People of the Philippines vs. Villamor

A conviction for Murder may rest on the positive and credible testimony of a single eyewitness, notwithstanding the accused's alibi; treachery qualifies the killing, but the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position is not appreciated absent proof that the accused used the influence, prestige, or ascendancy of his office to commit the crime.

PO3 Renato F. Villamor was a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to the Office of the Mayor of Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, while his co-accused, Jessie "Joy" Maghilom, was a Barangay Councilman. The victims, Jerry and Jelord Velez, were brothers.

At around dusk on November 24, 1995, brothers Jerry and Jelord Velez were on their way home to Barangay Mitakas, Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, on board a motorcycle after having dinner at a friend's house in Barangay Landing. Jerry was driving. As they neared the junction of Barangays Lusot and Mitakas, they heard a speeding motorcycle fast approaching from behind. They ignored it, but it caught up with them. As they were about to cross the bridge leading to their home, gunshots rang out from behind them. They abruptly turned the motorcycle around toward the direction of the gunfire, and the light of their motorcycle's headlamp fell on their attackers aboard the second motorcycle. The assailants fired at them a second time and fled toward Calamba, Misamis Occidental. Jerry sustained gunshot wounds on the abdomen and left elbow but survived; Jelord died on the spot during the first gunburst.

For the deadly assault, PO3 Renato F. Villamor and Jessie "Joy" Maghilom were indicted for Murder in Criminal Case No. 1312-36-14 and for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 631-14-68-36-27. The Informations alleged that Villamor, a PNP member, and Maghilom, a Barangay Councilman, conspired and confederated, with treachery and intent to kill, in shooting Jelord and Jerry Velez. By agreement of the parties, the two cases were tried jointly. At pre-trial, the defense stipulated Villamor's identity, that Jelord was killed and Jerry was shot and wounded on the evening of November 24, 1995 in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental, and the authenticity and genuineness of Jelord's Certificate of Death and Jerry's Medico Legal Certificate dated March 22, 1996. Only Villamor was arraigned and pleaded not guilty; Maghilom remained at large, so trial proceeded only against Villamor.

According to the prosecution, when the brothers turned around to face their assailants, Jerry saw Villamor and Maghilom on board the motorcycle behind them. Maghilom was driving while Villamor was holding a short gun pointed at them. Jerry sensed that Jelord's grip on his back slackened; Jelord fell off the motorcycle and died on the spot. As Jerry neared the bridge, Villamor again fired at Jerry, hitting him on the abdomen. The two assailants drove away. When Jerry arrived at their house, he told his other brother, Jelvis, about the incident. They rushed Jelord to the Calamba District Hospital, but he was transferred to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital in Oroquieta City. Jerry was treated at the Provincial Hospital and later at the Metro Cebu Hospital. The autopsy conducted by Dr. Nelson Gabrinez showed several wounds on the chest, mid-clavicular area, abdomen, and right diaphragm; the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. Dr. Olayzar Recamadas examined Jerry and found that he sustained a gunshot wound on the left quadrant abdomen penetrating the abdominal cavity with injury to the stomach, mesentery transverse colon, and hemoperitoneum; Dr. Recamadas testified that without prompt medical attendance, Jerry could have died of zero-zero blood pressure.

Villamor, for his defense, claimed that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its occurrence. He testified that on November 24, 1995, at around 5:00 p.m., he was in Barangay Landing as security escort of Mayor Agapito Yap III, which was among his duties as a member of the Philippine National Police assigned to the Office of the Mayor of Baliangao. The Mayor and his entourage left Baliangao for Barangay Landing at about 9:00 a.m. and arrived there at 10:00 a.m.; the Mayor visited the Barangay Captain and had lunch, then proceeded to the cockpit to attend a derby. At around 5:00 p.m., Villamor went home to take his child, who was suffering from diarrhea, to the clinic for treatment. He arrived at the Yap Clinic but was advised to go to the Calamba District Hospital. He radioed for an ambulance, but none was available, so he borrowed a vehicle from Mayor Yap. On board a jeep driven by Alvin Itum, Villamor left Baliangao at 5:30 p.m. When they passed the bridge at the junction of Barangays Lusot and Mitakas, they noticed no untoward incident. They arrived at the Calamba District Hospital at 7:00 p.m. His child was confined at the hospital for three days. From the time he brought his child for confinement on the date of the incident, Villamor never went back to Baliangao; the only occasion he left the hospital premises on November 24, 1995 was when he stepped out to buy biscuits and orange drink at a store 80 to 100 meters away. He testified that he learned of the incident from Isyong Lomoljo and claimed that he talked with Jerry Velez for several minutes at the hospital at around 7:30 to 8:00 p.m., during which Jerry told him he could not identify the assailants because it was dark. Villamor averred that he was implicated for political reasons because the Velezes and the Yaps were political rivals, and he argued that even if the place where the crime was committed was near, it was impossible for him to go there and commit the crime because he was attending to his sick son.

The trial court gave credence to Jerry Velez's testimony and rejected Villamor's alibi, finding that the distance between his claimed whereabouts and the crime scene was, by his own admission, "very near," and that it was not impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of the commission of the crime. Jerry's identification of Villamor as the gunman was positive and categorical, and he remained resolute under cross-examination.

• Alibi: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in rejecting his defense of alibi merely because the distance between the crime scene and his location at the time of the incident was very near and it would have been possible for him to be at the crime scene. He maintained that even granting proximity, it was impossible for him to commit the crime because he was attending to his sick son.
• Credibility of Lone Witness: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in giving credence to the testimony of Jerry Velez when, as an offended party and victim, he would naturally protect his interest, and his testimony was never corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
• Motive: Accused-appellant argued that the trial court gravely erred in not holding that there was no reason or motive whatsoever for him to wish the death of Jelord and Jerry Velez.

• Improper Aggravating Circumstance: The Solicitor General maintained that the trial court improperly applied the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, because there was no showing that accused-appellant used his influence, prestige, or ascendancy as a policeman to commit the crime.

• Alibi: Whether the trial court erred in rejecting accused-appellant's defense of alibi despite the proximity of his claimed whereabouts to the crime scene.
• Credibility of Lone Witness: Whether the trial court erred in giving credence to the lone and uncorroborated testimony of eyewitness-victim Jerry Velez.
• Motive: Whether the trial court erred in not holding that there was no reason or motive for accused-appellant to wish the death of Jelord and Jerry Velez.
• Treachery: Whether the killing of Jelord Velez was attended by treachery qualifying it to Murder.
• Abuse of Public Position: Whether the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position was properly appreciated.
• Penalties and Damages: Whether the penalties and damages imposed by the trial court were proper.

• Alibi: No. Alibi cannot prevail over positive identification; accused-appellant failed to establish physical impossibility because the distance was, by his own admission, "very near."
• Credibility of Lone Witness: No. The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to convict even for Murder; the trial court's credibility findings are entitled to great weight.
• Motive: No. Ill motive is not an essential element of a crime and becomes inconsequential where there are affirmative, categorical declarations of accountability.
• Treachery: Yes. The sudden and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim who had no chance to defend himself, with deliberate means, qualified the killing to Murder.
• Abuse of Public Position: No. There was no showing that accused-appellant used the influence, prestige, or ascendancy of his office to commit the crime; mere status as a policeman or use of a government-issued firearm is insufficient.
• Penalties and Damages: Modified. Reclusion perpetua for Murder; indeterminate penalty of 8 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum for Frustrated Murder; moral damages of P50,000 added; civil indemnity, funeral expenses, and medical expenses affirmed.

• Alibi: The defense of alibi is inherently weak and unreliable and can easily be fabricated; it cannot overcome the positive declarations of the victim unless supported by clear and convincing evidence. Villamor failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene. By his own admission, the distance between his alleged whereabouts and the place of the incident was "very near," so it was not impossible for him to be there. His claim that he was attending to his son at the hospital did not preclude his presence. Jerry Velez positively identified him as the gunman, testifying that when he turned the motorcycle around, he saw Joy Maghilom and PO3 Renato Villamor; Maghilom was driving while Villamor held a short gun pointed at them; he recognized them because they were lighted by the motorcycle's light, at a distance of two meters. Jerry remained resolute and unflinching under cross-examination.
• Credibility of Lone Witness: The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish guilt; evidence is weighed, not counted. A single witness's positive and credible testimony can convict even in a murder charge. The trial court's reliance on Jerry's lone testimony was proper because he testified in a simple and straightforward manner and convincingly identified Villamor. The trial court had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and determine the probative value of their testimonies; its findings are entitled to great weight and respect because an appellate court lacks the same opportunity.
• Motive: Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime. It becomes inconsequential where there are affirmative, categorical declarations regarding the accused-appellant's accountability for the felony. Jerry's positive identification of Villamor rendered motive irrelevant.
• Treachery: Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The qualifying circumstance requires (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift, sudden, and unexpected attack by the aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. Here, Jelord Velez was unsuspecting, holding onto his brother on board their motorcycle on their way home, unaware of the onrushing peril behind them. As in People vs. Padilla, treachery is evident when the accused suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him, and, without any warning, promptly delivered the fatal shots. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life and the danger that lurked behind him; there was no way he could have defended himself, taken flight, or avoided the assault. The attendance of treachery qualified the killing to Murder.
• Abuse of Public Position: To appreciate the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position under Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the public officer must use the influence, prestige, or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence is whether the accused abused his office to commit the crime. There was no showing that Villamor took advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Jelord Velez or that he used his influence, prestige, or ascendancy in killing the victim. He could have shot Velez even without being a policeman. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. As held in People vs. Herrera, the mere fact that the accused is a policeman and used his government-issued .38 caliber revolver to kill is not sufficient to establish that he misused his public position in the commission of the crime. The trial court therefore improperly applied this aggravating circumstance.
• Penalties and Damages: With no modifying circumstances to be appreciated, the proper imposable penalty for the killing of Jelord Velez is reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. For Frustrated Murder, the penalty for a frustrated felony is one degree lower than that of the consummated crime, pursuant to Article 50 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code; in the absence of any modifying circumstances, it is imposed in its medium period in accordance with Article 64, paragraph 1. The proper imposable penalty for Frustrated Murder is Reclusion Temporal in its medium period, with a range of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months. The penalty one degree lower than Reclusion Temporal is Prision Mayor, from which the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty is taken. The Court affirmed the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim even in the absence of proof other than the death. Moral damages of P50,000 were awarded to the victims' heirs in the Murder case, considering the pain and anguish of the victim's family brought about by his death. The award for funeral and burial expenses of Jelord Velez and the medical expenses for Jerry Velez, being amply supported by documentary evidence, were sustained.

• Alibi — Alibi is inherently weak and unreliable and can easily be fabricated; it cannot overcome the positive declarations of the victim unless supported by clear and convincing evidence. The accused must establish that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Applied: Villamor admitted the distance was "very near," so physical impossibility was not established.
• Single-Witness Rule — The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused; evidence is weighed, not counted. It may suffice to convict even in a murder charge. Applied: Jerry Velez's lone testimony was positive and credible and sufficient to convict Villamor.
• Credibility Findings on Appeal — Findings of fact made by the trial court, which had the opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and determine the probative value of their testimonies, are entitled to great weight and respect because the trial court is in a better position to assess them. Applied: the trial court's reliance on Jerry Velez's testimony was upheld.
• Motive in Criminal Cases — Ill motive is never an essential element of a crime and becomes inconsequential where there are affirmative, categorical declarations regarding the accused's accountability for the felony. Applied: the absence of motive did not negate conviction because Jerry positively identified Villamor.
• Treachery (Alevosia) — Treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The requisites are: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed. Its essence is a swift, sudden, and unexpected attack on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend himself, ensuring commission without risk to the aggressor, and without the slightest provocation on the victim's part. Applied: the shooting from behind of the unsuspecting Velez brothers on a motorcycle qualified the killing of Jelord to Murder.
• Abuse of Public Position as an Aggravating Circumstance — To appreciate this circumstance under Article 14, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the public officer must use the influence, prestige, or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose; the essence is whether the accused abused his office to commit the crime. If the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position. Applied: no showing that Villamor used his office to shoot the victim; mere status as a policeman and use of a government-issued .38 caliber revolver are insufficient.
• Penalty for Murder and Frustrated Murder — Absent modifying circumstances, the penalty for Murder is reclusion perpetua under Article 63, paragraph 2 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. For a frustrated felony, the penalty is one degree lower than that of the consummated crime under Article 50 in relation to Article 6, imposed in its medium period under Article 64, paragraph 1; the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty is taken from the penalty one degree lower. Applied: the death penalty for Murder was reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the Frustrated Murder penalty was modified accordingly.
• Damages for Death and Injury — Civil indemnity for death may be awarded even in the absence of proof other than the death of the victim; moral damages may be awarded for the pain and anguish of the victim's family; funeral and burial expenses and medical expenses are sustained when supported by documentary evidence. Applied: P50,000 civil indemnity and P50,000 moral damages were awarded for Jelord's death, funeral expenses of P39,652.52 were sustained, and medical expenses of P47,955 for Jerry were affirmed.

• "The Court has consistently looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion and received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because it can be easily fabricated." — States the Court's settled treatment of alibi, which it used to reject Villamor's defense against Jerry Velez's positive identification.
• "It must be stressed in this regard that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused for evidence is weighed not counted." — Articulates the single-witness rule relied on to uphold conviction based on Jerry Velez's lone testimony.
• "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make." — States the canonical definition of treachery used to qualify the killing of Jelord Velez to Murder.
• "To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry "Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime?"" — Defines the requisites for abuse of public position, which the Court found absent in this case.

• People vs. Hofileña, 334 SCRA 214, 227 [2000] — Cited to support the rule that alibi is inherently weak, unreliable, easily fabricated, and received with caution.
• People vs. Castillo, 273 SCRA 22 [1997] — Cited on the requirement that alibi must establish physical impossibility to be at the crime scene.
• People vs. Buendia, 314 SCRA 655 [1999] — Cited for the rule that the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to establish guilt.
• People vs. Quitoriano, 266 SCRA 373 [1997] — Cited, with Buendia, for the single-witness rule.
• People vs. Barellano, 319 SCRA 567 [1999] — Cited for the rule that a single witness's positive and credible testimony can convict even in a murder charge.
• People vs. Optana, G.R. No. 133922, 12 February 2001 — Cited for the rule that ill motive is never an essential element of a crime.
• People vs. Visaya, et al., G.R. No. 136967, 26 February 2001 — Cited for the rule that trial court findings of fact are entitled to great weight and respect.
• People vs. Galam, 325 SCRA 489 [2000] — Cited for the requisites of treachery.
• People vs. Padilla, G.R. Nos. 138472-73, 9 August 2001 — Cited as analogous precedent; treachery is evident when the accused positions himself at the back of an unsuspecting victim and fires without warning.
• People vs. Magayac, 330 SCRA 767, 777 [2000] — Cited for the inquiry whether the accused abused his office to commit the crime.
• People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670-671 [1999] — Cited for the rule that if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position.
• People vs. Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, 5 December 2001 — Cited for the rule that the mere fact that the accused is a policeman and used a government-issued .38 caliber revolver to kill is not sufficient to establish misuse of public position.
• People vs. Lao-as, G.R. No. 126396, 29 June 2001 — Cited in relation to the imposition of reclusion perpetua for Murder.
• People vs. Amion, G.R. No. 140511, 1 March 2001 — Cited for the award of civil indemnity for death.
• People vs. Concepcion, et al., G.R. No. 131477, 20 April 2001 — Cited for the award of moral damages to the victims' heirs.
• People vs. Caldona, G.R. No. 126019, 1 March 2001 — Cited for pegging moral damages at P50,000.
• People vs. Pardua, et al., G.R. No. 110813, 28 June 2001 — Cited for moral damages based on the pain and anguish of the victim's family.
• People vs. Alba, et al., G.R. Nos. 130627 & 139477-78, 31 May 2001 — Cited in connection with funeral and burial expenses.

• Article 248, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes Murder; used as the basis for convicting Villamor of Murder and for the penalty imposed.
• Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Defines a frustrated felony; used in relation to Article 50 to determine the penalty for Frustrated Murder.
• Article 50, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the penalty for a frustrated felony is one degree lower than that of the consummated felony; applied to Frustrated Murder.
• Article 63, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Governs the penalty when there are no modifying circumstances; used to impose reclusion perpetua for Murder.
• Article 64, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides for imposition of the penalty in its medium period in the absence of modifying circumstances; applied to Frustrated Murder.
• Article 14, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code — Defines the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position; held improperly applied because Villamor did not use his office to commit the crime.
• Article 14, paragraph 16, Revised Penal Code — Defines treachery; applied to qualify the killing of Jelord Velez to Murder.
• R.A. No. 7659 — Amended Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code; cited in imposing reclusion perpetua for Murder.
• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Applied in imposing the indeterminate penalty for Frustrated Murder, with the minimum taken from Prision Mayor and the maximum from Reclusion Temporal.

Davide, Jr. C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapuna, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, J.J., concur.