People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Onabia

A rape charge cannot be qualified by the use of a deadly weapon unless the weapon was actually used to threaten or intimidate the victim; and aggravating circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information cannot be appreciated without violating the accused's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The stepbrother-stepsister relationship does not qualify rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, because the parties are not related by blood or affinity.

Raquel B. Eballe, a minor, was the stepsister of Wilfredo Onabia alias "Odoy." The charges were brought under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, which then governed the penalty for rape and its qualified forms. The relationship between the parties and the statutory classification of rape supplied the backdrop for the case.

Private complainant Raquel B. Eballe, then nine years old, was the stepsister of accused-appellant Wilfredo Onabia alias "Odoy." At about 6:30 in the evening of February 15, 1994, Onabia asked Raquel to accompany him to a copra drier located about two hundred meters from their houses. He carried a kerosene lamp and had a bolo placed in his waist. When they arrived at the copra drier, they went upstairs; Onabia then put out the lamp, embraced Raquel, and forced her to lie down. He told her that he would kill her and the other members of her family if she shouted. He removed his pants and brief and inserted his penis into her vagina. He again threatened to kill her and her family if she revealed the incident to her mother.

In the afternoon of August 10, 1994, only Raquel and Onabia were in their house because the other family members had gone to the farm. Raquel was in her room when Onabia entered and told her not to shout, otherwise he would kill her and the other members of her family. He embraced her, forced her to lie down, removed her panty, and inserted his penis into her vagina.

At about 9:00 P.M. on October 7, 1995, Onabia called Raquel, who was in her room, and asked her to massage him at the sala of their house. Raquel was hesitant, but her mother told her to do so. While they were at the sala, Onabia squeezed her arm and told her not to shout. He then removed his short pants and brief and Raquel's underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina.

At about 9:00 P.M. on November 6, 1995, Raquel was in her room when Onabia, who was in the sala, called her and told her to massage him. Although hesitant, she was prevailed upon by her mother. While both were in the sala, Onabia told her not to shout. He then forced her to lie down, removed his brief and her underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina.

On November 7, 1995, Raquel reported the sexual assaults to her brother Jessie, who in turn reported them to their elder brother Bernabe. Bernabe and Raquel then reported the incidents to the barangay councilman and the police. The following day, November 8, 1995, Raquel was medically examined by Dr. Dennis Duenas; the medical report issued on November 15, 1995 showed old laceration at the hymenal ring, an introitus that admitted one finger with ease, and a small, close uterus with small adnexie. Onabia was consequently charged in four separate informations for rape. He denied liability and claimed that the charges were fabrications arising from a quarrel he had with Raquel's elder brother. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the four counts, crediting Raquel's testimony and the evidence presented.

• Deadly Weapon Qualification: Accused-appellant argued that the rape in Criminal Case No. 95-17443 was not qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, because although he carried a bolo in his waist, he never used it to threaten private complainant, and the information did not allege the use of a weapon.
• Credibility of Complainant: Accused-appellant assailed the credibility of private complainant Raquel B. Eballe and argued that the trial court erred in giving weight and credit to her testimony.
• Sufficiency of Evidence and Damages: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court erred in convicting him of four counts of rape and in ordering him to pay P50,000.00 for each count despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alibi and Improbability: Accused-appellant interposed alibi, claiming that the first and second incidents could not have occurred because he moved in with his father and the latter's new family only on August 24, 1994; he also argued that the third and fourth incidents were improbable because they were committed in the living room.
• Fabrication: Accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed they were fabrications arising from a quarrel with private complainant's elder brother.

• Use of Deadly Weapon: The People invoked People vs. Lamberte to refute accused-appellant's first assigned error that the rape in Criminal Case No. 95-17443 was not qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.

• Deadly Weapon Qualification: Whether the rape in Criminal Case No. 95-17443 was qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Right to Be Informed: Whether the trial court erred in appreciating abuse of superior strength, abuse of confidence, and lack of respect on account of age and relationship although these were not alleged in the complaint or information.
• Qualified Rape by Relationship: Whether the stepbrother-stepsister relationship between private complainant and accused-appellant qualifies the rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
• Credibility of Complainant: Whether the trial court erred in giving weight and credit to the testimony of private complainant Raquel B. Eballe.
• Sufficiency of Evidence, Conviction, and Damages: Whether accused-appellant was properly convicted of four counts of rape and ordered to pay P50,000.00 for each count despite the alleged failure of the prosecution to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Alibi and Improbability: Whether accused-appellant's defenses of alibi and improbability of commission in the living room, and the delay in reporting the incidents, negate the prosecution's evidence.

• Deadly Weapon Qualification: No. The bolo carried by accused-appellant was not used to threaten or intimidate private complainant; mere carrying of a bolo does not qualify rape. People vs. Lamberte is inapplicable because the rape there was qualified by commission of two or more persons, not by use of a deadly weapon.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Right to Be Informed: No. Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information cannot be appreciated; doing so would violate the accused's right to be informed and convict him of an offense higher than charged. They were also not sufficiently proven.
• Qualified Rape by Relationship: No. A stepbrother-stepsister relationship is not a relationship by blood or affinity and cannot qualify rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
• Credibility of Complainant: No. The trial court's assessment of private complainant's credibility was upheld; her detailed and straightforward testimony, positive identification, and the medical evidence supported conviction. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification, and delay in reporting was justified by threats.
• Sufficiency of Evidence, Conviction, and Damages: Yes, as modified. The conviction for four counts of rape was affirmed, but the penalty in Criminal Case No. 95-17443 was reduced to reclusion perpetua, and moral damages of P50,000.00 were awarded in each of the four cases.
• Alibi and Improbability: No. Alibi did not preclude commission because accused-appellant could have visited the family before moving in; rape may be committed even in unlikely places such as a living room; and the delay in reporting was justified by the threats.

• Deadly Weapon Qualification: The records showed that accused-appellant carried a bolo in his waist, as he usually did, but he never used it to threaten private complainant. The threats he made were not accompanied by the use of the bolo. Although private complainant mentioned a "bladed weapon" in her earlier complaint, the use of the weapon was not established. People vs. Lamberte, cited by the People, did not apply because the rape there was qualified by commission of two or more persons, not by use of a deadly weapon. Hence, the rape in Criminal Case No. 95-17443 could not be qualified by the use of a deadly weapon.
• Aggravating Circumstances and Right to Be Informed: Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution guarantees the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. The aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, abuse of confidence, and lack of respect on account of age and relationship were neither alleged in the complaint nor in the information. Appreciating them and convicting accused-appellant of an offense higher than that charged would violate this constitutional right. Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, so no ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances may affect it. In any event, abuse of superior strength requires proof that it was deliberately taken advantage of; abuse of confidence requires that the confidence facilitated the offense, which was not true because private complainant was hesitant and reluctant to accompany accused-appellant; and lack of respect on account of age requires a deliberate intent to offend or insult the victim's age, which was not shown.
• Qualified Rape by Relationship: The stepbrother-stepsister relationship between private complainant and accused-appellant could not elevate the crime to qualified rape under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, because they were not related either by blood or by affinity.
• Credibility of Complainant: Accused-appellant assailed private complainant's credibility and interposed alibi. Even if he moved in with his father and the latter's new family on August 24, 1994, this did not prevent him from visiting them before he moved in. Under People vs. Bugarin, when a complainant in a rape case, especially a minor, testifies that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove the commission of the crime, provided her testimony is credible. Private complainant gave a detailed account of the first two incidents, and her straightforward testimony, voluntary medical examination, and willingness to undergo public trial could not be dismissed as concoction. It was improbable that a victim of tender years would impute so serious a crime if it were not true. Alibi failed because affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony, and the positive identification of accused-appellant made the defense unacceptable. As to the third and fourth incidents, the improbability of committing rape in the living room did not persuade, because lust is no respecter of time and place and rape may be committed in unlikely places. The delay in reporting was justified by accused-appellant's threats on all four occasions. The trial court's findings on credibility were affirmed absent any overlooked or misinterpreted facts.
• Sufficiency of Evidence, Conviction, and Damages: Except for the penalty in Criminal Case No. 95-17443, the trial court's findings were affirmed. The conviction for four counts of rape stood, but the first count was simple rape and the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659. In addition to the indemnity already awarded, accused-appellant was ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages in each of the four cases in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.
• Alibi and Improbability: The defense of alibi was rejected because it did not establish that accused-appellant was physically absent from the scene or that it was impossible for him to be there; he could have visited the family before moving in. The claim that rape could not have occurred in the living room was rejected because rape can be committed even in places where people congregate or where other family members are present. The delay in reporting did not impair credibility because accused-appellant threatened private complainant on all four occasions.

• Right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation — Under Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution, the accused must be fully apprised of the charge to prepare his defense. Aggravating circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information cannot be appreciated, and the accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher than that charged. The Court applied this rule to strike the trial court's appreciation of abuse of superior strength, abuse of confidence, and lack of respect on account of age and relationship.
• Qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon in rape — For rape to be qualified by the use of a deadly weapon, the weapon must actually be used to threaten or intimidate the victim. Mere carrying of a weapon is insufficient. Because the bolo carried by accused-appellant was never used to threaten private complainant, the rape in Criminal Case No. 95-17443 remained simple rape.
• Stepbrother-stepsister relationship as non-qualifying — Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the relationship that qualifies rape must be by blood or affinity. A stepbrother-stepsister relationship is neither, so it cannot elevate simple rape to qualified rape.
• Credibility of a rape victim's testimony — When a complainant in a rape case, especially a minor, testifies that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove the commission of the crime, provided her testimony is credible. Conviction may rest on her testimony alone if credible. The Court found private complainant's detailed and straightforward account credible.
• Alibi as a defense — Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification and affirmative testimony. It must show that the accused was elsewhere and that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene. Accused-appellant's alibi failed because he could have visited the family before moving in, and private complainant positively identified him.
• Rape may be committed in unlikely places — Lust is no respecter of time and place; rape can be committed in places where people congregate, in parks, along roadsides, within school premises, or inside a house where other occupants or family members are present. The Court applied this to reject the improbability defense regarding the living room incidents.
• Indivisible penalty and aggravating circumstances — Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. No ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances may affect an indivisible penalty. Thus, even if aggravating circumstances had been proven, they could not alter the penalty for simple rape.
• Delay in reporting rape — Delay in reporting may be justified by threats made by the accused. The Court found the delay explained by accused-appellant's threats on all four occasions.

• "In the case before us, the above-mentioned aggravating circumstances were neither mentioned in the complaint nor in the information. Consequently, to appreciate the aforementioned aggravating circumstances and to convict the accused of an offense higher than that charged in the complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute an unauthorized denial of his constitutional right." — This passage states the ratio for rejecting the trial court's appreciation of aggravating circumstances and enforcing the accused's right to be informed.
• "Considering further that the crime is simple rape, which is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, no ordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances may affect it." — This defines the consequence of simple rape being punishable by an indivisible penalty.
• "Now it is settled that when the complainant in a rape case, more so if she is a minor, testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect, all that is necessary to prove the commission of the crime. Care must be taken, however, that her testimony is credible for conviction to be justified based on her testimony alone." — This is the Court's canonical formulation of the credibility rule for rape victims, especially minors.
• "As regards the third and fourth incidents of rape, accused-appellant presents the improbability of having committed the rape in the living room. We do not agree for lust is no respecter of time and place." — This passage rejects the improbability defense and states the doctrine that rape may be committed in unlikely places.

• People vs. Lamberte, 142 SCRA 685 — Distinguished. The People invoked it to refute accused-appellant's first assigned error, but the Court found it inapplicable because the rape there was qualified by commission of two or more persons, not by use of a deadly weapon.
• Matilde, Jr. vs. Jabson, 68 SCRA 466 — Cited for the rationale behind the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, which supported the ruling that unalleged aggravating circumstances cannot be appreciated.
• People vs. Bugarin, 273 SCRA 384 — Cited for the rule that when a complainant in a rape case, especially a minor, testifies that she was raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to prove the crime, provided her testimony is credible.
• People vs. Tabugoca, 285 SCRA 312 — Cited in relation to simple rape and the indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua, and on delay in reporting justified by threats.
• People vs. Cabillan, 267 SCRA 258 — Cited for the principle that a straightforward account by a young rape victim is credible and that rape may be committed in unlikely places.
• People vs. San Juan, 270 SCRA 693 — Cited on alibi, positive identification, rape in unlikely places, and the deference owed to trial court credibility findings.
• People vs. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335 — Cited for the rule that affirmative testimony is stronger than negative testimony and that alibi cannot prevail over positive identification.
• People vs. Ortega, Jr., 276 SCRA 166 and People vs. Escoto, 244 SCRA 87 — Cited for the requirement that abuse of superior strength must be deliberately taken advantage of.
• People vs. Luchico, 49 Phil. 689 and People vs. Alqueza, 51 Phil. 817 — Cited for the rule that abuse of confidence requires that the confidence facilitated the commission of the offense.
• People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548; U.S. vs. Dacquel, 36 Phil. 781; People vs. Decena, 235 SCRA 67 — Cited for the rule that lack of respect on account of age requires a deliberate intent to offend or insult the victim's age.

• Article III, Section 14, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the accused the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. Applied to hold that aggravating circumstances not alleged in the complaint or information could not be appreciated and that accused-appellant could not be convicted of an offense higher than charged.
• Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 — Governs rape and its penalties. Simple rape is punishable by the single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua; the stepbrother-stepsister relationship does not qualify rape because the parties are not related by blood or affinity.
• Paragraph 15, Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Defines abuse of superior strength as an aggravating circumstance. The Court held it could not be appreciated because it was not alleged and because there was no proof that it was deliberately taken advantage of.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concurred. Ynares-Santiago, J., took no part.