People of the Philippines vs. Virgilio Uribe

A claim of self-defense fails where the accused, having admitted the killing, does not prove unlawful aggression and the prosecution evidence shows he was the aggressor; absent proof of treachery, the killing is homicide, not murder. In illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution is bound by its own witness’s declarations tending to absolve the accused, and an irregularity in a memorandum receipt for a surrendered firearm cannot justify the death penalty.

Virgilio Uribe was a member of the Philippine Constabulary, and Gaspar Tibay was a PC trainee at Camp September 21st Movement, Palo, Leyte. Uribe was charged in two informations before the then Court of First Instance of Leyte with murder and illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866. The cases initially reached the Supreme Court on automatic review because the trial court imposed the death penalty for illegal possession; after the death penalty was commuted to reclusion perpetua pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, Uribe manifested his desire to continue the cases as appealed cases.

On March 31, 1982, at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Virgilio Uribe, a Constable First Class of the Philippine Constabulary and the incoming Sergeant of the Guard, went to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters at Camp September 21st Movement, Palo, Leyte, to verify the details of his tour of duty scheduled at 5:00 o’clock that afternoon. He then went to the July 22nd Canteen inside the camp to have a snack. While he was there, Staff Sergeant Vicente Cabanacan, Jr. arrived and asked whether Uribe was the incoming Sergeant of the Guard; Uribe answered in the affirmative. Uribe, Cabanacan, Sgt. Tobias Lubitos, and another companion then drank a pocket-size bottle of Fundador. Trainee Second Class Gaspar Tibay arrived and was invited by Cabanacan to join them; Tibay declined the drink. Lubitos and his companion later left.

According to the prosecution, after Tibay had consumed what had been offered to him, Uribe asked Tibay whether he knew Cabanacan, and Tibay answered that he had known the sergeant for some time. The conversation turned into an argument about guard duties. Uribe boxed Tibay. Tibay went out of the canteen, but Uribe followed him outside and boxed him once more. Tibay ran toward the guardhouse. Uribe returned to the canteen, put his shirt on, and followed Tibay to the guardhouse. Cabanacan followed, but before he could reach the guardhouse he saw Uribe with a drawn .45 caliber pistol. Cabanacan shouted at Uribe to stop, but Uribe fired two shots at Tibay, who fell dead. Uribe surrendered his .45 caliber pistol to Cabanacan. Cabanacan testified that Uribe hit the victim first, and Genoveva Barredo, the cashier of the July 22nd Canteen, corroborated this testimony.

Uribe admitted the killing but claimed self-defense. According to him, he admonished Tibay, who was on duty but not in uniform, to wear his uniform; Tibay resented the admonition and cursed him. Tibay then raised his T-shirt from his hip to make it known that he had a firearm and moved to draw it. Uribe approached him and they boxed each other. They grappled until they reached in front of the canteen, where Tibay was pushed and outbalanced. Cabanacan told them to stop, and they did. Tibay went hurriedly to the Duty Guard House while trying to get something from his waist, and Uribe returned to his seat inside the canteen. Uribe later got up to inform their Commanding Officer about Tibay’s actuations and his possession of a .22 caliber firearm although he was not authorized to carry it. While outside, Uribe saw Tibay still going toward the Guard House. On reaching the Guard House, Tibay grabbed an armalite rifle from Guard T2C Carcedo, cocked it, positioned himself in the Guard House, and aimed the rifle at Uribe, who was then passing by en route to the Office of the Commanding Officer. At a distance of around eight meters, Uribe drew his .45 caliber service pistol from his waist, chamberloaded it, and fired at Tibay twice, hitting him.

On the illegal possession charge, the prosecution presented a certification dated April 6, 1984 signed by Captain Prudencio Erfe, PC, Chief Records Branch Firearm and Explosives Unit, Camp Crame, Quezon City, stating that the Pistol Colt Caliber .45 serial number 1807163 used by Uribe in shooting Tibay was an unlicensed and unregistered firearm per verification from available records. The certification was obtained by Mrs. Purificacion E. Tibay, the mother of the deceased, who testified on the matter. Uribe, who had been connected with the PC for eight years before the incident, testified that the .45 caliber pistol was officially issued to him by his commanding officer and Staff Sergeant Cabanacan, the supply officer. Cabanacan testified that the .45 caliber pistol taken from Uribe at the scene was property of the service department. On cross-examination, Cabanacan stated that he issued a memorandum receipt for a .45 caliber pistol for Uribe’s use on February 3, 1982, which he signed and had approved by Major Virgilio I. Bautista, their commanding officer. On redirect, Cabanacan stated that the firearm was personally owned by Uribe, who asked him to make a memorandum receipt; it was surrendered to the headquarters service detachment and re-issued to Uribe with a memorandum receipt, with the approval of the commanding officer.

The trial court found the prosecution evidence more credible, rejected the self-defense claim, and found that Uribe was the aggressor while Tibay was running away from him. It also observed that Uribe’s account—that he was able to fire first although Tibay had already aimed an armalite rifle at him and his own pistol was still uncocked and tucked in his waist—was incredible. The defense witnesses did not corroborate Uribe’s version: Sgt. Galicia mentioned a .22 revolver but not an armalite rifle, and M/Sgt. Malogapo’s testimony was inconsistent with Uribe’s claim that Tibay was already aiming the armalite rifle at him.

• Self-Defense — Unlawful Aggression: The appellant maintained that Tibay raised his T-shirt from his hip to reveal a firearm and moved to draw it; that as Tibay was going out of the canteen he said, “Follow me outside and we will shoot it out outside”; and that Tibay later grabbed an armalite rifle from Guard Carcedo, chamberloaded it, positioned himself in the Guard House, and aimed it at the appellant from about eight meters. These acts, according to the appellant, constituted unlawful aggression.
• Reasonable Necessity and Lack of Sufficient Provocation: The appellant argued that he was forced to use his .45 caliber service pistol to repel Tibay’s aggression and that he employed reasonable means to defend his life. He also claimed lack of sufficient provocation on his part because, as the incoming Sergeant of the Guard that afternoon, he had the right to confront Tibay for not wearing the required uniform.
• Medico-Legal Evidence: The appellant pointed to the testimony of medico-legal officer Captain Angel Cordero on cross-examination that both wounds sustained by the deceased could have been sustained while he was in the act of aiming a long firearm.
• Illegal Possession: The appellant testified that the subject .45 caliber pistol was officially issued to him by his commanding officer and by Staff Sergeant Cabanacan, the supply officer.

• Prosecution Version and Credibility: The prosecution maintained that Uribe was the aggressor: he boxed Tibay, followed him out of the canteen, boxed him again, and later shot him twice at the guardhouse. Cabanacan and cashier Genoveva Barredo corroborated that Uribe hit the victim first, and the prosecution’s evidence was more credible than the appellant’s self-defense account.
• Illegal Possession — Recommendation for Acquittal: The Solicitor General recommended the appellant’s acquittal on the illegal possession charge because prosecution witness Cabanacan testified that the .45 caliber pistol was property of the service department and had been issued or re-issued to Uribe through a memorandum receipt approved by the commanding officer.

• Self-Defense: Whether the appellant acted in self-defense, thereby exempting him from criminal liability for the death of Gaspar Tibay.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Whether the trial court correctly gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and rejected the appellant’s version of the incident.
• Treachery: Whether treachery qualified the killing to murder.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: Whether the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866.

• Self-Defense: No. The appellant failed to prove unlawful aggression; the evidence showed he was the aggressor and Tibay was running away from him. The requisites of self-defense were not established.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Yes. The trial court’s findings of fact are entitled to the highest respect, and no reason appeared to deviate from its assessment that the prosecution evidence was more credible.
• Treachery: No. The mode of attack was not consciously adopted to insure the killing without risk to the appellant; both protagonists had firearms, the incident occurred in an open field, and the shooting was done on impulse during a chase. The killing is homicide, not murder.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: No. The prosecution is bound by the declarations of its own witness, Cabanacan, which tended to absolve the appellant by confirming that the .45 caliber pistol was issued or re-issued to him through a memorandum receipt approved by the commanding officer. The appellant was acquitted.

• Self-Defense: Once the appellant admitted the killing, the burden shifted to him to prove the elements of self-defense: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. He had to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The prosecution’s witnesses, Cabanacan and Barredo, categorically stated that the appellant hit the victim first. This negated unlawful aggression and showed that the appellant was the aggressor while the victim was running away. The appellant’s claim that Tibay aimed an armalite rifle at him from eight meters while his own pistol was still uncocked and tucked in his waist was incredulous; the trial court observed that this could happen only in the movies or in the comics. The medico-legal officer’s testimony established only the possibility that Tibay was shot while in a squatting position and did not confirm that Tibay was aiming a long firearm. The defense witnesses did not corroborate the appellant’s version. Self-defense therefore failed.
• Credibility of Witnesses: Findings of fact of trial courts are entitled to the highest respect because those courts have the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and can ascertain whether they are telling the truth. The records sustained the trial court’s finding that the prosecution evidence was more credible, and no reason appeared to deviate from that finding.
• Treachery: Section 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as the employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Evidence must also show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. Here, the deceased was also armed with a .22 caliber gun when he was chased by the appellant. After the fistfight, Tibay went out of the canteen ahead of the appellant; the appellant followed him, and at about four meters distance, while Tibay was trying to hide near a guard, the appellant shot him in the arm. Under this scenario, there was the possibility that the appellant himself could have been hit by Tibay had the latter drawn his gun and used it before the appellant shot him. The appellant did not take any precautionary measures to insure no risk upon himself, and it could not be said that he consciously adopted a mode of attack to insure the impossibility of Tibay’s retaliating. Both protagonists had firearms, and the incident happened in an open field. As in People vs. Villanueva, the attack was not unexpected, there was sufficient warning, and it was not established that the appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the offense without risk to himself. The killing was done on impulse whetted by the excitement of the chase and was not the result of earlier deliberation. The appellant was therefore guilty of homicide, not murder.
• Illegal Possession of Firearm: The Solicitor General recommended acquittal based on the testimony of prosecution witness Cabanacan, who was the PC Supply Officer at the time of the incident. Cabanacan testified that the .45 caliber pistol taken from Uribe at the scene was property of the service department. On cross-examination, he declared that he issued a memorandum receipt for a .45 caliber pistol for Uribe’s use on February 3, 1982, which he signed and had approved by Major Virgilio I. Bautista, their commanding officer. On redirect, he stated that the firearm was personally owned by Uribe, who asked him to make a memorandum receipt; it was surrendered to the headquarters service detachment and re-issued to Uribe with a memorandum receipt, with the approval of the commanding officer. The trial court observed that this threw the illegal possession case out. There may have been some irregularity in a surrendered firearm being re-issued to the former holder through a memorandum order, but the irregularity could not be the basis of the penalty of death. The prosecution is bound by the declarations of its own witness which tend to absolve the appellant of the crime charged, as held in People vs. Cuison. The prosecution’s evidence confirmed the appellant’s testimony that the .45 caliber pistol was issued to him through a memorandum receipt signed by the commanding officer. The appellant’s testimony that when the entire Philippine Constabulary Command was divided into regions, the Philippine Constabulary Command was authorized to issue firearms which were not reported to Camp Crame was not refuted. The appellant was therefore acquitted of illegal possession of firearm.

• Self-Defense — Requisites and Burden of Proof — In a criminal case where the accused admits the killing, self-defense is an affirmative defense; the burden shifts to the accused to clearly establish it. The requisites are: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. The accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Applied here, Uribe admitted the killing but failed to prove unlawful aggression; the prosecution showed he was the aggressor, so self-defense was rejected.
• Credibility of Witnesses and Trial Court Findings — Findings of fact of trial courts are entitled to the highest respect because trial courts have the privilege of examining the deportment and demeanor of witnesses and can ascertain whether they are telling the truth. The Supreme Court found no reason to deviate from the trial court’s assessment that the prosecution evidence was more credible.
• Treachery — Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Evidence must show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted to make it impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. The Court found no treachery because both protagonists had firearms, the incident occurred in an open field, the appellant took no precautionary measures, and the shooting was done on impulse during a chase. The killing was therefore homicide, not murder.
• Prosecution Bound by Its Own Witness’s Declarations — Where the prosecution’s own witness gives testimony tending to absolve the accused of the crime charged, the prosecution is bound by such declarations. This doctrine, applied in People vs. Cuison, led to the appellant’s acquittal for illegal possession of firearm because prosecution witness Cabanacan testified that the .45 caliber pistol was service property and had been issued or re-issued to Uribe through a memorandum receipt approved by the commanding officer.
• Irregularity in Memorandum Receipt for Firearm — An irregularity in a surrendered firearm being re-issued to the former holder through a memorandum order cannot be the basis of the penalty of death. The Court used this principle to reject the illegal possession conviction despite the Camp Crame certification that the firearm was unlicensed and unregistered.

• "For self-defense to prosper, the following elements should have been proved by appellant: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself." — States the requisites of self-defense; the Court used this formulation to reject Uribe’s claim because unlawful aggression was not proved.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — Defines treachery under the Revised Penal Code; the Court cited it to hold that the killing was not qualified to murder.
• "the prosecution is bound by the declarations of its own witness which tend to absolve the appellant of the crime charged." — States the rule that led to Uribe’s acquittal for illegal possession of firearm, because the prosecution’s own witness confirmed that the .45 pistol had been issued to him.
• "This can probably happen only in the movies or in the comics." — The trial court’s observation, quoted by the Supreme Court, on the incredibility of Uribe’s claim that he fired first although Tibay had already aimed an armalite rifle at him while his own pistol was uncocked and tucked in his waist.

• People vs. Abagon, 161 SCRA 255 [1988] — Cited for the elements of self-defense and for the rule that findings of fact of trial courts are entitled to the highest respect.
• People vs. Sadie, 149 SCRA 240; People vs. Regulacion, 121 SCRA 40; People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48; People vs. Bauden, 77 Phil. 105; People vs. Ansoyon, 75 Phil. 772 — Cited for the rule that an accused who admits killing must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.
• People vs. Balmaceda, 148 SCRA 194 [1987] — Cited for the three requisites of self-defense.
• People vs. Crisostomo, 160 SCRA 47 [1988] — Cited for the requirement that the mode of attack be consciously adopted for treachery to exist.
• People vs. Villanueva, 161 SCRA 511 [1988] — Quoted for the principle that treachery is not present where the attack was not unexpected, there was sufficient warning, and no conscious mode of attack was adopted.
• People vs. Cuison, 106 SCRA 98 [1981] — Cited for the rule that the prosecution is bound by the declarations of its own witness tending to absolve the appellant.

• Section 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery. The Court applied it and found no treachery because the mode of attack was not consciously adopted to insure execution without risk to the appellant.
• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866 — Illegal possession of firearm. The trial court applied it and imposed death; the Supreme Court acquitted the appellant, so the provision did not sustain conviction.
• 1987 Constitution — Basis for the commutation of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua; the accused then continued the cases as appealed cases.
• Intermediate Sentence Law — Applied in fixing the penalty for homicide: reclusion temporal in its medium period, with a minimum of 10 years and 1 day and a maximum of 17 years and 4 months.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.