonies of Danilo Castañeda, Carlos Rocha and Myrna Borromeo showed that the group planned the killing weeks before the ambush. It was, as the Court observed, unfortunate that only Wilfredo Peralta was brought to justice and proved guilty of the crime.

• State Witnesses and the Witness Protection Program: The assertion that the two State witnesses should have been indicted with the appellant under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court instead of the Witness Protection Act used by the Department of Justice was held to be without merit. Citing Webb vs. De Leon, the Court explained that the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government, whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws are faithfully executed; a necessary component of this power is the right to prosecute violators, which vests in the prosecutor a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge — the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors best appreciated by prosecutors. It is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact Republic Act No. 6981 vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative; under that provision, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused, and the discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function. Accordingly, no error was committed by the Department of Justice when it placed the witnesses in the case under the Witness Protection Program.

• Damages: The trial court correctly awarded to the heirs of the deceased Fifty Thousand Pesos as civil indemnity for the death of Major Rivera. The award of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos as moral damages, however, was reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos following jurisprudence, and the amount of actual damages was reduced to Twenty Five Thousand Pesos because that was the only expense evidenced by a receipt. The Court additionally awarded to the heirs of the deceased One Million Ninety Two Thousand Six Hundred Eighteen and Forty Five Centavos for loss of earning capacity, computed by multiplying the victim's monthly income of Seven Thousand One Hundred Ninety Seven Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos by twelve to arrive at an annual income of Eighty Six Thousand Three Hundred Seventy Three Pesos, deducting necessary and incidental expenses of fifty percent to arrive at Forty Three Thousand One Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Fifty Centavos, and multiplying the result by the victim's life expectancy of 25.3, derived from two-thirds of eighty less the victim's age of forty-two at the time of his death.

• Credibility of witnesses is a matter for the trial court — The assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts, which can weigh testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct, and attitude at trial and are thus better situated than appellate magistrates to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court unless it is clearly shown that the lower court overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance in the case. The Court applied the doctrine in refusing to overturn the trial court's credence to the testimonies of Conrado Capitulo and Francisco Rivera, whose positive identifications of Peralta were categorical, consistent, and untainted by any showing of ill motive.
• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak and generally not given much credence by the courts due to the facility with which it can be concocted. To prosper, the defense must satisfy two requisites:
  • The accused must show that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; and
  • He must further demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Peralta's alibi failed on the second requisite because he admitted that the chapel where he claimed to be was only one barangay away from the scene, ten minutes away by vehicle, and he presented no witness to corroborate his claim.
• Evident premeditation — Evident premeditation requires proof of three elements, which must be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself:
  • The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
  • An act manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and
  • A sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The Court found these elements satisfied by the testimonies of Myrna Borromeo, Danilo Castañeda and Carlos Rocha, which narrated the several planning meetings held by the group, their adherence to the plan, and its eventual execution on April 2, 1993.
• Treachery — Treachery is present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended party might make. The victim was caught defenseless and manifestly overpowered when he was gunned down while seated in the driver's seat of his car. Treachery absorbs the other aggravating circumstances alleged in the Information — taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
• Conspiracy — Conspiracy exists where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It can be proven by evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. The Court found conspiracy established through the eyewitness accounts of the manner of execution, which showed the use of two vehicles to follow the victim and a coordinated volley of fire, and through the testimonies of witnesses to the planning meetings held weeks before the ambush.
• Prosecutorial discretion and the selection of state witnesses — The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department, whose principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws are faithfully executed; a necessary component of that power is the right to prosecute violators, which vests in the prosecutor a wide range of discretion — whether, what, and whom to charge — depending on a smorgasbord of factors best appreciated by prosecutors. It is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to vest in the Department of Justice, through Republic Act No. 6981, the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the Witness Protection Program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9, Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative; the court's power to discharge a state witness exists only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused, and the discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function.
• Damages in criminal cases — Civil indemnity for the death of the victim is fixed at Fifty Thousand Pesos. Moral damages may be awarded but must be kept consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, hence the reduction from Two Hundred Thousand Pesos to Fifty Thousand Pesos. Actual damages must be limited to expenses evidenced by receipts, which in this case supported only Twenty Five Thousand Pesos. Loss of earning capacity is computed by multiplying the victim's annual income (monthly income multiplied by twelve) by the victim's life expectancy, after deducting necessary and incidental expenses equivalent to fifty percent of the annual income.

• "Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses lies within the province and competence of trial courts. Said doctrine is based on the time-honored rule that the matter of 'assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to discriminate between truth and falsehood. Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses, unless it be clearly shown that the lower court had over looked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.'" — This passage, quoted from People vs. Bolivar, et al., states the ratio decidendi for the rejection of the appellant's challenge to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and is the canonical formulation of the trial court's primacy in credibility assessment.
• "The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion---the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasboard of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 (Witness Protection Security and Benefit Act) vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative." — Quoted from Webb vs. De Leon, this passage supplies the controlling rule on the executive nature of prosecutorial discretion and disposes of the appellant's objection to the placement of the State witnesses under the Witness Protection Program.
• "Treachery was also proved in this case. As previously held by this Court, treachery is present when the offender commits any crime against persons employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense which the offended party might make." — This states the definition of treachery applied to the ambush of the victim while he sat defenseless in the driver's seat of his car, and notes that the circumstance absorbs the other aggravating circumstances alleged in the Information.
• "Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. It can be proven by evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest." — This is the Court's formulation of the conspiracy doctrine as applied to the coordinated use of two vehicles and the volley of fire that killed Major Rivera.

• People vs. Bolivar, et al., 352 SCRA 438, 451 (2001) — Quoted at length as the controlling statement of the doctrine that the assessment of witness credibility lies within the province and competence of trial courts and that appellate courts will not disturb such findings absent a showing of arbitrariness; also cited in connection with the requisites of alibi.
• Webb vs. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652 (1995) — The principal authority relied upon in rejecting the appellant's challenge to the placement of the State witnesses under the Witness Protection Program; the Court adopted its holding that the right to prosecute vests in the prosecutor a wide range of discretion and that Republic Act No. 6981 is constitutionally permissible.
• People vs. Capitle, G.R. No. 137046, February 26, 2001 — Cited in support of the three elements of evident premeditation and the requirement that they be established with equal certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself.
• People vs. Bayod, 352 SCRA 727, 737 (2001) — Cited for the definition of treachery as the employment of means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to the offender arising from any defense the offended party might make.
• People vs. C2C Porras, G.R. No. 103550, and People vs. Tajores, et al., G.R. No. 103551, July 17, 2001 — Cited for the rule that conspiracy may be proven by a chain of circumstances and inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime.
• People vs. Sabredo, 331 SCRA 663, 669 (2000) — Cited for the rule that discrepancies between a witness's affidavit and his testimony in open court do not necessarily impair credibility, affidavits being usually taken ex parte and often incomplete for lack of searching inquiries by the investigating officer.
• Barrera vs. People, 352 SCRA 207, 212 (2001) — Cited for the rule that between alibi and positive identification, weight is given to identification especially when categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness.
• People vs. Visaya, 352 SCRA 713 (2001), and People vs. Cawayan, 353 SCRA 62, 68 (2001) — Cited for the rule that alibi is inherently weak and must be supported by proof that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
• People vs. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698, July 19, 2001 — Cited in support of the reduction of the award of moral damages to Fifty Thousand Pesos in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
• People vs. Laut, et al., 351 SCRA 93, 99 (2001), and People vs. Templo, 346 SCRA 626, 646 (2000) — Cited in support of the award and computation of damages for loss of earning capacity.

• Section 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court — The provision invoked by the appellant as the applicable law for the discharge of State witnesses. The Court held that it does not support the proposition that the power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative; the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused, and such discharge is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent judicial function.
• Republic Act No. 6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act) — The statute under which the Department of Justice placed two of the prosecution's witnesses in the Witness Protection Program. The Court sustained its constitutionality as applied, holding that it validly vests in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be granted immunity from prosecution, and that no error was committed in placing the witnesses under the program.

Davide, Jr., Vitug, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.